2025:JHHC:25017 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P (S). No. 2768 of 2019 ------- Hema Prasad, w/o. Ravi Shankar Prasad, presently posted as Sub-divisional Magistrate, Chas, Bokaro, residing of Bokaro, P.O. & P.S. Chas, District Bokaro. ……….. Petitioner Versus 1. State of Jharkhand 2. Secretary, Personnel, Administrative Reforms and Rajbhasha Department, Govt. of Jharkhand, Project Building, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi. 3. Joint Secretary, Personnel, Administrative Reforms and Rajbhasha Department, Govt. of Jharkhand, Project Building, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi. ……….. Respondents ---- CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN For the Petitioner : Mr. Saurabh Shekhar, Advocate For the State : Mr. Karan Shah Deo, AC to SC-II ---- 05/ 21.08.2025 The instant writ application has been preferred by the petitioner praying therein for quashing the order contained in resolution dated 04.04.2019 (Annexure-19), whereby punishment of stoppage of two increments with non-cumulative effect has been passed against the petitioner. Petitioner has further prayed for a direction upon the respondents to release the salary and make payment of aforesaid two increments which have been withheld and further to grant other consequential benefits like promotion, etc. 2. Initially the petitioner moved before this Court by filing W.P.(S). No. 3308 of 2018, wherein a prayer was made for quashing the resolution dated 12.06.2018, whereby departmental proceeding was initiated against the present petitioner. The said writ petition was dismissed vide order dated 22.02.2019 on the ground that the enquiry against the memorandum of charge had already been completed and therefore, the Court was of the view that it would not interfere in the matter at this belated stage. 3. Briefly stated, while the petitioner was working as Circle Officer, he recommended a land to be mutated in favour of the 2025:JHHC:25017 2 Transferee but could not be registered in view of the nature of land being Mukarari Satatva. Thereafter, on her recommendation, the Deputy Commissioner transferred the property by registered deed of sale by calling the nature of land to be Basaurhi. 4. Subsequently, a preliminary enquiry was conducted and in the preliminary enquiry, the Committee found that there might be some dereliction on the part of the petitioner but it cannot be said that she was having any bad intention for recommending for transfer. However, though the preliminary enquiry was partly in favour of the petitioner and partly against her, the respondent- department contemplated a departmental proceeding and charge- sheet was issued and the Inquiry Officer relied upon the documents of preliminary enquiry and few letters but admittedly no oral evidences were adduced in order to prove the documents and corroborate the charge which has been levelled against the petitioner in the memorandum of charge. 5. This issue is recurring again and again in several cases and the respondent-State is doing the same mistake by not proving the documents by any oral evidence. Long before, in the case of Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank1, the principle of proving the documents has been dealt with and law was laid down to the effect that even in ex-parte proceeding the respondent-Department has to prove the documents by oral evidence. Recently, in the case of State of U.P. through Principal Secretary, Department of Panchayati Raj, Lucknow Vs. Ram Prakash Singh2, the Hon’ble Apex Court has formulated a specific question in para-7 as under: (i) Whether, in pursuance of a purported enquiry where there was none to present the case of the department, no witness was examined in support of the charges and no document was formally proved, any order of punishment could validly be made? (ii) …………. (iii) ………… (iv) ………… (v) ………… 1 (2009) 2 SCC 570 2 2025 SCC OnLine SC 891 2025:JHHC:25017 3 6. The said question has been answered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraphs 14 to 18, wherein the Hon’ble Court dealing several judgments has held as under: “14. What follows from a conjoint reading of the above two decisions is and what applies here is that, ‘materials brought on record by the parties' (to which consideration in the enquiry ought to be confined) mean only such materials can be considered which are brought on record in a manner known to law. Such materials can then be considered legal evidence, which can be acted upon. Though the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is not strictly applicable to departmental enquiries, which are not judicial proceedings, nevertheless, the principles flowing therefrom can be applied in specific cases. Evidence tendered by witnesses must be recorded in the presence of the delinquent employee, he should be given opportunity to crossexamine the witnesses and no document should be relied on by the prosecution without giving copy thereof to the delinquent - all these basic principles of fair play have their root in such Act. In such light, the documents referred to in the list of documents forming part of the annexures to the chargesheet, on which the department seeks to rely in the enquiry, cannot be treated as legal evidence worthy of forming the basis for a finding of guilt if the contents of such documents are not spoken to by persons competent to speak about them. A document does not prove itself. In the enquiry, therefore, the contents of the relied-on documents have to be proved by examining a witness having knowledge of the contents of such document and who can depose as regards its authenticity. In the present case, no such exercise was undertaken by producing any witness. 15. We may further refer to the decision of this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, (2010) 2 SCC 772 where disciplinary proceedings were drawn up against the respondent, Saroj Kumar Sinha, under the 1999 Rules itself with which we are concerned. Paragraphs 26 to 30 and 33 of the said decision being relevant are quoted below: “26. The first inquiry report is vitiated also on the ground that the inquiry officers failed to fix any date for the appearance of the respondent to answer the charges. Rule 7(x) clearly provides as under: ‘7. (x) Where the charged government servant does not appear on the date fixed in the inquiry or at any stage of the proceeding in spite of the service of the notice on him or having knowledge of the date, the inquiry officer shall proceed with the inquiry ex parte. In such a case the inquiry officer shall record the statement of witnesses mentioned in the charge-sheet in absence of the charged government servant.’ 