1 2025:CGHC:1854 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 675 of 2019 1 - Parasmani Sahu S/o Bisruram Sahu Aged About 25 Years R/o Village - Dhetha, Chowki - Birejhar, Police Station Kurud, District Dhamtari Chhattisgarh., District : Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh 2 - Dhalchand Sahu @ Dhalu S/o Bisruram Sahu Aged About 30 Years R/o Village - Dhetha, Chowki - Birejhar, Police Station Kurud, District Dhamtari Chhattisgarh., District : Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh 3 - Smt. Renuka Sahu W/o Dhalchand Sahu Aged About 27 Years R/o Village - Dhetha, Chowki - Birejhar, Police Station Kurud, District Dhamtari Chhattisgarh., District : Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh … Appellant(s) -Versus- State Of Chhattisgarh Through The District Magistrate, Dhamtari, District Dhamtari Chhattisgarh., District : Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Pragalbha Sharma, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Atanu Ghosh, Dy. Govt. Advocate along with Ms. Isha Jajodia, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal Order on Board Digitally signed by VEDPRAKASH DEWANGAN 2 10/01/2025 1. The present appeal under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has been filed by the appellants against the judgment dated 08.04.2019, passed learned Additional Sessions Judge, Link Court, Kurud, District Dhamtari, in Sessions Case No. 13 of 2018, whereby the appellants have been convicted for the offence under Section 304-B/34 of IPC and sentenced for R.I. for 7 years with fine of Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of fine additional R.I. for 3 months to each of the appellants. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the deceased Vimla Sahu was married with the appellant No. 1- Paras Mani Sahu on 09.03.2016. During her stay in her matrimonial house, she died by burn injuries on 18.09.2017. Death Intimation/Exhibit P-12 was sent by the doctor from Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Hospital, Raipur, on which the Merg Intimation/Exhibit P-13 was recorded on 18.09.2017 at Police Station Maudahapara, Raipur. Notice to the witnesses were sent for their appearance for inquest proceeding vide Exhibit P-4 and in their presence the Inquest/Exhibit P-5 was prepared. The dead body was sent for its post-mortem to Dr. Ambedkar Hospital, Raipur where Dr. M. Nirala has conducted the post-mortem of the dead body and gave report/Exhibit P-29. The said post-mortem report is admitted by the appellants as provided under Section 293 of the CRPC on 06.12.2018. In the post-mortem report, the doctor has opined that the death was due to cardio-respiratory failure as a result of burn injuries and their complications. The burn injuries are antemortem in nature 3 and are originated from a flame and burn injuries are sufficient to cause death. *** During the investigation, the marriage card of the deceased was seized vide seizure memo/Exhibit P-1 and the copy of marriage card is Exhibit P-2. The marriage registration certificate is Exhibit P-3 and according to which the date of their marriage was 09.05.2016. Spot map/Exhibit P-8 was prepared by the police and Exhibit P-6 was prepared by Patwari. When kerosene jerrycan and half-burnt pieces of clothes of the deceased have been seized from the spot vide seizure memo/Exhibit P-9. The unnumbered FIR has been registered against the appellants at Police Outpost Girejhar, District Dhamtari for the offence under Section 304-B, 34 of IPC, which is Exhibit P-10 and numbered FIR/Exhibit P-30 was registered at Police Station Kurud, District Dhamtari. The statements of the witnesses under Section 161 of CRPC have been recorded. The appellants have been arrested on 22.01.2018 and they have also been medically examined by the doctor at Community Health Centre, Kurud and their medical reports are Exhibit P-21, P-22 and P-23 respectively. The seized kerosene jerrycan and half-burnt cloth of the deceased were sent for chemical examination to FSL Raipur, from where Report/Exhibit P-27 was received and the kerosene was found present in the sent articles. 3. After completion of investigation, charge sheet was filed against the appellants before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kurud, District Dhamtari for the offence under Section 304B, 34 of IPC. The case was committed to the Court of learned Sessions Judge, 4 Dhamtari from where the same was transferred to the learned trial Court for its trial. 4. The learned trial Court has framed charge against the appellants for the offence under Section 304B, 34 of IPC, in alternative 302 of IPC. The appellants abjured their guilt and claimed trial. In order to prove the charge against the appellants, the prosecution has examined as many as 23 witnesses. Statement of the appellants under Section 313 of CRPC have also been recorded in which they denied the circumstances appears against them, plead innocence and have submitted that they are innocent and falsely implicated in the offence, they had gone to the field at the time of the incident and when they came back to their house from the field, they came to know about the incident and extinguished the fire. The deceased was suffering from skin disease for which she went on depression and despite her treatment she could not recover from her ailment and for that reason she committed suicide. The appellants have examined two defence witnesses Smt. Gayatri Verma/DW-1 and Tarun Kumar Dote/DW-2 in their support. 