1 2025:CGHC:36282 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPL No. 64 of 2023  M/s Nagar Palika Parishad Kawardha Kabirdham Chhattisgarh Through C.M.O. Nagar Palik Parishad Kawardha, P.S. Kawardha, District - Kabirdham Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner(s) versus  Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner Regional Office, Raipur, District - Raipur Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner : Mr. Anuj Kumar Pandey, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Bhupendra Singh, Advocate For Respondent : Mr. Sunil Pillai, Advocate Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Judgment On Board 25-07-2025 1) By way of this petition, the petitioner has sought the following reliefs:- 10.1 That the Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to call the records regarding the case of the petitioner for its kind perusal. 10.2 That the Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the impugned order dated 21.07.2022 passed by the learned Central Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court Jabalpur and also quash and set aside orders dated 31.10.2018 & 28.03.2019 passed by the respondent because The petitioner is not liable to pay any liabilities under sections 7-A and 8-A of the EPF and MP Act 1952. 10.3 That this Hon’ble Court further may kindly be pleased to direct the respondent to do not to recover further any amount from the 2 account of the petitioner and also direct the respondent to refund all recovered amount if any then and there. 10.4 Cost of the petition may also be granted to the petitioner. 10.5 Any other relief Hon’ble Court deems fit and proper may also kindly be granted to the petitioner, in the interest of justice. 2) Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner- establishment is covered under the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 and a notice was issued by the respondent on 15.02.2017 whereby the petitioner was directed to comply with the provisions of the EPF & MP Act, 1952 and submit a coverage proposal in the enclosed proforma. He further submits that without initiating any proceedings under Section 7-A of the Act, 1952, the notice under Section 8F of Act, 1952 was issued on 31.10.2018 and the recovery proceedings were initiated and the petitioner was directed to make payment to the tune of Rs. 81,30,474/- under Section 8F of the Act, 1952 for the period between January, 2011 to September, 2015. He contends that an appeal was preferred before the learned Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Jabalpur, after the expiry of 10 months from the date of the order, which was registered as Case No. CGIT/LC/EPFA/MISC/01/2022. He further contends that the learned Industrial Tribunal vide order dated 21.07.2022 dismissed the appeal on the ground that the same was not preferred within the prescribed limitation period and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to condone the delay of over 60 days. He argues that the delay part was properly explained; therefore, the Tribunal ought to have adjudicated the appeal on the merits rather than going on technicalities. 3 3) On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the period of limitation is prescribed in Rule 7 of the Employees Provident Funds Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1997 and according to this Rule, the period of limitation is 60 days from the date of the order which may be extended on sufficient cause being shown for another 60 days. He has placed reliance on the judgments rendered by the High Court of Delhi in the matter of Assistant Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Meerut & Ors. Versus Employees Provident Fund App. Tribunal1 and the High Court of Jharkhand in the matter of Nagarmal Modi Seva Sadan Versus Employees Provident Fund Organization & Ors.2 4) Rule 7 of the Rules,1997 reads as under:- 7. Fee, time for filing appeal, deposit of amount due on filing appeal. (1) Every appeal filed with the Registrar shall be accompanied by a fee of two thousand rupees to be remitted in the form of crossed Demand Draft on a nationalised bank in favour of the Registrar of the Tribunal and payable at the main branch of that Bank at the station where the seat of the said Tribunal situate. (2) Any person aggrieved by a notification issued by the Central Government or an order passed by the Central Government or any other authority under the Act, may within 60 days from the date of issue of the notification/order, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal:Provided that the Tribunal may if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the prescribed period, extend the said period by a further period of 60 days. (3) Provided further that no appeal by the employer shall be entertained by a Tribunal unless he has '[deposited with the Tribunal a Demand Draft payable in the Fund and bearing] 75 per cent of the amount due from him as 1 . 2005 (83) 647 DB 2 . 2021 SCC OnLine Jhar 1308 4 determined under section 7-A:Provided also that the Tribunal may for reasons to be recorded in writing, waive or reduce the amount to be deposited under section 7-0. 