R/CR.MA/26268/2025 ORDER DATED: 11/08/2026 IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD R/CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY) NO. 26268 of 2025 In F/CRIMINAL APPEAL/42690/2025 ========================================== PASHCHIM GUJARAT VIJ COMPANY LTD THRO SANDIPKUMAR CHHAGANBHAI HIRANI Versus STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. ========================================== Appearance: MS LILU K BHAYA(1705) for the Applicant(s) No. 1 MR AMIT P SOLIYA(10780) for the Respondent(s) No. 2 MS JIRGA JHAVERI APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1 ========================================== CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK Date : 11/08/2026 ORAL ORDER 1. This application is 3led by the applicant seeking condonation of delay of 1234 days caused in preferring the criminal appeal. 2. Heard Ms.Lilu Bhaya, learned counsel for the applicant, Ms.Jirga Jhaveri, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent No.1 and Mr.Amit Soliya, learned counsel for respondent No.2. 3. Ms.Bhaya, learned counsel has submitted that the delay caused in 3ling the appeal against the judgment and order dated 14.10.2021 passed by the learned 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Gondal in Special Criminal Case (Elec) No.211 of 2012 whereby the learned Judge acquitted the accused for the o@ence under Section 135 r/w. Section R/CR.MA/26268/2025 ORDER DATED: 11/08/2026 138 of the Electricity Act, 2003. She has submitted that the judgment and order was pronounced on 14.10.2021 and since the accused was acquitted, the concerned oBcer of the applicant under impression that the complainant cannot 3le an appeal under the criminal law. She has submitted that the present application deserves to be allowed the delay deserves to be condoned. In support of her submissions Ms.Bhaya, learned counsel has relied upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of (1) State (NCT of Delhi) Vs. Ahmed Jaan, AIR 2009 SC (Supp.) 695, (2) State of J & K and others Vs. Mohmad Madbool So7 and others, AIR 1987 SC 1353 and (3) Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vs. MST Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107. 4. Mr.Soliya, learned counsel for the respondent – accused has strongly objected the application and submitted that the present application being meritless deserves to be dismissed. Mr.Soliya, learned counsel has referred to the aBdavit-in-reply 3led on behalf of respondent – accused. 4.1 Mr.Soliya, learned counsel for the respondent – accused has referred and relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of O>ce of the Chief Post Master General Vs. Living Media India Ltd, (2012) 3 SCC 563 and submitted that the government and statutory bodies cannot claim condonation as a matter of right through general explanations of administration when there is a clear absence of diligence. Mr.Soliya, learned counsel has also referred and relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654. 5. In the Living Media India Ltd (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme R/CR.MA/26268/2025 ORDER DATED: 11/08/2026 Court has held and observed in para – 9 and 10 as under:- “9. In view of the stand taken by the Postal Department as to the reasons for the delay and the serious objections of the respondents, it is desirable to extract the entire statement as placed in the form of "better a davit" by the o cer of the appellant-Department :- ["I, Aparajeet Pattanayak presently posted as SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi, do hereby solemnly a rm and state as under :- [1) In the o cial capacity mentioned above, I am acquainted with the facts of the case on the basis of the information derived from the record.] [2) On the last date of hearing i.e. 05.12.2011 this Hon'ble Court was pleased to allow the petitions to 5le better a davit in support of the application for condonation of delay in 5ling Special Leave Petition.] [3) It is submitted that the delay is not intentional but is on account of the departmental/administrative procedures involved in for 5ling the petition for Special Leave Petition. It is submitted that unlike the private litigant the matters relating to Government are required to be considered at various levels and then only a decision is taken.] [4) In the present case it would be evident from the n following that delay has been caused due to unavoidable circumstances :- 11.09.2009 Date of judgment in LPA Nos. 418/2007 and 1006/2007. 29.10.2009 Certi5ed copy of judgment not received from the Government Counsel and hence copy of judgment was downloaded from the web site of Delhi High Court and o ce note was put by ASP (Court) proposing to refer the matter to Postal Directorate for opinion and further course of action for approval of the Chief Postmaster General, Delhi. 12.11.2009 Chief Postmaster General Delhi approved to refer the matter to Directorate. 16.12.2009 Directorate desired to submit legal opinion and certi5ed copy of judgment. 