IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA RSA No.190/2025 Date of Decision: 08.09.2025. Maheshi Lal Verma .....Appellant. Versus Darshnu Devi and others …..Respondent Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bipin Chander Negi, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the Appellant: Mr. Amit Singh Chandel, Advocate. For the Respondent: Nemo. Bipin Chander Negi, Judge (oral). The present appellant has filed this appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, CPC), whereby he has assailed the judgment and decree dated 10.03.2025 passed by the learned Additional District Judge (C.B.I. Court), M.A.C.T/Special Judge C.B.I. Shimla, H.P. in case No. 75/2024, whereby the appeal of appellant/respondent has been dismissed and judgment and decree dated 30.09.2024 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Court No. 3, Shimla, District Shimla, H.P. in Civil Suit No. 90982/2011 title Smt. Darshnu Devi vs. Karam Chand and others has been upheld. 2. The brief facts giving rise to the present second appeal are that the respondents No. 1 and 2 (plaintiffs) instituted a civil suit seeking a declaration that an agreement dated 15.03.2011, executed by respondent No. 4, Karam Chand, in favor of the appellant (defendant No. 2), was void. They further sought 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? YES 2 mandatory and prohibitory injunctions against the appellant. The plaintiffs' case was that they, along with respondents No. 3 and 4, were in possession of ancestral abadi-deh land situated in Mauza Gharyana, Tehsil Sunni, District Shimla, H.P., since the time of their ancestors. After the death of Shri Rewa Dass, they constructed two small RCC houses on the suit land after demolishing an old, unsafe structure. They claimed that respondent No. 4, being a habitual drunkard who had divorced his wife and deserted his children, had long ago sold his entire share in the ancestral property and had no right, title, or interest in the suit land, nor was he in possession thereof. It was alleged that the appellant, taking advantage of respondent No. 4's weaknesses, connived with him to execute the impugned agreement for a sale consideration of Rs. 1,00,000/-. The plaintiffs contended the agreement was void as it was not signed by the appellant (the purchaser), was not registered, was prepared on a misused non-judicial stamp paper, and was executed by a person with no ownership or possessory rights. The appellant, based on this agreement, allegedly tried to forcibly dispossess the plaintiffs and even put a lock on the property, leading to the registration of an FIR. The plaintiffs, facing hardship, sought restoration of possession through mandatory injunction. 3. The respondent No. 4, though a family member, was impleaded as a proforma defendant and did not appear. The appellant (defendant No. 2) contested the suit, denying the 3 plaintiffs' claims. He asserted that respondent No. 4 was a joint owner of the suit land, having inherited it from his father, and had constructed two rooms on it from his own income. The appellant claimed that he purchased this specific structure from respondent No. 4 for lawful consideration, received vacant possession, and was residing there. He denied all allegations of wrongdoing and challenged the maintainability of the suit, the plaintiffs' locus standi, and the valuation of the court fee. 4. Based on the pleadings, the Learned Trial Court framed following eleven issues:- 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the decree of declaration to the effect that the agreement dated 15.03.2011 is null and void, since the defendant No.1 is neither the owner of the suit land nor in possession of the same for the reasons that he has sold his share from the ancestral property; and the agreement dated 15.03.2011 has not been signed by the defendant No.2 and the same has also not been registered with the competent authority and further non judicial stamp has been misused as the same has not been purchased by the defendant in accordance with law, as prayed for? ......OPP. 2. Whether the plaintiffs are also entitled for the decree of permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in the possession of the plaintiffs and proforma defendant over the suit land as they are in possession of Abadi Deh land from the time of their ancestors and their houses are existing thereon, as alleged? .... OPP. 3. Whether the plaintiffs are also entitled for the decree of mandatory injunction directing the defendants to remove the lock placed by them over the disputed house in question and to put the plaintiffs in peaceful possession of said disputed house, as alleged? ...OPP. 4. Whether the present suit is not maintainable, as alleged? .... OPD-I & II 5. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi to file and maintain the present suit against the defendants, as alleged? .... OPD-I & II 6. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action to file the present suit, as alleged? .....OPD-I & II. 7. Whether the plaintiffs have suppressed true and material facts from the Court and have not approached the Court with clean hands, as alleged? .....OPD-I & II. 4 8. Whether the replying defendant No.1 is also joint owner of the suit land which has been inherited by him from his father late Shri Rewa Dass, as alleged? ......OPD-I & I 9. Whether the defendant No.1 has constructed his two room house out of his own income which is existing over the suit land and he has sold said accommodation to the defendant No.2, as alleged? .... OPD-I & II 10. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the purpsoe of Court fee, as alleged? .. 11. Relief 5. The plaintiffs examined six witnesses, and the contesting defendants examined five. Vide judgment and decree dated 30.09.2024, the Learned Trial Court partly decreed the suit. It declared the agreement dated 15.03.2011 void, holding that respondent No. 4 was neither the owner nor in possession of the suit property. It permanently restrained the appellant from interfering with the suit land. However, it declined to grant the relief of mandatory injunction for removing the lock and restoring possession to the plaintiffs. 