1 2025:CGHC:18970-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 280 of 2025 Shri Radhe Enterprises Coal And Transport Division Agrawal Government Higher Secondary School, Dayalband Road, Bilaspur, Through Its Proprietor, Arun Agrawal S/o Narayan Das Agrawal, Age 61 Yrs, R/o Opposite Govt. High School, Dayalband Road, Bilaspur, P.S. - City Kotwali, Distt. - Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh, Note (1) Arun Agrawal, Proprietor Of The Appellant Firm (A Proprietorship Firm) Is Permanent R/o Flat No.- 504, Amrita Manor, Civil Lines, Police Station - Sitabardih, Nagpur (M.H.), Pin - 440001, Thus This Address Is Also Mentioned In AfÏdavit..... (2) In W.P.C. No.- 2073/2014, The Age Of The Appellant Was Mentioned As 50 Years, As He Was Of That As At That Time. In This Writ Appeal The Current Age Of The Appellant Is Mentioned In Cause Title. ... Appellant(s) versus 1. State of Chhattisgarh Through - The Secretary, Department of Commerce And Industry, P.S. - Rakhi, Tahsil And Thana - Arang, New Raipur, Distt. - Raipur (C.G.), Chhattisgarh 2. Chhattisgarh State Industrial Development Corporation Through - Its Managing Director, First Floor, Udyog Bhawan, Ring Road No.- 1, Telibandha, Raipur, District - Raipur, Chhattisgarh 3. The Chief General Manager Chhattisgarh State Industrial Development Corporation Limited, First Floor, Udyog Bhawan, Ring Road No.-1, Telibandha, Raipur, District - Raipur, Chhattisgarh 4. M/s Satnam Pulses Through - Its Proprietor Smt. Pooja Sidara W/o Sunil Kumar Sidara, R/o Dhan Mandi Road, Torwa, District - Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh BRIJMOHAN MORLE Digitally signed by BRIJMOHAN MORLE Date: 2025.04.28 17:24:33 +0530 2 5. M/s Satya Automobiles Through Its Proprietor Shri Pramod Khedia, Aged About 55 Years, S/o Shri Chunnilal Khediya, R/o Q.No. C-7, Minocha Colony, Bilaspur, Tahsil And District - Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ...Respondent(s) For Appellant : Mr. Akash Shrivastava, Advocate. For Respondent/State : Mr. Shashank Thakur, Deputy Advocate General. For Respondents No. 2 & 3 : Mr. Kashif Shakeel, Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Arvind Kumar Verma , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 28 .04.2025 1. The present appeal is listed today for orders on default as there is delay of 10 days in filing this appeal and no application for condonation of delay has been filed. 2. Looking to the period of delay i.e. only 10 days, the delay is condoned and we proceed to hear the matter finally. 3. Heard Mr. Akash Shrivastava, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Shashank Thakur, learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing for respondent No. 1/State and Mr. Kashif Shakeel, learned counsel, appearing for respondents No. 2 and 3. 4. The present intra Court appeal has been filed by the appellant against the order dated 24.01.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPC No. 2073 of 2024 (Shri Radhe Enterprises Coal & Transport 3 Division vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Others), whereby the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant/writ petitioner herein. 5. Brief facts of the case are that initially, a lease of the land bearing survey No. 45A admeasuring 40,000 sq. feet situated at Sirgitti Industrial Area, Bilaspur was granted to M/s Anurag Chemicals in the year 1996 under the M.P./C.G. Industries (Shed, Plot and Land Allotment), Rules, 1974 (for short, ‘Rules of 1974’). The appellant entered into an agreement for the purchase with M/s Anurag Chemicals on 12.12.2005, and thereafter, moved an application before respondent No. 2/Chhattisgarh State Industrial Development Corporation (CSIDC) to grant the lease of that land and the application of the appellant remained pending. Meanwhile, the lease granted to M/s Anurag Chemicals got cancelled vide order dated 29.05.2012. A letter of intent was issued on 19.08.2014 in favour of respondent No. 4, the order of allotment was issued on 16.10.2014 and the agreement was executed on 19.11.2014. Thereafter, the respondent No. 4 sought permission to alienate the property in favour of respondent No. 5. Such permission was granted by the State Government and after completing the formalities, the lease was granted in favour of respondent No. 5 by respondent No. 2 on 25.03.2019. The appellant has challenged the lease granted in favour of respondent No. 4 as well as respondent No. 5 along with the order Annexure P/1 (in the writ petition) dated 02.09.2014, whereby the application moved by the appellant was rejected. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned Single Judge erred in appreciating that the impugned action and order of 4 respondent/Corporation also has violated the fundamental rights of right to business under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, by debarring the right to transfer of land, without a speaking order, in complete non-application of the relevant rules/regulations. He also submits the learned Single Judge has erred in misapplication of law as well as facts and has failed to appreciate that the impugned order by which the application of transfer of land was rejected, was absolutely silent over violation of any such rule or condition. Thus, the reference of any such alleged non-observance, was never a part of the impugned order, by which the application was finally decided. 