HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD CRIMINAL MISC. APPLICATION U/S 419 BNSS DEFECTIVE No. - 159 of 2025 Court No. - 91 HON'BLE RAJ BEER SINGH, J. Order on Criminal Misc. Delay Condonation Application No. 01 of 2025 1. Rejoinder affidavit filed in court today, is taken on record. 2. Heard learned counsel for the appellant / complainant, learned counsel for the private opposite parties and learned AGA for the State. 3. This application has been filed under Section 5 of Limitation Act for condonation of delay, which took place in filing of the present appeal. There is delay of 777 days in filing of the present criminal appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the delay in filing of the present appeal was not deliberate and there was sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the period of limitation. It was submitted that the appellant is complainant of the case and the opposite party Nos. 2 to 7 / accused persons were acquitted by the trial court vide order dated 26.06.2023. Due to wrong legal advice, the appellant has filed a criminal appeal before the Session court, which was later on dismissed as not Versus Counsel for Applicant(s) : Hanuman Kinkar, Lalit Ojha, Vinay Kumar Counsel for Opposite Party(s) : Daya Shanker Yadav, G.A., Mahendra Kumar Babloo .....Applicant(s) State Of U.P. And 6 Others .....Opposite Party(s) maintainable. It is further submitted that after that sufficient time was consumed in obtaining certified copy of the order of Session court and in collection of other related documents and thereafter this appeal was filed on 07.10.2025. It was stated that in view of aforesaid facts, the delay in filing the appeal may be condoned in the interest of justice. 5. Learned AGA and learned counsel for the private opposite parties have opposed the application and submitted that appellant has lodged a complaint against the private opposite parties in the year 2011 for the offence under Sections 323/34, 427, 504, 506 IPC. After trial the private opposite parties were acquitted by the trial court vide judgement and order dated 26.06.2023. Despite knowing well that the appeal against the said judgement was not maintainable before the Session court, the appellant / complainant has filed an appeal before the Session court, which was dismissed vide order dated 11.07.2024, holding that in such matters appeal can only be filed before the High Court. Despite that the present criminal appeal was filed before this Court after about 15 month. Learned counsel submitted that there is absolutely no sufficient cause for such long delay. Referring to facts of the matter, it was submitted that no case for condonation of delay is made out. 6. I have considered rival submissions and perused the record. 7. Section 5 Limitation Act provides that an appeal or application may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or applicant satisfies the Court that he has sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Generally the words 'sufficient cause' must be given a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is NA419D No. 159 of 2025 2 imputable to the petitioner. In N.Balakrishnan v. M.Krishnamurthy [1998 (7) SCC 123], the Court held: "It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower court. The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice?... Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation." 8. In case of Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others (2013) 12 SCC 649, Hon'ble Apex Court after referring to various authorities broadly culled out the following principles :- "i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice oriented, non- pedantic NA419D No. 159 of 2025 3 approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation. iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the NA419D No. 159 of 2025 4 approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude." 9. In case of Improvement Trust, Ludhiana v. Ujagar Singh and others 2010 (28) LCD 1531, it has been held that while considering an application for condonation of delay no straitjacket formula is prescribed to come to the conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not. It has been further stated therein that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which the party acts and behaves. In case of P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala & Anr., AIR 1998 SC 2276, the Apex Court while considering a case of condonation of delay of 565 days, wherein no explanation much less a reasonable or satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay had been given, held that Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. 10. Considering the aforesaid legal provisions, in the instant matter it may be seen that appellant is complainant of the case and said complaint was filed in the year 2011. After trial the opposite party Nos. 2 to 7 / accused persons were acquitted by the trial court vide judgement and order dated 26.06.2023. Against that order, the appellant has preferred an appeal before the Session court, which was dismissed vide order dated 11.07.2024, with observation that in case of acquittal in a complaint case, appeal can only be filed before the High Court under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C. From that order it is apparent that the appellant has full knowledge about the remedy of appeal before this Court but despite that NA419D No. 159 of 2025 5 the present appeal was filed before this Court on 07.10.2025. Regarding delay of about 15 months after the order of Session court, merely general and vague averments have been made that sufficient time has been consumed in obtaining certified copy and in collection of other related documents. From perusal of record it does not appear that so much period has been consumed in obtaining certified copy and in collection of other related documents. Having considered the entire facts, it appears that no sufficient cause has been shown for condonation of long delay of more than one year. No sufficient cause could be shown for not filing the appeal within the period of limitation and thus, no case for condonation of delay is made out. Application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is liable to be rejected. 11. The application under section 5 Limitation Act is hereby rejected. March 18, 2026 Anand NA419D No. 159 of 2025 6 (Raj Beer Singh,J.) Digitally signed by :- ANAND VERMA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad