Page No.1 of 36 IN ACQA-01-2008 & CRR-187-2007 2025:CGHC:28974-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR [Arising out of a common impugned judgment dated 28.02.2007, passed in Sessions Trial No.376 of 2005 (State of Chhattisgarh vs. Manish Kumar and others) by the Additional Sessions Judge, Mungeli, District Bilaspur (CG)] Acquittal Appeal No. 1 of 2008 State of Chhattisgarh, through- District Magistrate, Bilaspur (CG) --- Appellant Versus 1. Manish Kumar, S/o Omprakash Gulhare, aged about 35 years, 2. Ravish, S/o Omprakash Gulhare, aged about 38 years, 3. Smt. Shruti, W/o Ravish Gulhare, aged about 33 years, 4. Ramesh, S/o Late Bhaiyalal Gulhare, ageda bout 60 years, 5. Smt. Radha Gulhare, W/o Ramesh Gulhare, aged about 58 years, 6. Smt. Krishna, W/o Omprakash Gulhare, aged about 63 years, [All R/o Gondpara, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur (CG) --- Respondents [Cause-titles taken from Case Information System (CIS)] --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For Appellant/State : Mr. R.S. Marhas, Addl. Advocate General For Respondents : Mr. Anil Khare, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Priyank Agrawal, Mr. Anmol Sharma, and Mr. Himanshu Sinha, Advocates ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- WITH Criminal Revision No. 187 of 2007 Radha Krishna Prasad Gupta [died and deleted as per CO dt.10.06.2025] through Legal Representative- Vinod Gupta, S/o Late SAIFAN KHAN Digitally signed by SAIFAN KHAN Date: 2025.07.09 10:41:15 +0530 Page No.2 of 36 IN ACQA-01-2008 & CRR-187-2007 Radha Krishna Prasad Gupta, aged about 54 years, R/o House No.25, Phase-II, Vaishali Nagar, Behind Maosaji Sweets, Bilaspur (CG) --- Applicant Versus 1. State of Chhattisgarh, through District Magistrate, Bilaspur (CG) 2. Manish Kumar, S/o Omprakash Gulhare, aged about 35 years, 3. Ravish, S/o Omprakash Gulhare, aged about 38 years, 4. Smt. Shruti, W/o Ravish Gulhare, aged about 33 years, 5. Ramesh, S/o Late Bhaiyalal Gulhare, ageda bout 60 years, 6. Smt. Radha, W/o Ramesh Gulhare, aged about 58 years, 7. Smt. Krishna, W/o Omprakash Gulhare, aged about 63 years, [No.02 to 07 all R/o Gondpara, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur (CG) --- Respondents [Cause-titles taken from Case Information System (CIS)] ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For Applicant : Mr. Naveen Shukla, Advocate For Respondent/State: Mr. R.S. Marhas, Addl. Advocate General For Respondents No.2 to7 : Mr. Anil Khare, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Priyank Agrawal, Mr. Anmol Sharma, and Mr. Himanshu Sinha, Advocates ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Division Bench Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Deepak Kumar Tiwari Judgment on Board (30.06.2025) (1) Regard being had to the similitude of the questions of fact and law involved and being arising out of a common impugned judgment dated 28.02.2007, on the joint request of learned counsel for the parties, both the matters are clubbed together, heard together and are being decided by this common judgment. Page No.3 of 36 IN ACQA-01-2008 & CRR-187-2007 (2) In acquittal appeal (i.e. ACQA-01-2008) filed under Section 378(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the “CrPC”), the appellant/State is calling in question the legality, validity and correctness of impugned judgment of acquittal dated 28.02.2007, passed in Sessions Trial No.376 of 2005 (State of Chhattisgarh vs. Manish Kumar and others) by the Additional Sessions Judge, Mungeli, District Bilaspur (CG), whereby the learned trial Court has acquitted all the accused/respondents No.01 to 06 for offence under Section 498-A & 304-B/34 of IPC. Whereas, in criminal revision (i.e. CRR-187-2007) filed under Section 397/401 of CrPC, the complainant- Radhakrishna (PW-0), now represented through his LR- Vinod Gupta, is also challenging the same impugned judgment of acquittal dated 28.02.2007, whereby all the accused persons (private respondents) have been acquitted by the learned trial Court from the aforesaid offences. Facts of the case, in brief: (3) According to the case of the prosecution, the marriage of deceased, namely, Mini was solemnized with accused- Manish Kumar (A-1) on 05.05.2005 according to Hindu rituals and customs, however, deceased- Mini committed suicide on 11.08.2005 under abnormal circumstances within 07 years of her marriage. It is also the case of the prosecution that after the marriage of deceased- Mini and prior to the date she committed suicide, acquitted accused Page No.4 of 36 IN ACQA-01-2008 & CRR-187-2007 persons, namely, Manish Kumar (A-1), Ravish (A-2), Smt. Shruti (A- 3), Ramesh (A-4), Smt. Radha Gulhare (A-5) and Smt. Krishna (A-6) all have subjected deceased- Mini with cruelty for or in connection of dowry (i.e. Rs.2.5 lac. and four-wheeler car) and, due to which, deceased- Mini suffered harassment mentally and physically and, therefore, committed suicide by hanging. As such, the accused persons are said to have committed the aforesaid offences in question. (4) It is also the case of the prosecution that immediately after the incident, on the basis of information so given by accused- Manish (A- 1), merg intimation (Ex.P/28) was registered by the police on 11.08.2005 and, thereafter, on the next day (i.e. 12.08.2005), when father of the deceased- Radha Krishna (PW-01), reported the matter to the police by submitting written complaint (Ex.P/01), FIR (Ex.P/19) was registered against all the acquitted accused persons for offence under Section 498-A, 304-B & 34 of IPC and wheels of investigation started running, in which, spot map was prepared vide Ex.P/18. Summons under Section 175 of CrPC were sent vide Ex.P/03 and inquest proceedings were conducted vide Ex.P/02. The dead-body of the deceased was sent for postmortem examination, which was conducted by Dr. Sagar Shukla (PW-12) and, according to PM Report (Ex.P/09), the nature of death of the deceased has been opined to be suicidal and cause of death is asphyxia due to hanging. Page No.5 of 36 IN ACQA-01-2008 & CRR-187-2007 Certain articles were seized vide Ex.P/04, P/13, P/15, P/16, P/17. The accused persons were arrested vide Ex.P/22 to Ex.P/27. Copy of note-book of the deceased was seized vide Article-A. The said note- book of the deceased