Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
2025:HHC:27646 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No.
866
of 2023 Reserved on :
14 th May, 2025 Decided on :
13 th August, 202
5 Bhagwan Dass Manwani
…Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh & Another …Respondents Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the petitioner : Mr. Kartik Gadi, Advocate. For the respondents : Mr. Mohinder Zharaick, & Mr. H.S. Rawat, Additional Advocates General, for
respondent No.1. Mr. Ajay Kochhar Senior Advocate with Mr. Anubhav Chopra, Advocate, for
respondent No.2. Virender Singh, Judge Petitioner Bhagwan Dass Manwani has filed the present petition, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘Cr.PC’), with a prayer to quash FIR No.06/2019, dated 20.06.2019 (hereinafter referred to as the FIR, in question), registered under Sections 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter 1 Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:27646 referred to as ‘the IPC’), with Police Station, CID Bharari, District Shimla, H.P., as well as, the proceedings, resultant thereto, which are stated to be pending before the Court of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rampur, District Shimla (hereinafter referred to as the ‘trial Court’). 2. According to the petitioner, the FIR, in question has been registered at the instance of respondent No.2, who has alleged therein that in the year 201819, petitioner bought apples from the firm of the private respondent and an amount of Rs.4,61,03,487/, was to be paid by the petitioner against which, a payment of Rs.1,00,000/, only was made to him on 26.03.2019. 3. It has further been alleged by respondent No.2, in the complaint that the total purchase from his firm was Rs.7,22,03,487/, whereas, it is the case of the petitioner that he was regularly in contact with private respondent/ complainant and he used to get response that the apples are in CA store and the payment will be made after the sales of the apples. 4. It has further been alleged by respondent No.2, in the complaint that in the months of February and
3 2025:HHC:27646 March, 2019, the petitioner was contacted personally in Delhi and as some amount had remained unpaid by the petitioner, it has been alleged that he has cheated the private respondent and is not paying the alleged outstanding amount of Rs.4,61,03,487/. 5.
It has further been alleged by respondent No.2, in the complaint that most of the times, his calls were not being answered by the petitioner, so, having no option left, the private respondent got lodged the FIR in question. Thereafter, the Government of Himachal Pradesh has constituted Special Investigation Team. 6. It is the further case of the petitioner that after registration of the FIR, in question, he had obtained bail, under Section 438 Cr.PC, by filing application in the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Shimla. Thereafter, the petitioner had duly cooperated with the investigation and supplied all the documents, but, the investigating agency has filed the chargesheet before the learned trial Court. 7. As per the further case of the petitioner, despite lengthy investigation, the investigating agency could not verify the books of accounts of respondent No.2 and both
4 2025:HHC:27646 petitioner and respondent No.2 had different books of accounts, which were not matching. 8. According to the petitioner, respondent No.2, has lodged the FIR, in question, by concealment of material
facts, as he had settled the entire dispute with the petitioner vide settlement agreement, dated 17.05.2019. As per the settlement agreement, without mentioning any exact figure of the amount due, respondent No.2, has taken 50% of the land comprised at Khata Khatauni No.08/19, khasra No.111/1, kita 7 Mohal Bekhalti, in lieu of the amount due, from the petitioner towards respondent No.2. 9. As per the petitioner, the FIR has been lodged after settlement of the dispute on 17.05.2019. As per the settlement, petitioner has transferred 50% of the shares of his Company/land property situated in Bekhalti, Himachal Pradesh and had signed all the relevant documents in this regard. According to petitoner’s further case, intention of respondent No.2, became mala fide and he has used the registration of FIR, as a method of extortion of amount. 5 2025:HHC:27646
10. It is the further case of the petitioner that no offence is made out under Section 420 IPC or Section 406 IPC, as respondent No.2, himself has alleged that dispute is qua some remaining payment arising out of an ongoing business transaction, as such, basic element of inducement or entrustment are missing in the present case. The I.O. has wrongly filed the chragesheet, whereas he should have filed the closure report. 11. It is the further case of the petitioner that respondent No.2, has taken the contrary stand, after taking the possession of the land, the land has been acquired by the State, in contravention of Section 118 of the HP Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972, whereas, relying upon the report of Tehsildar, which has been obtained, during the course of investigation, it is the case of the petitioner that it was found that the said land has not been acquired by the State and still belongs to M/s Himalayan Agro Fresh Fruit Pvt. Ltd., i.e., the company, whose 50% shares were transferred to respondent No.2, in lieu of the settlement agreement, between the parties. 6 2025:HHC:27646
12. Petitioner further admitted that he never purchased any crop from any grower or agriculturist, but the same was purchased from respondent No.2. 13. On the basis of the above facts, it has been reiterated that the matter has now been settled between petitioner and respondent No.2. As such, no useful purpose would be served, by continuing with the criminal proceedings, as no offence is made out under Sections 406 and 420 IPC. 14.