08.01.2010 The Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner had applied for the certi5ed copy of the impugned judgment and order and the same was received by the Department on 08.01.2010. 11.01.2010 The desired documents supplied to Directorate. 25.01.2010 Directorate desired to submit R/CR.MA/26268/2025 ORDER DATED: 11/08/2026 copies of original writ petition 5led by the party, counter a davit thereto, copies of appeals 5led by DOP & counter reply thereto. 12.02.2010 The desired documents supplied to Directorate. 17.02.2010 Directorate desired to send an o cial/o cer well conversant with the case. 15.03.2010 Directorate asked to depute an o cer well conversant with the case to collect the UO Note along with other documents to pursue the matter with Mr. Suresh Chandra Additional Legal Advisor. 06.04.2010 Shri Suresh Chandra, Additional Legal Advisor was contacted on 06.04.2010 and the matter was briefed thoroughly by ASP (Court). 25.06.2010 Case 5le collected from Directorate and handed over to Central Agency Section on 25.06.2010 under diary No. 1865/2010 dated 25.06.2010 as per advice of Additional Legal Advisor. 26.06.2010 to 30.06.2010 Central Agency Section sent the 5le back to the Postal Department with directions to send the same through Ministry of Law and Justice. 01.07.2010 to 10.09.2010 After receiving the 5le through proper channel. Central Agency Section sent the 5le to Ld ASG for his considered opinion and Ld. Additional Solicitor General opined that it is a 5t case for 5ling the Special Leave Petition. 11.09.2010 to 30-9-2010 On receiving the opinion of Ld. ASG the 30.09.2010 5le was sent to Central Agency for drafting the Special Leave Petition. 01.10.2010 Directorate informed that ASG had considered the case and found it 5t for Special Leave Petition. 15.11.2010 The panel Counsel prepared the draft of Special Leave Petition and submitted the draft Special Leave Petition with 5le to Central Agency Section for further steps. The draft Special Leave Petition was forwarded to the Department by Central Agency Section for vetting. After factual veri5cation, the draft Special Leave Petition was returned to Central Agency Section for typing and preparation of Paper Book which also took some time. 04.01.2011 Special Leave Petition remained pending due to non-availability of disputed magazines of Reader's Digest and India Today. Hence, ASG was requested to intervene and direct Shri Akash Pratap who handled the case to provide the magazines. 14.01.2011 Shri A.K. Sharma was requested to arrange to collect the above magazines from the record of Delhi High Court. 31.01.2011 SSRM Delhi Sorting Division was authorized to sign the a davit on behalf of the respondent. 10.02.2011 Special Leave Petition 5led in Supreme Court.] [5. It is submitted that it is evident from the foregoing reasons that the delay caused in 5ling the petition was result of all the necessary and unavoidable o ce R/CR.MA/26268/2025 ORDER DATED: 11/08/2026 formalities and was bona5de and not deliberate or intentional and the petitioner was prevented by su cient cause from 5ling the petition within the period of limitation.] [6. It is further submitted that the petitioner humbly seeks leave to draw the kind attention of this Hon'ble Court to the views expressed by this Hon'ble Court that liberal approach may be adopted and that the Court should not take too strict and pedantic stand which will cause injustice while considering the application for condonation of delay, in terms of its judgments in the case of Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. V/s. Mst. Katiji & Ors. and Bhag Singh & Anr. V/s. Major Daljeet Singh & Ors. It is submitted that the principles for condonation of delay laid down in the above cited cases may therefore be adopted in the present case also.] [7. This Hon'ble Court in G. Ramegowda V/s. Special Land Acquisition O cer, (1998) 2 SCC 142 laid down that the expression su cient cause in Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction of lack of bona5de is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay.] [8. In the matter of State of Haryana V/s. Chandra Mani, reported in (1996) 3 SCC 132, this Hon'ble Court observed and laid down as follows :- ["when the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, 5le-pushing and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less di cult to understand but more di cult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by o cers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the 5les from table to table and keeping it on the table for considerable time causing delay - intentional or otherwise - is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default, no person is individually aIected but what in the ultimate R/CR.MA/26268/2025 ORDER DATED: 11/08/2026 analysis suIers, is public interest. The expression "su cient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice- oriented approach rather than the technical detection of su cient cause for explaining every day's delay.] [9. This Hon'ble Court in Union of India V/s. Manager, Jain and Associates, 2001 (3) SCC 277 decided on 06.02.2011 has held that delay ought to be