5. After considering the material produced by the parties in the case, and hearing them, the learned trial Court has convicted and sentenced the appellants for the offence under Section 304-B, 34 of IPC. The said judgment of conviction and sentence is under challenge in the present appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. There are 5 material omissions and contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses, which cannot be relied upon for the conviction of the appellants. There is no evidence against the appellants that soon before the death of the deceased, she was being harassed by the appellants for demand of dowry or subjected to cruelty for the same. There are contradictory statements made by the witnesses, who are the parents and other family members of the deceased, and they are not consistent on the evidence of any demand or cruelty. Although they could not dispute the nature of death of the deceased, but there is no evidence that the appellants have harassed her or she was subjected to cruelty for demand of any dowry. He would further submit that from the evidence of the parents and other family members of the deceased, it is quite vivid that prior to her death, there is no complaint made by either the deceased or by her parents to anywhere, or even no community meeting were called. Even the 161 CRPC statement of the parents of the deceased had been recorded after about a month of the incident, and till the recording of their 161 CRPC statement, they have not made any complaint to anyone, and have not lodged any report to the police. Even at the time of inquest of the dead body, they were present, but have not made any complaint regarding the mode of death of the deceased. He would further submit that general and omnibus allegations have been levelled by the parents of the deceased in order to satisfy their ego as their daughter had died in her matrimonial house. The allegation levelled against the present appellants with respect to demand of dowry or harassment or even cruelty has not been proved by leading, clinching and cogent evidence and the witnesses are not 6 of that sterling quality which required for holding conviction of the accused in the offence. He would also submit that with respect to the oral dying declaration allegedly made by the deceased to her parents, has also been inconsistent in their evidence. Therefore, the same can also not sufficient to hold guilty of the appellants. In the present case, the requirements of the offence of Section 304-B of IPC is missing, yet the learned trial Court has convicted the appellants, which is erroneous, and the appellants are entitled for their acquittal. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes and has submitted that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, but for minor omission or contradictions the evidence of prosecution witnesses are reliable and corroborative. Within one year after her marriage, the deceased has died in unnatural circumstance in her matrimonial house. There are sufficient evidence with respect to harassment given by the accused persons to the deceased for demand of dowry Within a short span of her married life, she has died in unnatural circumstance, and therefore there is no question of soon before her death, but the same reflects from the time gap and conduct of the accused persons as well as the deceased that she was subjected to cruelty before her death. It also comes in the record that 15 days prior to date of her death, she came to her parents' house and was not willing to return back to her matrimonial house. However, she was convinced and then she went back to her matrimonial house, and within 15 days she died. Therefore, the ingredients of soon before her death are very well 7 available in the present case, and there is statutory presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act. The prosecution has proved all the ingredients that the deceased died within 7 years of her marriage in unnatural circumstance and she was subjected to cruelty for demand of dowry, and therefore under the statutory presumption, the appellants have been convicted by the learned trial Court, which is absolutely justified and needs no interference. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the case. 9. So far as the unnatural death of the disease is concerned, the post- mortem report (exhibit P-29) has been admitted by the appellants. Therefore, the doctor who conducted the post-mortem of the dead body of the deceased have not been examined and since it is an admitted fact in the case that the deceased died, due to cardio- respiratory failure as a result of burn injuries and their complications. It can be held that the deceased died in unnatural circumstance. Further, from the inquest (exhibit P-5), the death intimation (exhibit P- 12) sent by the doctor from the hospital and also from the merg intimation (exhibit P-13), it is established that the deceased died on 18.09.2017 in unnatural circumstance. From the evidence, it comes that the deceased was married with the appellant No. 1 on 10.05.2016, whereas she died on 18.09.2017. The same has not been specifically challenged by the appellants and thus her death is proved that she died in unnatural circumstance within 7 years of her marriage. 8 10. Now the next question for consideration would be whether the deceased was subjected to cruelty soon before her death for demand of dowry ? 