On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has been made to allow the petition, as prayed for. 15. When put to notice, the Police has filed reply to the petition, disclosing therein, that the FIR, in question, was registered against the petitioner at the instance of respondent No.2. It has been alleged in the FIR that the firm owned by petitioner Bhagwan Dass has failed to remit the outstanding amount of Rs.4,61,03,487/ to the complainant. 16. As per the stand of respondent No.1, during the investigation, the I.O. obtained record, according to which, complainant M/s Dogra Traders, Narkanda, conducted an
7 2025:HHC:27646 apple business worth Rs.7,22,03,487/ with the petitioner, but, he has failed to remit the outstanding amount of Rs.4,61,03,487/ to the complainant. 17. It has come on record that a mutual settlement agreement was between the parties, according to which, the petitioner claimed to own a piece of land, in the name of his company, Himalayan Agro Fresh Pvt. Ltd., in Theog and has agreed to transfer 50% of the land as part of settlement, whereas, as per the report of Tehsildar, the said land is in the name of Himalayan Agro Fresh Pvt. Ltd, but, the name of the complainant has not been found mentioned in the revenue record. In this regard, the I.O. has recorded the statements of the witnesses. 18. It has been reasserted that the petitioner, with fraudulent intention, had cheated the complainant, by entering into agreement and has not paid the outstanding amount. 19. Respondent No.2, has also filed the reply, in which, apart from reasserting the contents of the complaint, upon which the FIR, in question, has been registered, it has been pleaded that the modus operandi of
8 2025:HHC:27646 the petitioner was to cheat the respondent, as well as complainant. 20.
The settlement dated 17.5.2019, is stated to be a farce, on the ground, that in the settlement, it has been agreed to transfer 50% shares of the ‘Himalayan Agro Fresh Fruits Pvt. Ltd., towards part of the outstanding amount, which is yet to be decided by the parties. It has also been mentioned that the land mentioned in the settlementagreement was purchased by the petitioner in the name of ‘Himalayan Agro Fresh Fruits Pvt. Ltd., after obtaining the requisite permission under Section 118 of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972, for the purpose of setting up of ‘coldstore’. 21. Highlighting the contents of the agreement, it has been pleaded that there is stipulation in the said document that in case of failure to set up the ‘cold store’, the land would vest in the State, along with structure, if any. 22. According to respondent No.2, the land stated to have been transferred, stood already vested with the State, in the year 2016, in terms of Section 118 of the
9 2025:HHC:27646 Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972, whereas, 50% shares of the ‘Himalayan Agro Fresh Fruits Pvt. Ltd., have been transferred to M/s JCO Traders. 23. On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has been made to dismiss the petition. 24. Perusal of the record shows that the police, after registration of the FIR, has conducted the investigation and submitted the report under Section 173 (2) Cr.P.C., in the learned trial Court. Upon the report of the police, learned trial Court has summoned the accused (petitioner). 25. Scope of Section 482 Cr.P.C., has elaborately been discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the year 1992, in the seminal judgment titled as State of Haryana Vs.
Chaudhary Bhajan Lal & Others, 1992 CrLJ, 527, in which, the Hon’ble Apex Court has formulated the guidelines for exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Relevant paragraph 107 of the judgment is reproduced as under:
“107. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions
10 2025:HHC:27646 relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. 1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate with the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where, the allegations in the FLR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only.
a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently
11 2025:HHC:27646 improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
26. This view has again been reiterated by a three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Versus State of Maharashtra & Others, 2021 SCC Online SC 315. Relevant paragraph 38 of the judgment is reproduced as under:
38. In the case of Golconda Lingaswamy (supra), after considering the decisions of this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra) and other decisions on the exercise of inherent powers by the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., in paragraphs 5, 7 and 8, it is observed and held as under:
“5. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The section does
12 2025:HHC:27646 not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code.
