IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA RSA No.194 of 2025 Decided on: 07.04.2026 State of H.P. & another ….Appellants Versus Tej Singh ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge Whether approved for reporting? For the appellants: Mr. Manish Thakur, Deputy Advocate General. For the respondent: Mr. Amit Dhumal and Ms. Parul Negi, Advocates. Romesh Verma, Judge (oral) The present appeal arises out of judgment and decree, as passed by learned Additional District Judge, Sarkghat, District Mandi, H.P., dated 31.05.2022, whereby judgment and decree, as passed by learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Court No.2, Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P. dated 20.05.2019 has been affirmed. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff/respondent filed a suit for declaration and in alternative for permanent prohibitory and mandatory injunction under Sections 37, 38 and 39 of Specific Relief Act. It was averred in the plaint that the land comprised in Khata-Khatauni No.3/4 min bearing Khasra No.264 was recorded in the ownership and possession of the plaintiff as 2 per jamabandi for the year 2008-2009. The defendants acquired Khasra No.264/1, measuring 00-01-86 hectares, Khasra No.264/2, measuring 00-00-78 hectares and Khasra No.264/3, measuring 00-00-37 hectares, vide mutation No.109, dated 05.11.2009, Khasra No.264/4/1 vide mutation No.118 dated 25.07.2012. The defendants started construction of super highway. During this process, the defendants encroached upon the land of the plaintiff over Khasra No.264/4/2/1 land measuring 00-01-16 hectares. Though, the plaintiff objected to the cutting of the land by the defendants, however, the officials of the defendants promised the plaintiff to pay the compensation if the land of the plaintiff is cut down. During the construction of the road, heavy machinery was deployed by the defendants to cut the land of the plaintiff. 3. As per plaintiff he was constrained to approach the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade for giving demarcation and to issue the spot map on 08.11.2013. The demarcation was provided on 09.12.2013. After that, it transpired that the defendants have encroached over Khasra No.264/4/2/1, thereby causing damage to the cow shed as well as land of the plaintiff and made the land unfit for cultivation and for construction of cow shed or any construction as there were cultivating fields on the spot and the 3 land has been made unfit for any cultivation. Therefore, the suit was filed by the plaintiff with the prayer that the suit be decreed in favour of the plaintiff, restraining the defendants causing any interference over the suit land comprising Khasra No.264/4/2 land measuring 00-01-16 hectares and mandatory injunction was also sought against the defendants restoring the suit land into its original position and in alternative a consequential relief for possession was also sought from the learned trial Court. 4. The suit, as filed by the present respondent/plaintiff, was contested by the appellants/defendants by filing written statement. Preliminary objections with respect to maintainability, estoppel, suppression, jurisdiction etc. were raised. On merits, it was admitted that the road/super highway by name Jahu Kalkhar road was constructed and the cutting was done during the construction of the said road. It was submitted that the defendants had acquired the land of the plaintiff and due compensation has also been paid to the plaintiff. Further, it was submitted that in addition to the land acquired of the plaintiff, if more land has been acquired for the construction of the road then the plaintiff can approach the competent authority for grant of compensation. The defendants did not deny the encroachment over the suit land while answering para-5 of the plaint on merits. It was not denied 4 that the encroachment has been made by the defendants over the suit land bearing Khasra No.264/4/2/1. Therefore, it was prayed that the suit filed by the plaintiff be ordered to be dismissed. 5. The plaintiff did not file the replication to the written statement. 6. Learned trial Court framed the following issues on 11.04.2016: 1. Whether plaintiff is entitled for injunction, as prayed for? OPP 2. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable in the present form, as alleged? OPD. 3. Whether plaintiff has no cause of action to file the present suit, as alleged? OPD 4. Whether plaintiff is estopped from filing the present suit, by his own acts & conduct? OPD 5. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try the present suit, as alleged? OPD 6. Whether plaintiff has suppressed the material facts from this Court, as alleged? OPD 7. Relief. 7. Learned trial Court directed the respective parties to adduce evidence in support their contentions and finally vide its judgment and decree dated 20.05.2019, decreed the suit filed by the plaintiff for mandatory injunction directing the defendants to acquire the part of the suit land i.e. Khasra No.264/4/2/1 and to 5 pay compensation accordingly after conducting demarcation on the spot. 8. Feeling dissatisfied, the present appellants preferred an appeal in the Court of learned Additional District Judge, Sarkghat, District Mandi, H.P., on 02.08.2021. In the said appeal, the present respondent/plaintiff had also preferred the cross- objections. Learned First Appellate Court vide its judgment and decree dated 31.05.2022 dismissed the appeal, as preferred by the present appellants and the cross-objections filed by the respondent/plaintiff were also ordered to be dismissed. Consequently, the findings, as returned by learned trial Court, were affirmed 9. Still feeling aggrieved, the State has approached this Court by filing present regular second appeal. 10. It is contended by Mr. Manish Thakur, learned Deputy Advocate General, that the judgments and decrees as passed by learned Courts below are erroneous and liable to be quashed and set aside. He submits that the respondent/plaintiff has given implied and expressed consent for the construction of the road and the suit, as filed by the plaintiff, was hopelessly time barred. 11. On the other hand, Mr. Amit Dhumal, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff, has defended the judgments and 6 decrees as passed by learned Courts below and submitted that as per mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court, no person can be deprived of his property without adopting due process of law. He further submitted that, in view of concurrent findings of fact, no interference is warranted in the present appeal. 12. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also scanned the case file. 13. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the appeal is finally heard at the admission stage. 14. Admittedly, in the present case, the land owned by the present respondent/plaintiff has been utilized for the construction of the road/super highway. In order to prove the case in hand, the plaintiff has placed on record a copy of demarcation report Ext PW-4/A. A perusal of the report reveals that the State has utilized the suit land. The said document has not been rebutted by the State in any manner. The demarcation report clearly reveals that the land of the plaintiff/respondent has been encroached/utilized for the construction of the road. Therefore, the submission, as made by learned counsel for the State that no encroachment has been made by the State over the suit land, is found to be incorrect. 7 15. In order to substantiate his case, the plaintiff has examined himself as PW-1. While deposing, he has categorically stated that he is the owner of the suit land and not only the road has been constructed even the remaining land has been destroyed by the State. Though, in the cross-examination, he has admitted that in pursuance to the construction of the road, certain land of the plaintiff was acquired, however, the acquisition was not carried out qua the entire utilized land. 16. PW-2 Tek Chand, in his deposition, has stated that he is the former President of Gram Panchayat. He stated that over the suit land, the State has raised the construction of Super Highway and adjoining to the same the land of the plaintiff is situated. During the construction of the road, the remaining portion of the land of the plaintiff was destroyed. Although, the plaintiff stopped the officials of the State Government not to raise the construction, however, they did not pay heed to his request. 17. PW-3, Rattan Chand, Senior Assistant in the office of Tehsildar, Baldwara, District Mandi, H.P. has brought the record. 18. PW-4. is the statement Som Dutt, who has stated in his deposition that, on 9th December, 2013, on the application of the plaintiff, the Local Commissioner demarcated the suit land. Tatima has been prepared by him and is duly singed by him. 8 19. In order to rebut the case of the plaintiff, the defendant has examined DW-1 Arvind Bhardwaj. He stated that he is working as SDO in the Public Works Department. He further stated that prior to the construction of the road, the land had been acquired and the appropriate compensation was paid to the landholders. The State/defendant never raised any encroachment over the suit land. He further stated that cow shed and the remaining land of the plaintiff was never damaged in any manner. In the cross-examination, he has categorically admitted that qua the utilization of the suit land, no process was started by the State till date. He further admitted that, after the institution of the present suit, no steps were taken by the State Government for the acquisition of land utilized by the defendants. He further admitted that qua the utilization of the suit land, no amount of compensation has been paid to the plaintiff. 20. The admitted facts of the case are that the suit land has been utilized by the State/appellants for the construction of the road. In the present case, the suit has been filed by the plaintiff on the basis of title and the title of the respondent has not been disputed by the present appellants. The demarcation report Ext. PW-4/A clearly shows that the land of the present respondent has been utilized for the construction of the road. 9 21. The Hon’ble Apex Court has in various cases held that no person can be deprived of his property without adopting due process of law. In the present case, as per clear cut admission on the part of DW-1 that the suit land which has been utilized by the State has neither been acquired nor amount of compensation has been paid to him, clinches the entire controversy. The submission of Mr. Manish Thakur, learned Deputy Advocate General, that the respondent has given oral consent for the construction of the road is dehors the record. He has failed to show any document from the record which indicates that there is any implied or express consent for the construction of the said road. Therefore, the said submission does not hold good. 22. As far as the submission as made by learned counsel for the appellants that the Suit as filed by the respondent is highly belated, it is well settled principle of law that the State cannot claim adverse possession against its citizen. Thus the suit on the basis of title cannot be said to be time barred, which right could only be defeated by proof of perfection of title by way of adverse possession by the other. 23. Admittedly, the respondent/plaintiff is the title holder of the suit property. Being owner of the suit property, he may file a 10 suit at any stage until and unless the said right is defeated by the present appellants/ defendants by perfection of title by way of adverse possession. 24. Being the owner of the suit land, the plaintiff/respondent was well within his right to file a suit for injunction and mandatory injunction since the suit land was utilized by the State for construction of the road in question without adopting due process of law including the payment of amount of compensation. 25. Admittedly, the defendants/appellants were not in possession of any document to show that the plaintiffs had consented for construction of road through the suit land. 26. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Vidya Devi vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & others (2020) 2 SCC 569 has held that no person can be forcibly dispossess of his property without any legal sanction and without following the due process of law and depriving her payment of just and fair compensation. The State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution. The Court has held as follows: 11 “12. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 12.1. The Appellant was forcibly expropriated of her property in 1967, when the right to property was a fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III of the Constitution. Vidaya Devi vs The State Of Himachal Pradesh on 8 January, 2020 Article 31 guaranteed the right to private property 1, which could not be deprived without due process of law and upon just and fair compensation. 12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right 2 in a welfare State, and a Constitutional right under Article 300 A of the Constitution. Article 300 A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300 A, can be inferred in that Article The State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose and Ors. AIR 1954 SC 92. 2 Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors. (2013) 1 SCC 353. 12.3. To forcibly dispossess a person of his private property, without following due process of law, would be violative of a human right, as also the constitutional right under Article 300 A of the Constitution. Reliance is placed on the judgment in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai4, wherein this Court held that: “ 6. … Having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300A of the Constitution, the State in 12 exercise of its power of "eminent domain" may interfere with the right of property of a person by acquiring the same but the same must be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation therefor must be paid.” (emphasis supplied) 12.4 In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy5, this Court held that: “21. If the right of property is a human right as also a constitutional right, the same cannot be taken away except in accordance with law. Article 300A of the Constitution protects such right. The provisions of the Act seeking to divest such right, keeping in view of the provisions of Article 300A of the Constitution of India, must be strictly construed.” (emphasis supplied) 4 (2005) 7 SCC 627. 12.5 In Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., this Court recognized the right to property as a basic human right in the following words: “30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by different political thinkers that some amount of property right is an indispensable safeguard against tyranny and economic oppression of the Government. Jefferson was of the view that liberty cannot long subsist without the support of property. "Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist" was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the view that property itself is the seed bed which must be conserved if other constitutional values are to flourish is the consensus among political thinkers and jurists.” (emphasis supplied) 13 12.6 In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat,7 this Court held as follows : “48. …In other words, Article 300A only limits the powers of the State that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. There has to be no deprivation without any sanction of law. Deprivation by any other mode is not acquisition or taking possession under Article 300A. In other words, if there is no law, there is no deprivation.” (emphasis supplied) 10.3. In this case, the Appellant could not have been forcibly dispossessed of her property without any legal sanction, and without following due process of law, there is no deprivation.” 12.7 In this case, the Appellant could not have been forcibly dispossessed of her property without any legal sanction, and without following due process of law, and depriving her 6 (2011) 9 SCC 354. 7 (1995) Supp. 1 SCC 596. payment of just compensation, being a fundamental right on the date of forcible dispossession in 1967. 12.8. The contention of the State that the Appellant or her predecessors had “orally” consented to the acquisition is completely baseless. We find complete lack of authority and legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the Appellant of her property by the State. 12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of their property without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors. wherein it was held that the State must comply with the procedure for acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The 14 State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution. 12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar held that the right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right, but also a human right. 8 (2013) 1 SCC 353. Human rights have been considered in the realm of individual rights such as right to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights have gained a multi− faceted dimension. 12.11. We are surprised by the plea taken by the State before the High Court, that since it has been in continuous possession of the land for over 42 years, it would tantamount to “adverse” possession. The State being a welfare State, cannot be permitted to take the plea of adverse possession, which allows a trespasser i.e. a person guilty of a tort, or even a crime, to gain legal title over such property for over 12 years. The State cannot be permitted to perfect its title over the land by invoking the doctrine of adverse possession to grab the property of its own citizens, as has been done in the present case. 12.12. The contention advanced by the State of delay and laches of the Appellant in moving the Court is also liable to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of action, or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court. Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of a case. It will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is no 15 period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice. 12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, a constitutional Court would exercise its jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not defeat it. 12.14. In Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors.,10 this Court while dealing with a similar fact situation, held as follows : “There are authorities which state that delay and laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for educational facilities and other categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true that there are a few authorities that lay down that delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right has been violated, under Article 9 P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N. (1975) 1 SCC 152. 10 (2013) 1 SCC 353. 