2025:HHC:21199 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP (M) No. 1302 of 2025 Reserved on: 30.06.2025 Date of Decision: 04.07.2025. Ajit Kumar ...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : M/s Aakash Thakur and Manvinder Singh, Advocates. For the Respondent/State : Mr. Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in F.I.R. No. 271 of 2024, dated 03.11.2024, registered for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 103(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 at Police Station Baddi, District Solan, H.P. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:21199 2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the petitioner had assaulted the deceased, who subsequently succumbed to his injuries. Police registered the F.I.R. and arrested the petitioner. The petitioner is innocent, and there is no material to connect him with the commission of crime. The petitioner is a labourer and is the only earning member in the family. It has become difficult for his family to survive after his detention. He would abide by all the terms and conditions which the Court may impose. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the petitioner had given beatings to Babu Ram (since deceased) on 29.10.2024 at 7:00 p.m. The informant went to the room of Babu Ram and asked him what had happened. Babu Ram was unconscious and did not reveal anything. The informant again went to the room of Babu Ram on 30.10.2024, and saw that Babu Ram was holding his stomach with his hands and was crying. He revealed that the petitioner came to his room at 7:00 p.m. on the previous evening and quarrelled with him for not going to work. The petitioner kicked Babu Ram’s stomach, and he suffered from pain. Babu Ram requested the informant to 3 2025:HHC:21199 take him to Ludhiana to the house of his relative for treatment. The informant took him to Ludhiana in a bus on 31.10.2024. Babu Ram died on the way. The matter was reported to the police. The police registered the F.I.R. As per the report of the Medical Officer, the deceased died due to septic peritonitis consequent upon rupture of the intestine caused by blunt force trauma. All injuries were ante mortem in nature and sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. The injuries were possible by kicking a person in the abdomen. The deceased was not suffering from any previous disease or injuries. The charge sheet has been filed before the Court, and the matter was listed for consideration of the charge on 20.06.2025. Hence, the status report. 4. I have heard M/s Aakash Thakur and Manvinder Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State. 5. Mr. Aakash Thakur, learned counsel of the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and was falsely implicated. The petitioner was not provided medical aid, which contributed to his death. A perusal of the F.I.R. shows that the 4 2025:HHC:21199 incident occurred due to grave and sudden provocation. Hence, the offence punishable under Section 103 (1) of BNS is not made out. The petitioner has been in custody since 17.12.2024. No fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and that the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the allegations in the F.I.R., prima facie, show the commission of a cognizable offence. The absence of medical aid will not help the petitioner, as the death was related to the injury; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 974, wherein it was observed at page 783: - “Relevant parameters for granting bail 26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in 5 2025:HHC:21199 which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. [Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman Lal v. State of U.P., (2004) 7 SCC 525: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1974]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977]; Masroor v. State of U.P. [Masroor v. State of U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 286 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368]; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765]; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi)[Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425]; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar [Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 558] .] 9. This position was reiterated in Ramratan v. State of M.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3068, wherein it was observed as under:- “12. The fundamental purpose of bail is to ensure the accused's presence during the investigation and trial. Any conditions imposed must be reasonable and directly related to this objective. This Court in Parvez Noordin Lokhandwalla v. State of Maharastra (2020) 10 SCC 77 observed that though the competent court is empowered to exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for the grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the 6 2025:HHC:21199 accused is not misused to impede the investigation, overawe the witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. The relevant observations are extracted herein below: “14. The language of Section 437(3) CrPC, which uses the expression “any condition … otherwise in the interest of justice” has been construed in several decisions of this Court. Though the competent court is empowered to exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for the grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is not misused to impede the investigation, overawe the witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. Several decisions of this Court have dwelt on the nature of the conditions which can legitimately be imposed both in the context of bail and anticipatory bail.” (Emphasis supplied) 13. In Sumit Mehta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 15 SCC 570, this Court discussed the scope of the discretion of the Court to impose “any condition” on the grant of bail and observed in the following terms: — “15. The words “any condition” used in the provision should not be regarded as conferring absolute power on a court of law to impose any condition that it chooses to impose. Any condition has to be interpreted as a reasonable condition acceptable in the facts permissible in the circumstance, and effective in the pragmatic sense, and should not defeat the order of grant of bail. We are of the view that the present facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant such an extreme condition to be imposed.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. This Court, in Dilip Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2021) 2 SCC 779, laid down the factors to be taken into consideration while deciding the bail application and observed: 7 2025:HHC:21199 “4. It is well settled by a plethora of decisions of this Court that criminal proceedings are not for the realisation of disputed dues. It is open to a court to grant or refuse the prayer for anticipatory bail, depending on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The factors to be taken into consideration while considering an application for bail are the nature of the accusation and the severity of the punishment in the case of conviction and the nature of the materials relied upon by the prosecution; reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witnesses or apprehension of threat to the complainant or the witnesses; the reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the time of trial or the likelihood of his abscondence; character, behaviour and standing of the accused; and the circumstances which are peculiar or the accused and larger interest of the public or the State and similar other considerations. A criminal court, exercising jurisdiction to grant bail/anticipatory bail, is not expected to act as a recovery agent to realise the dues of the complainant, and that too, without any trial.” (Emphasis supplied) 10. This position was reiterated in Shabeen Ahmed versus State of U.P., 2025 SCC Online SC 479. 11. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 12. The F.I.R. specifically mentions that Babu Ram told the informant that the petitioner went to his room, quarrelled with him and kicked him. These allegations show that the petitioner had deliberately gone to the house of the victim because the victim had not gone to work. He quarrelled with the 8 2025:HHC:21199 victim and gave him beatings. These circumstances do not show that there was any grave and sudden provocation. 13. Explanation 2 to Section 100 BNS provides that where the death was caused by bodily injury, the person causing the bodily injury would be deemed to have caused the death even though the death could have been prevented by resorting to proper remedy and treatment. Hence, the accused cannot take shelter behind the plea that proper treatment was not provided to the victim, and the life of the victim would have been saved by proper treatment. It has been explained in the Indian Penal Code by Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, 36th Edition 2020, Lexis Nexis, that if the death and injury are related to each other, the lack of medical aid is immaterial. It is stated in para 299.16 as under: “Although proof be given that the wound or other bodily injury, if skilfully treated, might not have resulted in death, yet, if in fact death is the result, the wound causes death. And it does not avail the offender to prove that the first cause might have been removed or rendered inoperative by the application of proper remedies and that death might have been prevented. 'Proper remedies and skilful treatment' may not be within the reach of the wounded man, or if they are at hand, he may be unable or unwilling to resort to them. But this is immaterial so far as it relates to the due interpretation of the words 'cause of death'. The primary cause, which sets in motion some other cause, as the severe wound which induces gangrene or fever, and the ultimate effect, death, are sufficiently 9 2025:HHC:21199 connected as cause and effect, notwithstanding that the supervening sickness or disease might have been cured by medical skill. All that is essential to establish is that the death has been caused by the bodily injury and, if there be any intervening cause, that it is connected with a sufficient degree of probability with the primary one. 14. It was laid down by the Madras High Court in Krishnaswami Naicker, In Re, 1964 SCC OnLine Mad 213, that the availability of the medical aid is irrelevant in view of the explanation. It was observed: “A question was put to the Doctor (P.W. 4) who conducted the post mortem, and an answer elicited that the deceased would have survived if medical attention had been given to him immediately. This has no relevancy, and the suggestion is fallacious, for if death results from an injury intentionally caused, the person who causes that injury is deemed to have caused death even though the life of the victim might have been saved if proper medical attention had been given. Explanation 2 to s. 299 I.P.C. is explicit and gives no room for discussion. It provides: “Where death is caused by bodily injury, the person who causes such bodily injury shall be deemed to have caused the death although by resorting to proper remedies and skilful treatment the death might have been prevented.” The reason for the provision is obvious. It is not always that proper remedies and skilful treatment are within the reach of a wounded man, and the danger of allowing any exception in the matter could be easily imagined.” 15. It was held in Pappachan v. State of Kerala, 1993 SCC OnLine Ker 399: (1993) 2 KLT 384: 1994 Cri LJ 1765 that the accused 10 2025:HHC:21199 cannot raise a plea that the deceased might have been saved by skilful treatment if the death is caused by the injury. It was observed at page 386: “8. Defence contention that the deceased would not have succumbed to the injuries had he been rendered proper medical assistance, and so no offence under S. 302 is made out, is untenable. Legally such a contention cannot be raised in view of Explanation 2 of S. 299 of the I.P.C. Explanation 2 makes the position clear that where death is caused by bodily injury the person who causes that injury shall be deemed to have caused the death although by resorting to proper remedies and skilful treatment the death might have been prevented. In view of the above Explanation, no accused can raise the contention that he did not cause the death, as it might have been prevented by resorting to proper remedies and skilful treatment. If an accused causes an injury on a vital portion of the body and as a result of it victim died, it is no defence to a charge of murder for the accused to say that rendering of proper and expert medical assistance would have prevented the death and so he cannot be held liable for murder. P.W. 3, who issued Ex t. P-2 wound certificate stated that the injury was on the left lower chest. P.W. 5 doctor who conducted autopsy opined that the deceased died due to collapse of left lung and left-sided pleural effusion (collection of fluid in the chest cavity) following penetrating injury involving chest, diaphragm/and liver. His evidence also shows that the injury could be caused by stabbing with M.O.I. His evidence is categorical to the effect that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In view of the medical evidence in the case, there is hardly any substance in the defence contention that the offence would not fall under S. 302 of the I.P.C.” 11 2025:HHC:21199 16. Therefore, the submission that a lack of proper treatment contributed to the death of the deceased will not help the petitioner. 17. The Medical Officer specifically stated that the deceased died due to septic peritonitis consequent upon rupture of the intestine caused by blunt force trauma. All injuries were ante mortem in nature and sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. The injuries could have been caused by kicking the deceased in the stomach. This report prima facie shows that the death was caused by the kicking and satisfies the requirements of Section 101(c) of the BNS. 18. The offence committed by the petitioner is heinous and punishable with capital punishment. Considering the gravity of the offence and nature of the punishment, the petitioner is not entitled to the concession of bail. 19. It was submitted that the trial has not been commenced, and there is a delay in the trial. This submission is not acceptable in the absence of copies of the order sheets to demonstrate that the delay is not attributable to the petitioner. Further, the status report shows that the petitioner was arrested 12 2025:HHC:21199 on 17.12.2024 and the matter was listed before the learned Trial Court on 20.06.2025 for consideration of the charge. The matter required investigation, committal proceedings and the lapse of five months in the process is normal. 20. In view of the above, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed. 21. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the case's merits. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 04th July, 2025 (ravinder)