alongwith other seized notes were sent to the State Examiner of Questioned Documents, Government of Chhattisgarh, Raipur for hand-writing expert opinion and, according to its report (Ex.C/01) it has been opined that the “person who wrote the red enclosed writing stamped and marked as S1 to S25 also wrote the red enclosed writings similarly stamped and marked Q1 to Q33.” Thereafter, statements of witnesses were recorded and, after due investigation, the police filed charge-sheet against the accused persons in the competent court of criminal jurisdiction and, ultimately, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions for hearing and trial in accordance with law, in which the accused persons abjured their guilt and entered into defence by stating that they are innocent and have been falsely implicated. (5) The prosecution in order to prove its case examined as many as 19 witnesses and exhibited 30 documents apart from Article-A, whereas the accused persons in support of their defence, examined 05 witnesses and exhibited 08 documents apart from Article-D/01 to D/08. Further, the learned trial Court has also exhibited one document i.e. Ex.C/01 (Handwriting Expert Report). (6) The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and Page No.6 of 36 IN ACQA-01-2008 & CRR-187-2007 documentary evidence available on record proceeded to acquit all the accused persons for offences under Sections 498-A, 304-B and 34 of IPC vide impugned judgment dated 28.02.2007 by holding that: (i) the date of incident is 11.08.2005, at about 03-05 PM, where the FIR was lodged on 12.08.2005, at about 2:30 PM, as such, there is a delay of one day in lodging the FIR and prosecution has also failed to explain the said delay, therefore, the entire prosecution story is nothing but just an afterthought; (ii) no independent witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution, indeed, two independent witnesses, namely, Shirishkant Mishra (PW-03) and Himalni Mishra (PW-04) have completely turned hostile and rest of the witnesses are relatives of the deceased, thus, appears to be interested witnesses; (iii) no previous complaint has been lodged by the relatives of the deceased during her lifetime and there is material contradiction in the statements of prosecution witnesses with regard to the alleged demand of dowry in connection with the marriage of the deceased; (iv) according to the PM report (Ex.P/09) of the deceased, the cause of death has been opined to be asphyxia due to hanging by Dr. Sagar Shukla (PW-12) and nature of death is suicidal. No injury was found over the body of the deceased and only ligature mark around the neck of the deceased with knot impression near left side or mastoid region was found and (v) on the basis of the statement of Durgesh Tiwari (DW-01) it is quite clear that on the date of incident, the deceased has made a phone to her father- Page No.7 of 36 IN ACQA-01-2008 & CRR-187-2007 Radhakrishan (PW-01), in which, everything appears to be normal and there was no complaint made by the deceased with regard to cruelty for or in connection with demand of dowry by the accused persons. As such, on the basis of above, the learned trial Court concluded that though first two primary ingredients to constitute offence under Section 304-B of IPC i.e. (i) death of the deceased under abnormal circumstance and (ii) death has occurred within seven years of her marriage are quite established in the present case, but the remaining ingredients i.e. (iii) soon before the death of the deceased, she was subjected to cruelty and harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband (accused persons herein) and (iv) said cruelty and harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry are lacking/missing and have not been established by the prosecution and, therefore, concluded that the accused persons (respondents herein) are entitled for acquittal. (7) Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of acquittal dated 28.02.2007, the appellant-State has preferred ACQA-01-2008, whereas the complainant has preferred CRR-187-2007. Both the matters were clubbed together and heard by the Division Bench of this Court on 28.01.2013 and, ultimately, this Court allowed both ACQA-01-2008 and CRR-187-2007 filed by the State and complainant respectively and remanded the matter to the learned trial Court with a direction to frame appropriate charges, receive Page No.8 of 36 IN ACQA-01-2008 & CRR-187-2007 evidence of the parties, examine the accused persons under Section 313 of CrPC, provide complete opportunity of hearing and decide the case. Thereafter, questioning the judgment and order of this Court dated 28.01.2013, the acquitted accused (private respondents herein) preferred Criminal Appeals No.1929-1930 of 2013 (Manish Kumar & ors. etc. v. Radha Krishna Prasad Gupta & anr etc.) before the Supreme Court, in which, on 23.01.2025, whereby the appeals preferred by the accused persons were allowed and the order of this Court dated 28.01.2013 was set aside and further the matter is remitted before this Court to reconsider the same on merits and dispose of expeditiously. (8) Under such factual backdrop, both these ACQA-01-2008 and CRR-187-2007 came up before us for fresh consideration on merits. Submissions of parties: (9) Mr. R.S. Marhas, learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant-State in ACQA-01-2008 submits that the learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in acquitting the accused persons, as there is ample evidence available on record to connect them with the offences in question. The prosecution has proved its case beyond all reasonable doubt. He vehemently argued that there is no delay in lodging the FIR for the reason that immediately after the incident the parents of the deceased, specially, Radhakrishna Prasad Gupta (PW-1) and other Page No.9 of 36 IN ACQA-01-2008 & CRR-187-2007 family members were in the state of shock finding that their beloved daughter (deceased) died suddenly and unexpectedly within 03 months of her marriage and, for which, he referred to Para-37 of the statement of Investigating Officer (IO)- IH Khan (PW-19). As such, the delay of 12 hours is not at all fatal to the case of the prosecution. He further submits that in view of testimonies of prosecutions