32 or 226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different scenario altogether. Functionaries of the State took over possession of the land belonging to the Appellants without any sanction of law. The Appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must either comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode.” (emphasis supplied) 13. In the present case, the Appellant being an illiterate person, who is a widow coming from a rural area has been deprived of her private property by the State without resorting to the procedure prescribed by law. The Appellant has been divested of her right to property 16 without being paid any compensation whatsoever for over half a century. The cause of action in the present case is a continuing one, since the Appellant was compulsorily expropriated of her property in 1967 without legal sanction or following due process of law. The present case is one where the demand for justice is so compelling since the State has admitted that the land was taken over without initiating acquisition proceedings, or any procedure known to law. We exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 136 and 142 of the Constitution, and direct the State to pay compensation to the appellant. 27. To the similar effect, the Hon’ble Apex Court in (2022) 7 SCC 508 titled as Sukh Dutt Ratra and another vs. State of H.P. and others has held as under: “14. It is the cardinal principle of the rule of law, that nobody can be deprived of liberty or property without due process, or authorization of law. The recognition of this dates back to the 1700s to the decision of the King’s Bench in Entick v. Carrington17 and by this court in Wazir Chand v. The State of Himachal Pradesh18. Further, in several judgments, this court has repeatedly held that rather than enjoying a wider bandwidth of lenience, the State often has a higher responsibility in demonstrating that it has acted within the confines of legality, and therefore, not tarnished the basic principle of the rule of law. 15. When it comes to the subject of private property, this court has upheld the high threshold of legality that must be met, to dispossess an individual of their property, and 17 even more so when done by the State. In Bishandas v. State of Punjab19 this court rejected the contention that the petitioners in the case were trespassers and could be removed by an executive order, and instead concluded that the executive action taken by the State and its officers, was destructive of the basic principle of the rule of law. This court, in another case - State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. v. Dharmander Prasad Singh and Ors. 20, held: “A lessor, with the best of title, has no right to resume possession extra-judicially by use of force, from a lessee, even after the expiry or earlier termination of the lease by forfeiture or otherwise. The use of the expression 're-entry' in the lease-deed does not authorise extrajudicial methods to resume possession. Under law, the possession of a lessee, even after the expiry or its earlier termination is juridical possession and forcible dispossession is prohibited; a lessee cannot be dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law. In the present case, the fact that the lessor is the State does not place it in any higher or better position. On the contrary, it is under an additional inhibition stemming from the requirement that all actions of Government and Governmental authorities should have a 'legal pedigree'”. 16. Given the important protection extended to an individual vis-a-vis their private property (embodied earlier in Article 31, and now as a constitutional right in Article 300-A), and the high threshold the State must meet while acquiring land, the question remains – can the State, merely on the ground of delay and laches, evade its legal responsibility towards those from whom private property has been expropriated? In these facts and circumstances, we find this conclusion to be 18 unacceptable, and warranting intervention on the grounds of equity and fairness. 17. When seen holistically, it is apparent that the State’s actions, or lack thereof, have in fact compounded the injustice meted out to the appellants and compelled them to approach this court, albeit belatedly. The initiation of acquisition proceedings initially in the 1990s occurred only at the behest of the High Court. Even after such judicial intervention, the State continued to only extend the benefit of the court’s directions to those who specifically approached the courts. The State’s lackadaisical conduct is discernible from this action of initiating acquisition proceedings selectively, only in respect to the lands of those writ petitioners who had approached the court in earlier proceedings, and not other land owners, pursuant to the orders dated 23.04.2007 (in CWP No. 1192/2004) and 20.12.2013 (in CWP No. 1356/2010) respectively. In this manner, at every stage, the State sought to shirk its responsibility of acquiring land required for public use in the manner prescribed by law. 18. There is a welter of precedents on delay and laches which conclude either way – as contended by both sides in the present dispute – however, the specific factual matrix compels this court to weigh in favour of the appellant-land owners. The State cannot shield itself behind the ground of delay and laches in such a situation; there cannot be a ‘limitation’ to doing justice. This court in a much earlier case - Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, held: ‘11…..."Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. 