23.4.2025 Ct. no.7 D/L.40 Nandita/ Samarpita IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION (Appellate Side) W.P.A. 7297 of 2021 Surendra Nath Maity & Ors. Vs. State of West Bengal & Ors. Mr. Gopal Chandra Ghosh, Sr. Adv., Mr. Uttam Kr. Bhattacharyya, Mr. Kaustav Mishra ..for the Petitioners Mr. Soumitra Bandyopadhyay, Sr. Govt. Adv. Mr. Priyabrata Batabyal, .. for the respondents The present writ petition has been filed challenging the legality of the order passed by the District Magistrate and Collector, Purba Medinipur, in compliance with the order dated 26th August, 2022, passed by the Hon’ble Coordinate Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. W.P. 5609 (W) of 2020, along with CAN 3371 of 2020. The order concluded that there was no illegality in the transfer of the plot of land in favour of the Public Health Engineering Department, and that the objection raised by the petitioners thereto, was untenable. The petitioners allege that, way back in 1941, the land was settled in favour of one Mr. Manmatha Nath Maity, since deceased, who was their predecessor-in- 2 interest. Accordingly, the name of Mr. Maity was duly recorded in the R.S. Record-of-Rights. Sometime in 1973, the concerned Revenue Officer initiated a proceeding under Section 44(2A) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1953 Act'). Challenging the legality of the said proceeding, Mr. Maity filed a suit, being Title Suit No. 156 of 1973, praying for a declaration and permanent injunction against the State of West Bengal. The suit was decreed on contest, declaring that the proceeding initiated under Section 44(2A) of the 1953 Act was without jurisdiction and illegal, and the State of West Bengal was permanently restrained from disturbing the plaintiff’s possession of the suit property. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, an appeal, being Title Appeal No. 205 of 1974, was preferred. The record reveals that, by a judgment and decree dated 17th May, 1974, the appeal was dismissed, thereby affirming the decision of the Trial Court. The State thereafter preferred a Second Appeal, being S.A. No. 13 of 1981, which was summarily dismissed by a Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court. In the final L.R. Record of Rights, the land was recorded under Khatian No. 1, treating the said land as having vested in the State. Subsequently, by way of an inter-departmental transfer, the land was 3 transferred in favour of the Public Health Engineering Department. In the meantime, Mr. Maity passed away. The present petitioners, being his successors-in-interest, stepped into his shoes and approached the B.L. & L.R.O. seeking rectification of the L.R. Record of Rights and for recording their names by altering the existing entries therein. However, despite receiving the petitioners’ application, the B.L. & L.R.O. failed to take any action. This inaction prompted the petitioners to approach the learned West Bengal Land Reforms Tribunal by filing an original application, being O.A. No. 1951 of 2018, which was disposed of by order dated 2nd October, 2018, directing the B.L. & L.R.O. to consider and dispose of the application by passing a reasoned order. Pursuant to the Tribunal’s direction, a proceeding, being Misc. Case No. 6 of 2020, was initiated by the B.L. & L.R.O. By a final order dated 29th September, 2020, the concerned B.L. & L.R.O. refused to entertain the petitioners’ prayer on the ground that, in view of the provisions of Section 57B of the 1953 Act, the suit was not maintainable, and the judgment and decree passed therein, as well as those passed in the subsequent appeals referred to in the preceding paragraph, could not be considered valid. In the meantime, the petitioners noticed that the Public Health Engineering (PHE) Department had 4 entered the said property and began the construction of a building thereon. The petitioners brought the matter to the attention of the District Magistrate and Collector of Purba Medinipur by submitting an application, seeking his intervention. However, despite receiving the application, no effective decision has been made regarding the matter. Aggrieved by this, the petitioner was compelled to file a writ petition, W.P. 5609 (W) of 2020, which was disposed of by a Coordinate Bench. The Bench directed the District Magistrate and Collector of Purba Medinipur to consider and dispose of the matter. However, by the order under challenge in this writ petition, the District Magistrate and Collector, Purba Medinipur, has rejected the petitioner's representation, dismissing the petitioner's contentions. Mr. Gopal Chandra Ghosh, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner, submits that the District Magistrate and Collector based his decision on the conclusion drawn by the B.L. & L.R.O., which held that, in light of Section 57B of the 1953 Act, the judgments and decrees in question was null and void. However, he contends that at this stage, neither the State nor any of its functionaries is entitled to raise such a plea. He further asserts that the B.L. & L.R.O. has unlawfully declined to entertain 5 the petitioner’s request for the correction of the Land Records. Referring to three un-reported decisions of three different Hon’ble Division Benches of this Court passed in W.P.L.R.T. 34 of 2014 (Sri Durgadas Dutta & Ors. –vs.- The State of West Bngal & Ors) W.P.L.R.T. 78 of 2021 (Asit Baran Ghosh & ors-vs- The State of West Bngal & Ors) and a decision, reported at (2007 (3) CHN 683 (Niranjan Chatterjee & Ors. vs. State of West Bengal & Ors.), he argues that in similar situations, the Hon'ble Division Bench, without directing the petitioners to file a statutory appeal against the order of the B.L. & L.R.O., has instead directed the authorities to make the necessary corrections in the Land Records (L.R. R-O-R) and to act in accordance with the judgment and decree. He submits that, in light of these unique circumstances, a similar order be passed by this Court in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. Per contra, referring to the provisions of Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Mr. Soumitra Bandyopadhyay, learned Senior Government Pleader, argues that suits relating to the vesting of any property are expressly barred. He further elaborates on this point, contending that Section 57(B) of the 1953 Act explicitly excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain any suit concerning the vesting of property. Despite these legal provisions, he asserts, the suit was decreed. He emphasizes that a 6 judgment and decree passed in violation of any legal provision or in contravention of a statute cannot be regarded as valid or binding. He defended the actions of the Public Health Engineering Department and the order of the District Magistrate, arguing that the land, which had already vested in the State, cannot be divested based on a judgment and decree passed in violation of a specific provision of law. Therefore, the District Magistrate was justified in refusing to accept the petitioner’s contention. Heard learned advocate representing the respective parties. Perused the materials on record. As noted earlier, the suit seeking a declaration of title and permanent injunction against the State of West Bengal was decreed on contest, after the Trial Court determined the issue of maintainability. The State challenged the decree by filing a first appeal, which was dismissed on contest, followed by a second appeal, which was summarily dismissed. The State did not pursue any further challenge against the judgment and decree passed in the second appeal, thereby allowing the decisions of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court to attain finality. At this stage, it is not open to the State to question the legality of those judgments by invoking Section 57B of the 1953 Act or Section 9 of the CPC. In this context, reference may be made to Niranjan Chatterjee (supra), which held that a party cannot disregard a 7 decree of declaration and permanent injunction without having challenged it before the appropriate forum in due time. A judgment and decree passed by a court of law cannot be declared a nullity by any administrative authority, including the B.L. & L.R.O., or even by the Land Reforms Tribunal. Only a competent court, in a properly instituted legal proceeding, has the authority to declare such a judgment and decree as a nullity. Therefore, it is evident that the District Magistrate and Collector’s reliance on the decision of the B.L. & L.R.O. is misplaced. The impugned order, having been passed in disregard of this settled position of law, cannot be sustained. An administrative decision made in ignorance of established legal principles is subject to judicial review, and if permitted to stand, would result in a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, the said order is set aside. All the judgments referred to by Mr. Ghosh were delivered by the Hon’ble Division Bench in Tribunal Applications arising from orders passed by the Land Reforms Tribunal. In such proceedings, a Hon’ble Division Bench undoubtedly has the authority to direct correction of the record of rights, even without requiring the aggrieved party to file a statutory appeal against the order of the B.L. & L.R.O., in appropriate case. However, with due respect, in my view, while assessing the validity of an order passed by the 8 District Magistrate and Collector in a writ petition, it would not be appropriate to issue such a direction. However, since the impugned order was passed in disregard of well-settled legal principles established in a series of decisions and has accordingly been set aside, the matter is relegated to the District Magistrate and Collector. He is directed to revisit the issue and decide the petitioner’s application afresh, taking into consideration the observations made in the judgments referred to in the preceding paragraph, as well as those contained in this order. The decision shall be taken after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners or their representatives, and any other interested parties, if any. If, upon reconsideration, the District Magistrate finds merit in the petitioner’s application, appropriate follow-up action shall be taken accordingly. However, if he concludes that the application is without substance, he shall pass a reasoned order, which must be duly communicated to the petitioner. The entire exercise shall be completed within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. It is imperative to clarify that, until such decision is taken, both parties shall maintain status quo with regard to the nature, character, and possession of the property. 9 With this observation the writ petition, WPA 7297 of 2021 stands disposed of, without any order as to costs. (Partha Sarathi Chatterjee, J.)