witnesses, specially, Radhakrishna Prasad (PW-1), Smt. Kamla Gupta (PW-5), Rajednra Verma (PW-6), Smt. Ranju Gupta (PW-7), Satish Gupta (PW-8) and Om Prakash Gupta (PW-11), it is clearly established that soon before the death the deceased was subjected to cruelty by the accused persons (private respondents herein) for or in connection with demand of dowry. Therefore, it is not a case where the accused persons were entitled for acquittal and the learned trial Court has committed grave legal error in acquitting the accused persons. Hence, in exercise of appellate power, the acquittal appeal preferred by the appellant-State deserves to be allowed and, further, the accused persons (respondents No.01 to 06) are liable to be punished for offences under Sections 304-B & 498-A of IPC. (10) Mr. Naveen Shukla, learned counsel appearing for the applicant/legal representative of complainant- Radhakrishna Prasad (PW-1) in CRR-187-2007 also submits that the learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in acquitting the accused persons, as the prosecution has proved its case beyond all reasonable doubt. He Page No.10 of 36 IN ACQA-01-2008 & CRR-187-2007 referred to the diary note (Article-A) written by the deceased to highlight the grievances of the deceased that she was subjected to cruelty by the accused persons for or in connection with demand of dowry. He relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Sukhvinder Singh v. State of Punjab 1 ; State of Karnataka v. Ms. V Manju Nathegouda 2 ; Surendran v. State of Kerala 3 ; Ramesh Vitthal Patil v. State of Karnataka 4 ; Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka 5 ; A.K. Devaiya v. State of Karnataka 6 ; Rakhal Devnath v. State of West Bengal 7 ; Chhabi Karmakar v. State of West Bengal 8 and State of M.P. v. Joginder and another 9 to buttress his submission. Hence, he prays that the revision be allowed and acquitted accused persons be convicted for the offences in question. (11) Mr. Anil Khare, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the acquitted accused persons by rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Constable 907 Surendra Singh and another v. State of Uttarakhand 10 submits that the scope of interference in an appeal against the judgment of acquittal is extremely limited. He 1 (2014) 12 SCC 490 2 (2003) 2 SCC 188 3 (2022) 15 SCC 273 4 (2014) 11 SCC 516 5 (2019) 5 SCC 436 6 (2015) 1 SCC 752 7 (2012) 11 SCC 347 8 (2025) 1 SCC 398 9 (2022) 5 SCC 401 10 2025 INSC 114 Page No.11 of 36 IN ACQA-01-2008 & CRR-187-2007 further submits that: (i) there is a delay of 12 hours in lodging the FIR, which is fatal to the case of the prosecution. Though father of the deceased- Radhakrishna Prasad (PW-1) and other witnesses (relatives of the deceased) visited the spot and the police station, but they did not lodge first information report and, only after coming back in the night, they cooked up the story and lodged a concocted FIR on the next day, which is nothing, but just an act of afterthought in order to falsely implicate the acquitted accused persons. Even, despite suggestion having been given by Constable- Anil Tiwari (PW-14), no FIR was lodged by the family members of the deceased in the night of the alleged date of incident. As such, though there is a delay of some hours, but the same is extremely fatal to the case of the prosecution case; (ii) except Shirishkant Mishra (PW-03) and Himalni Mishra (PW-04), most of the prosecution witnesses are interested witnesses being close relative of the deceased. Even, Shirishkant Mishra (PW-03) and Himalni Mishra (PW-04), who are independent witnesses, have not supported the case of the prosecution and have completely turned hostile. Thus, chances of false implication on the basis statement of interested prosecution witnesses cannot be ruled out; (iii) there are material contradiction in the statements of Radhakrishna Prasad (PW-1), Smt. Kamla Gupta (PW-5), Rajednra Verma (PW-6), Smt. Ranju Gupta (PW-7), Satish Gupta (PW-8) and Om Prakash Gupta (PW-11) with respect of alleged demand of dowry from the deceased. Page No.12 of 36 IN ACQA-01-2008 & CRR-187-2007 Hence, the learned trial Court is absolutely justified in not relying upon the statements of aforesaid witnesses; (iv) that Dr. Sagar Shukla (PW-12), who conducted postmortem of the dead-body of the deceased has clearly opined in PM report (Ex.P/09) that only ligature mark was found over the neck of the deceased and no injuries were found over any body parts of the deceased. Even the nature of death has been opined to be suicidal. Further, according to the statement of Dr. Sagar Shukla (PW-12), on account of not mentioning the death of the deceased to be homicidal in nature, he was transferred to Dantewada at the instance of Omprakash Gupta (PW-11); (v) Durgesh Tiwari (DW-01), who is neighbour of accused- Manish Kumar (A-1) and the deceased and from whose shop the deceased had made phone call to his father- Radhakrishna Prasad (PW-1) on the date of incident, has also admitted in Para-16 of his statement that though the deceased used to make phone from his shop, but no complaint was made by her at any point of time and, even on the date of incident, when the deceased made phone call to her father- Radhakrishan (PW-01), everything seems to be normal and there was no complaint made by the deceased with regard to cruelty meted out by the accused persons. As such, from the aforesaid evidence, it is quite clear that soon before the death the deceased was not subjected to cruelty or harassment; and (vi) Similarly, from the statement of J.P. Singh (DW-02), who is Branch Manager of the Bank, where accused- Manish (A-1) has opened Page No.13 of 36 IN ACQA-01-2008 & CRR-187-2007 Fixed Deposit account, has clearly stated that accused- Manish (A-1) has opened FD of Rs.50,000/- in his branch, in which, deceased- Mini (his wife) was nominee. Therefore, financial health/conditon of accused- Manish (A-1) was also fairly good. Accordingly, in view of the above, the findings recorded by the learned trial Court in acquitting all the accused persons are well merited and, no interference by this Court is called for in it. Hence, both ACQA-01- 2008 & CRR-187-2007 are liable to be dismissed. (12) We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. Discussion and analysis: (13) At