11. In case of Sher Singh @ Partapa v. State of Haryana, (2015) 3 SCC 724, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in Para 13, 16 and 19 as under: "13. In our opinion, it is beyond cavil that where the same word is used in a section and/or in sundry segments of a statute, it should be attributed the same meaning, unless there are compelling reasons to do otherwise. The obverse is where different words are employed in close proximity, or in the same section, or in the same enactment, the assumption must be that the legislature intended them to depict disparate situations, and delineate dissimilar and diverse ramifications. Ergo, ordinarily Parliament could not have proposed to ordain that the prosecution should "prove" the existence of a vital sequence of facts, despite having employed the word "shown" in Section 304-B. The question is whether these two words can be construed as synonymous. It seems to us that if the prosecution is required to prove, which always means beyond reasonable doubt, that a dowry death has been committed, there is a risk that the purpose postulated in the provision may be reduced to a cipher. This method of statutory interpretation has consistently been disapproved and deprecated except in exceptional instances where the syntax permits reading down or reading up of some words of the subject provisions. 16. As is already noted above, Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B of the IPC were introduced into their respective statutes simultaneously and, therefore, it must ordinarily be assumed that Parliament intentionally used the word 'deemed' in Section 304-B to distinguish this provision 9 from the others. In actuality, however, it is well nigh impossible to give a sensible and legally acceptable meaning to these provisions, unless the word 'shown' is used as synonymous to 'prove' and the word 'presume' as freely interchangeable with the word 'deemed'. In the realm of civil and fiscal law, it is not difficult to import the ordinary meaning of the word 'deem' to denote a set of circumstances which call to be construed contrary to what they actually are. In criminal legislation, however, it is unpalatable to adopt this approach by rote. We have the high authority of the Constitution Bench of this Court both in State of Travancore-Cochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashewnut Factory AIR 1953 SC 333 and State of Tamil Nadu v. Arooran Sugars Limited (1997) 1 SCC 326, requiring the Court to ascertain the purpose behind the statutory fiction brought about by the use of the word 'deemed' so as to give full effect to the legislation and carry it to its logical conclusion. We may add that it is generally posited that there are rebuttable as well as irrebuttable presumptions, the latter oftentimes assuming an artificiality as actuality by means of a deeming provision. It is abhorrent to criminal jurisprudence to adjudicate a person guilty of an offence even though he had neither intention to commit it nor active participation in its commission. It is after deep cogitation that we consider it imperative to construe the word 'shown' in Section 304-B of the IPC as to, in fact, connote 'prove'. In other words, it is for the prosecution to prove that a 'dowry death' has occurred, namely, (i) that the death of a woman has been caused in abnormal circumstances by her having been burned or having been bodily injured, (ii) within seven years of a marriage, (iii) and that she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband, 10 (iv) in connection with any demand for dowry and (v) that the cruelty or harassment meted out to her continued to have a causal connection or a live link with the demand of dowry. We are aware that the word 'soon' finds place in Section 304-B; but we would prefer to interpret its use not in terms of days or months or years, but as necessarily indicating that the demand for dowry should not be stale or an aberration of the past, but should be the continuing cause for the death under Section 304-B or the suicide under Section 306 of the IPC. Once the presence of these concomitants are established or shown or proved by the prosecution, even by preponderance of possibility, the initial presumption of innocence is replaced by an assumption of guilt of the accused, thereupon transferring the heavy burden of proof upon him and requiring him to produce evidence dislodging his guilt, beyond reasonable doubt. It seems to us that what Parliament intended by using the word 'deemed' was that only preponderance of evidence would be insufficient to discharge the husband or his family members of their guilt. This interpretation provides the accused a chance of proving their innocence. This is also the postulation of Section 101 of the Evidence Act. The purpose of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B of the IPC, in our opinion, is to counter what is commonly encountered the lack or the absence of evidence in the case of suicide or death of a woman within seven years of marriage. If the word "shown" has to be given its ordinary meaning then it would only require the prosecution to merely present its evidence in Court, not necessarily through oral deposition, and thereupon make the accused lead detailed evidence to be followed by that of the prosecution. This procedure is unknown to Common Law systems, and beyond the contemplation of the Cr.P.C. 11 19. Keeping in perspective that Parliament has employed the amorphous pronoun/noun "it" (which we think should be construed as an allusion to the prosecution), followed by the word "shown" in Section 304B, the proper manner of interpreting the Section is that "shown" has to be read up to mean "prove" and the word "deemed" has to be read down to mean "presumed". Neither life nor liberty can be emasculated without providing the individual an