2025:HHC:33347 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 292 of 2025 Reserved on: 10.9.2025 Date of Decision: 25.9.2025. Paramjit Singh @ Jichu ...Petitioner Versus Yogesh Chander Ghambir ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes. For the Petitioner : Mr Vivek Negi, Advocate. For the Respondent : R.K. Gautam, Senior Advocate, with Mr Jai Ram Sharma, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge Present revision is directed against the order dated 3.5.2025, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dalhousie, District Chamba, H.P. (learned Trial Court), in the case titled Yogesh Chander Ghambir Vs. Paramjit Singh @ Jichu vide which the application filed under Section 346(2) of Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) was allowed. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:33347 (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act). The learned Trial Court took cognisance and put the notice of accusation to the accused. The matter was listed for recording the statements of the complainant’s witnesses on 15.10.2024; however, no witness appeared. A prayer for adjournment was allowed, subject to the exceptional last opportunity. The matter was listed for producing the complainant’s witnesses on self- responsibility on 22.11.2024, failing which it was ordered that the evidence would be closed by the order of the Court. No witness was present on 22.11.2024. Learned counsel for the complainant filed an application under Section 346(2) of BNSS for seeking an adjournment. The application was opposed by the accused for filing a reply. Learned Trial Court held that the application was supported by the medical record and a copy of flight tickets from the United States of America to India, which shows that the complainant intended to appear before the Court 3 2025:HHC:33347 on every date of hearing but could not do so due to unavoidable circumstances. The procedure was a handmaiden of justice, and the Court’s duty was to ensure that justice was done. Hence, the application was allowed, and the matter was listed for recording the statements of witnesses on 03.06.2025. 3. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused has filed the present petition, asserting that the learned Trial Court acted with material irregularity and illegality while passing the order. Learned Trial Court reviewed its earlier order dated 22.11.2024, vide which an exceptional last opportunity was granted to produce the evidence. The complainant asserted that he could not appear before the Court due to the illness of his daughter and wife. He proposed to visit India in the first week of February 2025. Learned Trial Court adjourned the matter till 3.5.2025 instead of deciding the application and passed the order virtually allowing the application. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 4 2025:HHC:33347 4. I have heard Mr Vivek Negi, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, and Mr R.K. Gautam, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr Jai Ram Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent/complainant. 5. Mr Vivek Negi, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the complainant failed to produce the evidence despite taking repeated adjournments. The Court granted the last opportunity and made it clear that failure to produce the evidence would result in closing the evidence by the order of the Court. The complainant filed an application for adjournment, which was not decided by the learned Trial Court. The reply was taken, and the matter was adjourned. The complainant has indulged in luxury litigation and is harassing the accused. He prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 6. Mr R.K. Gautam, learned Senior Counsel, submitted that the learned Trial Court had exercised the jurisdiction vested in it as per law. This Court should not interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction by the learned Trial Court. The Court had the jurisdiction to extend the time and grant an adjournment after 5 2025:HHC:33347 being satisfied of the genuineness of the cause being put forward before the Court. There is no infirmity in the order passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submission made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The present revision has been filed against an order granting adjournment. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, (1977) 4 SCC 137: 1977 SCC (Cri) 585: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 226 that an order granting adjournment is a purely interlocutory order and no revision lies against such an order. It was observed at page 142: “6. Let us now proceed to interpret the provisions of Sec- tion 397 against the historical background of these facts. Sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the 1973 Code may be extracted thus: “The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other pro- ceeding.” The main question which falls for determination in this appeal is as to what is the connotation of the term “inter- locutory order” as appearing in sub-section (2) of Section 397, which bars any revision of such an order by the High Court. The term “interlocutory order” is a term of well- known legal significance and does not present any serious difficulty. It has been used in various statutes, including 6 2025:HHC:33347 the Code of Civil Procedure, Letters Patent of the High Courts and other like statutes. In Webster's New World Dic- tionary, “interlocutory” has been defined as an order other than a final decision. Decided cases have laid down that interlocutory orders to be appealable