condoned when su ciently explained particularly where party seeking condonation is the Government. It is further submitted that the Hon'ble High Court ought to have condoned the delay in considering the public revenue involved and also because of the genuine di culties and circumstances beyond the control of the petitioner, on account of which Special Leave Petition could not be 5led within the time."] 10. Before considering whether the reasons for justifying such a huge delay are acceptable or not, it is also useful to refer the decisions relied on by Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, learned senior Counsel for the respondents. [i) In Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay V/s. Amateur Riders Club, Bombay, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 603, there is a delay of 264 days in 5ling the SLP by the Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay. The explanation for the delay had been set out in petitioner's own words as under :- [".....2 (g) The Advocate-on-Record got the special leave petition drafted from the drafting Advocate and sent the same for approval to the Board on Jun. 24, 1993 along with the case 5le. (h) The Board returned the case 5le to the Advocate-on- Record on Jul. 9, 1993 who re-sent the same to the Board on Sep. 20, 1993 requesting that draft SLP was not approved by the Board. The Board after approving the draft SLP sent this 5le to CAS on Oct. 1, 1993."] After incorporating the above explanation, this Court refused to condone the delay by observing thus :- ["3. ... .... Having regard to the law of limitation which binds everybody, we cannot 5nd any way of granting relief. It is true that Government should not be treated as any other private litigant as, indeed, in the case of the former the decisions to present and prosecute appeals are not individual but are institutional decisions necessarily bogged down by the proverbial red-tape. But there are limits to this R/CR.MA/26268/2025 ORDER DATED: 11/08/2026 also. Even with all this latitude, the explanation oIered for the delay in this case merely serves to aggravate the attitude of indiIerence of the Revenue in protecting its common interests. The a davit is again one of the stereotyped a davits making it susceptible to the criticism that the Revenue does not seem to attach any importance to the need for promptitude even where it aIects its own interest. [Emphasis supplied]] [ii) In Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead) by LRS. V/s. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and Another, (2008) 17 SCC 448, the question was whether the respondent- Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project had shown su cient cause to condone the delay of 1724 days in 5ling appeals before the High Court. In para 17, this Court held:- [".....The evidence on record suggests neglect of its own right for long time in preferring appeals. The Court cannot enquire into belated and stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The Court helps those who are vigilant and "do not slumber over their rights"] After referring various earlier decisions, taking very lenient view in condoning the delay, particularly, on the part of the Government and Government Undertaking, this Court observed as under :- ["29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for 5xing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy 5xing 16 a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.] [30. Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the Courts' discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner subserves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation to the landlosers facilitating their rehabilitation/resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy. Public interest demands that the State or the bene5ciary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable R/CR.MA/26268/2025 ORDER DATED: 11/08/2026 litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving bene5t to which they are otherwise not entitled, in any fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the landlosers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the Courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application 5led under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging the landlosers to Courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public interest."]” 6. In the case of Bherulal (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in para – 5, 6, 7 and 8 as under:- “5. A preposterous proposition is sought to be propounded that if there is some merit in the case, the period of delay is to be given a go-by. If a case is good on merits, it will succeed in any case. It is really a bar of limitation which can even shut out good cases. This does not, of course, take away the jurisdiction of the Court in an appropriate case to condone the delay. 