[2025:RJ-JP:31552] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6726/2003 1. Ratan Singh S/o Shri Harjee Singh, Age 48 years, 2. Pratap Singh S/o Shri Samda Singh, Age 35 years, 3. Dhan Singh S/o Shri Ram Singh, Age 56 years, 4. Kalyan Singh S/o Shri Sher Singh, Age 35 years, All residents of Village Boraj, Post Hathikheda, District Ajmer. ----Petitioners Versus 1. The Judge, Labour Court & Industrial Tribunal, Ajmer. 2. The State of Rajasthan through Secretary, Panchayatiraj Department, Rajasthan Secretariat, Jaipur. 3. The Chief Executive Officer & Secretary, Zila Parishad, Ajmer. 4. Block Development Officer, Panchayat Samiti Srinagar, District Ajmer. 5. Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat Hathikhera, District Ajmer. 6. Gram Sevak, Gram Panchayat Hathikhera, District Ajmer. ----Respondents For Petitioners : None present. For Respondents : Mr. Neeraj Kumar Tiwari Advocate with Mr. Sunil Kumar Lohia Advocate. HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA Judgment RESERVED ON :: 08.08.2025 PRONOUNCED ON :: 18.08.2025 1. No one has appeared on behalf of the petitioners. 2. The petitioners have challenged legality and validity of order dated 17.07.2003 passed by the Labour Court and Industrial Tribunal, Ajmer (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the Tribunal’), whereby application under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the Act of 1947’) filed by the petitioners has been dismissed. [2025:RJ-JP:31552] (2 of 5) [CW-6726/2003] 3. Facts, which are relevant for adjudication of the dispute involved in the instant writ petition, are that the petitioners filed a suit/application under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the Act of 1936’) before the Competent Authority in the year 1998 for recovery of their outstanding wages. While the aforesaid application was pending, a compromise was entered into between the petitioners and Respondents No. 4 and 5 on 13.08.1999 and the terms of compromise was reduced in writing. As per the compromise, Respondents No. 4 and 5 undertook to make payment of outstanding wages of the petitioners and they also undertook to continue payment of such wages in future also. 4. Pursuant to aforesaid compromise, Competent Authority under the Act of 1936 disposed of the application vide order dated 13.08.1999 and the compromise was also made part of the proceedings. 5. When the aforesaid compromise was not adhered to by the respondents, the petitioners filed an application under Section 33C(2) of the Act of 1947 for computation of the outstanding wages and for seeking directions against the respondents to make payment of the same. 6. While passing impugned order dated 17.07.2003, the Tribunal has taken into consideration that the proceedings under Section 33C(2) of the Act of 1947 are merely in the nature of execution proceedings and are not independent proceedings. Learned Tribunal has also observed that without getting the dispute referred through the State Government, the dispute [2025:RJ-JP:31552] (3 of 5) [CW-6726/2003] between the parties could not have been adjudicated and it was not a simple matter of computation and only on the basis of one compromise, whereupon signatures of the Competent Authority of the State Government were also not there, no sanctity can be attached to such compromise. While recording aforesaid findings, application was dismissed by the Tribunal. 7. Learned counsel the respondents defended the order impugned and stated that there is no infirmity and illegality in the impugned order which has been passed within the contour and scope of Section 33C(2) of the Act of 1947. 8. I have considered the record and heard learned counsel for the respondents. 9. In order to adjudicate the dispute in the instant case, it would be relevant to reproduce the provisions of Section 33C(2) of the Act of 1947 as under: “[33C. Recovery of money due from an employer.- (1) xxxxxxxxxx (2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government [within a period not exceeding three months]: [Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as he may think fit.]” 10. The aforesaid provision relates to recovery of money due from employer pursuant to a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter VA or Chapter VB of the Act of 1947. In the instant case, when the compromise entered into between the petitioners and Respondents No. 4 and 5 was taken on record by [2025:RJ-JP:31552] (4 of 5) [CW-6726/2003] the Competent Authority under the Act of 1936 and the application preferred by the petitioners for recovery of outstanding wages was disposed of without entering into the merits of the application and only on the basis of said compromise. Now at this later stage, Respondents No. 4 and 5 cannot raise a plea with regard to competence of the authority entering into the compromise. Admittedly, no application whatsoever was filed by Respondent No. 4 and 5 for reviewing or recalling the order dated 13.08.1999 passed by the Competent Authority under the Act of 1936. The aforesaid order still exists and has attained finality. 11. Since the aforesaid compromise was taken on record by the statutory authority under the Act of 1936 and the application for recovery of wages was decided vide order dated 13.08.1999 on the basis of said compromise, in my considered opinion, the compromise along with the order passed by the Competent Authority can be termed as settlement for the purpose of computation under Section 33C(2) of the Act of 1947. The rights of the parties were crystalised at the moment such compromise was signed and presented before the statutory authority. Hence, I find that the Tribunal has committed serious error of jurisdiction in non-suiting the petitioners simply by holding that on the basis of compromise, another application under Section 33C(2) cannot be maintained. Thus, I find order dated 17.07.2003 passed by the Tribunal to be irrational and perverse and the same is, hereby, quashed and set aside. 12. Resultantly, writ petition filed by the petitioners is allowed. Matter is remanded back to the Tribunal with direction to [2025:RJ-JP:31552] (5 of 5) [CW-6726/2003] decide the same on merits without entering into any technicalities. Looking to the fact that present one is an old matter relating to workmen, it is expected from the Tribunal to dispose of the application under Section 33C(2) of the Act of 1947 expeditiously after granting complete opportunity of hearing to both the sides. 13. Ordered accordingly. 14. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of. (ANAND SHARMA),J MANOJ NARWANI /