27. A bare perusal of the aforesaid sub-rule shows that when the respondent had failed to submit the 2025:JHHC:25017 4 explanation to the charge-sheet it was incumbent upon the inquiry officer to fix a date for his appearance in the inquiry. It is only in a case when the government servant despite notice of the date fixed failed to appear that the inquiry officer can proceed with the inquiry ex parte. Even in such circumstances it is incumbent on the inquiry officer to record the statement of witnesses mentioned in the charge-sheet. Since the government servant is absent, he would clearly lose the benefit of cross- examination of the witnesses. But nonetheless in order to establish the charges the Department is required to produce the necessary evidence before the inquiry officer. This is so as to avoid the charge that the inquiry officer has acted as a prosecutor as well as a judge. 28. An inquiry officer acting in a quasi-judicial authority is in the position of an independent adjudicator. He is not supposed to be a representative of the department/disciplinary authority/Government. His function is to examine the evidence presented by the Department, even in the absence of the delinquent official to see as to whether the unrebutted evidence is sufficient to hold that the charges are proved. In the present case the aforesaid procedure has not been observed. Since no oral evidence has been examined the documents have not been proved, and could not have been taken into consideration to conclude that the charges have been proved against the respondents. 29. Apart from the above, by virtue of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India t he departmental enquiry had to be conducted in accordance with the rules of natural justice. It is a basic requirement of the rules of natural justice that an employee be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in any proceedings which may culminate in punishment being imposed on the employee. 30. When a departmental enquiry is conducted against the government servant it cannot be treated as a casual exercise. The enquiry proceedings also cannot be conducted with a closed mind. The inquiry officer has to be wholly unbiased. The rules of natural justice are required to be observed to ensure not only that justice is done but is manifestly seen to be done. The object of rules of natural justice is to ensure that a government servant is treated fairly in proceedings which may culminate in imposition of punishment including dismissal/removal from service. *** 2025:JHHC:25017 5 33. As noticed earlier in the present case not only the respondent has been denied access to documents sought to be relied upon against him, but he has been condemned unheard as the inquiry officer failed to fix any date for conduct of the enquiry. In other words, not a single witness has been examined in support of the charges levelled against the respondent. The High Court, therefore, has rightly observed that the entire proceedings are vitiated having been conducted in complete violation of the principles of natural justice and total disregard of fair play. The respondent never had any opportunity at any stage of the proceedings to offer an explanation against the allegations made in the charge-sheet.” (emphasis ours) 16. It appears that the appellant is yet to take lessons despite the admonition in Saroj Kumar Sinha (supra). The same kind of omissions and commissions that led to setting aside of the order of punishment imposed being upheld by this Court were repeated in the present case. 17. Next, the decision in Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat, (2013) 4 SCC 301 deserves consideration where the concept of preliminary enquiry being distinct from a regular enquiry was noticed and discussed. Paragraphs 45 and 51 from such decision read as follows: “42. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Amalendu Ghosh v. North Eastern Railway, AIR 1960 SC 992, held that the purpose of holding a preliminary inquiry in respect of a particular alleged misconduct is only for the purpose of finding a particular fact and prima facie, to know as to whether the alleged misconduct has been committed and on the basis of the findings recorded in preliminary inquiry, no order of punishment can be passed. It may be used only to take a view as to whether a regular disciplinary proceeding against the delinquent is required to be held. 43. Similarly in Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 1854, a Constitution Bench of this Court while taking a similar view held that preliminary inquiry should not be confused with regular inquiry. The preliminary inquiry is not governed by the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of In dia. Preliminary inquiry may be held ex parte, for it is merely for the satisfaction of the Government though usually for the sake of fairness, an explanation may be sought from the government servant even at such an inquiry. But at that stage, he has no right to be heard as the inquiry is merely for the satisfaction of the Government as to whether a regular inquiry must be held.… 2025:JHHC:25017 6 45. In view of the above, it is evident that the evidence recorded in preliminary inquiry cannot be used in regular inquiry as the delinquent is not associated with it, and opportunity to cross examine the persons examined in such inquiry is not given. Using such evidence would be violative of the principles of natural justice.” 18. Guided by the law declared in the aforesaid decisions, we can safely conclude that the enquiry conducted by the Enquiry Officer in a manner not authorised by law could not have formed the basis of the order of punishment dated 24th March, 2015 imposed on the respondent. The first two issues are, therefore, answered in the negative.” 7. In the case at hand, admittedly, the preliminary enquiry report which was partly in favour of the petitioner and partly against him, has been taken into consideration apart from few letters but admittedly, the same was not proved in order to corroborate the charge mentioned in the said letters and/or the preliminary inquiry report. 8. During course of argument, learned counsel has also contended that the preliminary enquiry report cannot be made a ground in the regular departmental proceeding. The said argument appears to be correct and in the afore-referred judgment, the concept of preliminary enquiry has been elaborately dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex Court in para-17 which is quoted herein above. 9. On the ground of this procedural irregularity, the impugned order deserves to be, and, is hereby, quashed and set aside. 10. The respondents are directed to grant the consequential benefits to the petitioner within a period of 12 weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. 11. Accordingly, the writ application stands allowed. 12. Pending I.A(s)., if any, stand closed. (Deepak Roshan, J.) Kunal