opportunity to disclose extenuating or exonerating circumstances. It was for this reason that this Court struck down the mandatory death sentence in Section 303 IPC in its stellar decision in Mithu vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 473. Therefore, the burden of proof weighs on the husband to prove his innocence by dislodging his deemed culpability, and that this has to be preceded only by the prosecution proving the presence of three factors, viz. (i) the death of a woman in abnormal circumstances (ii) within seven years of her marriage, and (iii) and that the death had a live link with cruelty connected with any demand of dowry. The other facet is that the husband has indeed a heavy burden cast on his shoulders in that his deemed culpability would have to be displaced and overturned beyond reasonable doubt. This emerges clearly as the manner in which Parliament sought to combat the scourge and evil of rampant bride burning or dowry deaths, to which manner we unreservedly subscribe. In order to avoid prolixity we shall record that our understanding of the law finds support in an extremely extensive and erudite judgment of this Court in P.N. Krishna Lal v. Government of Kerala, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 187, in which decisions spanning the globe have been mentioned and discussed. It is also important to highlight that Section 304B does not require the accused to give evidence against himself but casts the onerous burden to dislodge his deemed guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In our opinion, it would not be appropriate to lessen the husband's onus to that of preponderance of probability as that would annihilate the deemed guilt expressed in Section 304-B, and such a curial interpretation would defeat and neutralise the 12 intentions and purposes of Parliament. A scenario which readily comes to mind is where dowry demands have indubitably been made by the accused husband, where in an agitated state of mind, the wife had decided to leave her matrimonial home, and where while travelling by bus to her parents' home she sustained fatal burn injuries in an accident/collision which that bus encountered. Surely, if the husband proved that he played no role whatsoever in the accident, he could not be deemed to have caused his wife's death. It needs to be immediately clarified that if the wife had taken her life by jumping in front of a bus or before a train, the husband would have no defence. Examples can be legion, and hence we shall abjure from going any further. All that needs to be said is that if the husband proves facts which portray, beyond reasonable doubt, that he could not have caused the death of his wife by burns or bodily injury or not involved in any manner in her death in abnormal circumstances, he would not be culpable under Section 304-B." 12. In case of Maya Devi & another v. State of Haryana, (2015) 17 SCC 405, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in Para 23, 24 and 25 as under: "23. To attract the provisions of Section 304B, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that "soon before her death" she was subjected to cruelty or harassment "for, or in connection with the demand for dowry". The expression "soon before her death" used in Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. In fact, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that there is no proximity for the alleged demand of dowry and harassment. With regard to the said claim, we shall advert to while considering the evidence led in by the prosecution. Though the language used is "soon before her death", no definite period has been enacted and the expression "soon before her death" 13 has not been defined in both the enactments. Accordingly, the determination of the period which can come within the term "soon before her death" is to be determined by the courts, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. However, the said expression would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in question. In other words, there must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence. 24. The aforesaid provisions were considered by this Court in Bansi Lal vs. State of Haryana (2011) 11 SCC 359 wherein it was held that: 17. While considering the case under Section 3048 cruelty has to be proved during the close proximity of the time of death and it should be continuous and such continuous harassment, physical or mental, by the accused should make life of the deceased miserable which may force her to commit suicide. This Court further held that where the cruelty has been proved during the close proximity of the time of death then the provisions of Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 providing for presumption that the accused is responsible for dowry death, have to be pressed in service. In paras 19 and 20 of the judgment, this Court has further held as follows:- "19. It may be mentioned herein that the legislature in its wisdom has used the word "shall" thus, making a mandatory application on the part of the court to presume that death had been committed by the person who had subjected her to cruelty or harassment in connection with any demand of dowry. It is 14 unlike the provisions of Section 113-A of the Evidence Act where a discretion has been conferred upon the court wherein it had been provided that court may presume abetment of suicide by a married woman. Therefore, in view of the above, onus lies on the accused to rebut the presumption and in case of Section 113-B relatable to Section 304-B IPC, the onus to prove shifts exclusively and heavily on the accused. The only requirements are that death of a woman has been caused by means other than any natural circumstances; that death has been caused or occurred within 7 years of her marriage; and such woman had been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband in connection with any demand of dowry. 