1 2025:CGHC:48490-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 68 of 2010 State of Chhattisgarh Through The District Magistrate, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus 1 - Chandan Singh Dhruw (Died and Deleted vide order dated 01.04.2025) 2 - Gurdip Singh @ Lakki S/o Magge Singh Bagga Aged About 20 Years R/o Village Kharora, P.S. Kharora, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh 3 - Inkeshwar Verma S/o Kishanlal Verma Aged About 21 Years R/o Village Kharora, P.S. Kharora, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh 4 - Yashvant Kosariya (Died and Deleted vide order dated 04.07.2022) 5 - Sann @ Surendra Singh Man S/o Avatar Singh Aged About 26 Years R/o Village Dhinvara, P.S. Kharora, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, Government Advocate For Respondents No.2 and 3 : Mr. Shivendu Pandya, Advocate For Respondents No.5 : Mr. Pragalbha Sharma, Advocate ANURADHA TIWARI Digitally signed by ANURADHA TIWARI Date: 2025.09.23 10:38:24 +0530 2 Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 22 .09.2025 1 Heard Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, learned Government Advocate for the appellant/State and Mr. Shivendu Pandya, learned counsel appearing for respondents No.2 and 3 as well as Mr. Pragalbha Sharma, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.5. 2 By this appeal, filed under Section 378(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “Cr.P.C.”), the appellant-State assails the legality, correctness, and propriety of the judgment of acquittal dated 03.07.2009, passed by the learned 10th Additional Sessions Judge (F.T.C.), Raipur, in Sessions Trial No.217/2008. By the impugned judgment, the respondents were acquitted of the offences allegedly committed by them under Sections 450, 397, and 307 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”). The appellant-State, being aggrieved by the acquittal, challenges the findings recorded by the trial court and seeks appropriate interference by this Court, contending that the evidence on record prima facie warranted conviction of the respondents under the aforesaid provisions of law. 3 It is an admitted position that a total of seven persons were arrayed as accused in the present case, out of whom five were 3 subjected to trial before the learned trial Court. During the pendency of the present acquittal appeal, two of the accused persons, namely, Chandan Singh Dhruw and Yashvant Kosariya, have expired. Consequently, as on date, only three accused persons, namely, Gurdip Singh @ Lakki, Inkeshwar Verma, and Sann @ Surendra Singh Man, are surviving and before this Court. 4 The prosecution case, in brief, is that on the night of 23.09.2008, at approximately 1:15 a.m., the deceased, Sharda Prasad Dubey, was at his residence located on Tilda Road, Ravi Nagar. At that time, seven accused persons—Somi Sardar, Vikas @ Vikki, Gurdip Singh @ Lakki, Inkeshwar Verma, Sann @ Surendra Singh Man, Chandan Singh Dhruv, and Yashwant Kosariya allegedly forcefully entered his house with a common intention to commit murder and robbery. Somi Sardar was armed with a knife, Sann with a stone, Lakki with a stick, and the remaining accused carried sticks, rods, or other blunt weapons. 5 Upon entering, the accused threatened the complainant, verbally abusing him and stating that they would not spare his life. They then launched a violent assault, hitting him with knives, sticks, and stones. In an attempt to defend himself, the complainant raised his hands, but he was injured on his hand and arm and subsequently fell to the ground. Lakki inflicted further blows with a stick with the intention to cause death, Sann struck him on the back with a stone, and the remaining accused continued to 4 assault him, causing serious bodily injuries. 6 During the assault, the accused also looted a mobile phone and cash amounting to Rs.2,500/- from the complainant. The entire attack was interrupted only when his neighbors and family members arrived at the scene, prompting the accused to flee in a Bolero vehicle bearing registration number CG-04/1111. 7 Following the incident, the complainant reported the matter to the police, who promptly arrived at the scene. During investigation, the police arrested the accused, recovered the weapons used in the attack, the looted cash, the mobile phone, and the vehicle involved. A site plan was prepared, and statements of witnesses were recorded. 8 After completing all necessary formalities, a charge sheet was filed under Sections 450 (house-trespass), 397 (robbery with attempt to cause death), 307 (attempt to murder), and 34 (common intention) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’). 9 The case was initially filed before the F.T.C., Barora, and was subsequently transferred to the Sessions Court, Raipur, for trial, from where the case was transferred to the Court of 10th Additional Sessions Judge (F.T.C.), Raipur for hearing and disposal in accordance with law. 10 In order to bring home of the offence, the prosecution has 5 examined as many as 13 witnesses as PW-1 to PW-13 and exhibited 30 documents as Ex.P/1 to Ex.P/30 whereas the accused in defence, have not examined any witnesses but exhibited statement of one Sharda Prasad vide Ex.D/1. 11 The statement of the accused persons were examined under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., wherein the denied all the incriminating circumstances put to them as appearing in the evidence led by the prosecution. They asserted that they have been falsely implicated in the present case and claimed complete innocence. The accused specifically stated that the allegations levelled against them are baseless, that they have no connection with the alleged offence, and that they have been roped in due to ulterior motives. The investigation was not conducted in a fair and impartial manner, and hence, they deserve to be acquitted. 