( 2025:HHC:14458 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA CWPOA No. 934 of 2019. Reserved on : 7 th May, 2025. Decided on : 19 th May, 2025. Onkar Singh ...Petitioner. Versus State of H.P. & Ors. ....Respondents. Coram: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Satyen Vaidya, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes. For the Petitioner: Mr. Amit Singh Chandel, Advocate. For the Respondents: Mr. Baldev Singh Negi, Addl. A.G. for respondent No.1. Mr. Vijay Kumar Arora, Sr. Advocate with Ms. Godawari, Ms. Lalita Sharma, Mr. Hitansh Raj, Mr. Gaurav Kumar and Ms. Astha Kohli, Advocates for respondents No.2 to 4. Satyen Vaidya, Judge. The instant petition has been filed for following reliefs:- “1. That the respondents may be directed to produce entire records pertaining to this case may be produced before this Court. 1 Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 ( 2025:HHC:14458 ) 2. That the impugned annexures A/15, A/16 and A/29 being passed in violation of the principles of natural justice, being arbitrary and against the law may kindly be quashed and set aside. 3. That the applicant may kindly be restored his position as a Junior Assistant under the respondents with all consequential benefits by quashing of impugned annexures A/15 and A/16.” 2. Brief facts of the case necessary for adjudication are that the petitioner while posted as Junior Assistant in the office of 4th respondent faced two separate complaints dated 19.10.2002 and 22.03.2023 with allegations of sexual harassment by female co-employees. 3. In respect of first complaint dated 19.10.2002 disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner under CCS (CCA) Rules vide office memos No. 1084 and 1089 issued on 20.05.2003. However, the inquiry with respect to the second complaint dated 22.03.2003 was undertaken by the complaint committee constituted in terms of the directions issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vishaka vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., (1997)6 SCC 241. 3 ( 2025:HHC:14458 ) 4. The complaint committee indicted the petitioner vide its report dated 14.10.2003. Petitioner was issued notice dated 23.12.2003 requiring him to show cause as to why he should not be dismissed from service. Petitioner submitted his reply dated 03.01.2004. One of the objection raised by the petitioner was that the complaint committee had not afforded him sufficient opportunity of being heard. Respondent No.2 on 14.01.2004 ordered that the petitioner be afforded another opportunity to present his case before the complaint committee along with such documents and witnesses that were required to be produced. Next hearing was ordered to be held by the complaint committee on 09.02.2004 at 11.00 AM. Petitioner accordingly submitted a list of witnesses before the complaint committee but thecommittee disallowed his request and allowed only the petitioner to represent his case. On the date of hearing i.e. on 09.02.2004, petitioner submitted his written brief. He was questioned by the committee and thereafter the said committee submitted its report dated 12.03.2004, which was the reiteration of its earlier report dated 14.10.2003. Strict action against the petitioner was recommended. In sequel, respondent No.2 passed office order No.365 dated 31.03.2004 whereby penalty of removal from service was 4 ( 2025:HHC:14458 ) ordered to be imposed against the petitioner as provided under 6.17(i)(e) of the Service Bye Laws Himachal Pradesh State Forest Corporation Ltd., (for short “Corporation”) and also in accordance with Rule 11 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. Consequently, respondent No.3 issued order dated 04.04.2005 removing the petitioner from service w.e.f. 31.03.2004. 5. Petitioner assailed the order dated 31.03.2004 passed by respondent No.2 and order dated 04.04.2004 issued by respondent No.3 by filing appeal under the service rules before the Chairman of the Corporation. However, the appeal of the petitioner having remained undecided, he filed the instant petition. 6. The petitioner has alleged that the entire process of inquiry held by the complaint committee is vitiated for non compliance of principles of natural justice. It is alleged that neither the petitioner was supplied with the copy of complaint nor with the report of the complaint committee. As per petitioner, he was not afforded any opportunity of being heard by the complaint committee and it was in pursuance to the order dated 14.01.2004 passed by respondent No.2 that the petitioner was allowed to participate in the proceedings dated 09.02.2004 that too without allowing the petitioner to 5 ( 2025:HHC:14458 ) examine any witness. As per the petitioner, he had filed written brief before the complaint committee on 09.02.2004. The said committee had questioned the petitioner on certain aspects of the matter and the petitioner had reiterated his defence of innocence, but the committee indicted him without considering his submissions. 