20. Therefore, in case the essential ingredients of such death have been established by the prosecution, it is the duty of the court to raise a presumption that the accused has caused the dowry death. It may also be pertinent to mention herein that the expression "soon before her death" has not been defined in either of the statutes. Therefore, in each case, the Court has to analyse the facts and circumstances leading to the death of the victim and decide if there is any proximate connection between the demand of dowry and act of cruelty or harassment and the death." 25. This Court, in Mustafa Shahadal Shaikh vs State of Maharashtra (2012) 11 SCC 397 held as under:- "9. In order to convict an accused for the offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC, the following essentials must be satisfied: (i) the death of a woman must have. been caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances; (ii) such death must have occurred within seven years of her marriage; 15 (iii) soon before her death, the woman must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relatives of her husband; (iv) such cruelty or harassment must be for, or in connection with, demand for dowry. When the above ingredients are established by reliable and acceptable evidence, such death shall be called dowry death and such husband or his relatives shall be deemed to have caused her death. If the above-mentioned ingredients are attracted in view of the special provision, the court shall presume and it shall record such fact as proved unless and until it is disproved by the accused. However, it is open to the accused to adduce such evidence for disproving such compulsory presumption as the burden is unmistakably on him to do so and he can discharge such burden by getting an answer through cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses or by adducing evidence on the defence side. * * * 11. To attract the provisions of Section 304- B, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that "soon before her death" she was subjected to cruelty or harassment "for, or in connection with the demand for dowry". The expression "soon before her death" used in Section 304-B IPC and Section 113- B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. In fact, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that there is no proximity for the alleged demand of dowry and harassment. With regard to the said claim, we shall advert to the same while considering the evidence led in by the prosecution. Though the language used is 16 "soon before her death", no definite period has been enacted and the expression "soon before her death" has not been defined in both the enactments. Accordingly, the determination of the period which can come within the term "soon before her death" is to be determined by the courts, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. However, the said expression would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in question. In other words, there must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence. These principles have been reiterated in Kaliyaperumal v. State of T.N. and Yashoda v. State of M.P." 13. In case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Jogendra and another, (2022) 5 SCC 401, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in Para 15 and 16 as under: "15. Now, coming to the second point urged by learned counsel for the State that the High Court has overlooked the fact that Geeta Bai had been subjected to cruelty/harassment at the hands of the respondents soon before her death, which submission is strictly contested by learned counsel for the respondents, we may note that the meaning of the expression "soon before her death" has been discussed threadbare in several judgments. In Surinder Singh (supra), while relying on the provisions of Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and Section 304-B IPC, where the words "soon before her death" find mention, the following pertinent observations have been made: - 17 "17. Thus, the words "soon before" appear in Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872 and also in Section 304-B IPC. For the presumptions contemplated under these sections to spring into action, it is necessary to show that the cruelty or harassment was caused soon before the death. The interpretation of the words "soon before" is, therefore, important. The question is how "soon before"? This would obviously depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The cruelty or harassment differs from case to case. It relates to the mindset of people which varies from person to person. Cruelty can be mental or it can be physical. Mental cruelty is also of different shades. It can be verbal or emotional like insulting or ridiculing or humiliating a woman. It can be giving threats of injury to her or her near and dear ones. It can be depriving her of economic resources or essential amenities. of life. It can be putting restraints on her movements. It can be not allowing her to talk to the outside world. The list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Physical cruelty could be actual beating or causing pain and harm to the person of a woman. Every such instance of cruelty and related harassment has a different impact on the mind of a woman. Some instances may be so grave as to have a lasting impact on a woman. Some instances which degrade her dignity may remain etched in her memory for a long time. Therefore, "soon before" is a relative term. in matters of emotions we cannot have fixed formulae. The time-lag may differ from case to case. This must be kept in mind while examining each case of dowry death. 