12 After affording due opportunity of hearing to both the parties and upon appreciation of the evidence available on record, the learned 10th Additional Sessions Judge (F.T.C.), Raipur vide the impugned judgment dated 03.07.2009, acquitted the respondents of all the charges framed against them. 13 Aggrieved by the said judgment of acquittal, the State has preferred the present appeal. 14 Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, learned Government Advocate appearing for the appellant/State submits that the impugned judgment of 6 acquittal is vitiated by material misappreciation of evidence and is, therefore, liable to be interfered with in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Section 378(1) Cr.P.C. The power of an appellate Court to interfere with an acquittal is well settled where the trial Court’s conclusion is perverse, founded on conjectures or surmises, or where the Court has ignored or overlooked material evidence which, if properly appreciated, would have led to a verdict of guilt. It is submitted that the order of acquittal has resulted in a clear miscarriage of justice. The trial Court, instead of weighing the testimony of the prosecution witnesses in a balanced manner, has rejected credible evidence on the basis of irrelevant or immaterial discrepancies and by indulging in speculation. Such approach has deprived the State of its legitimate remedy and allowed a person, against whom substantial and cogent evidence exists, to escape culpability. Learned counsel further submits that the trial Judge has erred in law by failing to appreciate that the prosecution witnesses are natural, credible, and truthful, and have consistently deposed to the true version of the occurrence. The trial Court overlooked the statement of the complainant, PW-1, Sharda Prasad Dubey, which fully supports the prosecution’s allegations and corroborates the sequence of events leading to the assault. The trial Court failed to give due weight to the sustained injuries found on various parts of the complainant’s body, which clearly indicate a violent assault with intent to cause grievous harm. No cogent reasons were 7 provided by the trial Court to disbelieve the testimony of the investigating officer and other supporting witnesses, whose evidence is reliable and consistent. A holistic reading of the evidence, including the complainant’s statement and the nature of injuries inflicted, establishes beyond doubt that the accused intended to commit the murder of the complainant. Further, the memorandum of the accused and the recovery of the weapons used in the assault from their possession conclusively corroborate the prosecution case and demonstrate the involvement of the accused in the crime. As such, the instant acquittal appeal be allowed while setting aside the impugned judgment of acquittal and convict and sentence the accused/respondents. 15 On the other hand, Mr. Shivendu Pandya and Mr. Pragalbha Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the respective respondents, oppose the submissions made by the learned State counsel. It is submitted that the trial Court has meticulously examined the evidence on record, including the statements of the prosecution witnesses, the nature of injuries, and the circumstances of the case, and has arrived at a well-reasoned conclusion of acquittal. It is further submitted that the alleged discrepancies relied upon by the prosecution are not minor or immaterial, but are significant and cast reasonable doubt on the veracity of the witnesses. The respondents’ counsel contend that the trial Court has rightly exercised judicial caution in evaluating 8 the evidence, keeping in mind the settled legal principle that an accused is entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt. Learned counsel further submit that the complainant himself is an Assistant Sub Inspector, and the principal accused, namely Somi Sardar, who allegedly inflicted the blows to the complainant’s head, remains absconding. In such circumstances, the present respondents cannot be held responsible for the act of the absconding accused. The acquittal passed by the trial Court is therefore based on a careful appreciation of all evidence and is legally sustainable. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the State be dismissed, and the judgment of acquittal of the present respondents deserves to be upheld in the interest of justice. 16 We have heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties at length and with due circumspection. The rival submissions advanced before us have received our anxious consideration in the light of the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. 17 This appeal is directed against the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and has been preferred by the State under Section 378(1) of the Cr.P.C., in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction vested in this Court. While entertaining an appeal against an order of acquittal, it is well settled that the appellate Court must exercise its jurisdiction with caution and circumspection, keeping in view the principle that the trial Court 9 has the distinct advantage of observing the demeanour of the witnesses and assessing their conduct, particularly while they are examined in the witness-box. 18 It is also necessary to bear in mind that, at the trial stage, the accused is always entitled to the benefit of doubt. However, such doubt must be real and substantial. It must be a doubt which an ordinary and reasonable person, acting honestly and conscientiously, would entertain about the guilt of the accused. Mere theoretical or fanciful doubt, or doubt created by minor discrepancies in the evidence that do not affect the core of the prosecution case, cannot justify an acquittal. The appellate Court, therefore, must carefully examine whether the trial Court has properly appreciated the evidence, both oral and documentary, and whether the benefit of doubt, if any, has been extended in a manner consistent with settled legal principles. 