[2025:RJ-JP:20217] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 1016/2014 1. Sunder W/o Unkar (Since decease) 2. Gajanand S/o Unkar 3. Sharwan S/o Unkar adopted S/o Ram Lal @ Ramu 4. Suraj adopted S/o Ram Lal @ Ramu 5. Satram Adopted s/o Ram Lal @ Ramu All appellant R/o Arniya Kakar Tehsil Peeplu Distt. Tonk. ----Appellant Versus 1. Ladu S/o Shyochanda R/o Soda P.S. Diggi (Driver) 2. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation through its managing director Parivahan marg, Jaipur. ----Respondent For Appellant(s) : Mr. Arjun Sharma, Mr. Ram Singh Rathore for Mr. Sunil Jain For Respondent(s) : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANEESH SHARMA Order 13/05/2025 1. The present appeal filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, challenging the award dated 30.06.2012 passed by the Additional District Judge (Fast Track), Tonk (Motor Accident Claims Tribunal) in claim case No.333/2010(92/2007), whereby the claim petition filed by the claimant has been partly allowed. 2. The present appeal has been filed by the claimants/appellants after an inordinate delay of 457 days. 3. Heard on application for condonation of delay. [2025:RJ-JP:20217] (2 of 4) [CMA-1016/2014] 4. The only explanation given by the learned counsel for the appellant is that their lawyer did not inform the appellants about the passing of the impugned award and because of negligence of the lawyer delay has occurred. 5. In the present case, the claim petition of the applicant was allowed vide order dated 30.06.2012 and it has not been disputed by the appellants that they have received the claim amount much prior to filling of the appeal. Therefore, it is explicitly clear that the alleged ground of condonation of delay is not genuine and occurred due to the inaction and negligence of the appellant only. 6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in "Esha Bhattacharjee v. Committee of Raghunatpur Nafar Academy and others" reported in [(2013) 12 SCC 649] held as under: "21.8 (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration of a few days, for the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted, whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants a strict approach, whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9 (ix) The conduct, behaviour, and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties, and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of a liberal approach" 7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG Go. v. The Employees State Insurance Corporation, reported in (1971) 2 SCC 860", has held as under: [2025:RJ-JP:20217] (3 of 4) [CMA-1016/2014] "That law does not assist a person who is inactive and sleeps over his rights by allowing them when challenged or disputed to remain dormant without asserting them in a Court of law. The principle which forms the basis of this rule is expressed in the maximum vigilantibus, non dermientibus, jura subveniunt (the laws give help to those who are watchful and not to those who sleep). Therefore, the object of the statutes of limitations is to compel a person to exercise his right of action within a reasonable time as also to discourage and suppress stale, fake or fraudulent claims." 8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Rajneesh Kumar & Anr. vs. Ved Prakash" reported in 2024 0 Supreme (SC) 1101, has held as under: It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the head of the advocate who was appearing for the petitioners in the trial court. We have noticed over a period of time a tendency on the part of the litigants to blame their lawyers of negligence and carelessness in attending the proceedings before the court. Even if we assume for a moment that the concerned lawyer was careless or negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the court initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the advocate and thereby disown him at any time and seek relief. 9. In view of the above legal proposition of law and facts stated above, the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for [2025:RJ-JP:20217] (4 of 4) [CMA-1016/2014] condonation of delay is hereby dismissed for want of any sufficient cause mentioned in the application. 10. Accordingly, the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act is dismissed as being devoid of merits. 11. The present civil miscellaneous appeal has also been dismissed. 12. Any other pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of. (MANEESH SHARMA),J SOURAV /16