IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA Civil Appellate Jurisdiction APPELLATE SIDE Present: The Hon’ble Justice Tapabrata Chakraborty & The Hon’ble Justice Reetobroto Kumar Mitra FMA 1277 of 2021 + IA No. CAN 1 of 2021 Anupam Das Versus Allahabad Bank & Ors. For the Appellant : Mr. Samim Ahammed, Mr. Arka Maiti, Ms. Ambiya Khatun. For the Respondent : Mr. Shiv Mongol Singh. Nos. 1 to 3 / Bank. Hearing is concluded on : 23rd April, 2025. Judgment On : 7th May, 2025. Tapabrata Chakraborty, J. 1. A procrastinated legal battle pertaining to a disciplinary proceeding (hereinafter referred to as DP) initiated under the provisions of the Allahabad Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the 1976 Regulations) which culminated in an order of ‘removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for 2 future employment’ dated 14.12.2017 was assailed in a statutory appeal which was dismissed by an order dated 10.05.2018. Challenging the entire DP initiated by the chargesheet dated 15.09.2016 including the orders passed by the disciplinary authority (hereinafter referred to as DA) and the appellate authority (hereinafter referred to as AA) and two transfer orders dated 11.03.2016 and 01.07.2016, the writ petitioner/appellant herein preferred a writ petition being W.P.13189 (W) of 2018 which was dismissed by a judgment dated 26.02.2021. The said judgment is the subject matter of challenge in the present writ petition. 2. It is the appellant’s case that while he was working in the SME Finance Branch of Allahabad Bank (hereinafter referred to as the Bank), he was transferred to ARM Branch at Kolkata by an order dated 11.03.2016 and thereafter by an order dated 01.07.2016, he was transferred to the Zonal Office of the Bank at Siliguri. The said orders were punitive and illegal and the same were issued as he acted as a whistle-blower protesting against the acts of corruption indulged in by a section of the Bank’s officials. However, due to lack of specific allegations, the transfer order dated 01.07.2016 was not interfered with when the writ petition was heard on 23.08.2016. Thereafter, on 15.02.2017 by way of an amendment the appellant was allowed to bring on record the particulars of mala fide but subsequently on 29.06.2018, the said writ petition was dismissed as infructuous. In the midst thereof, a chargesheet dated 15.09.2016 was issued and before he could reply to the same, an enquiry was conducted ex- parte. Without communicating the report of the Inquiring Authority 3 (hereinafter referred to as IA), an order of removal dated 14.12.2017 was passed observing that his acts were prejudicial to the interest of the Bank and in violation of Regulation 3(1) and 3(3) of the Allahabad Bank Officer Employees’ (Conduct) Regulations, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Conduct Regulations) amounting to misconduct in terms of Regulation 24 of the Conduct Regulations. The statutory appeal preferred against the same was also dismissed by an order dated 10.05.2018. 3. Mr. Samim Ahammed, learned advocate appearing for the appellant argues that from the chargesheet itself it would be explicit that the respondents have proceeded with a preconceived notion and had arrived at a finding as regards the guilt of the appellant. Such conclusion reflects the biased mind of the DA and that as such the chargesheet itself is liable to be set aside. 4. He contends that the learned Single Judge erroneously discounted the plea that mere unauthorised absence does not amount to a misconduct under the Regulation 3(1) and 3(3) of the Conduct Regulations on the rudiments of an erroneous finding that it was not obligatory on the part of the DA to establish that such purported absence was wilful, failing to appreciate that the reasons given by the appellant in the writ petition were not controverted in the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the Bank. 5. According to him, the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the chargesheet, the report of the IA, the findings of the DA and the AA do not disclose any misconduct within the meaning of Regulation 3(1), 3(3) and 24 of the Conduct Regulations, 1976. 4 6. Mr. Ahammed submits that the learned Single Judge erred in law by observing that the appellant acted in a casual and cavalier manner particularly when no such finding has been returned by the DA or the AA. The reasoning supplied by the Hon’ble Judge that being absent from work without prior intimation causes serious prejudice to the Bank and poses problems in the general administration and day to day functioning of the Bank and amounts to violation of Regulation 3(1) is alien to the records of the case since no such finding has been returned by the DA or the AA. 7. According to him the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the order of transfer to Siliguri dated 01.07.2016 issued by the Zonal Office was received by the SME branch only on 04.07.2016 and that as such it was an impossibility on the part of that the Manager of the SME branch to communicate the same to the appellant vide his letter dated 01.07.2016. No explanation was also forthcoming as to why DP was conducted against the appellant in SME branch and not by Siliguri Zonal office. The said order of transfer thus suffers from a jurisdictional error and was issued only with a view to victimize the appellant and to entangle him in the DP with a view to oust him from service. 