1 2025:CGHC:35530 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 781 of 2005 1 - Sunder Lal S/o Mela Ram Patel Aged About 27 Years Village-Hardi, P.S.-Kasdol, District-Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Pyarmati W/o Mela Ram Patel Aged About 60 Years R/o-Village- Hardi, P.S.-Kasdol, District-Raipur (C.G.) 3 - Durugiha @ Firat Ram (Dead And Deleted) As Per Honble Court Order Dated 06-03-2025. ... Appellants versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through S.H.O. Kasdol District Raipur C.G. ... Respondent For Appellants : Mr. Harshvardhan Sharma & Mr. Rakesh Kumar Manikpuri, Advocates For Respondent/State : Ms. Neeta T. Thawani, PL Hon'ble Shri Justice Deepak Kumar Tiwari PRIYANKA VERMA Digitally signed by PRIYANKA VERMA Date: 2025.07.24 16:49:37 +0530 2 Judgment On Board 23/07/2025 1. This Criminal Appeal has been preferred by the appellants under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the judgment of conviction dated 20.09.2005, passed by the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Baloda-Bazar in Sessions Trial No.43/2005, by which, the appellants herein have been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 201/34 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo R.I. for three years and to pay a fine of Rs.500/- each, in default of payment of fine, to further undergo S.I. for three months. 2. During pendency of this Appeal, one of the appellants, namely Durugiha @ Firat Ram, died on 13.01.2007 and vide the order dated 22.01.2016 passed by this Court, the Appeal against him has been abated. 3. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the marriage of deceased- Bhuneshwari was solemnized with appellant No.1- Sunder Lal 6 months ago prior to the incident. Appellant No.2- Pyar Mati is the mother of appellant No.1. Father of the deceased- Khelan Singh Patel (PW-1) lodged a merg intimation to the effect that on 2.10.2004, the accused/appellants caused the death of his daughter namely Bhuneshwari with an intention of causing her miscarriage. After giving notices to the witnesses vide Ex-P/4, death inquest report was prepared vide Ex-P/5. Postmortem of the deceased was conducted by Dr. B.P. Baghel (PW-10), who gave his report vide Ex- P/13 and opined that the death of the deceased occurred due to unnatural abortion and peritonitis by perforation of uterus & rectum; viscera was preserved. In the FSL report, it was found that the uterus was not sent for 3 forensic examination. After merg inquiry, FIR (Ex.P/15) was registered on 10.10.2004. Statements of the witnesses were recorded. After completion of the investigation, the charge sheet was filed. 4. The appellant/accused has been charged for the offence under Sections 314/34 & 201/34 of the IPC. By the impugned judgment, the appellants have been acquitted of the main offence i.e. under Section 314/34 of the IPC, however, convicted under Section 201/34 of the IPC as mentioned at para-1 of this judgment. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the law is well settled that a charge under Section 201 of the IPC can be independently laid and conviction maintained also, in case the prosecution is able to establish that an offence had been committed, the person charged with the offence had the knowledge or the reason to believe that the offence had been committed, the said person has caused disappearance of evidence and such act of disappearance has been done with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment. These are the four necessary ingredients, which have also been reiterated in the matter of Dinesh Kumar Kalidas Patel vs. State of Gujarat1, at para 10 of the said judgment. He would further submit that as the main offence under Section 314/34 of the IPC fails, the secondary offence under Section 201 of the IPC with regard to intention to screen the offender from legal punishment would also not be sustainable. He would further submit that the secondary offence of concealing evidence is dependent on the establishment of the initial crime. Thus, learned counsel for the appellants prays to allow the Appeal. 1 (2018) 3 SCC 313 4 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State would support the impugned judgment. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 8. The appellants/accused have been convicted for the offence under Section 201 of the IPC, which reads as follows:- “201. Causing disappearance of evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender.—Whoever, knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has been committed, causes any evidence of the commission of that offence to disappear, with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment, or with that intention gives any information respecting the offence which he knows or believes to be false; if a capital offence.— shall, if the offence which he knows or believes to have been committed is punishable with death, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine; if punishable with imprisonment for life.— and if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment which may extend to ten years, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine; 5 if punishable with less than ten years’ imprisonment.— and if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for any term not extending to ten years, shall be punished with imprisonment of the description provided for the offence, for a term which may extend to one-fourth part of the longest term of the imprisonment provided for the offence, or with fine, or with both.” 9. A plain reading of Section 201 of IPC itself reflects that the offence under Section 201 would be made firstly when the accused person knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has been committed causes any evidence of the commission of that offence to disappear with the intention of screening the offender only then the provisions of the said Section can be attracted. 10.The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab2, had said that in order to establish the charge under Section 201 of IPC, it is essential to prove that an offence has been committed, that the accused knew or had reason to believe that such offence had been committed, with requisite knowledge and with the intent to screen the offender from legal punishment, caused the evidence thereof to disappear to give false information respecting such offence knowing or having reason to believe the same to be false. It was observed that the Court should safeguard itself against the danger of basing its conclusion on suspicions, however, strong they may be. 2 AIR 1952 SC 354 6 11.In 2007, the Hon'ble Supreme Court again in the case of Sukhram v. State of Maharashtra3, has reiterated the fact that to bring home an offence under Section 201 of IPC, the ingredients to be established are: (i) committal of an offence; (ii) person charged with the offence under Section 201 must have the knowledge or reason to believe that an offence has been committed: (iii) person charged with the said offence should have been done with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment or with that intention he should have given information respecting the offence, which he knew or believed to be false. It is plain that the intent to screen the offender committing an offence must be the primary and sole aim of the accused. It hardly needs any emphasis that in order to bring home an offence under Section 201 of IPC, a mere suspicion is not sufficient. There must be on record cogent evidence to prove that the accused knew or had information sufficient to lead him to believe that the offence had been committed and that the accused has caused the evidence to disappear in order to screen the offender, known or unknown. 