7. It is further stated by the learned counsel for the appellant that the allegation that the appellant did not apply in the prescribed form or under the prescribed Rules, was never the ground of rejection of his application. The entire records, before the learned Single Judge, is absolutely silent over any observation made by the respondent/Corporation in this regard and/or any communication to the appellant in this regard. He also stated that the learned Single Judge erred in interpreting Rule 19 of the Rules of 1974 r/w Condition No. 15 of the agreement, as the agreement to sell dated 12.12.2005 (Annexure P/3 in the writ petition), was merely recording of intention of transfer of land and was not the actual transfer. Thus, no violation of any Rule or condition was apparent from the record. Even otherwise it was action among those two parties creating any effect only between them. Both the parties were before respondent with request of transfer along with no objection of Anurag Chemicals. He would submit that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate that the subsequent transfer of land, allowed by the Department from M/s Satnam 5 Pulses/respondent No. 4 to M/s Satya Automobiles/respondent No. 5, was also followed by an agreement to sell dated 27.09.2018 (Annexure P/12), executed between them. Thus, the respondent/Corporation for no plausible reason, in the stand taken in their reply (in the writ petition), has distinguished the two applicants and their respective agreement to sell under the vigil of Rule 19 of the Rules of 1974 r/w Condition No. 15 of the agreement. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the learned Single Judge has further erred in appreciating the fact that even after the cancellation of the lease deed, in favour of Anurag Chemicals, the application for transfer of land was still pending and under principles of equity and fairness, the first right of consideration belonged to the appellant, which was debarred for no reason apparent on record and the land was allotted to an all together similarly placed candidate, thus violating the right to equality and opportunity. He further contended that the learned Single Judge erred in appreciating that the petition never suffered from any delay as the application since 2005, was kept pending the Department with positive communication and afÏrmation, only expressly cancelled/rejected vide order dated 02.09.2014, which was followed by the subject writ petition i.e. WPC No. 2073 of 2014, filed on 27.10.2014, without any delay. The learned Single Judge, in its impugned order, before holding the petition to be inordinate and unexplained delay, has not discussed the validity of aforesaid communications and also the manner in which the impugned order was passed. Hence, the order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 24.01.2025 is untenable in the eyes of law and deserves to be quashed. 6 9. On the other hand, learned State counsel and learned counsel, appearing for respondents No. 2 and 3 submit that the learned Single Judge after considering all the aspects of the matter has rightly dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant/writ petitioner, in which no interference is called for. 10. Learned counsel for respondents No. 2 & 3 further submits that the application was moved by the appellant in the year 2005 to record his name against the land bearing survey No. 45A admeasuring 40,000 sq.ft. on the strength of the agreement entered into between the appellant and M/s Anurag Chemicals. He would further submit that no permission was sought by the appellant from the State Government according to Rule 19 of the Rules of 1974; therefore, the claim of the appellant was not considered and the application was rejected. He would also submit that respondent No. 2 after following the due procedure granted a lease to respondent No. 4, and thereafter, a lease was granted to respondent No.5. 11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgment and materials available on record. 12. It is evident that earlier a lease was granted in favour of M/s Anurag Chemicals in the year 1996 pertaining to plot No. 45A admeasuring 40,000 sq.ft. situated at Sirgitti Industrial Area, Bilaspur. The lease granted in favour of M/s Anurag Chemicals was cancelled by CSIDC vide order dated 29.04.2012, but in between, the appellant and the proprietor of M/s Anurag Chemicals entered into a private agreement. An agreement to purchase was executed between the parties. 7 13. Rule 19 of the Rules of 1974, states that there shall be a ban on partial transfer of the land and the lease cannot be transferred without prior permission of the State Government or prescribed authority. There was a condition No. 15 in the agreement entered into between respondent No. 2 and M/s Anurag Chemicals, which reads as under:- “15. The lessee shall not sublet, assign or other wise transfer the said premises/land or any part thereof or any building constructed thereon for any purpose, whatsoever, except as provided in rule 20 of the said rule.” 14. A bare reading of Rule 19 of the Rules of 1974 and condition No. 15 of the agreement makes it clear that the lease was not transferable without prior permission of the State Government or respondent No. 2 and the lessee was not authorized to sublet, assign or otherwise transfer the said premises/land contrary to provisions of Rule 19 of the Rules of 1974. 