the very outset, we would firstly consider the scope of interference in an appeal against the judgment of acquittal, for which, it would be profitable to notice the relevant principle of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Constable 907 Surendra Singh and another (supra), whereby in Para-11 & 12 it has been held that the High Court should interfere in the order of acquittal, if the same suffers from perversity and is based on misreading of material evidence etc. and observed as under: “11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and others v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Page No.14 of 36 IN ACQA-01-2008 & CRR-187-2007 Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below : (SCC pp. 482- 83, para 29) 6 (2024) 8 SCC 149 “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words : (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325] , SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, Page No.15 of 36 IN ACQA-01-2008 & CRR-187-2007 “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however,must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.’ ” 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748] this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows : (SCC p. 584, para 8) “8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused Page No.16 of 36 IN ACQA-01-2008 & CRR-187-2007 further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” Page No.17 of 36 IN ACQA-01-2008 & CRR-187-2007 12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” (14) Thus, in light of the above quote guidelines, we have to examine whether the findings recorded by the learned trial Court suffers from patent perversity or the same is based on misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record and whether two reasonable views are possible or only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. (15) In order to consider the plea raised at the Bar, it would be now appropriate to notice relevant provisions of Section 304-B of the IPC which relates to dowry death:- “304-B. Dowry death.-(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation.-For the purposes of this sub-section, "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of Page No.18 of 36 IN ACQA-01-2008 & CRR-187-2007 the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.” The above provision was inserted by Act 43 of 1986 and came into force w.e.f. 19.11.1986. (16) In order to convict an accused for the offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC, the following essentials must be satisfied-  The death of a women should be caused by burn or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances.  Such death should have occurred within seven years of the marriage.  Soon before the death of deceased, she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her Husband or any relative of her Husband.  Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand for dowry. (17) Thus, if the aforesaid ingredients are established by the prosecution by leading appropriate reliable evidence, such death shall be called dowry death and the court shall presume and it shall record such fact as proved unless and until it is disproved by the accused. (18) Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 speaks about presumption as to dowry death which reads as under:- "113B. Presumption as to dowry death- When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her Page No.19 of 36 IN ACQA-01-2008 & CRR-187-2007 death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation. For the purposes of this section, "dowry death" shall have the same meaning as in section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)." The aforesaid provision shows that if the women has been subjected to cruelty as defined in Section 498-A IPC, the court may presume that such person has caused dowry death. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 provides as under:- 2. Definition of "dowry". In this Act," dowry" means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly- a. by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or b. by the parents of either party to a marriage or by a other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person; at or before or after the marriage us consideration for the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies." (19) To attract the provisions of Section 304B, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that "soon before her death" she was subjected to cruelty or harassment "for, or in connection with the demand for dowry". The expression "soon before her death" used in Section 304B IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. (20) As regards the principles concerning the above-referred provisions, it would be profitable to notice the decisions reported in Page No.20 of 36 IN ACQA-01-2008 & CRR-187-2007 K. Prema S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao 11 , Kaliyaperumal v. State of T.N. 12 , and Devi Lal v. State of Rajasthan 13 . (21) In K. Prema S. Rao (supra) it has been held as under:- “16. … To attract the provisions of Section 304-B IPC, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that 'soon before her death' she was subjected to cruelty and harassment 'in connection with the demand for dowry'.” (22) In Kaliyaperumal (supra) relevant portion states as under:- “5. A conjoint reading of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC shows that there must be material to show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. The prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of the 'death occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances'. The expression 'soon before' is very relevant where Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC are pressed into service. The prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and only in that case presumption operates. Evidence in that regard has to be led in by the prosecution. 'Soon before' is a relative term and it would depend upon the circumstances of each case and no straight-jacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period of soon before the occurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate any fixed period, and that brings in the importance of a proximity test both for the proof of an offence of dowry death as well as for raising a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. The expression 'soon before her death' used in the substantive Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. 