6. Aggrieved by this judgment and decree, the appellant preferred the first appeal, challenging it on several grounds. The arguments raised before the First Appellate Court were that the impugned judgment was against the law and principles of natural justice; that it was based on conjectures and surmises; that the Court below failed to appreciate that respondent No. 4 had constructed the two rooms from his own income and sold them lawfully to the appellant; that the Court failed to appreciate that possession remained with the appellant and thus injunctive relief was wrongful; that the plaintiffs, being third parties to the agreement, lacked the standing to seek its declaration; that the Court gave undue advantage to the plaintiffs' evidence while overlooking the appellant's evidence; 5 and that the matter was decided in a slipshod manner without proper appreciation of the entire facts and circumstances. 7. The First Appellate Court, after hearing the appeal, affirmed the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. The First Appellate Court based on the statement of Smt. Darshnu plaintiff No. 1 came to the conclusion that defendant No. 2 had put locks on the disputed house, therefore, in the aforesaid facts and attending circumstances, the First Appellate Court by way of mandatory injunction directed the defendant to remove the lock placed by him over the disputed house and put the plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 in its peaceful possession. Hence, the appellant, feeling aggrieved, has filed the present second appeal. 8. Heard Counsel for the appellant, perused the impugned judgements. 9. The nature of the suit land is not in dispute. It is established that the disputed house is situated on land comprised in Khasra No. 684, which is categorised as abadi deh. This fact is conclusively proved by the nakal jamabandi for the year 2006-2007, Ext. PW2/B, duly proved by PW2 Munish Sharma. In accordance with the presumption of truth attached to revenue records under Section 45 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act, and in the absence of any contrary evidence, Khasra No. 684 is held to be abadi deh land. 10. It is further admitted that the late Shri Rewa Dass was originally in possession of this land. The familial relationships are also not contested. Plaintiff No. 1, Smt. Darshnu Devi, is the widow of the late Shri Rewa Dass, and Plaintiff No. 2, Shri Roop 6 Chand, Defendant No. 1, Shri Karam Chand, and proforma Defendant No. 3, Shri Ramesh, are their sons, a fact corroborated by the copy of the pariwar register, Ext. PW1/B. 11. The central controversy revolves around the construction on the suit land. The plaintiffs asserted that after the death of Shri Rewa Dass, they and the proforma defendant demolished an old structure and constructed two RCC houses. The defendants, however, claimed that the plaintiffs live in a kuccha house built under the Indira Awas Yojana and that there exist four separate houses constructed by each legal heir, with Defendant No. 1 having built a specific two-room RCC structure which he sold to Defendant No. 2. 12. Upon a meticulous appraisal of the evidence, the testimony of the plaintiffs' witnesses, PW4 (Roop Chand), PW5 (Sanjay Bhardwaj), and PW6 (Bhoop Prakash) remains consistent and firm even under cross-examination. They unanimously attest to the existence of only two RCC houses: one comprising four rooms and another, the disputed house, comprising two rooms (12x12 feet). This version is materially corroborated by the aks tatima (map) annexed to the jamabandi, Ext. PW2/B, which depicts two constructions, not four. In stark contrast, the defendants' claim of four houses is unsupported by any credible evidence. Defendant No. 1, the alleged builder and vendor, notably abstained from entering the witness box, warranting a strong adverse inference against the defendants' case. The testimony of DW4 (Gurdev Singh) is of no assistance as it fails to mention any construction by Defendant No. 1. Consequently, it 7 is proved on a preponderance of probability that the plaintiffs and the proforma defendant constructed the two existing houses on the suit land. 13. The document at the heart of the dispute, Ext. PW4/B, styled as a vikray savida (sale deed), was written by DW1 (Jeet Ram) and witnessed by DW2 and DW3. A holistic reading of its recitals, as mandated by the Supreme Court in B.K. Muniraju vs. State of Karnataka (2008) 4 SCC 451, reveals it purports to affect a complete sale of a one-storey, two-room house with surrounding land for a consideration of Rs. 1,00,000/-. Therefore, it is not a mere agreement to sell but a conveyance of immovable property valued over one hundred rupees. As such, its registration was mandatory under Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908. Being unregistered, the document is void and incapable of conferring any title upon Defendant No. 2, as held in Shankar vs. Surindra Singh Rawat (2021) 20 SCC 425 and S.P. Singh vs. Harinder Singh (2015)5 SCC 574. 14. Furthermore, the principle of nemo dat quod non habet (no one can give what they do not have) is squarely applicable. Having concluded that Defendant No. 1 did not construct the disputed house and had no exclusive right, title, or interest in it to convey, he could not transfer any valid title to Defendant No. 2. His action of executing the deed without the consent of the other joint holders further vitiates the transaction. The document, also unsigned by the purported purchaser (Defendant No. 2), remains a unilateral declaration devoid of contractual force. 8 15. However, the plaintiffs' ancillary plea that the property is ancestral in nature remains unproven. The best evidence to establish this was the earlier revenue records which was not produced, leading to an adverse inference against them under the evidence law. Similarly, the allegation of misuse of a non- judicial stamp paper was not substantiated with any evidence. 16. In conclusion, the findings of the Learned Court below are upheld. Defendant No. 1 had no exclusive right to execute Ext. PW4/B. The document is void for want of registration and because the executant lacked title. The Appellant (Defendant No. 2) acquired no rights under it. The plaintiffs are, therefore, entitled to the declaration that the vikray savida dated 15.03.2011 (Ext. PW4/B) is null and void and to a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with their possession. 17. In view of the aforesaid, there arises no question of law much less a substantial question of law for the consideration of the Court. Accordingly, the appeal being devoid of merit is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. (Bipin Chander Negi) Judge 08th September, 2025 (Susheel/T.B.)