19 As held by the Supreme Court in C. Antony v. Raghavan Nair1, unless the High Court arrives at definite conclusion that the findings recorded by trial Court are perverse, it would not substitute its own view on a totally different perspective and also as held by the Supreme Court in Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhunath Jha2, the appellate Court in considering the appeal against judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned 1AIR 2003 SC 182 2AIR 2004 SC 1053 10 judgment is clearly unreasonable and relevant and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference. 20 The scope of interference in appeals against acquittal is well settled. In Tota Singh and another v. State of Punjab3, Hon’ble Supreme Court has succinctly laid down the principles to be applied by appellate Courts while examining an order of acquittal. In paragraph 6 of the said judgment, it has been observed that while an appellate Court has the power to examine the correctness of an acquittal, such power must be exercised with caution and circumspection. The trial Court enjoys a distinct advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses, observing their demeanour, and forming an opinion regarding their credibility. Consequently, an acquittal should not be lightly interfered with unless it is shown that the trial Court has committed a manifest error, ignored material evidence, or reached a conclusion which is palpably perverse, based upon conjectures, surmises, or misappreciation of evidence. The Court further emphasized that while minor discrepancies in the evidence may be noted, they cannot be allowed to override the core, credible, and consistent testimony of witnesses unless such inconsistencies go to the root of the prosecution case. Thus, interference in an order of acquittal is justified only in exceptional circumstances where it is shown that the trial Court has overlooked or misread the evidence in 3AIR 1987 SC 1083 11 such a manner that the acquittal results in a miscarriage of justice and held in para 6 as under:- “……….the mere fact that the Appellate Court is inclined on a re-appreciation of the evidence to reach a conclusion which is at variance with the one recorded in the order of acquittal passed by the Court below will not constitute a valid and sufficient ground for setting aside the acquittal. The jurisdiction of the appellate Court in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal is circumscribed by the limitation that no interference is to be made with the order of acquittal unless the approach made by the lower Court to the consideration of the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the Court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any Court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to be characterised as perverse. Where two views are possible on an appraisal of the evidence adduced in the case and the Court below has taken a view which is a plausible one, the Appellate Court cannot legally interfere within an order of acquittal even if it is of the opinion that the view taken by the Court below on its consideration of the evidence is erroneous.” 21 Applying the law governing the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Kistoora Ram4 has observed that an appellate Court must exercise extreme caution before interfering with an order of acquittal and has held as follows:- "8. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is very limited. Unless it is found that the view taken by the Court is impossible or perverse, it is not permissible to interfere with the 4 2022 SCC OnLine SC 984 12 finding of acquittal. Equally if two views are possible, it is not permissible to set aside an order of acquittal, merely because the Appellate Court finds the way of conviction to be more probable. The interference would be warranted only if the view taken is not possible at all." 22 Further, in the matter of Jafarudheen and others v. State of Kerala5, the Supreme Court held as under:- "25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 of the Cr.PC. the Appellate Court has to consider whether the trial Court's view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analyzed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters." 23 While exercising appellate jurisdiction over an acquittal, High Courts are empowered to re-appreciate all evidence, oral and documentary, and to examine whether the trial Court correctly interpreted and weighed the materials. Interference is warranted if the trial Court’s reasons for acquittal are unsustainable. 24 In accordance with these principles, we have examined the prosecution evidence in its entirety, assessing witness credibility, consistency, and the logical inferences from the proved facts. 5 (2022) 8 SCC 440 13 25 PW-1, Sharda Prasad Dubey, deposed in his evidence that on 22.08.2008, after completing his patrolling duty, he returned to his rented residence at Koushle Guruji’s house around midnight. At 1:15 a.m., he was approached by the accused, who forcibly entered his house armed with a knife, sticks, and stones. PW-1 categorically stated that Somi Sardar inflicted injuries on him. The accused assaulted him on the head, forearm, chest, and back, causing multiple injuries, and stole his mobile phone and Rs,2,500/-. He raised an alarm, prompting the neighbors to respond, after which the accused fled in a Bolero vehicle. He lodged a report at Kharora Police Station and received initial treatment at Kharora Government Hospital. Subsequently, he was treated at Mekahara and Ramakrishna Hospital, Raipur where his head injury was operated on, and he was admitted for ten days, followed by fifteen days of follow-up. 26 From the impugned judgment, it is apparent that the trial Court carefully considered the medical evidence. Dr. B. Kathotia (PW-6) observed multiple injuries on the complainant, Sharda Prasad Dubey, but admitted that the report (Ex.P/10) did not indicate life- threatening severity. 