It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely: (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognises and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal, possess in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alique concedit, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (when the law gives a person anything, it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the Court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for
13 2025:HHC:27646 advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice.
In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. 7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process, no doubt should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private
14 2025:HHC:27646 complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to shortcircuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death….. 8. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles.
The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hardandfast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. [See Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [(1992) 4 SCC 305 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 36 : AIR 1993 SC 892] and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar [AIR 1964 SC 1 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 1] .] It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises, arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In a proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the
15 2025:HHC:27646 proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognisance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code.
It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint/FIR has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant or disclosed in the FIR that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint/FIR is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the proceeding.”
27. It is no longer res integra that at the time of deciding the petition, under Section 482 Cr.PC, this Court cannot assume the powers of the appeal/Revisional Court, nor, this Court can act as trial Court. While holding so, the view of this Court is being guided by the decision of
16 2025:HHC:27646 Hon’ble
Supreme
Court
in Chilakamarthi Venkateswarlu & Another versus State of Andhra Pradesh & Another, (2019) 10 Scale 239. Relevant paragraph 15 of the judgment is reproduced as under:
“15. In exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 it is not permissible for the Court to act as if it were a trial Court. The Court is only to be prima facie satisfied about existence of sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. For that limited purpose, the Court can evaluate materials and documents on record, but it cannot appreciate the evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused.”
28.
Similar view has been taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.W. Palanitkar & Others versus State of Bihar & Another, (2002) 1 Supreme Court Cases, 241. 29. At the time of deciding the petition, only prima facie case is to be seen and the truthfullness of the allegations are not to be seen. Reference in this regard can be made to the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajiv Thapar & Others versus Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC, 330. 17 2025:HHC:27646
30. In view of the guidelines, as laid down, by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court would proceed to discuss the stand, as taken by the petitioner, in the present petition. 31. In this case, the police has registered a case under Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC. Ingredients of Sections 406 and 420 IPC have elaborately been discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in M.N.G. Bharateesh Reddy versus Ramesh Ranganathan & Another, (2022) 16 Supreme Court Cases 210, Relevant paragraphs 12 to 21, are reproduced, as under:
12. The ingredients of the offence of cheating are spelt out in Section 415 of the IPC. Section 415 is extracted below:
“415. Cheating — Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat”. Explanation — A dishonest concealment of
facts is a deception within the meaning of this section.”
18 2025:HHC:27646
13. The ingredients of the offence under Section 415 emerge from a textual reading. Firstly, to constitute cheating, a person must deceive another. Secondly, by doing so the former must induce the person so deceived to (i) deliver any property to any person; or (ii) to consent that any person shall retain any property; or (iii) intentionally induce the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived and such an act or omission must cause or be likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property. 14. Section 420 deals with cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property. It reads as follows:
“420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property – Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being capable of converting into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.”
15. In Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar, a twojudge bench of this Court interpreted sections 415 and 420 of IPC to hold that fraudulent or dishonest intention is a precondition to constitute the offence of cheating. The relevant extract from the judgment reads thus:
“14. On a reading of the section it is manifest that in the definition there are set forth two separate classes of acts which
19 2025:HHC:27646 the person deceived may be induced to do. In the first place he may be induced fraudulently or dishonestly to deliver any property to any person. The second class of acts set forth in the section is the doing or omitting to do anything which the person deceived would not do or omit to do if he were not so deceived. In the first class of cases the inducing must be fraudulent or dishonest. In the second class of acts, the inducing must be intentional but not fraudulent or dishonest. 15.