19 Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy." 19. The facts of the present case reveal that the State has, in a clandestine and arbitrary manner, actively tried to limit disbursal of compensation as required by law, only to those for which it was specifically prodded by the courts, rather than to all those who are entitled. This arbitrary action, which is also violative of the appellants’ prevailing Article 31 right (at the time of cause of action), undoubtedly warranted consideration, and intervention by the High Court, under its Article 20 226 jurisdiction. This court, in Manohar (supra) - a similar case where the name of the aggrieved had been deleted from revenue records leading to his dispossession from the land without payment of compensation – held: 6“Having heard the learned counsel for the appellants, we are satisfied that the case projected before the court by the appellants is utterly untenable and not worthy of emanating from any State which professes the least regard to being a welfare State. When we pointed out to the learned counsel that, at this stage at least, the State should be gracious enough to accept its mistake and promptly pay the compensation to the respondent, the State has taken an intractable attitude and persisted in opposing what appears to be a just and reasonable claim of the respondent. Ours is a constitutional democracy and the rights available to the citizens are declared by the Constitution. Although Article 19(1)(f) was deleted by the Forty-fourth Amendment to the Constitution, Article 300-A has been placed in the Constitution, which reads as follows: “300-A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law.—No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.” 8.This is a case where we find utter lack of legal authority for deprivation of the respondent's property by the appellants who are State authorities. In our view, this case was an eminently fit one for exercising the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution… 21 20. Again, in Tukaram Kana Joshi (supra) while dealing with a similar fact situation, this court held as follows: (SCC p. 359 para11) “11“There are authorities which state that delay and laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for educational facilities and other categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true that there are a few authorities that lay down that delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right has been violated, under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different scenario altogether. The functionaries of the State took over possession of the land belonging to the appellants without any sanction of law. The appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must either comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode.” 21. Having considered the pleadings filed, this court finds that the contentions raised by the State, do not inspire confidence and deserve to be rejected. The State has merely averred to the appellants’ alleged verbal consent or the lack of objection, but has not placed any material on record to substantiate this plea. Further, the State was unable to produce any evidence indicating that the land of the appellants had been taken over 22 or acquired in the manner known to law, or that they had ever paid any compensation. It is pertinent to note that this was the State’s position, and subsequent findings of the High Court in 2007 as well, in the other writ proceedings.” 28. The similar position has been reiterated and relied upon by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in CWP No. 491 of 2022, titled as Sakuntla Devi and another vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & another dated 20.10.2023. After relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Vidya Devi & Sukh Dutt Ratra’s case, the Court held as follows: “7. In the aforesaid judgments, Hon’ble Apex Court has categorically held that contention advanced by the State of delay and laches of the appellant in moving the Court is liable to be rejected especially when it is not in dispute that petitioner are suffering continuous loss coupled with the fact that they repeatedly requested the authorities to initiate acquisition proceedings. 8. If the aforesaid judgments are read in their entirety, it clearly emerges that land owners cannot be deprived of their land, without following due process of law. If it is so, ground raised by the respondents that petitioners have made their land available with consent, is of no consequence rather, this court, having taken note of the fact that the land of petitioners stands utilized for the construction of road in question, is compelled to agree with the submission of learned counsel for the petitioners that her clients are entitled for compensation qua the land 23 utilized by respondents for construction of road in question. 10. Admittedly, land of the petitioners stands utilized for construction of road but till date, they have not been paid any amount, which action of the respondent-State certainly amounts to forcible dispossession of the petitioners from their land, which is violative of provision contained under Art. 300-A of the Constitution of India. 14. In case titled, State of Himachal Pradesh v. Umed Ram Sharma (1986) 2 SCC 68, Hon’ble Apex Court has held that entire State of Himachal Pradesh is a hilly area and without workable roads, no communication is possible; every person is entitled to life as enjoined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India; every person has right under Article 19 (1) (b) of the Constitution of India to move freely, throughout the territory of India; for the residents of hilly areas, access to road is access to life itself. Stand taken by the respondents that there was a policy for providing roads on demand of residents as a favour to them on conditions that they would not claim compensation, cannot be sustained because such stand is violative of Article 300A of the Constitution of India. 15. In case titled Hari Krishna Mandir Trust v. State of Maharashtra and others, 2020 9 SCC 356, Hon’ble Apex Court has held that though right to property is not a fundamental right, but it is still a constitutional right under Article 300A of the Constitution of India and also a human right; in view of the mandate of Article 300A, no person can be deprived of his property save by the authority of law. No doubt, State possesses the power to take or control the property of the owner of the land for the 24 benefit of public, but at the same time, it is obliged to compensate the injury by making just compensation.” 29. No other point was raised by the learned counsel for the parties. 30. Both the Courts below have rightly appreciated the point in controversy after considering the oral as well as documentary evidence placed on record. No question of law much less substantial question of law arises in the present case. 31. In view of above, the present appeal being devoid of any merit deserves to be dismissed. Ordered accordingly. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. ( Romesh Verma ) Judge 7th April, 2026 (vt)