6. We are also of the view that the aforesaid approach is being adopted in what we have categorized earlier as "certi5cate cases". The object appears to be to obtain a certi5cate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue and thus, say that nothing could be done because the highest Court has dismissed the appeal. It is to complete this formality and save the skin of o cers who may be at default that such a process is followed. We have on earlier occasions also strongly deprecated such a practice and process. There seems to be no improvement. The purpose of coming to this Court is not to obtain such certi5cates and if the Government suIers losses, it is time when the concerned o cer responsible for the same bears the consequences. The irony is that in none of the cases any action is taken against the o cers, who sit on the 5les and do nothing. It is presumed that this Court will condone the delay and even in making submissions, straight away counsels appear to address on merits without referring even to the aspect of limitation as happened in this case till R/CR.MA/26268/2025 ORDER DATED: 11/08/2026 we pointed out to the counsel that he must 5rst address us on the question of limitation. 7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we propose to do in all matters today, where there are such inordinate delays that the Government or State authorities coming before us must pay for wastage of judicial time which has its own value. Such costs can be recovered from the o cers responsible. 8. Looking to the period of delay and the casual manner in which the application has been worded, we consider appropriate to impose costs on the petitioner- State of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty 5ve thousand) to be deposited with the Mediation and Conciliation Project Committee. The amount be deposited in four weeks. The amount be recovered from the o cers responsible for the delay in 5ling the special leave petition and a certi5cate of recovery of the said amount be also 5led in this Court within the said period of time.” 7. This Court has considered the facts of the case and the submissions made on behalf of learned counsel for both the sides and the contents of the application. This Court has perused the decisions cited at the bar and the material on record. It appears that the present application is 3led by the applicant for condonation of delay caused in 3ling the appeal challenging the impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. It emerges from the material on record that the judgment and order of acquittal was passed on 14.10.2021 and applied for certi3ed copy of the judgment and order after four years from the date of pronouncement of the judgment i.e. on 28.08.2025 and the same was ready for delivery on 25.09.2025 and it was delivered on 25.09.2025 in between the gross delay of four years was caused which was not satisfactorily explained by 3ling additional aBdavit. The relevant paragraphs of additional aBdavit which are as under:- “I say and submit that this is case of theft of electricity R/CR.MA/26268/2025 ORDER DATED: 11/08/2026 where very serious modus operandi has been applied by the Opponent no.2 which has wide eIect on the applicant company and it was found that the circuit which was available for Rs.500/- was used by number of industries to keep the meter in hanged condition. Since it was external device, nothing can be found on the spot. After detailed and o cers and detailed study of M.R.I. such modus operandi could be spelt out. In some cases helper, meter Govt. Law O cersstudy and conferences with the manufacturer of the reader, and other employees were found to have been involved in helping such theft of electricity. Against them also F.I.Rs. were 5led and their services were terminated. Therefore prompt and immediate action was required to stop this type of theft of electricity. I say and submit that therefore even while issuing supplementary bills for theft of electricity, option to compound oIence was not given. The applicant had objected before Hon'ble High Court through Learned Advocate General when the Opponent no.2 had applied for anticipatory bail and the Hon'ble Court granted anticipatory bail to the Opponent no.2 on the condition that the names of persons who supplied circuit would be given. In this case also same modus operandi was found. However, unfortunately the o cers were not able to explain to the trial court entire modus operandi and in absence of proper evidence the trial court acquitted the Opponent no.2 on 14.10.2021. It was only in 2022 when the Opponent no.2 5led CrMA No.1980/2022 for refund. The Special Court vide order dated 6.2.2022 refused to direct refund of the amount of supplementary bill and only directed to refund the amount of compounding charges deposited by the Opponent no.2 with the Special Court. I say and submit that since the Opponent no.2 had already deposited the entire amount of supplementary bill for theft of electricity issued to him, there was no need for the applicant to 5le suit for recovery of the bill. Further the order of Special Court did not direct to refund the amount and therefore there was no question of refunding the amount of supplementary bill to the Opponent no.2. I say and submit that subsequently the Opponent no.2 