18. In this connection we may refer to the judgment of this Court in Kans Raj v. State of Punjab [(2000) 5 SCC 207 where this Court considered the term "soon before". The relevant observations are as under: 18 "15.... 'Soon before' is a relative term which is required to be considered under specific circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down by fixing any time-limit. This expression is pregnant with the idea of proximity test. The term 'soon before' is not synonymous with the term 'immediately before' and is opposite of the expression 'soon after' as used and understood in Section 114, Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act. These words would imply that the interval should not be too long between the time of making the statement and the death. It contemplates the reasonable time which, as earlier noticed, has to be understood and determined under the peculiar circumstances of each case. In relation to dowry deaths, the circumstances showing the existence of cruelty or harassment to the deceased are not restricted to a particular instance but normally refer to a course of conduct. Such conduct may be spread over a period of time. If the cruelty or harassment or demand for dowry is shown to have persisted, it shall be deemed to be 'soon before death' if any other intervening circumstance showing the non-existence of such treatment is not brought on record, before such alleged treatment and the date of death. It does not, however, mean that such time can be stretched to any period. Proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the consequential death is required to be proved by the prosecution. The demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment based. upon such demand and the date of death should not be too remote in time which, under the circumstances, be treated as having become stale enough." 19 Thus, there must be a nexus between the demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment, based upon such demand and the date of death. The test of proximity will have to be applied. But, it is not a rigid test. It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and calls for a pragmatic and sensitive approach of the court within the confines of law. [emphasis added] 16. In Rajinder Singh [supra], falling back on the rulings in Kans Raj v. State of Punjab and Others. Dinesh v. State of Haryana and Sher Singh Partapa v. State of Haryana, it has been emphasized that "soon before" is not synonymous to "immediately before" and the following observations have been made: - "24. We endorse what has been said by these two decisions. Days or months are not what is to be seen. What must be borne in mind is that the word "soon" does not mean "immediate". A fair and pragmatic construction keeping in mind the great social evil that has led to the enactment of Section 304-B would make it clear that the expression is a relative expression. Time- lags may differ from case to case. All that is necessary is that the demand for dowry should not be stale but should be the continuing cause for the death of the married woman under Section 304-B." 14. PW-1, who is the father of the deceased has stated in his evidence that his daughter has got married with the appellant No. 1 Parasmani. After 5-6 months of her marriage, his daughter was residing happily and thereafter the appellants started harassing her for demand of dowry. He along with his brother-in-law and brother had gone to the house of appellants and tried to convince them. She again resided happily for about 1½ months and again started 20 harassing her. Thereafter, when he had gone to the house of the appellants, he saw injuries on the body of his daughter and she informed that they are demanding money from her, because they are constructing a house. He again convinced the appellant No. 1 and the appellant No. 1 assured him that he will not repeat the same. Despite that, their act of harassment again started. By the harassment made by the appellants, his daughter had gone to her maternal uncle's house which was being informed to him through telephone. When they had gone to meet her at her maternal uncle's house, she informed that the appellants had beaten her. The appellants have also came there and they convinced his daughter and sent her back along with the appellants. At the time of Teeja festival, she stayed in his house for about 10-12 days and they again sent her with the appellant No. 1. After 12-13 days, he was being informed that his daughter has got burnt. When he asked from his daughter, she disclosed that her jeth Dhalchand has got burnt by pouring kerosene oil. During treatment, his daughter has died. *******In cross-examination, he admitted that at the time of marriage, no demand was made by the appellants. Even at the time of marriage, all the rituals were performed happily and in a healthy atmosphere. He further admitted that after one year of the marriage, his daughter had come to his house occasionally and after staying for some time, his daughter and his son-in-law used to return back to their house. Up to 5-6 months of the marriage, there was no dispute between them. He admitted that when he came to know