7. It is further the objection of the petitioner that the petitioner had faced two parallel inquiries on the same allegations. The first inquiry was under the service rules of the corporation and other was by the complaint committee. The first inquiry was closed on 24.09.2004 on the ground that the petitioner had already been penalised and removed from service vide order dated 31.03.2004. The petitioner defended himself in the first inquiry but he was denied the opportunity to defend himself in the second inquiry. 8. It has further been alleged that the complainant had motive to falsely frame the petitioner and a specific defence to this effect was raised which remained without consideration throughout. As per the petitioner, the impugned orders dated 31.03.2004 and 04.04.2004 were passed/issued without application of mind. The said orders were non speaking on material aspects. Neither there was any discussion or findings on the contents of the complaint 6 ( 2025:HHC:14458 ) and the defence raised by the petitioner nor the aspect of violation of principles of natural justice was considered. The impugned orders have also been termed as harsh and excessive. It is further alleged that even respondent No.2 before passing of order dated 31.03.2004 had not afforded any opportunity of being heard to the petitioner. 9. In reply filed by the respondents, the order of removal from service has been defended. It is stated that the order dated 31.03.2004 was passed by respondent No.2 in accordance with the certified standing orders issued by the Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh as also the Service Bye Laws of the Corporation besides the relevant CCS (CCA) Rules 1965. It is submitted that the complaint committee was constituted by the 2nd respondent vide office memorandum dated 04.01.2003 and the complaint dated 22.03.2003 against the petitioner was referred to complaint committee. The inquiry report was submitted by the complaint committee on 14.10.2003. It has been admitted that on the representation of the petitioner, 2nd respondent had issued order dated 14.01.2004 directing the complaint committee to afford the petitioner an opportunity to defend himself and to take any evidence which was to be submitted by him. It has further been admitted that on 09.02.2004 the 7 ( 2025:HHC:14458 ) complaint committee allowed only the petitioner to represent his case. The petitioner was not allowed to lead any evidence or examine his witnesses. It has also not been denied that some questions were put to the petitioner and thereafter the report dated 12.03.2004 was submitted by the complaints committee whereby the contents of earlier report dated 14.10.2003 of the committee were reiterated. It is also submitted that the penalty was imposed upon the petitioner as per the Rule 6.17 (i)(e) of the Service Rules of Corporation. As per the respondents, Rule 11 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 was also made applicable to the case of the petitioner. In para-17 of the reply, it has been submitted by the respondents that there was no need to supply copies of complaint and inquiry report to the petitioner. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties parties and have also gone through the record carefully. 11. In the first instance, it is necessary to ascertain as to by what set of rules the petitioner was to be treated and governed. The complaint in which the complaint committee indicted the petitioner was submitted by the complainant on 22.03.2003. The first inquiry report was submitted on 14.10.2003 and the 2nd and final report was submitted on 12.03.2004. The judgment in Vishakha (supra) was passed in 8 ( 2025:HHC:14458 ) the year 1997. The direction contained in the said judgment was to legislate on the subject of protection of women from sexual harassment in working places. In the interim, it was mandated that the complaint committee would be constituted in each working place for adjudication of the complaints relating to sexual harassment of women in working places. The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Protection, Prohibition and Redressal) Act came into being in the year 2013. Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 was amended w.e.f. 01.07.2004 whereby a proviso was added and the inquiry held by the complaint committee was to be treated as inquiry under Rule 14 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. Rule 3 of the CCS Conduct Rules was amended in the year 1998 and as per Rule 3 (c), the sexual harassment was also added as a misconduct by government employee. 12. In Medha Kotwal vs. Union of India & Ors (2013)1 SCC 297 vide order dated 26.04.2004, it was directed that the complaint committee as suggested by Vishaka’s case will be demeed to be an inquiry authority for the purpose of CCS (CCA) Rules and its report would be deemed as inquiry report. Before that the Government of India vide office memorandum dated 12.12.2002 had ordered 9 ( 2025:HHC:14458 ) the report of complaint committee to be treated as preliminary inquiry against the accused government servant. 