demanded refund of the amount of supplementary bill and 5led SCA No.13449/2023. Thereafter the applicant R/CR.MA/26268/2025 ORDER DATED: 11/08/2026 company looking to the fact that there was no order by the Special Court to refund the amount of civil liability. As per catena of decisions on this aspect that merely because there is acquittal in criminal court, it does not entitle party to claim amount of civil liability unless there is speci5c order of Special Court under Sec.154 of The Electricity Act.2003. If the special court would have found it deem 5t, it would have ordered to refund the amount of civil liability. But since no such order was passed, there was no question of refund but as the Opponent no.2 was demanding refund, it was decided to send the matter to the Head O ce because there are certain case of the same nature where this modus operandi has been applied and it has serious impact on the electricity which is public property, therefore in the interest of company it was found 5t to prefer appeal in this case and obtain opinion on the question of action to be taken in the matter. Thereafter decision was taken to prefer appeal. In this process there was some delay caused on the of the applicant. The said delay is bona5de. There was no negligence of any o cer but looking to the order passed by Special Court not directing refund of the amount of civil liability, initially concerned o cer was under bona5de impression that no further legal action is required to be taken in the matter. Under the circumstance delay has been caused in 5ling this appeal and there is su cient cause.” 8. It reveals from the record that the respondent – accused has also 3led aBdavit-in-reply and raised an objection for condonation of delay as it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that while preferring an application for condonation of delay the applicant has to explain delay in day by day possibly. The relevant paragraphs of the aBdavit-in-reply read as under:- “At the outset, I say and submit that the present application 5led by the Applicant (PGVCL) seeking to condone a massive and inordinate delay of 1234 days in 5ling the acquittal appeal is entirely baseless, deceptive, and an abuse of the judicial process. The application has been preferred with a clear oblique motive to avoid the repayment of legitimate money of the present respondent, which I am seeking via Special Civil Application No. 13449 of 2023 pending before this Honorable High Court, and R/CR.MA/26268/2025 ORDER DATED: 11/08/2026 therefore, this delay application should be rejected outright. By way of a brief summary of the acquittal details, I state that an FIR was registered against me under Sections 135 and 138 of the Indian Electricity Act, 2003, resulting in a Special Criminal Case (Elec.) No. 211 of 2012. After the conclusion of trial, the Learned Special Electricity Judge and 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Gondal, vide judgment and order dated 14.10.2021, acquitted me from all charges. The trial court explicitly observed that the prosecution failed to recover or produce any external device or circuit from the spot to prove the alleged theft, making the case entirely foundationless. Despite my de5nitive acquittal in October 2021, the Applicant chose to sit over its rights for more than three years. I oppose the condonation of this delay on the ground that the Applicant has failed to mention any speci5c, legal, or day-to-day justi5cation for this huge delay of 1234 days. In Paragraph 3 of the application, PGVCL suggests that its o cers were under a "bona5de impression" that a complainant cannot 5le a criminal appeal, which is an absurd and unacceptable excuse from a statutory body who is dealing day in and day out in the legal department with the panel of expert advocates. There was clear Ignorance of law and routine internal negligence cannot constitute a "su cient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Applicant has provided absolutely no clear clari5cation or date-wise explanation what prevented them from taking action between 14.10.2021 and the 5ling of this appeal in 2025. I further submit that this acquittal appeal is an afterthought and 5led only as a defense mechanism against my pending Special Civil Application No. 13449 of 2023, where I have sought the repayment of Rs.20,91,713.84 deposited by me during bail and subsequently withdrawn by PGVCL. It was speci5cally brought to the notice of the trial court during my withdrawal application (CRMA No. 1980 of 2022) that PGVCL had not preferred any appeal against the acquittal. The law assists the vigilant, not those who sleep over their rights, and a statutory body cannot be given special treatment to harass an acquitted citizen after an unpardonable delay.” R/CR.MA/26268/2025 ORDER DATED: 11/08/2026 9. Being aggrieved and dissatis3ed with the impugned judgment and order of acquittal, the applicant has preferred the criminal appeal under Section 156 of the Electricity Act, 2003. Section 156 of the Electricity Act, 2003 reads as under:- “156. Appeal and revision. The High Court may exercise, so far as may be applicable, all the powers conferred by Chapters XXIX and XXX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), as if the Special Court within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court is a District Court, or as the case may be, the Court of Session, trying cases within the local limits of jurisdiction of the High Court.” 