27 Dr. Netram Beck (PW-12) and Dr. Chandrabhan Das (PW-3) testified that subsequent examinations at Raipur hospitals revealed no fatal or grievous injuries, and the complainant received routine medical care. No expert or document established 14 that the injuries could have caused death or serious harm in the absence of treatment. Thus, the injuries were consistent with ordinary harm, and the prosecution failed to prove otherwise. 28 Further, in paragraph 22, the learned trial Court has recorded a categorical finding that there existed love relations between the complainant’s sister-in-law, namely, Neetu Dubey, wife of Dr. Ashok Dubey, and the accused Somi @ Harpal. The Court has further observed that the complainant, being a police officer and a government servant, attempted to suppress this fact during cross- examination by denying knowledge of Neetu Dubey, despite admitting Dr. Ashok Dubey to be his cousin. This conduct of the complainant was considered by the Trial Court to cast a serious doubt on the prosecution version and to lend weight to the defence plea that due to such relations, the complainant and his family bore a grudge against the accused, leading to their false implication in the present case. 29 The trial Court noted that the complainant initially treated at Harora and referred to Mekahara, voluntarily went to Ramakrishna Hospital. Dr. Netram confirmed no fatal injuries were present and the complainant left with medical documents without formal referral. The trial Court observed that the complainant, a responsible police officer, acted independently in seeking treatment, casting reasonable doubt on the prosecution case. Several discrepancies in his testimony were uncorroborated, and 15 alleged recoveries were not supported by key witnesses. As such, the trial Court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the alleged house trespass, attempted murder, or robbery, and accordingly, held that the accused were entitled to the benefit of doubt. 30 Considering the overall facts and circumstances of the case, the evidence brought on record, and the findings of the trial Court, it is evident that the principal accused, Somi Sardar who, according to the categorical testimony of Sharda Prasad Dubey (PW-1), inflicted the blow on the head of the complainant has remained absconding till date. The present respondent-accused are alleged to have caused injuries only on the hand and other non-vital parts of the complainant, which, in any case, do not establish an intention to cause grievous or life-threatening harm. 31 The trial Court, upon a careful appreciation of the medical evidence and the testimony of Sharda Prasad Dubey (PW-1), noted several material discrepancies in the complainant’s version, including the lack of corroboration from key witnesses regarding the alleged recoveries, as well as the complainant’s own conduct in independently seeking medical treatment. The medical evidence confirms that the complainant did sustain injuries; however, none of those injuries were fatal or of such a nature as to endanger life in the absence of treatment. 16 32 Further, in paragraph 22 of the judgment, the learned trial Court has recorded a categorical finding that there existed love relations between the complainant’s sister-in-law, namely, Neetu Dubey, wife of Dr. Ashok Dubey, and the accused Somi @ Harpal. The Court also observed that the complainant, being a police officer and a government servant, sought to suppress this fact during cross-examination by denying knowledge of Neetu Dubey, despite admitting Dr. Ashok Dubey to be his cousin. This conduct was held to cast serious doubt on the prosecution version and to lend substantial support to the defence plea that due to such strained relations, the complainant and his family bore a grudge against the accused, leading to their false implication in the present case. 33 In light of the totality of the evidence, including the above findings, the trial Court rightly concluded that the prosecution failed to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, that the present respondents had committed the alleged offences of house trespass, attempt to murder, or robbery. In such circumstances, the benefit of doubt was correctly extended to the respondents. 34 In view of the foregoing discussion and findings, this Court is of the considered opinion that the judgment of acquittal rendered by the learned trial Court does not suffer from any perversity, illegality, or manifest error warranting interference in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. The trial Court has meticulously appreciated the oral and documentary evidence on record and has rightly 17 extended the benefit of doubt to the respondents, particularly in light of the absence of conclusive proof against them and the material circumstances noted hereinabove. 35 Accordingly, the appeal preferred by the State under Section 378(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, being devoid of substance and merit, stands dismissed. The judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court is hereby affirmed and maintained. 36 The Registry is directed to transmit a certified copy of this judgment along with the trial Court record to the Court concerned forthwith for its information and necessary compliance. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Anu