HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL Writ Petition (S/B) No. 692 of 2024 Deepak Kumar ...Petitioner Versus Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Uttarakhand Dehradun and others .....Respondents Present:- Mr. B.S. Adhikari and Mr. Manoj Sah, Advocates for the petitioner. Mr. K.N. Joshi, D.A.G. for the State. Mr. Santosh Kumar Sah, Advocate for the respondent no.2 through video conferencing. Coram: Hon’ble Ravindra Maithani, J. Hon’ble Alok Mahra, J. Hon’ble Ravindra Maithani, J. (Oral) The challenge in this petition is made to the order dated 22.12.2020, passed by the respondent no.1/Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Uttarakhand, Dehradun (“the Registrar), by which, a surcharge of Rs. 21,16,490/- was imposed on the petitioner under Section 68 (2) of the Uttarakhand Co-operative Societies Act, 2003 (“the Act”). The challenge is also made to an order dated 30.09.2022 of the Secretary, Cooperative Societies, by which the appeal preferred by the petitioner under Section 98 of the Act has been dismissed on the ground that there is a vigilance inquiry pending against the petitioner. The petitioner has also challenged a notice dated 22.08.2024, by which he was required to deposit the surcharge imposed on him. 2 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 3. The petitioner is the General Manager, State Cooperative Societies Bank Ltd. Haldwani, District Nainital. He was served with a notice dated 07.01.2019 and on 09.06.2020, by which ten charges were leveled against him, which related to the Financial Years 2012-13 and 2016-17. The petitioner replied, but without application of mind, according to the petitioner, the impugned order was passed on 22.12.2020 and surcharge was imposed on the petitioner. The petitioner did prefer an appeal under Section 98 of the Act, which was rejected by the impugned order dated 30.09.2022, on the ground that a vigilance inquiry is pending against him and thereafter, the petitioner was served with a notice to deposit the amount of surcharge. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that vigilance inquiry has nothing to do with the proceedings, which were initiated against the petitioner under Section 68 of the Act. He submits that the surcharge may be imposed under Section 68 of the Act, but a person aggrieved by it, may prefer an appeal under Section 98 of the Act. In the instant case, he submits that in view of Section 98 (1) (g) of the Act, an appeal, as per Section 98 (2) of the Act may be to the State Government. He submits that the petitioner had preferred an appeal to the State Government under Section 98 of the Act, but, the appeal has not been decided on merit. It has not been admitted on the ground that a vigilance inquiry is pending against the petitioner. He submits that this may not be a ground to reject the appeal that has been preferred by the petitioner under Section 98 of the Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner restricts his 3 submission to the extent his appeal was dismissed by the impugned order dated 30.09.2022 and pursuant to which, the recovery notice dated 22.08.2024. He submits that the order of surcharge has been challenged in the appeal. Therefore, the appeal may be directed to be heard on merits after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. He does not assail the order dated 22.12.2020, passed under Section 68 of the Act in the petition. 5. Learned State Counsel, very fairly concedes that the appeal could not have been dismissed merely on the ground that the vigilance inquiry is pending against the petitioner. 6. The petitioner was imposed with a surcharge under Section 68 of the Act. He had a statutory right to appeal under Section 98 of the Act. Which he did. If there were other proceedings pending against the petitioner that could not have been a ground for not entertaining the appeal that was filed by the petitioner under Section 98 of the Act. The appeal under Section 98 of the Act ought to have been decided on merits. 7. The petitioner has preferred an appeal under Section 98 (1) (g) of the Act. Section 98 (1) (g) of the Act, reads as follows:- “98. Appeal against the awards, orders and decisions. (1) An appeal against- (a)………………………………………………………………... (b)………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………. (g) an order of surcharge made by the Registrar under Section 68;” 8. Section 98 (2) of the Act reads as follows:- “98. (2) An appeal under clauses (c), (d), (e) (f), (g), (k) and (i) of sub section (1) shall be preferred to the Tribunal 4 and an appeal under clauses (a), (b), (h), (b) (i), (j), (m) and (n) of the said sub-section shall be preferred- (a) if the decision or the order was made by the Registrar to the State Government; (b) if the decision or order or award was made by any other person or authority, to the Registrar, (c) if the order or award was made on a dispute relating to an election to the Tribunal.” 9. Section 98 (2) of the Act reveals that an appeal against an order of surcharge made by the Registrar under Section 68 of the Act, may be preferred to the Tribunal. The petitioner did not prefer an appeal to the Tribunal. Therefore, while quashing the order rejecting the appeal dated 30.09.2022 and the notice dated 22.08.2024, the petitioner may be directed to prefer an appeal before the Tribunal. Accordingly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed. 10. The writ petition is allowed. 11. The impugned order dated 30.09.2022 and notice dated 22.08.2024 are quashed. The petitioner is at liberty to prefer an appeal, in accordance with Section 98 (1) (2) of the Act before the Tribunal within two weeks. 12. In case, the appeal is preferred within two weeks and a stay application is filed, till such stay application is decided, the operation of the impugned order dated 22.12.2020 shall remain in abeyance. (Alok Mahra, J.) (Ravindra Maithani, J.) 19.11.2025 Jitendra