11 (2003) 1 SCC 217 12 (2004) 9 SCC 157 13 (2007) 14 SCC 176 Page No.21 of 36 IN ACQA-01-2008 & CRR-187-2007 No definite period has been indicated and the expression 'soon before' is not defined. A reference to the expression 'soon before' used in Section 114 Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act is relevant. It lays down that a Court may presume that a man who is in the possession of goods soon after the theft, is either the thief who has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession. The determination of the period which can come within the term 'soon before' is left to be determined by the courts, depending upon facts and circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression 'soon before' would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the women concerned, it would be of no consequence.” (23) In Devi Lal (supra) the ingredients of the provisions of Section 304-B as laid down in Harjit Singh v. State of Punjab 14 and Ram Badan Sharma v. State of Bihar 15 have been reiterated as under:- “20. The question, as to what are the ingredients of the provisions of Section 304-B of the Penal Code is no longer res integra. They are: (i) that the death of woman was caused by any burns or bodily injury or in some circumstances which which were not normal; (2) such death occurs within 7 years from the date of her marriage; (3) that the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband; (4) such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with the demand of dowry; and (5) it is established that such cruelty and harassment was made soon before death.” 14 (2006) 1 SCC 463 15 (2006) 10 SCC 115 Page No.22 of 36 IN ACQA-01-2008 & CRR-187-2007 (24) Further, in the matter of Appasaheb and another v. State of Maharashtra 16 it has been held by the Apex Court as under:- “9. Two essential ingredients of Section 304-B IPC, apart from others, are (i) death of woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances, and (ii) woman is subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for “dowry”. The explanation appended to sub section (1) of Section 304-B IPC says that “dowry” shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. 10. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act reads as under: “2. Definition of ‘dowry’.-In this Act, "dowry" means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly. (a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or (b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person, at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies. 11. In view of the aforesaid definition of the word “dowry” any property or valuable security should be given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly at or before or any time after the marriage and in connection with the marriage of the said parties. Therefore, the giving and taking of property or valuable security must have some connection with the marriage of the parties and a correlation between the giving or taking of property or valuable security with the marriage of the parties is essential. Being a penal provision it has to be strictly construed. Dowry is a fairly well known social custom or practice in India. It is well settled principle of interpretation of statute that if the Act is passed with 16 (2007) 9 SCC 721 Page No.23 of 36 IN ACQA-01-2008 & CRR-187-2007 reference to a particular trade, business or transaction and words are used which everybody conversant with that trade, business or transaction knows or understands to have a particular meaning in it, then the words are to be construed as having that particular meaning. (see Union of India v. Garware Nylons Ltd and Chemical and Fibres of India Ltd. v. Union of India). A demand for money on account of some financial stringency or for making some urgent domestic expenses or for purchasing manure cannot be termed as a demand for dowry as the said word is normally understood. The evidence adduced by the prosecution does not, therefore, show that any demand for 'dowry' as defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was made by the appellants as what was allegedly asked for was some money for meeting domestic expenses and for purchasing manure. Since an essential ingredient of Section 304-B IPC viz demand for dowry is not established, the conviction of the appellants cannot be sustained.” (25) The word "soon before her death", no definite period has been prescribed and the expression "soon before her death" has not been defined either in IPC or Evidence Act. (26) The Supreme Court in case of Mustafa Shahadal Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra 17 while considering the word "soon before her death", it has been held that term of the period which can come within the term "soon before her death" is to be determined by the courts, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the concerned cruelty or harassment and the death in question and there must be existence of a proximate and live link 17 2012 (11) SCC 397 Page No.24 of 36 IN ACQA-01-2008 & CRR-187-2007 between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the concerned death. It has been further held that if the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence. (27) Recently, in the matter of Karan Singh v. State of Haryana 18 has observed as under: “6. The following are the essential ingredients of Section 304-B: a) The death of a woman must have been caused by any burns or bodily injury, or must have occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances; b) The death must have been caused within seven years of her marriage; c) Soon before her death, she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by the husband or any relative of her husband; and d) Cruelty or harassment must be for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry. 7. If the aforesaid four ingredients are established, the death can be called a dowry death, and the husband and/or husband's relative, as the case may be, shall be deemed to have caused the dowry death. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 provides that dowry means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage or by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to the other party to the marriage or to any other person. The dowry must be given or agreed to be given at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties. The term 18 2025 SCC Online SC 214 Page No.25 of 36 IN ACQA-01-2008 & CRR-187-2007 valuable security used in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 has the same meaning as in Section 30 of IPC. 8. In this case, there is no dispute that the death of the appellant's wife occurred within seven years of the marriage. Section 113-B of the Evidence Act reads thus: “113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.-When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, “dowry death” shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of Penal Code, 1860.” The presumption under Section 113-B will apply when it is established that soon before her death, the woman has been subjected by the accused to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry. Therefore, even for attracting Section 113- B, the prosecution must establish that the deceased was subjected by the appellant to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand of dowry soon before her death. Unless these facts are proved, the presumptions under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked.” (28) Keeping the above-stated principles of law in mind, we shall now proceed to consider the evidence led by the prosecution in the instant case qua whether ingredients for offence under Section 304- B of IPC is made out or not ? (29) Admittedly, the marriage of deceased- Mini with accused- Manish (A-1) was solemnized on 05.05.2005 and the date of incident Page No.26 of 36 IN ACQA-01-2008 & CRR-187-2007 whereby the deceased committed suicide by hanging is 11.08.2005, i.e. within seven years of her marriage. Furthermore, as per PM report (Ex.P/09) of the deceased, the cause of death is asphyxia due to hanging and same is suicidal in nature, which is duly proved by Dr. Sagar Shukla (PW-12), who has conducted the postmortem of the dead-body of the deceased. As such, the two primary ingredients to constitute offence under Section 304-B of IPC i.e. (i) death of the deceased under abnormal circumstance and (ii) the said death has occurred within seven years of her marriage are clearly established in the present case. We hereby hold accordingly. (30) Now, the spinal issue is as to whether the remaining ingredients to constitute offence under Section 304-B of IPC, i.e. (iii) soon before the death of the deceased, she was subjected to cruelty and harassment by the acquitted accused and (iv) said cruelty and harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry, are established in the instant case or not ? (31) In order to answer this plea, the learned trial Court has taken into consideration the following facts: (i) there is an unexplained delay in lodging the FIR (Ex.P/19); (ii) there was no previous complaint by the deceased or her relatives with regard to cruelty or demand of dowry by the accused persons; (iii) there are material contradictions in the statements of Radhakrishna Prasad (PW-1), Smt. Kamla Gupta (PW-5), Rajednra Verma (PW-6), Smt. Ranju Page No.27 of 36 IN ACQA-01-2008 & CRR-187-2007 Gupta (PW-7), Satish Gupta (PW-8) and Om Prakash Gupta (PW- 11) with respect to the alleged demand of dowry; (iv) independent witnesses- Shirishkant Mishra (PW-03) and Himalni Mishra (PW- 04) both have turned hostile and not supported the case of the prosecution; (v) the death of the deceased was opined to be suicidal in nature and there was no injury found over the body of the deceased and (vi) Durgesh Tiwari (DW-1) has stated that on the date of incident the deceased as made a phone call to his father- Radhakrishna (PW-01) from his shop and she did not make any complaint at that point to time with regard to cruelty or harassment by the accused persons. As such, on the basis of the above evidence, the learned trial Court has held that the accused persons are entitled for acquittal. (32) In the present case, it is the case of the prosecution that the accused persons (private respondents herein) demanded Rs.2.50 lac. and a car in shape of dowry from the deceased and, when said demand was not fulfilled, they subjected her with cruelty, due to which, she suffered harassment mentally and physically and ultimately committed suicide on 11.08.2005. In this regard, the statement of Radhakrishna (PW-01) may be referred herein profitably, who has lodged written complaint (Ex.P/01) and lodged FIR (Ex.P/19). It is also the case of the defence, duly proved by Durgesh Tiwari (DW-01) that on the date of offence (i.e. 11.08.2005), Page No.28 of 36 IN ACQA-01-2008 & CRR-187-2007 the deceased has made a phone call to her father- Radhakrishna (PW-01), at about 01-01:30 PM, which has also been admitted by Radhakrishna (PW-01) in Para-63 of his statement. Further, in the written report (Ex.P/01), Radhakrishna (PW-01) has also stated that on the date of offence (i.e. 11.08.2005), at about 1-1.30 PM, his daughter (deceased- Mini) had made a phone call to him, but she did not made any allegation regarding cruelty meted out by the accused persons upon her, indeed, she only stated that she wanted to visit her parental house, but her husband- Manish (A-1) is not allowing her to go and further demanded cash and car from her. Moreover, though it is also the case of the prosecution that the deceased used to write diary, but Radhakrishna (PW-01) has confronted/admitted in Para-104 of his statement that the deceased has nowhere written in her diary notes seized vide Article-A that at the time of her marriage, dowry in shape of Rs.2.5 lac and maruti car was demanded. Similarly, Smt. Kamla Gupta (PW-05), who is sister of the deceased, in Para-125 has clearly admitted that at the time of marriage of the deceased, accused- Manish (A-1) has not made any demand of dowry in shape of Rs.2 lac and maruti car. Further, Satish Gupta (PW-8), who is brother of the deceased, has stated that at the time of recording of his police statement (Ex.D/04) he has informed that all the accused persons (acquitted respondents) have demanded dowry at the time of marriage of