5) The High Court of Delhi in the matter of Assistant Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Meerut (supra) held that Rule making authority under the Statute has specifically provided that after the statutory period, if there is a delay of 60 days, on showing sufficient grounds for the delay of 60 days, that can be condoned. It was further held that the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is specifically excluded. Relevant paras 25 and 33 are reproduced herein below:- 25. In the instant case, a separate period of limitation is provided, as also the period for which delay can be condoned. The Legislature was aware about the provisions contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, yet with an intention to curb the delay in labour matters, legislature left it to the Rule making authority to make a provision for limitation Rule making authority under the Statute has specifically provided that after the statutory period, if there is delay of 60 days, on showing sufficient grounds for delay of 60 days, that can be condoned. Thus applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is specifically excluded. 33. What the Court is required to examine is that the period during which delay can be condoned is specifically prescribed, and it has not left open to extend further, then by an express exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act beyond the period prescribed under a different statute cannot be applied. 6) The High Court of Jharkhand in the matter of Nagarmal Modi Seva Sadan (supra) held that the EPF Act is a special law providing for the institution of provident funds, pension fund and deposit-linked insurance fund for employees in factories and other establishments. It is further held that certain period of limitation for filing an appeal has been provided in the act itself and the appeal must be preferred within 5 the period of limitation and the appeal preferred beyond such maximum time limit cannot be condoned. Relevant paras 51 to 54 are reproduced herein below:- 51. In view of the foregoing discussion, the legal position which emerges that in terms of Section 7-1 (2) every appeal is to be filed in such form and manner, within such time and be accompanied by such fees, as may be prescribed. Rule 7(2) of the Rules, 1997 provides for filing of the appeal within 60 days from the date of issuance of the order. The first proviso thereunder further stipulates that the Tribunal may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the prescribed period,extend the said period by a further period of 60 days. 52. It is thus seen that the EPF Act is a special law providing for institution of provident funds, pension fund and deposit-linked insurance fund for employees in factories and other establishments and in terms of the rules framed thereunder a certain period of limitation for filing an appeal having been provided for in clear terms and a further provision having been made for extension of such period only upto a specified time period and no further, the Appellate Tribunal would have no jurisdiction to treat within limitation, an appeal filed before it beyond such maximum time limit specified in terms of the statutory rules. 53. Moreover, in terms of the scheme and the intent of the provisions contained in the EPF Act it is seen that the legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself. As a consequence, even if the provisions of the Limitation Act may be held to have not been expressly excluded the principle of implied exclusion would apply in terms of the nature of the subject matter, the purpose and the scheme of the Act. The provisions contained under the Limitation Act, 1963 would therefore not be applicable for seeking extension of time beyond the statutory time period of 60 days from the date of issue of the notification/order, extendable by a further period of 60 days, upon the Tribunal being satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the prescribed period. The maximum period for filing the appeal would be thus 120 (60+60) days from the date of the issuance of the notification/order which is sought to be challenged. 6 54. It is a well settled principle of statutory interpretation that where the statute confers power on the authority to condone the delay only to a limited extent the same cannot be stretched or extended beyond what has been provided under the statute. We, after considering the facts in its entirety as discussed hereinabove, are of the view that the order passed by the learned Single Judge requires no interference, therefore, the present appeal is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the instant appeal is dismissed. 7) Taking into consideration (i) the provisions entailed in Rule 7 of the Rules, 1997 and (ii) the period of delay caused by the petitioner in filing the appeal and (iii) the law laid down by the High Court of Delhi and High Court of Jharkhand in the matters of Assistant Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Meerut (supra) and Nagarmal Modi Seva Sadan (supra) respectively, in the opinion of this Court, the respondent authority has not committed any error of law in dismissing the appeal preferred by petitioner. 8) Consequently, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed. No cost(s). Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) JUDGE Ajinkya Digitally signed by AJINKYA PANSARE Date: 2025.07.28 13:58:41 +0530