must be those which decide the rights and liabilities of the parties con- cerning a particular aspect. It seems to us that the term “interlocutory order” in Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the im- portant rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the right of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties, cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in Section 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudi- cate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court.” (Emphasis supplied) 9. This judgment was followed by the full bench of the Alla- habad High Court in Father Thomas v. State of U.P., 2010 SCC OnLine All 2438: (2011) 72 ACC 564: (2011) 100 AIC 273: 2011 Cri LJ 2278, wherein it was observed at page 571: “45. In Amar Nath v. State of Maharashtra, [AIR 1977 SC 2185]. In- terlocutory orders have been described thus in paragraph 6: “It seems to us that the term ‘interlocutory order’ in section 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any 7 2025:HHC:33347 broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely in- terim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the im- portant rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the rights of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties, cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for the insertion of this particular provision in section 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocu- tory orders against which no revision would lie under section 397(2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court.” 10. Therefore, the present petition against an order granting an adjournment is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed on this short ground alone. 11. The photocopies of the order sheets show that the learned counsel for the accused had sought an adjournment for filing a reply to the application. The matter was listed on 19.12.2024, on which date again, an adjournment was sought by the learned counsel for the accused to file a reply. The reply was filed on 23.01.2025, and the matter was listed for consideration on 30.1.2025. Time was prayed for consideration on 30.1.2025, and the matter was listed for consideration on 13.3.2025. The arguments were heard on 13.3.2025, and the matter was reserved for orders. The order was pronounced on 3.5.2025. Thus, the 8 2025:HHC:33347 record shows that the adjournments were sought by learned counsel for the petitioner/accused for filing a reply to the application; therefore, the Court cannot be faulted for not deciding the application on the date on which it was filed. Had the application been allowed on the date itself, the accused would have complained that his right to be heard was violated. Hence, the grievance of the petitioner/accused that the Court erred in not deciding the application on the date of filing is without any basis. 12. The complainant asserted in the application that he could not appear before the Court because he had gone to the United States of America for the treatment of his daughter. He had arranged to come back to India, but his daughter could not recover. His wife also fell ill. He annexed the documents of the treatment of his daughter and wife. Therefore, the complainant had given sufficient cause for the non-appearance before the Court and the learned Trial Court was justified in granting the adjournment. 13. It was submitted that the learned Trial Court had made it clear on 15.10.2024 that an exceptional last opportunity 9 2025:HHC:33347 was granted to the complainant to produce the evidence. The evidence was to be produced on self-responsibility, failing which it would be closed by the order of the Court. Hence, the learned Trial Court was not justified in allowing the prayer for adjournment. This submission cannot be accepted. The discretion to grant adjournment has been conferred upon the Court to take care of unforeseen situations when a party is unable to comply with the orders passed by the Court. The Court is not powerless to remedy the situation when a party is unable to do anything because of the circumstances beyond his control. Learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out that procedure is a handmaiden of justice and cannot be used to thwart it. When the learned Trial Court was satisfied by the material placed before it that the complainant was unable to appear before the Court, it had the discretion to grant the adjournment. The jurisdiction to exercise the discretion could not have been taken away because the Court had stated on an earlier occasion that the discretion would not be exercised. The Court could not have contemplated an unforeseen situation, and when such a situation was brought to its notice, it had the jurisdiction to pass an appropriate order. 10 2025:HHC:33347 14. It was submitted that the order dated 3.5.2025 amounts to a review of the order dated 15.10.2024, which is impermissible. This submission is not acceptable. The Court had only indicated that it would not grant an adjournment, but the discretion conferred upon the Court by the legislature under Section 346 to grant the adjournment remained with it. Such a jurisdiction could not have been taken away simply because the Court had indicated its disinclination to exercise the discretion. 15. No other point was urged. 16. In view of the above, the order dated 3.5.2025 cannot be faulted. Hence, the present petition fails, and the same is dismissed. 17. The observations made heretofore shall remain confined to the disposal of the present petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 25th September, 2025 (Chander)