12.The ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above referred two judgments clearly suggests the fact that the accused person for the offence under Section 201 of IPC should have sufficient evidence and knowledge about the fact that the offence has been committed and that by the act of the accused person he is trying to screen the offender from legal punishment. 13.The word "offence" used in the first part of Section 201 of IPC means some real offence which is described in Section 40 of Chapter II of IPC. The language of first part of Section 201 of IPC is self explanatory establishing 3 2007 (7) SCC 502 7 the fact of commission of "offence" is sine quo non to bring home an offence under this Section and without establishing the fact of commission of offence the person/accused cannot be convicted under this Section which has, however, been done in the present case. 14.Further, if we see the provisions of Section 201 of IPC, it would show that the punishment imposed upon the accused person for the offence under Section 201 of IPC is proportionate to the punishment of the substantive which has been committed by the accused person as is reflected from the three paragraphs dealing with the punishment for the offence under Section 201 of IPC. That is to say that the offence under Section 201 of IPC there is no independent punishment prescribed but would always be commensurate to the main offence. However, in the instant case the ingredients of the said main offence itself is missing and therefore, also the charges leveled against the accused person for the offence under Section 201 of IPC cannot be said to have been proved or established so as to convict the accused. 15.The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Duvvur Dasratharammareddy Vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh4, dealing with a similar issue so far as the sustainability of conviction under Section 201 of IPC independently is concerned has held as under: “If once the case of the prosecution regarding the offence of murder is not accepted, it follows that the appellant cannot be convicted for the offence under Section 201 IPC either because the evidence relating to that offence is common.” 4 1971 (3) SCC 247 8 16.The aforesaid view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been reiterated in the case of State of U.P. Vs. Kapil Deo and Another5, wherein it has been held as under: “We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the evidence and material on the record. The fact staring at us is that the prosecution case collapsed so far as Vidya Sagar, accused is concerned and he stands acquitted of the charge of murder. It is to be borne in mind that he prominently was assigned the offensive part of the crime of murder. It is he who was seen cutting the throat of the deceased with a big knife. It is he who was seen escaping from the scene of the occurrence carrying a blood-stained knife in his hand. It is he who was sought to be apprehended by the eye- witnesses and others collected there. When the evidence against him, occular as well as circumstantial, has cautiously been weighed by this Court resulting in his acquittal, we find it difficult to convict the said accused for offence under section 201 read with section 34 I.P.C. This Court though slightly in different circumstances in Duvvur Dasratharammareddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [1971] 3 SCC 247, observed as follows: "If the evidence relating to the offence of murder and disappearance of evidence is the same and the case of the prosecution regarding the Offence of murder is not accepted, it follows that the accused cannot be convicted' for the offence under Section 201, I.P.C.” 5 1991 Supp (2) SCC 170 9 17.The same view has further again been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dinesh Kumar Kalidas Patel (supra) wherein again dealing with a similar issue the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: “Thus, the law is well-settled that a charge under Section 201 of the IPC can be independently laid and conviction maintained also, in case the prosecution is able to establish that an offence had been committed, the person charged with the offence had the knowledge or the reason to believe that the offence had been committed, the said person has caused disappearance of evidence and such act of disappearance has been done with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment.” 18.The High Court of Rajasthan also in the case of Kajju Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan6, in paragraph-11, dealing with the said issue has held as under: “11. A careful study of the judgment relied upon by learned amicus curiae in Mazahar Ali v. State 1976 CriLJ 1629, it was in the facts of that case held by Division Bench of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court that since evidence against the appellant in that case for offence under Section 201, IPC was also substantially same as for the offence under section 302, IPC (Indian Penal Code), conviction of the appellant for offence under section 201, IPC alone cannot be sustained. The said observations were made by the Court at the conclusion of the judgment having held that offence under section 6 2006 CRILJ 4386 10 302, IPC was not proved against the appellant and, therefore, when the same evidence was the basis for their conviction under section 201, such conviction also cannot be sustained. It was in that context observed that “the proof of the commission of an offence is an essential requisite for bringing home the offence under section 201, IPC and in the present case the commission of the principle offence by the accused has not been proved, their conviction for the offence under Section 201 IPC is not sustainable.” 19.In view of the aforesaid legal position and also taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is evident that the present accused persons have been charged for the main offence under Section 314/34 of the IPC and the trial Court has not found them guilty of the main offence. So far as the offence under Section 201 of the IPC is concerned, since the primary offence under Section 314/34 of the IPC itself has not established, the charge under Section 201 of the IPC, which deals with causing disappearance of evidence, is also not sustainable against the accused persons. 20.For the foregoing reasons as discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the conviction on the part of the accused persons for the offence under Section 201 of the IPC independently, in such facts and circumstances is not proper, legal or justified and therefore, the finding of conviction as imposed by the trial Court deserves to be and is accordingly set aside. The appellants are 11 acquitted of the charge under Section 201 of the IPC. They are set at liberty subject to the conditions of Section 437A of the CrPC. 21.The Appeal is allowed. Sd/- (Deepak Kumar Tiwari) Judge Priyanka