10. That the High Court while exercising the power is applicable all the powers conferred by Chapters XXIX and XXX of the Criminal Procedure Code meaning thereby that the Court is exercising the jurisdiction under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. and exercising the power under Section 378 of the Cr.P.C. against the order of acquittal. 11. It appears that though there was a delay of 1234 days in preferring the criminal appeal, no satisfactory reason and explanation made in the application merely reference of the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of (1) Ahmed Jaan (supra), (2) Mohmad Madbool So7 (supra) and (3) MST Katiji (supra). The applicant was defending other litigation 3led by the accused before this Court and the applicant – company was busy and therefore the applicant has not preferred the appeal in time. The Court has asked the applicant to 3le additional aBdavit showing suBcient grounds, if applicant wants. In the event, the respondent – accused has 3led aBdavit-in-reply and vehemently opposed this application to the e@ect that the applicant has failed to explain the delay caused in R/CR.MA/26268/2025 ORDER DATED: 11/08/2026 preferring the appeal as per the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as aforesaid. That the accused had preferred Special Civil Application No. 13449 of 2023 before this Court seeking direction to the applicant to refund the amount and the accused had also preferred Criminal Misc. Application No. 1980 of 2022 whereby the trial Court ordered to refund Rs.4,24,000/- which was deposited by the respondent – accused in connection with the criminal case registered against the accused. When the accused went for execution of the order, the applicant has 3led the criminal appeal along with the application for condonation of delay before this Court, which is opposed by the accused by 3ling aBdavit-in-reply and the applicant has also 3led additional aBdavit. On perusal of the contents of the additional aBdavit, it reveals that the applicant has explained that the applicant was busy with proceeding arising from this criminal case decided by the trial Court and, therefore, the applicant has not preferred this appeal in time and also seeking advice and further discussion with the department and hence the delay cause. So considering the contents of the additional aBdavit, it emerges that there is no satisfactory explanation assigned by the applicant in the application as well as in the additional aBdavit. The reason stated for delay is not a suBcient ground as the Hon’ble Supreme Court described the just delay and inordinate delay and considered the same in way back in 2024. 12. It is worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Brijesh Kumar and others Vs. State of Haryana and others reported in (2014) 11 SCC 351 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the law of limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim "Interest Reipublicae Ut Sit Finis Litium" (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to R/CR.MA/26268/2025 ORDER DATED: 11/08/2026 litigation). Rules of Limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively $xed period of time. 13. In the Brijesh Kumar (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paras 7, 8, 9 and 10 as under:- “8. The Privy Council in General Fire and Life Assurance Corporation Ltd. V/s. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, AIR 1941 PC 6, relied upon the writings of Mr. Mitra in Tagore Law Lectures 1932 wherein it has been said that "a law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party as the Judge cannot, on applicable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognised by law." 9. In P.K. Ramachandran V/s. State of Kerala & Anr., AIR 1998 SC 2276, the Apex Court while considering a case of condonation of delay of 565 days, wherein no explanation much less a reasonable or satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay had been given, held as under:- "Law of limitation may harshly aIect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds." 10. While considering a similar issue, this court in Esha Bhattacharjee V/s. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors. (2013) 12 SCC 649 laid down various principles inter alia: " x x x v) Lack of bona 5des imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a signi5cant and relevant fact vi) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play x x x R/CR.MA/26268/2025 ORDER DATED: 11/08/2026 ix) The conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. x x x xvii) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non- serious mater and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters." (See also: Basawaraj V/s. Land Acquisition O cer (2013) 14 SCC 81) 11. The courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. However the court while allowing such application has to draw a distinction between delay and inordinate delay for want of bona 5des of an inaction or negligence would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Su cient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion by the Court for condoning the delay. This Court has time and again held that when mandatory provision is not complied with and that delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, the court cannot condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone.” 14. It is also pertinent to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Odisha and others Vs. Managing Committee of Namtara Girls High School reported in 2026 SCC Online SC 191 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paras 18 and 21 as under:- “18. However, what perhaps remained unnoticed in any of the decisions post Katiji (supra) and Ramegowada (supra) adopting a liberal approach is the exasperation and consequent lament expressed by none other than Hon’ble R/CR.MA/26268/2025 ORDER DATED: 11/08/2026 M.N. Venkatachaliah, CJI.in course of authoring a brief order in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v. Amateur Riders Club, Bombay and admonishing o cers of the “revenue” in not acting with promptitude. This order was made within six years of the decision in Ramegowda (supra). We can do no better than quoting the same in its entirety hereunder: 1. We have heard Shri S.C. Manchanda, learned senior counsel for the Revenue. 2. This special leave petition 5led on November 16, 1993 is delayed by 264 days. For quite some time in the past, this Court has been making observations as to the grave prejudice caused to public interest by appeals brought on behalf of the Government being lost on the point of limitation. Such observations have been made for over a few years in the past. But there seems to be no conspicuous improvement as is apparent in the present petition which is 5led in November 1993. The explanation for the delay, had better be set out in petitioner’s own words: “(g) The Advocate-on-Record got the special leave petition drafted from the drafting Advocate and sent the same for approval to the Board on June 24, 1993 along with the case 5le. (h) The Board returned the case 5le to the Advocate-on- Record on July 9, 1993 who re-sent the same to the Board on September 20, 1993 requesting that draft SLP was not approved by the Board. The Board after approving the draft SLP sent this 5le to CAS on October 1, 1993.” 3. This explanation is incapable of furnishing a judicially acceptable ground for condonation of delay. After the earlier observations of this Court made in several cases in the past, we hoped that the matters might improve. There seems to be no visible support for this optimism. There is a point beyond which even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant is Government which is itself under the shackles of bureaucratic indiIerence. Having regard to the law of limitation which binds everybody, we cannot 5nd any way of granting relief. It is true that Government should not be treated as any other private litigant as, indeed, in the case of the former the decisions to present and prosecute appeals are not individual but are R/CR.MA/26268/2025 ORDER DATED: 11/08/2026 institutional decisions necessarily bogged down by the proverbial red-tape. But there are limits to this also. Even with all this latitude, the explanation oIered for the delay in this case merely serves to aggravate the attitude of indiIerence of the Revenue in protecting its common interests. The a davit is again one of the stereotyped a davits making it susceptible to the criticism that the Revenue does not seem to attach any importance to the need for promptitude even where it aIects its own interest. 4. The application for condonation of delay is, accordingly, dismissed. The special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed as barred by time. 21. Condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a matter of right. It is entirely the discretion of the Court whether or not to condone delay. Despite all the latitude that is shown to a “State”, we are of the clear opinion tha the cause sought to be shown here by the State of Odisha is not an explanation but a lame excuse. No case for exercise of discretion has been set up.” 15. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and aspects and the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court is of the opinion that no case is made out to entertain this application and the application being meritless deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly, the application is dismissed. Notice discharged. (HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK,J) V.R. PANCHAL Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judge. Digitally signed by: VIJAYKUMAR RAMESHBHAI PANCHAL(HC00171), PRINCIPAL PRIVATE SECRETARY, at High Court of Gujarat on 14/08/2026 16:36:08