-1- 2025:CGHC:4222 NAFR HIGH COURT of CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 3492 of 2018 Sanjeev Kumar Yadav S/o Permeshwar Yadav Aged About 38 Years R/o Village - Mahapatre Colony Jashpur Nagar Tahsil and District Jashpur Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner Versus 1- State of Chhattisgarh, Through: Secretary Department of Panchayat And Rorer Development New Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 2- The Commissioner, Surguja Division - Ambikapur Surguja Chhattisgarh., District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh. 3- The Chief Exective officer, Jila Panchayat Jashpur District Jashpur Chhattisgarh., District : Jashpur, Chhattisgarh. 4- Block Education officer Bagecha District Jashpur Chhattisgarh., District : Jashpur, Chhattisgarh. 5- The Asstt. Commissioner of Tribal , Welfare Jashpur District Jashpur Chhattisgarh., District : Jashpur, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Petitioners : Mr. Vineet Kumar Pandey, Advocate, For State : Mr. Vinay Pandey, Deputy Advocate General, For Respondent 3 : Ms. Priyanka Rai, Advocate, holding the brief of Mr. Shashank Thakur, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 23.01.2025 1) The petitioner has filed this petition seeking the following relief(s):- Digitally signed by NADIM MOHLE -2- “i) That, this Hon'ble court may kindly be pleased to call the entire records relating to petitioner's case. ii) That, this Hon'ble court may kindly be pleased to issue an appropriate writ/direction to quash the order dated 02/04/2018 and 18/09/2017 (Annexure P-1& P/2) passed by respondent No. 2 & No.3. iii) That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a appropriate writ, directing the respondents to give all consequence benefit while quash the order dated 02/04/2018 and 18/09/2017 (Annexure P-1 & P/2). iii) Any other relief / reliefs which may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, may also be allowed.” 2) Brief facts of the present case are as under:- A. The petitioner was appointed to the post of Shiksha Karmi Grade-III vide order dated 10.07.1998. His services were regularized vide order dated 11.07.2001. B. In the year 2006, the petitioner was promoted to the post of Shiksha Karmi Grade-II and vide order dated 04.08.2014, he was posted at the Office of Block Resources Center, Manora as Block Resource Person. C. A complaint was made against the petitioner before the Chief Executive Officer, Zila Panchayat Jashpur, Block Education Officer, Manora with regard to the misbehavior towards the female employees and committing illegality in the distribution of place of posting under a scheme of the utilization of the teachers. D. A show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 06.09.2014. He filed a reply to the show cause notice. The petitioner was placed under suspension by respondent No. 3 vide order dated 07.01.2015. E. On 22.01.2015, a show cause notice along with the article of charges was issued. Vide order dated 18.05.2015, the Assistant Commissioner -3- Tribal Welfare Jashpur, District Jashpur/respondent no.5 was appointed as an Enquiry Officer and respondent No.4/Block Education Officer was appointed as the Presenting Officer. F. The enquiry officer recorded the statement of the prosecution witnesses and also afforded the opportunity of hearing to the petitioner to lead evidence. G. After the completion of the enquiry, the enquiry report was submitted on 09.06.2016 before the Disciplinary Authority. Thereafter, the enquiry report was submitted before the General Administration Committee, Zila Panchayat Jashpur and the said report was approved for punishment of stoppage of 4 increments with cumulative effect vide order dated 18.9.2017. H. The petitioner preferred WPS No.6250/2017 challenging therein the order dated 18.9.2017 and the same was disposed of granting liberty to the petitioner to prefer an appeal before the appropriate appellate authority. In compliance thereof, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the appellate authority, which in turn, was dismissed affirming the findings recorded by the learned discipline authority. 3) Mr. Vineet Kumar Pandey, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would make the following submissions:- I. The orders passed by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority are illegal and contrary to the well settled principle of service jurisprudence. He would contend that the statement of the complainant and witnesses were recorded, but the department failed to place clinching material against the petitioner. He would argue that the opportunity of hearing was not afforded to the petitioner as after the submission of the enquiry report; -4- before imposing major punishment, no show cause notice was given to the petitioner; further, he was not permitted to cross examine the witnesses. J. It is also contended that the departmental enquiry was contemplated against one Kamleshwar Tappo, but he was exonerated from the alleged charges. It is also contended that the relevant documents were not supplied to the petitioner. It is also stated that the presenting officer was not appointed. K. Mr. Pandey would also submit that the disciplinary authority was the superior officer of the petitioner, who acted as the disciplinary authority; therefore, the departmental enquiry got vitiated. He would pray to quash the orders dated 18.09.2017 and 02.04.2018. 4) On the other hand, Mr. Vinay Pandey, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State and Ms. Priyanka Rai, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Mr. Shashank Thakur, for respondent No. 3 would oppose the submissions made by learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and submit that various complaints were received against the petitioner, therefore, a show cause notice was issued to him by the respondent authorities. Thereafter, the article of charges was issued and a reply was filed by the petitioner which was not found satisfactory. Thereafter, the enquiry officer and presenting officer were appointed. They would contend that the petitioner was afforded a due opportunity of hearing; finally, a final report was submitted before the disciplinary authority on 09.06.2016. They would further contend that a copy of -5- the enquiry report and statement of witnesses were provided to the petitioner and he was afforded a due opportunity to cross examine the witnesses. They would further argue that the enquiry report was submitted before the General Administration Committee of Zila Panchayat, Jashpur i.e. the appointing authority and a meeting was held on 12.09.2017 whereby a resolution was passed to inflict punishment of stoppage of 4 increments with cumulative effect and accordingly, the order was passed on 18.09.2017. They would also argue that except for charge No. 02, charges No. 01, 03, 04, 05 & 06 were found proved against the petitioner. They would state that a departmental appeal was preferred by the petitioner but the same was dismissed vide order dated 02.04.2018. In support of their arguments, they placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and others v. Constable Sunil Kumar, (2023) 3 SCC 622, and Chhatrapal v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, (2024) SCC OnLine SC 146. 5) Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents available on the file. 6) In the matter of Constable Sunil Kumar (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that for interfering with the quantum of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority in the exercise of the power of judicial review, punishment should not be merely disproportionate but strikingly disproportionate. Only in extreme cases where on the face of it there is perversity or irrationality, the power of judicial review under Articles 226/227 or Article 32 may be exercised. -6- The relevant para-12 is reproduced herein below:- “12.Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decision(s) to the facts of the case on hand, it cannot be said that the punishment of dismissal can be said to be strikingly disproportionate warranting the interference of the High Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the facts and circumstances of the case and on the charges and misconduct of indiscipline and insubordination proved, the CRPF being a disciplined force, the order of penalty of dismissal was justified and it cannot be said to be disproportionate and/or strikingly disproportionate to the gravity of the wrong. Under the circumstances also, the Division Bench of the High Court has committed a very serious error in interfering with the order of penalty of dismissal imposed and ordering reinstatement of the respondent.” 7) In the matter of Chhatrapal (supra), the Supreme Court held that the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer should not be interfered with by the appellate authority or by the writ court. However, when the finding of guilt recorded by the Inquiry Officer is based on a perverse finding, the same can always be interfered with. The relevant para-17 is reproduced herein below:- “17. It is trite law that ordinarily the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer should not be interfered by the appellate authority or by the writ court. However, when the finding of guilt recorded by the Inquiry Officer is based on perverse finding the same can always be interfered as held in Union of India vs. P. Gunasekaran [2015 (2) SCC 610], State of Haryana vs. Rattan Singh [1977 (2) SCC 491] and Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board vs. T.T. Murali Babu [2014 (4) SCC 108]. In P. Gunasekaran (supra), the following has been held by this Court in para nos. 12, 13, 16 : “12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the -7- High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) reappreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience. 16. These principles have been succinctly summed up by the living legend and centenarian V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. in State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh [(1977) 2 SCC 491 : 1977 SCC (L&S) 298]. To quote the unparalleled and inimitable expressions: (SCC p. 493, para 4) “4. … in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules -8- of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and administrative tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor textbooks, although we have been taken through case law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fair play is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good.” (emphasis supplied) 8) The enquiry report filed as Annexure R/1 by respondent No.1, would show that Smt. Suman Bhagat, Assistant Teacher (Panchayat), Government Primary School, Sogda, and Smt. Indravati Kunj, Teacher (Panchayat), Government Boys Primary and Middle School, Manora, raised allegations of misbehavior against the petitioner. Additionally, Smt. Bifni Bhagat, Assistant Teacher (Panchayat), Government Primary School, Chadiya, and Smt. Taramani Ohdar, Assistant Teacher (Panchayat), Primary School, Korvatoli, stated that they were threatened by the petitioner. Smt. Vimlavati Bhagat, Government Primary Middle School (Girls), Manora, alleged a demand of 20,000 for posting at a preferred location. ₹ Further, many of the teachers have made allegations against the petitioner regarding ill-treatment. The statement of Kishore Kumar, Assistant Teacher (Panchayat), would also show that the petitioner refused to cross-examine certain witnesses, while Mahendra Kumar Nishad was cross-examined. Since the -9- petitioner was given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, the contention made by the counsel for the petitioner that no such opportunity was afforded, appears to be misplaced. 9) The counsel for the petitioner has also argued that the documents were not supplied, but before the enquiry officer, no such application was moved and no such statement was given, therefore, the contention made by counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. 10) It is also argued that a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner after the submission of the enquiry report before the disciplinary authority, particularly, before imposing major punishment. It appears that before the authority, this issue was not raised. Further, the petitioner has not stated as to what prejudice was caused due to the issuance of show cause notice, which was ultimately not challenged. 11) Though the other delinquent employee namely, Kamlesh Toppo, who was charged along with the petitioner, was exonerated by the disciplinary authority, the petitioner has not placed any document to substantiate his arguments. Therefore, the ground raised by the petitioner cannot be accepted. 12) In the present case, the enquiry was conducted in accordance with the prescribed procedure; there was no violation of the principles of natural justice; the authorities concerned acted fairly; the allegations levelled against the petitioner are of a serious nature; the disciplinary authority considered only the admissible evidence, and findings recorded by it were affirmed by the appellate -10- authority; further, the High Court is not required to re-appreciate the evidence or reassess the conclusions drawn by the enquiry officer, nor should it delve into the adequacy of the evidence while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, unless the finding of guilt recorded by the Inquiry Officer is based on perverse finding. 13) Taking into consideration the above-discussed facts and the law, in the opinion of this Court, no case is made out for interference by this Court with orders impugned. 14) Accordingly, this petition is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. 15) No cost(s). Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge Nadim