1 2025:CGHC:16244-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 1748 of 2025 D.S.G. Papers Private Limited, Is A Company Incorporated In Terms of The Companies Act, 1956, Having Its Registered OfÏce At Kothi No. 7957/5, Ranbir Marg, Model Town, Patiala, Punjab - 147 001 ... Petitioner versus Chhattisgarh Pathya Pustak Nigam OfÏce Complex, Block- B., Sector-24, Nava Raipur, Atal Nagar, Chhattisgarh - 492101 ... Respondents For Petitioner : Mr. Kishore Bhaduri, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Sabyasachi Bhaduri, Advocate For Respondent-Corporation. : Mr. Prafull N. Bharat, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Arjit Tiwari, Advocate For Intervenor-Shreyansh Industries Ltd. : Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Arvind Kumar Verma , Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 0 7/ 04/2025 1 Proceedings of this matter have been taken through Video Conferencing. 2 Heard Mr. Kishore Bhaduri, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Sabyasachi Bhaduri, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Mr. 2 Prafull N. Bharat, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Arjit Tiwari, learned counsel, appearing for the respondent as well as Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, learned counsel for the Intervenor. 3 By way of this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for following relief(s): “i. Pass appropriate writ(s)/ order(s)/ direction(s) thereby quashing/ setting-aside the impugned decision of the Respondent rejecting the Petitioner's Bid at technical stage, as notified in the GEM Portal on 29.03.2025; ii. Pass appropriate writ(s)/ order(s)/ direction(s) thereby quashing/ setting-aside the Impugned Decision of the Respondent of opening the Financial Bid and notification of putting the purportedly qualified Financial Bids for Reverse Auction in a post haste manner, as notified in the GEM Portal on 31.03.2025; iii. Pass appropriate writ(s)/ order(s)/ direction(s) thereby directing the respondent to include and consider the Petitioner's Bid also in the evaluation and consideration of Financial Bid and for award of contract; In case the relief sought in prayer iv. In case the relief sought in prayer (iii) is not possible due to any reasons including technical unfeasibility, pass appropriate writ(s)/ order(s)/ direction(s) thereby quashing/ setting-aside the Bid titled as 'BID on GEM Portal for SUPPLY OF 70 GSM & 80 GSM WATER MARKED (CGPPN**) REEL MAPLITHO PAPER Conforming to BIS Specification 1848 (Part I) : 2018 with latest amendments in SIZE 84 CM WIDTH REEL'; and v. Pass any further appropriate writ, order, direction as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the present case.” 4 Brief facts of the case, are that the petitioner is a Company incorporated in the year 2005 under the provisions of Companies Act, 1956 and 3 continue to operate in terms of the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013. The petitioner is engaged in the business of manufacturing and marketing various types of papers including news print, writing and printing papers and kraft papers etc. and has acquired sound goodwill and reputation in the field. The petitioner is the BIS Licensee who is qualified and licensed to manufacture the paper meeting the BIS standard. 5 On 12.01.2025, the respondent-Chhattisgarh Text Book Corporation (for short, the Corporation) issued a Notice Inviting Tender, titled as 'BID on GEM Portal for SUPPLY OF 70 GSM & 80 GSM WATER MARKED (CGPPN**) REEL MAPLITHO PAPER conforming to BIS Specification 1848 (Part I):2018 with latest amendments in SIZE 84 CM WIDTH REEL. The aforesaid bid has been initiated by the Respondent for the purpose of procuring 8500 Metric Tonne (MT) of 70 GSM (Grams per Square Meter) and 500 MT of 80 GSM Water Marked Reel Mapiltho Paper. The petitioner, being the manufacturer of the aforesaid paper participated in the aforesaid bid initiated by the respondent. Under the bid document, as per Clause 8, the bidders were required to submit certain documents at the time of submission of the technical and financial bids. One of the documents was 'Pre-Contract Integrity Pact'. Clause 8(a)(vii) of the bid document reads as under: 8. Those interested and fulfiling above qualifying criteria may submit their technical and financial bids as per following: (a) Technical part ---- (viii) Duly ink signed by bidder or his representative with seal and signed by two witnesses in Pre-contract Integrity pact should be uploaded in original scanned copy. If found unsigned or not filled 4 properly the bid shall be summarily rejected….” 6 The petitioner participated in the aforesaid bid, and furnished/uploaded all the requisite documents on the GEM Portal, including the 'Pre- Contract Integrity Pact', which was duly ink signed by its representative alongwith seal, filled properly, and signed by two witnesses. The said Pre-Contract Integrity Pact was also submitted by the Petitioner on its letter-head. The petitioner have been supplying paper to various public entities across the country for last several years, as such, there cannot have any dispute as to the technical competence and capabilities of the petitioner in participating the tender or performing the contract, if awarded. However, to the utter shock and dismay of the petitioner, the respondent vide the impugned decision which has been notified on the GEM Portal on 29.03.2025, rejected the petitioner's bid at the technical evaluation stage itself. In terms of the bid document, the petitioner on 31.03.2025 made a representation to the respondent as to how the rejection of the bid was incorrect. However, on 31.03.2025, the respondent proceeded to reject the representation of the petitioner. In fact, on the very same day (i.e., on 31.03.2025), the respondent proceeded with opening of the financial bid evaluation of the remaining bidders whose technical bid was accepted. Additionally, the respondent also proceeded to issue the reverse auction document on 31.03.2025, thereby intimating that such auction will commence from 16:00 Hours of 01.04.2025 to 16:00 Hours of 02.04.2025. 7 Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits that the Constitution of India is described variously as a charter of governance of the republic, as a delineation of the powers of the State in its various manifestations vis- à-vis, inalienable liberties and a document delimiting the rights and the 5 responsibilities of the Union and its constituent States, including their instrumentality, agencies, functionaries, etc., and they are bound by law to act free from all facets of arbitrariness, unreasonableness, abuse of dominant position, highhandedness, while imbibing the benevolent principles of fairness and justice and dispensing their duties and functions, which are apparently curtailed by the impugned decision. He further submits that in contrast, the case before this Hon'ble Court is a stark instance of authoritarian practices, unfairness, highhandedness of an instrumentality/agency of the State, that is the respondent, which not only acted in a manner which is illegal and arbitrary, but also its actions strike at the root and is a classic instance of commercial injustice by the State. The impugned decision of the respondent is patently arbitrary, unfair and unreasonable and as such contrary to the principles of Article 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India and is liable to be set aside. It has been contended that while rendering the impugned decision, the respondent Corporation completely failed to take into account that the bid submitted by the petitioner was a 'substantially responsive bid' and therefore, the same could not at all have been rejected on trivial grounds as has been resorted by the respondent. The principle of substantially responsive bid has been settled in a catena of judgments, in respect of which reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corpn. v. Anoj Kumar Agarwala, reported in (2020) 17 SCC 577, and a decision of the Delhi High Court in J. Mitra & Co. (P) Ltd. v. National Aids Control Organisation, reported in 2007 SCC OnLine Del 506. 8 Mr. Bhaduri further submits that it is clear that as long as a substantially responsive bid is submitted by an entity i.e., the bid which conforms to all terms, conditions and specifications without any 'material deviation', then 6 in such a case the procurer cannot reject the bid. The bid submitted by the petitioner has not been affected by any material deviations and as such, the impugned decision is bad in law. A material deviation is one which limits, in any substantial way, or is inconsistent with the bidding documents. In the present case, there is no such material deviation, on account of the following reasons: (i) no irregularity was found by the respondent qua the authenticity of the bid submitted by the petitioner; and (ii) even the Pre-Contract Integrity Pact uploaded by the petitioner was in accordance with the governing clause under the bid document i.e., Clause 8(a) (viii), since it satisfied the condition of the said contract being (i) duly ink signed by its representative alongwith seal; (ii) filled properly; and (iii) signed by two witnesses and as such, the entire bid of the petitioner was in accordance with the bid document and no material deviation whatsoever was committed by the petitioner, which could entail any sort of rejection by the respondent. It is further submitted that the purpose of the Pre-Contract Integrity Pact is to execute a pre-contract agreement between the buyer and the bidder in order to avoid all forms of corruption by following a system that is fair, transparent and free from any influence/prejudiced dealings, prior to, during and subsequent to the final contract to be entered between such buyer and bidder. Further, the said contract outlines the commitments of the parties (i.e., buyer and bidder), terms relating to security deposit, enabling the buyer to put sanctions upon the bidder (in case of any violation) etc. Thus, once the bidder (such as the petitioner) provides a duly signed pre-contract integrity pact with seal and signed by two witnesses, then the purpose of such contract is fulfilled. As such, the submission of the said document on the petitioner's letterhead does not in any manner whatsoever make it a material deviation to the terms and conditions of the bid. Clause 8(a) 7 (viii) of the Bid Document categorically limited the ground upon which the Bid can be rejected only to 'unsigned or not filled properly'. Admittedly, the Petitioner's bid was not rejected on the aforesaid condition as the said Pre-Contract Integrity Pact was duly signed and also filled properly. 9 In aid of the above, the Petitioner places reliance upon the settled principle of law that any decision which is contrary to the terms and conditions of the Bidding Document, is not permissible. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in National High Speed Rail Corpn. Ltd. v. Montecarlo Ltd. reported in (2022) 6 SCC 401, Banshidhar Construction (P) Ltd. v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., reported in (2024) 10 SCC 273. 10 It has been further submitted by Mr. Bhaduri that an act done by the State or its agency or its ofÏcers, sans force of law or lawful jurisdiction, head-on disrupts the recognized precept of equality and reasonability, enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, therefore liable to be interfered with by this Hon'ble Court, under its vested extra-ordinary jurisdiction. In addition, the sacrosanct fundamental right guaranteed to the Petitioner under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India also gets obliterated by such actions of the Respondent. The said impugned acts of Respondent taken away the very rationale of public procurement through competitive bidding and would result in huge financial loss to the public exchequer and as such, the impugned decision is liable to be set aside in the interest of public. It is equally a settled tenet of law that any action of the State which defies logic or reasoning becomes non-est and gets vanquished in the eyes of law. It has come to light that the respondent has rejected seven out of ten bidders, including the petitioner, on various unsubstantial and fictitious grounds, thereby 8 limiting the number of bidders eligible to participate in the financial bid stage to a mere three. Such exclusion of bidders on trivial grounds severely curtails fair competition and creates a scenario where the public contract may be awarded to less deserving bidders due to the lack of competitive bidding, which undermines the objective of the tender process. Apparent facts of the present case leads to an unequivocal conclusion that the impugned acts of respondent has been actuated with dishonesty, malafide and made with oblique motive. The arbitrariness is manifested in the impugned decision and as such the impugned decision is liable to be set aside in limine. The motive that led the respondent to take the impugned decision is antithetic to the principles of fairness, transparency and equality and also the norms of public procurement. Thus, the impugned decision takes away the rationale behind the competitive bidding in public procurement. 11 Mr. Bhaduri further submits that the high-handedness of the respondent is also evidenced from the fact that immediately after the rejection of the bid, the petitioner furnished its representation for rejection of the bid (within a period of 48 hours as provided in the bid document), which was surreptitiously rejected by the respondent. Further, the respondent proceeded to open the financial bid evaluation on 31.03.2025 (on a government gazetted holiday) and also on the very same day (i.e., on 31.03.2025), the said respondent also notified the reverse auction to be held from 16:00 Hours of 01.04.2025 to 16:00 Hours of 02.04.2025. The respondent has proceeded with all said impugned steps in a post hate manner where the malafide is presumed. This is in violation of principles of fair play and justice. The respondent has proceeded in such a post hate manner on a government notified holiday and despite the legitimate objections by various bidders solely with an object to award the contract 9 before the aggrieved bidders could approach this Hon'ble Court. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the decisions rendered by the Apex Court in S.P. Kapoor v. State of H.P., (1981) 4 SCC 716 and Bahadursinh Lakhubhai Gohil v. Jagdishbhai M. Kamalia, (2004) 2 SCC 65. 12 Further, it has been argued by Mr. Bhaduri that the bidders do not enjoy an absolute right towards rejection of the bid. A decision of a public authority is always subjected to a judicial review if there exists an illegality, irrationality (also termed as Wednesbury unreasonableness) and Procedural Impropriety. This position has been settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a catena of judgments. One such decision being Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651, and thus, in terms of the dictum laid down in the said judgment, it is stated that as long as the decision of public/ state agency is irrational, in a sense that it is in defiance of any logic, the Courts have the power of judicial review to set aside/ quash such decision. In the present case, the impugned decision of the respondent to reject the bid of the petitioner, merely on the basis of that the Pre-Contract Integrity Pact is allegedly is not proper manner, is clearly an arbitrary and irrational decision, and as such, the same deserves to be deprecated and set aside/quashed by this Hon'ble Court. 13 Mr. Bhaduri lastly submits that the products of the petitioner Company for which bid was submitted, is of extremely high quality and the petitioner's bid is fully eligible to fulfill all technical parameters mandated by the tender. Thus, the petitioner being a bonafide, eligible and competitive bidder ought not to have been rejected on fictitious reason. 14 On the other hand, Mr. Prafull N Bharat, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent/Corporation draws attention of this Court to 10 Clause 8(a)(viii) of the bid document and submits that pursuant to the said requirement, the petitioner has submitted its document which finds place at page No. 154 of the writ petition. The petitioner has duly signed all the pages of the pre-contract integrity pact but as per the requirement, there is no signature of the two witnesses. At page 175, another document has been annexed which is the pre-contract integrity pact which is on the letter head of the petitioner Company and it has been signed by the petitioner as well as also notarised on 30.01.2025. The said document contains the signature of two witnesses also. This document has been executed 30.01.2025 prior to the opening of the bid or prior to entering into any contract. The pre-contract integrity pact is signed by two parties one by the authority issuing the tender and the other who is given the work order or who is the successful bidder. It is further submitted by Mr. Bharat that as per Section 8 of the Notaries Act, both the parties to the agreement must be present before the Notary for executing the agreement which is not the case here. This was the reason that the respondent-Corporation had not asked for any notarised document. As per the requirement of the respondent-Corporation, the pre-contract integrity pact was simply required to be signed by the petitioner alongwith two witnesses which does not find place in page 154 wherein there is no signature of witnesses. Hence, the contention of the petitioner that his bid has been rejected on the ground that the pre- contract integrity pact has been submitted on the letter head of Company is misplaced and erroneous. 15 We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order as well as materials available on record. 11 16 In Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corpn. Ltd.1, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the owner or the employer of a project having authored the tender documents, is the best person to understand and appreciate its requirements and interpret its documents. 17 In N.G. Projects Ltd. v. Vinod Kumar Jain2,, the Apex Court has observed as under: “22. The satisfaction whether a bidder satisfies the tender condition is primarily upon the authority inviting the bids. Such authority is aware of expectations from the tenderers while evaluating the consequences of non-performance. In the tender in question, there were 15 bidders. Bids of 13 tenderers were found to be unresponsive i.e., not satisfying the tender conditions. The writ petitioner was one of them. It is not the case of the writ petitioner that action of the Technical Evaluation Committee was actuated by extraneous considerations or was malafide. Therefore, on the same set of facts, different conclusions can be arrived at in a bona-fide manner by the Technical Evaluation Committee. Since the view of the Technical Evaluation Committee was not to the liking of the writ petitioner, such decision does not warrant for interference in a grant of contract to a successful bidder. 23. In view of the above judgments of this Court, the Writ Court should refrain itself from imposing its decision over the decision of the employer as to whether or not to accept the bid of a tenderer. The Court does not have the expertise to examine the terms and conditions of the present day economic activities of the State and this limitation should be kept in view. Courts should be even more reluctant in interfering with contracts involving technical issues as there is a requirement of the necessary expertise to adjudicate upon such issues. The approach of the Court should be not to find fault with magnifying glass in its hands, rather the Court should examine as to whether the decision-making process is after complying with the procedure contemplated by the tender conditions. If the Court finds that there is total arbitrariness or that the tender has been granted in a malafide manner, still the Court should refrain from interfering in the grant of tender but instead relegate the parties to seek damages for the wrongful exclusion rather than to injunct the execution of the contract. The injunction or interference in the tender leads to additional costs on the State and is also against public interest. Therefore, the State and its citizens suffer twice, firstly by paying escalation costs and secondly, by being deprived of the infrastructure for which the present-day Governments are expected to work.” 1 (2016) 16 SCC 818 2 (2022) 6 SCC 127 12 18 Recently, the Apex Court, in the matter of Banshidhar Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Others, {Civil Appeal No. 11005 of 2024, decided on 04.10.2024}, taking note of the decisions rendered in various other celebrated judgments, observed as under: “21. There cannot be any disagreement to the legal proposition propounded in catena of decisions of this Court relied upon by the learned counsels for the Respondents to the effect that the Court does not sit as a Court of Appeal in the matter of award of contracts and it merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made; and that the Government and its instrumentalities must have a freedom of entering into the contracts. However, it is equally well settled that the decision of the government/ its instrumentalities must be free from arbitrariness and must not be affected by any bias or actuated by malafides. Government bodies being public authorities are expected to uphold fairness, equality and public interest even while dealing with contractual matters. Right to equality under Article 14 abhors arbitrariness. Public authorities have to ensure that no bias, favouritism or arbitrariness are shown during the bidding process and that the entire bidding process is carried out in absolutely transparent manner. 22. At this juncture, we may reiterate the well-established tenets of law pertaining to the scope of judicial intervention in Government Contracts. 23. In Sterling Computers Limited v. M/s. M & N Publications Limited and Others3, this Court while dealing with the scope of judicial review of award of contracts held: - “18. While exercising the power of judicial review, in respect of contracts entered into on behalf of the State, the Court is concerned primarily as to whether there has been any infirmity in the “decision making process”. In this connection reference may be made to the case of Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans [(1982) 3 All ER 141] where it was said that: (p. 144a) “The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment, and not to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment, reaches on a matter which it is authorised or enjoined by law to decide for itself a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the court.” 3 (1993) 1 SCC 445 13 By way of judicial review the court cannot examine the details of the terms of the contract which have been entered into by the public bodies or the State. Courts have inherent limitations on the scope of any such enquiry. But at the same time as was said by the House of Lords in the aforesaid case, Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans [(1982) 3 All ER 141] the courts can certainly examine whether “decision-making process” was reasonable, rational, not arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.” 24. In Tata Cellular vs. Union of India4, this Court had laid down certain principles for the judicial review of administrative action. “94. The principles deducible from the above are: (1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action. (2) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. (3) The court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible. (4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or award the contract is reached by process of negotiations through several tiers. More often than not, such decisions are made qualitatively by experts. (5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides. (6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure. Based on these principles we 4 (1994) 6 SCC 651 14 will examine the facts of this case since they commend to us as the correct principles.” 25. It has also been held in ABL International Limited and Another vs. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Limited and Others5, as under: - “53. From the above, it is clear that when an instrumentality of the State acts contrary to public good and public interest, unfairly, unjustly and unreasonably, in its contractual, constitutional or statutory obligations, it really acts contrary to the constitutional guarantee found in Article 14 of the Constitution.” 26. In Jagdish Mandal vs. State of Orissa and Others6, this Court after discussing number of judgments laid down two tests to determine the extent of judicial interference in tender matters. They are: - “22. (i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority is mala fide or intended to favour someone; or Whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the court can say: “the decision is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached;” (ii) Whether public interest is affected. If the answers are in the negative, there should be no interference under Article 226. Cases involving blacklisting or imposition of penal consequences on a tenderer/contractor or distribution of State largesse (allotment of sites/shops, grant of licences, dealerships and franchises) stand on a different footing as they may require a higher degree of fairness in action.” 27. In Mihan India Ltd. vs. GMR Airports Ltd. and Others7, while observing that the government contracts granted by the government bodies must uphold fairness, equality and rule of law while dealing with the contractual matters, it was observed in Para 50 as under: - “50. In view of the above, it is apparent that in government contracts, if granted by the government bodies, it is expected to uphold fairness, equality and rule of law while dealing with contractual matters. Right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India abhors arbitrariness. The transparent bidding process is 5 (2004) 3 SCC 553 6 (2007) 14 SCC 517 7 (2022) SCC OnLine SC 574 15 favoured by the Court to ensure that constitutional requirements are satisfied. It is said that the constitutional guarantee as provided under Article 14 of the Constitution of India demands the State to act in a fair and reasonable manner unless public interest demands otherwise. It is expedient that the degree of compromise of any private legitimate interest must correspond proportionately to the public interest.” 28. It was sought to be submitted by the learned Counsels for the Respondents relying upon the observations made in Central Coalfields Limited and Another vs. SLL-SML (Joint Venture Consortium) and Others8, that whether a term of NIT is essential or not is a decision taken by the employer which should be respected. However, in the said judgment also it is observed that if the employer has exercised the inherent authority to deviate from the essential term, such deviation has to be made applicable to all the bidders and potential bidders. It was observed in Para 47 and 48 as under:- “47. The result of this discussion is that the issue of the acceptance or rejection of a bid or a bidder should be looked at not only from the point of view of the unsuccessful party but alsofrom the point of view of the employer. As held in Ramana Dayaram Shetty [Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489] the terms of NIT cannot be ignored as being redundant or superfluous. They must be given a meaning and the necessary significance. As pointed out in Tata Cellular [Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651] there must be judicial restraint in interfering with administrative action. Ordinarily, the soundness of the decision taken by the employer ought not to be questioned but the decision-making process can certainly be subject to judicial review. The soundness of the decision may be questioned if it is irrational or mala fide or intended to favour someone or a decision “that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached” as held in Jagdish Mandal [Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa, (2007) 14 SCC 517] followed in Michigan Rubber [Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2012) 8 SCC 216]. 48. Therefore, whether a term of NIT is essential or not is a decision taken by the employer which should be respected. Even if the term is essential, the employer has the inherent authority to deviate from it provided the deviation is made applicable to all bidders and potential 8 (2016) 8 SCC 622 16 bidders as held in Ramana Dayaram Shetty [Ramana Dayaram Shetty v.International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489] . However, if the term is held by the employer to be ancillary or subsidiary, even that decision should be respected. The lawfulness of that decision can be questioned on very limited grounds, as mentioned in the various decisions discussed above, but the soundness of the decision cannot be questioned, otherwise this Court would be taking over the function of the tender issuing authority, which it cannot.” 19 The requirement of the respondent-Corporation was merely pre-contract integrity pact duly signed by the bidder alongwith signature of two witnesses. The petitioner-Company has filed two separate documents and both of them are defective. One document does not bear the signature of the witnesses and other which bears the signature of both the petitioner as well as the witnesses, have been unnecessarily notarised. Hence, it can be said that the requirement of the respondent- Corporation was not fulfilled. Whether or not the said defect is trivial in nature or would have some serious impact, can certainly be ascertained only by the authority issuing the tender and this Court cannot examine that aspect. Even the representation filed by the petitioner which stood rejected also states the same reason for rejection of its bid and hence, this Court is of the view that no interference is warranted at this stage with the decision of the respondent-Corporation. 20 In view of the foregoing discussion, this petition being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No order as to cost(s). Sd/- Sd/- (Arvind Kumar Verma) (Ramesh Sinha) JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE Anu / Amit AMIT KUMAR DUBEY Digitally signed by AMIT KUMAR DUBEY Date: 2025.04.09 20:27:42 +0530