8. He further submits that the appellant preferred a statutory appeal incorporating specifically grounds of challenge but a perusal of the order of the AA would reveal that the order of rejection of appeal does not stand supported with appropriate reasons. The right to appeal is a statutory right and it was incumbent upon the AA to arrive at a finding after consideration 5 of all facts and records. The order of the AA does not reveal any such endeavour and the same was mechanically rejected through a cryptic order. 9. He argues that in the absence of any charge of financial loss caused to the employer by misconduct, fraud, gross negligence or other conduct of like nature, the imposition of the severest penalty of removal from service for alleged unauthorised absence is shockingly disproportionate. In support of the arguments advanced reliance has been placed upon the judgments cited before the learned Single Judge and also upon the judgments delivered in the cases of Swapan Kumar Chowdhury Vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in 2017 SCC OnLine Cal 11050 and Dr. U.N. Biswas Vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in 1998 SCC OnLine Cal 144. 10. Mr. Singh, the learned advocate appearing for the Bank denies and disputes the contention of the appellant and submits that the appellant was continuously absent from office since 23rd February, 2016. Prior thereto, he was also absent on 18.11.2015, 24.11.2015 and from 27.11.2015 till 15.02.15. The chargesheet was sent to him by registered post as well as by courier to his recorded residential address. All those letters were returned undelivered. Thereafter, notices were published in the local newspapers on 30.12.2016 advising him to collect the chargesheet from the Bank, but no response was received from him. Thereafter the DA appointed the IA and the Presenting Officer (hereinafter referred to as the PO). Such intimation was sent to the appellant by registered post to his recorded residential address and it returned undelivered. The appellant, however, did not participate in the enquiry and all the letters sent to him by the IA and 6 the PO were returned undelivered. As a result, the enquiry was conducted ex-parte. The enquiry was completed on 24.03.2017 and the IA submitted his report on 31.08.2017 which was sent to the appellant’s recorded residential address by registered post on 04.09.2017 for his comments but it returned undelivered. Thereafter, notices were published in local newspapers on 27.10.2017 advising the appellant to collect the IA’s report from Zonal Office, Kolkata Metro within five days of the publication of the notice. However, he neither came to the office to collect the report nor submitted any representation in this regard to the DA. 11. He contends that from the above sequence of facts it would be explicit that ample opportunity was granted to the appellant to contest the DP and the orders passed by the DA and the AA were passed in a strict consonance with the statutory provisions and the records do not reveal any error in the decision-making process. The allegation that the respondents had a mindset to penalize the appellant is thus absolutely unfounded. 12. Mr. Singh further submits that it is a well-settled proposition of law that the power of the Writ Court to interfere with the disciplinary action is limited and the Writ Court does not, in exercise of power of judicial review, reappreciate the evidence and that it cannot sit in appeal over the orders passed by the DA and the AA. 13. Replying to the contention of Mr. Ahammed that the penalty imposed was disproportionate, Mr. Singh submits that the appellant had been a habitual absentee and his mindset was to remain absent from duties 7 on trivial grounds. Such activities are most unbecoming of a Bank official. A Bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of efficiency. 14. He contends that procedural provisions are generally meant for affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the delinquent officer and that they are conceived in his interest but the appellant himself refused to accept the documents forwarded and chose to be absent in the DP in spite of the endeavour on the part of the respondents to ensure his presence upon making paper publications. In support of the arguments advanced reliance has been placed upon the judgments Tushar D. Bhatt Vs. State of Gujrat and Another, reported in (2009) 11 SCC 678, State of T.N. and Another Vs. S. Subramaniam, reported in (1996) 7 SCC 509, State Bank of India Vs. Ram Lal Bhaskar and Another, reported in (2011) 10 SCC 249, Union of India and Others Vs. P. Gunaskeran, reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 and Bank of India & Ors. Vs. Muthyala Saibaba Suryanarayana Murthy & Anr., reported in, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 585. 15. We have examined the submissions advanced by learned advocates appearing for the respective parties in the contours of the aforesaid factual position. 16. A perusal of the chargesheet would reveal that the charges are definite and that the same does not suffer from any vagueness or infirmity. From the language used in the chargesheet, we do not find that the DA proceeded with a closed and biased mind. It is well-settled that a chargesheet has to be construed in a reasonable manner. Closed and 8 prejudged mind of the DA cannot be comprehended only from the language and or expressions used in the chargesheet. 17. Record reveals that the appellant was given ample opportunity to contest the DP and that there had been no violation of the principles of natural justice. If fairness is shown by the decision-makers to the man proceeded against, the form, features and the fundamentals of such essential processual propriety being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of its situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of. Unnatural expansion of natural justice, without reference to the administrative realities and other factors of a given case, can be exasperating. 