about the fact that his daughter was being harassed by the appellants, he has 21 not made any complaint to anyone, neither in the community nor in the village. Even when he saw the injuries on her body, he has not made any complaint. He disclosed before the police that his daughter was being harassed for demand of money from her because the accused persons were constructing house and if it is not there in his police statement, he could not tell the reason. His house is situated at the distance of 2 - 2½ miles. He further admitted that his daughter has also not lodged any report to any police station and has not made any complaint to anyone. *******He further admitted that he participated in the final rites of the deceased. At the time of 10th day rituals after her death, the persons of the community and society were there, but at that time also he has not made any complaint to anyone against the appellants and even he has not made any complaint to any police station. 15. PW-2, Kamal Narayan who is the uncle of the deceased has stated in his evidence that he was being informed by his sister-in-law that the deceased has received burn injuries. When they went there, they saw that the deceased is lying in the room having burn injuries on her body. When they asked from her, she informed that the appellants have got her burnt after pouring kerosene oil. In cross-examination, he admitted that he has not disclosed in his police statement that the deceased has disclosed before him that her jethani and husband has poured kerosene and set her ablaze and this statement he made first time before the Court. 22 16. PW-3, Smt. Rekha Bai is the mother of the deceased, has stated in her evidence that her daughter has got married with appellant Parasmani in the year 2016. After 6 months of the marriage, she was residing happily in her matrimonial house. Thereafter, her in-laws and husband have started harassing her for demand of dowry, which was being informed to her by her daughter. Her husband and other family members had gone to the house of her daughter and tried to convince her in-laws and they assured them. The act of their harassment was continued. *******At the time of Teeja festival, the deceased came to her house and stayed for about 10-12 days and thereafter she was not willing to return back to her matrimonial house, but they convinced her and sent her back. After 15 days, the appellant- Dhalchand informed them that the deceased has got burn injuries. When they had gone to her house and asked her, she informed that she has been burnt by Dhalchand by pouring kerosene oil upon her. She was being taken to hospital, where she died during treatment. *******In cross-examination, she too has admitted that at the time of marriage, there was no demand made by the appellants and her daughter and her son-in-law were used to come to her house, but up to 6 months they have not made any complaint. She also admitted that they have not made any complaint to anyone about harassment made by the appellants to the deceased. She admitted that prior to the marriage, her daughter was a patient of itching on her hand. She also admitted that after the marriage, her daughter had gone to Raipur for its treatment. 23 17. PW-4, Sanjay Kumar Sahu is the relative of the deceased. He stated in his evidence that when he received information about the incident, he had gone to the hospital, but till that time the deceased had already died. He admitted in his cross-examination that the father of the deceased had not made any complaint to the community. He is the community head at village Bhedsar. He further admitted that till the final rites of the deceased, the father of the deceased or any of her family members have not made any complaint against anyone. 18. PW-5, Rohit Kumar has stated in his evidence that after 6 months of the marriage of the deceased, she was resided happily in her matrimonial house and thereafter her husband and in-laws started harassing her and used to beat her. When they had gone to her house, then she disclosed that she was being harassed for demand of dowry and at that time they convinced her husband and in-laws. After 1 ½ month, when the appellants again beaten the deceased, they again had gone to her house and saw the injuries on her body, they again convinced them and came back. When she returned back to her matrimonial house after Teeja festival, she received burn injuries in her matrimonial house. When he had gone to Mekahara Hospital, Raipur and met the father and mother of the deceased, they informed him that she was being burned by her jeth Dhalchand by pouring kerosene oil and during treatment she died. *******In cross-examination, he too has remained firm in saying that up to 6 months of the marriage, there was no dispute between them. This witness is the maternal uncle of the deceased and despite having seen the injuries on her body, he has not made any complaint 24 to anyone. However, he was being informed by the parents of the deceased that she was being burned by her jeth. 19. PW-6 is the uncle of the deceased. He too has stated that the deceased was being harassed by the appellants and whenever they received information that the appellants have committed marpeet with her, they convinced her in-laws not to harass her. He too has admitted in his cross-examination that with respect to the harassment and cruelty by the appellants, they have not made any complaint to anyone at any time. 20. PW-7, Uttam Kumar Sahu is also a witness who has stated that he was being informed by the parents of the deceased that she was being harassed by the appellants in her matrimonial house and ultimately she has got burned. When the process of her admission in the hospital was going on, she disclosed to her parents that her jeth is responsible for her injuries. *******In cross-examination, he admitted that he himself has not asked anything from the deceased and he is not in his personal knowledge about the incident. He further admitted that the harassment made by Parasmani to the deceased has been disclosed by him first time before the Court. 