13. Thus, in the given facts of the case, it can be seen that at the time when complaint of sexual harassment was filed against the petitioner, its cognizance was taken by the complaint committee and a decision was taken thereon, the guidelines in Vishaka and office memorandum dated 12.12.2002 issued by the Government of India only were in place. In this view of the matter, the inquiry conducted by the complaint committee was to be considered as a preliminary inquiry. 14. That being so, it is clear case of violations of Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. Admittedly, the compliance of said Rule is clearly wanting as neither any regular inquiry was held against the petitioner nor the disciplinary authority had acted in terms of said rule before imposition of major penalty under Rule 11 of the rules ibid. 15. Even if it is assumed that the complaint committee had held inquiry as inquiry authority under the CCS (CCA) Rules and its report was inquiry report, still the procedure adopted by the said committee is found lacking in various aspects insofar as adherence to principles of natural justice is concerned. The respondents have clearly admitted that the 10 ( 2025:HHC:14458 ) petitioner was not supplied with the copies of complaint and the inquiry report. It is hard to comprehend as to how petitioner could have defended himself in the absence of such vital documents. Further, it has been established beyond doubt that the petitioner was not afforded even reasonable opportunity of being heard by the complaint committee which prompted the 2nd respondent to pass an order dated 14.01.2004. Even after passing of the said order petitioner was denied the opportunity to lead evidence. The list of witnesses submitted by the petitioner was not taken on record, only the written brief of the petitioner was allowed and in the name of inquiry certain questions were put to the petitioner. It is not the case where the petitioner admitted his guilt. 16. In Aureliano Fernandes vs. State of Goa and Ors., (2024)1 SCC 632, the importance of principles of natural justice have been highlighted as under:- “73. The undue haste demonstrated by the Committee for bringing the inquiry to a closure, cannot justify curtailment of the right of the appellant to a fair hearing. The due process, an important facet of the principles of natural justice was seriously compromised due to the manner in which the Committee went about the task of 11 ( 2025:HHC:14458 ) conducting the inquiry proceedings. As noted above, when the proceedings, subject matter of the present appeal had taken place, the PoSH Act was nowhere on the horizon and the field was occupied by the Vishaka Guidelines. The said Guidelines also did not exclude application of the principles of natural justice and fair play in making procedural compliances. The silence in the Guidelines on this aspect could not have given a handle to the Committee to bypass the principles of natural justice and whittle down a reasonable opportunity of affording a fair hearing to the appellant. This Court has repeatedly observed that even when the rules are silent, principles of natural justice must be read into them. In its keen anxiety of being fair to the victims/complainants and wrap up the complaints expeditiously, the Committee has ended up being grossly unfair to the appellant. It has completely overlooked the cardinal principle that justice must not only be done, but should manifestly be seen to be done. The principles of audi alterem partem could not have been thrown to the winds in this cavalier manner. 77. The intent and purpose of the proviso inserted in Rule 14(2) of CCS (CCA) Rules and Rule 3C of CCS (Conduct) Rules is that the procedure required to be 12 ( 2025:HHC:14458 ) adopted for conducting an inquiry into the complaint of sexual harassment that can lead to imposition of a major penalty under the Rules, must be fair, impartial and in line with the Rules. Pertinently, the emphasis on adhering to the principles of natural justice during an inquiry conducted by a Complaints Committee finds specific mention in Rule 7(4) of the subsequently enacted Rules of 2013. But the spirit behind the due process could never be suppressed or ignored even in the absence of the Statute or the Rules inasmuch as the principles of natural justice is the very essence of the decision-making process and must be read into every judicial or even a quasi- judicial proceeding.” 17. Rule 6.17 of the Service Bye Laws of the Corporation provides for penalties in case of either breach of the bye laws of the corporation or display of negligence, insufficiency or indolence, or breach of discipline or being guilty of misconduct or misbehaviour. It includes the penalty of removal or dismissal from service. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 6.17 reads as under:- “(2) No employee shall, after the enforcement of these bye-laws be subject to the penalties (b), (e), (d) & (e) of sub-bye-law (1) except by an order in writing signed by the appropriate authority, and no such order shall be passed without the charge or charges being formulated in writing and given to the said employee 13 ( 2025:HHC:14458 ) so that he/she shall have reasonable opportunity to answer them in writing or person, he/she prefers, and in the latter case his/her defence shall be taken down in writing an read to him/her.” 18. Rule 11 of the CCS (CCA) Rules also declares removal from service as major penalty and for infliction of major penalty under the said Rules, the procedure prescribed under Rule 14 thereof is mandatory. 