18. The factum of absence has not been disputed by the appellant. The defence was that he was prevented from joining his duties due to compelling circumstances and such fact was intimated to the authorities. In reply to the letter dated 16.12.2015 calling for explanation pertaining to his absence on 18.11.2015, 24.11.2015 and 27.11.2015 till 29.12.2015 and from 23.02.2016, the appellant stated inter alia that ‘I would like to also inform you that at the time of joining the bank i was totally fit, even at the time of taking promotion also. I strongly believe that my present illness (suffering from peripheral vestibulopathy with vertigo) is due to the huge work load that was put on me’. The medical certificates reveal that he was suffering from ‘vertigo and anxiety’. He did not reply to the chargesheet and as such had no explanation as regards his absence on 20.02.2016 and on 23.02.2016 to 15.09.2016. The letter of transfer issued on 11.03.2016 to 9 ARM Branch in the same building sent by post returned with postal remark ‘unclaimed’. A show cause notice issued thereafter on 14.06.2016 sent by post returned with postal remark ‘unclaimed’. The chargesheet sent thereafter by post was also not received. The same was again sent by email on 10.10.2016 but he did not respond. On 30.12.2016 a notice was published in three local newspapers but the appellant did not respond and as such DP had to be conducted in his absence. In the midst thereof, he also did not comply with the mandatory direction of the Court passed on 23.08.2016 to report to Siliguri within ten days. The IA report sent thereafter by post on 08.09.2017 returned with postal remark ‘unclaimed’. Thereafter a notice was published informing about the IA report with request to collect the same but in vain. The order of the DA was thereafter received by him and a statutory appeal was preferred. 19. The expression ‘sufficiency of evidence’ postulates existence of some evidence which links the charged officer with the misconduct alleged against him and in the instant case the documents reveal that there was a clear nexus of the appellant with the charges and no procedural irregularity has been committed by the IA, the DA and the AA. 20. We are unable to accept the argument of Mr. Ahammed that the punishment imposed is disproportionate and it shocks the conscience and that as such the same is liable to be struck down. In the backdrop of the charges which have been proved against the appellant, question of relaxation of the order of punishment imposed by the DA does not occasion inasmuch as it needs to be borne in mind that in banking business absolute 10 diligence is required to be preserved and in the event such discipline is not maintained, the confidence of public/depositors would be impaired and the appellant, being a Bank employee, is expected to be extremely cautious in his duties and having committed an offence, he cannot lament and seek sympathy from the Court. The disciplinary measure should, in banking service aim to eradicate the disregardful and remiss proclivity of conduct on the part of the employee. 21. It is well-settled that any interference with the order of punishment is permissible in very rare cases. It is only in an extreme case, where on the face of it there is perversity or irrationality, the punishment will be amenable for interference under the limited scope of judicial review. In the instant case the punishment is not so disproportionate to the established charges, that it would appear unconscionable and actuated with malice. 22. Measure, magnitude and degree of misconduct needs to be taken into consideration for weighing the proportion. The appellant’s conduct was reproachable and his understanding of responsibility and adherence to discipline was questionable. Regard being had to the facts involved, the nature of post held by the appellant and the conduct expected of him, we are of the opinion that the doctrine of proportionality is not invocable in the instant case and his reinstatement would tantamount to foisting a cantankerous and abrasive officer upon the employer. 23. It is well known that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. Even a slight distinction in 11 fact or an additional fact may make a lot of difference in decision making process. The judgment is a precedent for the issue of law that is raised and decided and not observations made in the facts of any particular case. Plentitude of pronouncements leaves cleavage in the opinions formed in the respective cases. There is no dispute as regards the proposition of law laid down in the judgments upon which reliance has been placed by the appellant but the same are distinguishable on facts. 24. An appellate power interferes not when the order appealed is not right but only when it is clearly wrong. Upon dealing with all the factual issues, the learned Judge arrived at specific findings and there is no error, least to say any patent error of law in the judgment impugned. 25. For the reasons as discussed above, no interference is called for in the present appeal. 26. The appeal and the connected application are, accordingly, dismissed. 27. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. 28. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, shall be granted to the parties as expeditiously as possible, upon compliance of all formalities. (Reetobroto Kumar Mitra, J.) (Tapabrata Chakraborty, J.)