the deceased, however, if the said fact is not mentioned in his police statement, he has no idea Page No.29 of 36 IN ACQA-01-2008 & CRR-187-2007 about it. Similarly, Om Prakash Gupta (PW-11), brother of the deceased, has also contradicted his police statement (Ex.D/05), in which, he has stated that while recording his police statement (Ex.D/05) he has stated that the deceased has informed him that accused persons used to subject her with cruelty for or in connection with demand of dowry and, even on 11.08.2005 also, the deceased has informed him that her husband (Manish) used to demand money from her and didn’t let her to go to her parental house, but, if the said facts are not mentioned in his police statement (Ex.D/05), he is not aware about it. As such, the factum of accused persons (acquitted respondents) demanding dowry in shape of Rs.2.5 lac and car from the family members of the deceased is not clearly borne out from the statements of the father, mother and brothers of the deceased being Radhakrishna Prasad Gupta (PW-1), Smt. Kamla Gupta (PW-5), Satish Gupta (PW-8) & Om Prakash Gupta (PW-11). (33) Furthermore, though it is correct to say that the family members of the deceased were is deep mental trauma after the death of the deceased, but fact remains that they did not lodge FIR (Ex.P/19) at the first available time (i.e. in the night of 11.08.2005) and, indeed, lodged FIR (Ex.P/19) on the next day of the incident, though they were present on 11.08.2005 at the place of incident as well as in the police station after the incident. Even otherwise, the cause of death of the deceased has been opined to be suicidal by Dr. Page No.30 of 36 IN ACQA-01-2008 & CRR-187-2007 Sagar Shukla (PW-12) in his PM report (Ex.P/09) and he has also stated that there was no injury found over the body of the deceased. Further, from the statement of Durgesh Tiwari (DW-01) it is apparently clear that on the date of incident the deceased has made a phone call to her father- Radhakrishna (PW-01) from his shop and, at that time, their conversation was normal and the deceased did not make any complaint with regard to cruelty meted out upon her by the accused persons. Moreover, during the life time of the deceased also, neither the deceased herself nor any of her relatives, who were examined before the learned trial Court, have ever made any complaint against the accused persons (acquitted respondents) with regard to cruelty on the deceased for or in connection with demand of dowry and same continued till the date of incident vis-a- vis till the death of the deceased. (34) Lastly, the dairy/note-book of the deceased, which was seized vide Article-A was sent to the State Examiner of Questioned Documents, Government of Chhattisgarh, Raipur for hand-writing expert opinion alongwith other seized notes and, according to the said report (Ex.C/01) it has been opined that the person who wrote the red enclosed writing stamped and marked as S1 to S25 (standard notes) also wrote the red enclosed writings similarly stamped and marked Q1 to Q33 (dairy notes). However, since the author of the said Report (Ex.C/01), namely, N.K. Sikkewal, Addl. Page No.31 of 36 IN ACQA-01-2008 & CRR-187-2007 State Examiner of Questioned Document, has neither been cited as a witness nor brought to the witness-box for examination before the Court. In this regard it would be relevant to mention relevant decisions of the Supreme Court on the point. (35) In the matter of State of H.P. v. Jai Lal 19 , their Lordships have clearly held that the report submitted by an expert does not go in evidence automatically and he is to be examined as a witness in court and has to face cross-examination and observed in Para-19 as under: “18. An expert is not a witness of fact. His evidence is really of an advisory character. The duty of an expert witness is to furnish the Judge with the necessary scientific criteria for testing the accuracy of the conclusions so as to enable the Judge to form his independent judgment by the application of this criteria to the facts proved by the evidence of the case. The scientific opinion evidence, if intelligible, convincing and tested becomes a factor and often an important factor for consideration along with the other evidence of the case. The credibility of such a witness depends on the reasons stated in support of his conclusions and the data and material furnished which form the basis of his conclusions. 19. The report submitted by an expert does not go in evidence automatically. He is to be examined as a witness in court and has to face cross-examination. This Court in the case of Hazi Mohammad Ekramul Haq v. State of W.B. [AIR 1959 SC 488 : 1959 Supp (1) SCR 922] concurred with the finding of the High Court in not placing any reliance upon the evidence of an expert witness on the ground that his evidence was merely an opinion unsupported by any reasons.” 19 (1999) 7 SCC 280 Page No.32 of 36 IN ACQA-01-2008 & CRR-187-2007 (36) Similarly, in the matter of Patel Babubhai Manohardas and others v. State of Gujarat 20 , their Lordships have clearly held as under: “41. The suicide note was sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) for examination. The Deputy Chief Handwriting Expert of FSL, Gandhinagar opined that the handwriting was of the deceased. However, the prosecution did not examine the Deputy Chief Handwriting Expert as an expert witness. The records also do not indicate that the accused had admitted genuineness of the report of the handwriting expert. 42. In Shashi Kumar Banerjee versus Subodh Kumar Banerjee (since deceased), AIR 1964 SC 529, this Court observed that expert’s evidence as to handwriting is opinion evidence. It can rarely, if ever, take the place of substantive evidence. Before acting on such opinion evidence, it is necessary to see if it is corroborated either by clear direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. 43. In the case of Murari Lal versus State of M.P., (1980) 1 SCC 704 this Court opined that having due regard to the imperfect nature of the science of identification of hand-writing, the approach of the court should be one of caution. Reasons for the opinion must be carefully probed and examined. In an appropriate case, corroboration may be sought. Where the reasons for the opinion are convincing and there is no reliable evidence throwing a doubt, uncorroborated testimony of a handwriting expert may be accepted. 