19. Thus, there is no escape from holding that the complaint committee had committed serious violations of principles of natural justice. Even the 2nd respondent while passing the impugned order dated 31.03.2004 had not considered the important aspect of violations of principles of natural justice. The petitioner was not afforded any opportunity to represent his case and one of the harshest punishment of removal from service was inflicted upon the petitioner. 20. As per the respondents, respondent No.2 had passed the order dated 31.03.2004 in terms of provisions contained in Model Standing Order concerning sexual harassment certified on 17.09.2003 by the Certifying Officer (Labour and Employment Department, Govt. of H.P.). The reliance was placed on the following extract of the said standing order:- 14 ( 2025:HHC:14458 ) “Once enquiry report is submitted by Complaints Committee to the Disciplinary Authority, the latter has to straight away pass orders without conducting any further departmental enquiry. In other words this is another form of departmental/domestic enquiry to be followed only in cases of sexual harassment.” 21. Learned counsel for the petitioner has seriously disputed the applicability of Standing Certified Order to the facts of the case. He has contended that the standing order dated 17.09.2003 could not have retrospective operation in a complaint filed on 22.03.2003. He further contended that the impugned order dated 31.03.2004 itself discloses that the penalty of removal from service was directed to be imposed on petitioner by 2nd respondent under Rule 6.17 (i) e) of the Service Bye Laws of Corporation and Rule 11 of the CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965. Reliance has been placed on Section 13(B) of Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 which reads as under:- “13B. Act not to apply to certain industrial establishments. Nothing this Act shall apply to an industrial establishment in so far as the workman employed there in are persons to whom the Fundamental and Supplement Rules, Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal_ Rules, Civil Service (Temporary Services) Rules, Revised Leave Rules, Civil Service Regular Civilians in Defence Service (Classification Control and Appeal Rules and 15 ( 2025:HHC:14458 ) the Indian Railway Establishment Code or any other rules or regulations as may be notified in this behalf by the appropriate Government in the Central Gazette, apply.” The contention raised by respondents with aspect of applicability of certified standing orders cannot be countenanced. 22. Since, the petitioner was governed by service Rules of the Corporation as also CCS (CCA) Rules, the inquiry under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules was mandatory. The absence of such inquiry amounts to serious violation of principles of natural justice. 23. In light of what has been held above, the impugned orders dated 31.03.2004 passed by the 2nd respondent and order dated 04.04.2004 issued by 4th respondent cannot be sustained and deserves to be quashed and set aside. 24. Having held so, the question arise as to what consequential relief can the petitioner be held entitled? The petitioner was removed from service in 2004. The original application was filed by the petitioner in the year 2005. Petitioner has already attained the age of superannuation. Learned counsel for the respondent corporation has submitted that in case the procedure adopted by the 16 ( 2025:HHC:14458 ) respondents is found faulty, direction should be issued to hold inquiry afresh and to take appropriate decision thereafter. In my considered view, such an approach will be totally unjustified for the reasons that there has been long lapse of about 21 years. The holding of fresh inquiry after such a long period will either be a futile exercise or will defeat the ends of justice. The petitioner in all probabilities will not be in a position to defend himself effectively as the evidence available with him may have either been destroyed or the witnesses may not be willing to come forward with truth after such a long time. The intervening circumstance are likely to prejudice the rights of petitioner in all probabilities. 25. Since, this Court has quashed and set aside the impugned orders dated 31.03.2004 passed by 2nd respondent and 04.04.2004 issued by 3rd respondent. The petitioner is held entitled to be reinstated in service from the date of his removal from service with all consequential benefits as would have been normally available to him but for passing of illegal orders of removal of service against him. The respondents are directed to complete the entire exercise within eight weeks from the date of passing of this judgment failing which petitioner shall be entitled to interest @ 6% per annum on 17 ( 2025:HHC:14458 ) the arrears of monetary benefits as will be available to the petitioner. Petition is accordingly disposed of. (Satyen Vaidya) Judge 19th May, 2025. (jai)