15. In this case, the lease granted to M/s Anurag Chemicals was cancelled by respondent No. 2 on 29.05.2012. Though the application of the appellant was pending, but it was not in consonance with Rule 19 of the Rules of 1974 and condition No. 15 of the agreement entered into between M/s Anurag Chemicals and respondent No. 2; therefore, there was no occasion for respondent No. 2 to consider the application moved by the appellant for the grant of the lease. 16. The lease was granted in accordance with the law to respondent No. 4, and thereafter, it was granted in favour of respondent No. 5. The appellant and M/s Anurag Chemicals entered into a private agreement 8 and respondent No. 2 cancelled the lease-deed of M/s Anurag Chemicals on 29.05.2012 and the appellant or M/s Anurag Chemicals had to approach this Court in the year 2012, but in para 07 of the writ petition, the appellant has stated that there is no delay in filing the writ petition and thus, the delay has not been explained in the writ petition. The lease was granted in favour of respondents No. 4 and 5 strictly in accordance with the Rules of the 1974 and the appellant failed to challenge the grant of lease within the prescribed period of limitation whereas respondent No. 5 is running the industry since 2019; therefore, at this stage, it would not be appropriate to interfere with the decision taken by respondent No. 2. 17. While passing the impugned learned Single Judge held that the application moved by the appellant was rejected vide order dated 02.09.2014 (Annexure P/1 in the writ petition) and that was also not challenged by the appellant within the stipulated time. Though in the writ jurisdiction, no limitation period is provided, but the litigants should approach the Court within a reasonable time. The term “reasonable time” has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Mrinmoy Maity vs. Chhanda Koley and Others, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 551. Relevant para 11 is reproduced herein-below:- “11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural 9 death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and latches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B., (2009) 1 SCC 768 has held to the following effect: ‘56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty 10 of delay and laches.’ 57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai, [AIR 1964 SC 1006 (1964) 6 SCR 261], Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court, [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India, [(1992) 3 SCC 136 (1992) 21 ATC 675 (1992) 2 SCR 9691). This principle applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi. [(1969) 1 SCC 110]. Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185] and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India. [(1970) 1 SCC 841). 58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the court 11 depending on and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose.” 18. There was an agreement between M/s Anurag Chemicals and the appellant. It is well a settled principle of law that the agreement to sell or purchase does not confer any right in favour of such person. In this regard, learned Single also relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Munishamappa vs. M. Rama Reddy, reported in 2023 SCC OnLine 1701, in para 10 held as under:- “10. The Agreement to Sell is not a conveyance; it does not transfer ownership rights or confers any title. What is prohibited or barred under the Fragmentation Act was the lease/sale/conveyance or transfer of rights. Therefore, the Agreement to Sell cannot be said to be barred under the Fragmentation Act. The appellant filed the suit for specific performance after the repeal of the Fragmentation Act. The suit could have been decreed without there being any violation to the law once the Fragmentation Act itself had been repealed in February 1991. Further, the High Court did not hold that the suit was barred by Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The First Appeal Court had considered this aspect and having decided the said issue in favour of the appellant, we need not go into that question at this stage. What is further noticeable is that the respondents received the 12 full consideration and had also transferred the possession of the property in question, as such other defences may not be available to them. Even the issue of readiness and willingness on the part of the appellant would not be relevant.” 19. The appellant is claiming right pursuant to the lease granted to M/s Anurag Chemicals whereas the lease granted to M/s Anurag Chemicals was cancelled on 29.05.2012; therefore, the appellant has no individual right to claim right on the basis of the lease which has already been cancelled by respondent No. 2. 20. Considering the pleadings made in writ appeal, submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties and also considering the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant/writ petitioner, we are of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge has not committed any illegality, irregularity or jurisdictional error warranting interference by this Court. 21. Accordingly, the present writ appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Arvind Kumar Verma) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Brijmohan