In determining the question it has to be kept in mind that the distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of cheating is a fine one. It depends upon the intention of the accused at the time of inducement which may be judged by his subsequent conduct but for this subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction, that is the time when the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to keep up promise subsequently such a culpable intention right at the beginning, that is, when he made the promise cannot be presumed.” (emphasis supplied)
16. In Dalip Kaur v. Jagnar Singh a twojudge bench of this Court held that a dispute arising out of a breach of contract would not amount to an offence of cheating under section 415 and
420. The relevant extract is as follows:
20 2025:HHC:27646
“9. The ingredients of Section 420 of the Penal Code are:
“(i) Deception of any persons; (ii) Fraudulently or dishonestly inducing any person to deliver any property; or (iii) To consent that any person shall retain any property and finally intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit.”
10. The High Court, therefore, should have posed a question as to whether any act of inducement on the part of the appellant has been raised by the second respondent and whether the appellant had an intention to cheat him from the very inception.
If the dispute between the parties was essentially a civil dispute resulting from a breach of contract on the part of the appellants by nonrefunding the amount of advance the same would not constitute an offence of cheating. Similar is the legal position in respect of an offence of criminal breach of trust having regard to its definition contained in Section 405 of the Penal Code.” (emphasis supplied)
17. Applying the above principles, the ingredients of Sections 415 and 420 are not made out in the present case. The grievance of the first respondent arises from the termination of his services at the hospital. The allegations indicate that there was an improper billing in respect of the surgical services which were rendered by the complainant at the hospital. At the most, the allegations allude to a breach of terms of the Consultancy Agreement by the Appellant, which is essentially in the nature of a civil dispute. 18. The allegations in the complaint are conspicuous by the absence of any reference to the practice of any deception or dishonest
21 2025:HHC:27646 intention on behalf of the Appellant. Likewise, there is no allegation that the complainant was as a consequence induced to deliver any property or to consent that any person shall retain any property or that he was deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would have not done or omitted to do if he was not so deceived. The conspicuous aspect of the complaint which needs to be emphasized is that the ingredients of the offence of cheating are absent in the averments as they stand. 19. Section 405 of the IPC deals with criminal breach of trust and reads as follows:
“405.
Criminal breach of trust – Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or willfully suffers any other person so to do, commits “criminal breach of trust”.” The offence of criminal breach of trust contains two ingredients: (i) entrusting any person with property, or with any dominion over property; and (ii) the person entrusted dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property to the detriment of the person who entrusted it. 20. In Anwar Chand Sab Nanadikar v. State of Karnataka a twojudge bench restated the essential ingredients of the offence of criminal breach of trust in the following words:
“7. The basic requirement to bring home the accusations under Section 405 are the requirements to prove conjointly (1)
22 2025:HHC:27646 entrustment, and (2) whether the accused was actuated by the dishonest intention or not misappropriated it or converted it to his own use to the detriment of the persons who entrusted it. As the question of intention is not a matter of direct proof, certain broad tests are envisaged which would generally afford useful guidance in deciding whether in a particular case the accused had mens rea for the crime.”
21. In Vijay Kumar Ghai v. State of West Bengal another twojudge bench held that entrustment of property is pivotal to constitute an offence under section 405 of the IPC. The relevant extract reads as follows:
“28. “Entrustment” of property under Section 405 of the Penal Code, 1860 is pivotal to constitute an offence under this. The words used are, “in any manner entrusted with property”. So, it extends to entrustments of all kinds whether to clerks, servants, business partners or other persons, provided they are holding a position of “trust”.
A person who dishonestly misappropriates property entrusted to them contrary to the terms of an obligation imposed is liable for a criminal breach of trust and is punished under Section 406 of the Penal Code.”