44. This Court dealt with the effect of placing reliance on the opinion of handwriting expert without examining him in court in Keshav Dutt versus State of Haryana, (2010) 9 SCC 286. One of the questions which fell for consideration in that case was whether the opinion of a handwriting expert can be admitted in evidence without examination of the handwriting expert. In this connection, this Court 20 2025 SCC Online SC 503 Page No.33 of 36 IN ACQA-01-2008 & CRR-187-2007 took the view that when the trial court chose to rely on the report of the handwriting expert, it ought to have examined the handwriting expert in order to give an opportunity to the accused to cross-examine the said expert. In that case, it was found that there was nothing on record to show that the accused persons had admitted to the report of the handwriting expert. 45. Finally, even if we take the suicide note as correct and genuine, we do not find any act of incitement on the part of the appellants proximate to the date on which the deceased committed suicide. No act is attributed to the appellants proximate to the time of suicide which was of such a nature that the deceased was left with no alternative but to commit suicide. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that any offence of abetment to commit suicide is made out against the appellants.” (37) In view of the above quoted principles, since the author of the said Report (Ex.C/01), namely, N.K. Sikkewal, Addl. State Examiner of Questioned Document, has neither been cited as a witness nor brought to the witness-box to be examined before the Court, for the reasons best known to the prosecution, his opinion given in Report (Ex.C/01), pales into insignificance and same is of no help to the prosecution, more particularly, when the hand-wrirting expert report has also not been put to the accused persons while recording their statements under Section 313 of CrPC, which was absolutely essential. Even otherwise, in light of the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in Magan Bihari Lal v. The State of Punjab 21 , whereby their Lordships held that expert opinion must always be received with great caution and perhaps none so with more caution 21 (1977) 2 SCC 210 Page No.34 of 36 IN ACQA-01-2008 & CRR-187-2007 than the opinion of a handwriting expert and, following its earlier decision in the matter of Fakhruddin v. The State of Madhya Pradesh 22 , their Lordships further held that it is unsafe to base a conviction solely on expert opinion without substantial corroboration. This type of evidence, being opinion evidence, is by its very nature, weak and infirm and cannot be itself form the basis for a conviction. It is also pertinent to notice here that statement contained in the personal diary of the deceased- Mini (Article-A) has also not been put to the accused persons (acquitted respondents herein) under Section 313 of CrPC, though the same has been relied upon by the prosecution as an incriminating piece of evidence. (38) Consequently, in view of the above detailed analysis, we are of the considered opinion that two primary ingredients, i.e. the death of the deceased was under abnormal circumstance and within seven years from the date of her marriage are duly established, but other two ingredients i.e. soon before the death of the deceased, she was subjected to cruelty and harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband (accused persons herein) and said cruelty and harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry, are completely lacking/missing. There is no evidence available on record to show that at any point of time, the acquitted accused had demanded dowry or had committed cruelty and harassment upon the deceased for or in connection with the same soon before her 22 AIR 1964 SC 1326 Page No.35 of 36 IN ACQA-01-2008 & CRR-187-2007 death. Thus, the learned trial Court is absolutely justified in acquitted all the accused persons (private respondents herein) for offence under Section 304-B of IPC. So far as decisions relied by Mr. Naveen Shukla, learned counsel for the complainant, rendered in Sukhvinder Singh; Ms. V Manju Nathegouda; Surendran; Ramesh Vitthal Patil; Vijay Mohan Singh; A.K. Devaiya; Rakhal Devnath; Chhabi Karmakar and Joginder (supra) are concerned, the same are clearly distinguishable under the facts and circumstances of the present case. We hereby hold accordingly. (39) In the present case, the learned trial Court has also acquitted all the accused persons for offence under Section 498-A of IPC. However, in light of the detailed discussion made hereinabove, the prosecution has miserably failed to establish on record that the deceased was subjected to cruelty by any of the acquitted accused soon before her death, therefore, it would be totally unsafe and risky to convict the acquitted accused persons for offence under Section 498-A of IPC and the learned trial Court is absolutely justified in acquitted all the accused persons (private respondents herein) for offence under Section 498-A of IPC as well and we do no find any patient perversity in said finding. We hereby hold accordingly. Conclusion: (40) Concludingly, we are unable to hold that the accused persons (private respondents herein) are the authors of the crime and, Page No.36 of 36 IN ACQA-01-2008 & CRR-187-2007 therefore, they are liable to convicted for the offences in question. The learned trial Court has rightly held all the accused persons (private respondents herein) entitled for acquittal for offences under Section 304-B & 498-A of IPC on the basis of finding recorded in the impugned judgment dated 28.02.2007, as culled out in Para-06 of this judgment, as we do not find that the said findings recorded by the learned trial Court suffers from patent perversity or the same is based on misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record and two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. (41) Accordingly, both the ACQA-01-2008, filed by the State, and CRR-187-2007, filed by the complainant (now died through LR), are liable to be and are hereby dismissed. No cost. Sd/- Sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Deepak Kumar Tiwari) Judge Judge s@if