21. PW-8, Smt. Ahilya is the neighbour of the deceased. She stated in her evidence that the deceased used to come to her house and regularly had a talk with her. They shared their thoughts, but she admitted that the deceased has never informed her that the appellants are harassing her. She is her next door neighbour. She 25 has not seen any incident in her house regarding harassment. She admitted that she came in the lane in burning condition and then her jeth Dhalchand and other persons got the fire extinguished by blanket and her jeth Dhalchand had called ambulance. The appellants and the deceased were residing happily. 22. PW-9, Smt. Manki is also a neighbour. She too has stated that she used to meet with the deceased and shared their thoughts, but the deceased has never informed her that she was being harassed by the appellants. 23. PW-10, Omprakash is also the witness of the same nature that he is the neighbour of the deceased and had never seen and never heard about any harassment to the deceased by the appellants. 24. PW-12, Rajesh Chandrakar is the Patwari, who prepared the spot map (exhibit P-6). 25. PW-15, Smt. Kumari Bai is also a neighbour. She stated that when she came from the pond and changing her clothes, she heard the noise “bachao bachao” and when she came out from her house, she saw that the deceased was burning and the villagers were trying to extinguish the fire. She too has stated that she regularly met the deceased, but she has never disclosed any incident to her by the appellants. The deceased was residing with her husband and in-laws happily. 26. PW-16/Amritlal, PW-17/Smt. Saroj Sahu, PW-20/Hemlal Sahu are the witnesses of the village and all of them have stated that the 26 appellants and the deceased were residing happily and they were not heard about any incident between them. 27. From all these evidences, it only comes that when the parents of the deceased met her at the time when she got burn injuries, she disclosed them that the appellant Dhalchand has poured kerosene and set her ablaze. The specific allegation against the appellant Dhalchand that he caused burn injuries to the deceased. There is also the allegation from the evidence of the parents of the deceased that the husband of the deceased, Parasmani, used to beat her for demand of dowry. Since, the deceased died due to burn injuries in the unnatural circumstances within 07 years of marriage and it is proved that she was subjected to cruelty for demand of dowry, it shall be presumed that the accused persons had committed her dowry death. There is sufficient evidence against the appellant No. 1 Parasmani and appellant No. 2 Dhalchand that they are guilty for committing dowry death of the deceased. However, from the evidence of the witnesses and parents of the deceased, it has not specifically come that the appellant No. 3 Smt. Renuka Sahu was also harassing her or committed cruelty with her for demand of dowry and only being the mother of the appellant No. 1 and mother-in-law of the deceased, it cannot be presumed in absence of any cogent evidence that she too were harassed the deceased for demand of dowry. There is no sufficient evidence to hold that she is also guilty for the offence of dowry death. 28. From all these evidences, it has been found proved that the appellants Parasmani and Dhalchand have committed dowry death 27 of the deceased as they have harassed the deceased for demand of dowry and it is Dhalchand who set her ablaze after pouring kerosene oil upon her. The evidence laid by the prosecution satisfies the requirement of the offence under section 304-B of IPC against the appellants Parasmani and Dhalchand. However, the prosecution does not satisfy the requirements of the offence under section 304-B of IPC against the appellant No. 3, Smt. Renuka Sahu. 29. In the result, the present appeal filed with respect to the appellant No. 1 (Parasmani Sahu) and appellant No. 2 (Dhalchand Sahu) is dismissed. However, the present appeal filed with respect to the appellant No. 3 (Smt. Renuka Sahu) is allowed. Therefore, the appellant No. 3 is acquitted from the alleged offences and the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence with respect to the appellant No. 3- Renuka Sahu is set aside. 30. It is reported that the appellant No. 3- Renuka Sahu is on bail. Her bail bond shall remain effective for the further period of 6 months as provided under section 481 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. 31. The appellants No. 1- Parasmani Sahu has already been released from jail after completion of the entire jail sentence on 02.05.2024, whereas the appellant No. 2- Dhalchand Sahu has also completed his entire jail sentence and released from jail on 10.02.2024. Therefore, they are not required to surrender before the Court. 28 32. From the above discussions, the present appeal filed with respect to the appellants No. 1 and 2 is dismissed and with respect to the appellant No. 3 is allowed. 33. Let a copy of this judgment and the original records be transmitted to the trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge ved