32. In view of the above law, now, this Court would proceed further to ascertain the fact as to whether the offences, as alleged therein, are made out or not. 33. The relief of quashing has been sought mainly on the ground that in view of the compromise, between the
23 2025:HHC:27646 parties, which had taken place on 17.5.2019, the matter has been settled, whereas, the police had also taken a stand with regard to the compromise. 34. During the investigation, it was found that the ownership of the said land was found in the name of M/s Himalayan Agro Fresh Fruit Pvt. Ltd., and as per the report, filed, under Section 173(2) Cr.PC, the said land has not been transferred in the name of complainant Sanjeev Dogra. The said land was purchased vide letter dated 2.8.2013, with a stipulation by M/s Himalayan Agro Fresh Fruit Pvt. Ltd., through the petitioner, after obtaining the permission under the provisions of Section 118 of the HP Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972. The land was purchased with certain stipulation, which are reproduced as under:
1. The permission will be valid for one year from the date of issuance of this letter. 2. In the instant case the details furnished by the applicant have not been verified at Government level and are assured to be correct. Hence if at any time it is found that the details are not correct. the permission shall be deemed to have beun withdrawn/cancelled and if so purchased shall vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances alongwith structures if any. Further, in case any dispute (s) arises between the transferor and transferee, the State
24 2025:HHC:27646 Government will not be responsible for that and cannot be impleaded as party in any court/forum. 3.
Your attention is drawn to the proviso belo section 118(2)(h) of the Act ibid which requires the purchaser to utilize the land for the purpose for which allowed to be purchased within a period of 2 years further extendable by 1 year in this regard this period of 2 years will be courted from the date of registration. However, before purchase, please satisfy yourself that you will be able to complete various other formalities to set up the industrial unit, construct factory building, install machinery and start production all within a period of 2 years, (extended by one year if required) in case you fail to do this, the land will vest in the State alongwith structure if any, free from all encumbrances. Further, in case you fail to do so, the Government or any authority cannot give extension beyond three years. 4. An entry will be made in remarks column of the concerned Jamabandi with red ink that the transferee will not become an agriculturist on account of such transfer of land and he/she will not become eligible for allotment/lease/grant from the Government. The transferee of land will remain nonagriculturist for all purposes. 5. The stamp duty of land proposed to be transferred will be charged from the transferee as per Law. 35. However, as per letter dated 2.11.2015, Annexure R2/2, M/s Himalayan Agro Fresh Fruit Pvt. Ltd., has applied for extension of time to use the land. By way of the said letter, the time was extended upto
25 2025:HHC:27646 13.09.2016, with a clear stipulation that further extension is not possible and in case, the land will not be used within the time so granted, it will be vested in the State Government. Meaning thereby, the outer limit for the use of the land has expired on 14.09.2016. 36.
During the pendency of the investigation, when the petitioneraccused has taken a stand with regard to the settlement of the account, in lieu of the 50% share of the land, purchased by the company owned by the petitioner, then, the I.O. has requested the revenue authorities to verify the said fact. 37. Consequently, Naib Tehsildar, Theog, on 24.07.2019, submitted a report to SHO Police Station CID Bharari, District Shimla, disclosing therein that fencing has been done over the land and a wall has been erected, along with the National Highway and rest of the area is lying vacant. No construction was found there, whereas, according to the stipulation, as contained in letter dated 02.08.2013, the land was given for setting up of an industrial unit ‘Cold Store’. 26 2025:HHC:27646
38. In the said letter, it has specifically been mentioned that the person/company, in whose favour permission has been granted to complete the formalities to set up the industrial unit, construct building, install machinery and start production, within two years time, which may extend for one year, in case of any requirement, when on 24.07.2019, nothing has been done over the land, for which the permission was given to M/s Himalayan Agro Fresh Fruit Pvt. Ltd., then, the arguments of learned counsel for respondent No.2, hold water that the intention of the petitioner was not to settle the account, but, to defraud the complainant, by offering land, which has already been vested in the State Government. 39. In the complaint specific allegations have been levelled by the complainant that the land has not been utilized and the same has now been vested in the State Government, as per letter dated 2.11.2015. He has also alleged that despite knowing the said fact, in order to cheat the complainant, the said material fact has been concealed. 27 2025:HHC:27646
40.
In such situation, when the specific allegations have been levelled, the probable defence of the petitioner is not liable to be taken into consideration, as, while exercising the powers, under Section 482 Cr.PC, only the allegations, as contained in the FIR, as well as, in the statements, so recorded, under Section 161 Cr.PC, by the I.O. are to be taken into consideration as it is. From the bare reading of those statements, this Court is of the view that the petitioner is not able to make out a case for exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.PC. 41. Consequently, the present petition is dismissed. Pending application(s), shall also stand disposed of accordingly. ( Virender Singh ) Judge August 13, 2025 (ps)