ADITYA ALIAS AADITYA ALIAS ADITYA DADWAL v. State of HP
CRMPM/2484/2025 · 2026-01-23
Rakesh Kainthla
body2025
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 1578 (HP) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 1578 (HP) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP (M) No. 2484 of 2025 Reserved on: 16.01.2026 Date of Decision:23.01.2026
Aditya @ Aaditya @ Aditya Dadwal
...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh
...Respondent
Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Vacation Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the Petitioner
: M/s Rakesh Kumar Chaudhary
and Panku Chaudhary,
Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr Lokender Kutlehria,
Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Vacation Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in F.I.R. No. 175 of 2024, dated 28.07.2024, registered in Police Station Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P., for the commission of an offence punishable under Sections 307, 324 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2
2. It has been asserted that the petitioner was falsely implicated. The petitioner has been behind bars for more than 1 year. The charges were framed on 02.08.2025. The prosecution has failed to complete the evidence, which is violative of the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial. The petitioner is a young person, and his future is at stake. He would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. The prosecution has cited 40 witnesses, but none were examined before the Court; hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that Pawan Kumar informed the police on 27.07.2024 at about 9:14 PM that Vinod and Kannu were injured by Aditya and his friends by using darat. They were taken to different hospitals for treatment. The police went to the hospital and recorded the victim’s statement, who stated that he and his friend Vinod Kumar, alias Viku, had gone towards Ganoh on
27.07.2024. They reached Ganoh Bazar Chowk at 7:15 PM. They were taking juice when Aditya Dadwal, Jagdev Dadwal and Rahul Kumar came to them and said that they were roaming around in the bazaar after pretending to be Don. Vinod enquired as to why
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the accused party was using such language. The accused started arguing with the informant party and pushed them. Aditya Dadwal brought Darat and inflicted a blow on Vinod’s head. He also inflicted blows on the right arm of the victim/informant, Aditya.
Jagdev Dadwal inflicted blows using stones, and Rahul Kumar gave beatings with kicks and fist blows. The accused ran away in their vehicle bearing registration No. HP-38D-7272. The police investigated the matter and arrested the accused near the Hollywood Hotel. The accused, Aditya, made a disclosure statement and recovered a darat with which the injuries were inflicted. The police seized darat. The articles were sent to RFSL, Dharamshala, HP and blood was found on the soil, glove, cotton swabs, T-Shirt and Pants of Aditya, T-Shirt, Vest, Underwear and Pants of Vinod Kumar and darat. As per the report, DNA from the blood on the rexine piece matched the DNA of Aditya. DNA from the soil, glove and darat matched the DNA of Vinod Kumar. DNA from the T-shirt of Aditya matched the DNA of Vinod Kumar and Aditya. DNA from the Pants of Aditya matched the DNA of Vinod Kumar and Aditya. DNA from the pants of Vinod Kumar matched the DNA of Vinod Kumar and Aditya. As per the medical report, the injuries sustained by the victim were
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dangerous and could have been caused by a sharp-edged weapon. FIR No. 357 of 2008 was registered against Jagdev Singh, and he was acquitted on 11.6.2014. FIR No. 133 of 2022, dated 28.4.2022, was registered against Jagdev, and he was acquitted by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nurpur, on 8.3.2025. The petitioner can intimidate the witnesses in case of their release on bail. The petitioner filed a petition for quashing the FIR before this Court, which was withdrawn on
02.07.2025. The charge sheet was filed before the Court on
29.08.2025. The matter was listed before the learned trial Court on 27.12.2025. 4. I have heard M/s Rakesh Chaudhary and Panku Chaudhary, Advocates for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State. 5.
Mr Rakesh Chaudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and that he was falsely implicated. The prosecution has failed to complete the evidence, which is violative of the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial. The petitioner has roots in society, and he would
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abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose; hence, he prayed that the petition be allowed and that the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State submitted that the petitioner was involved in the commission of a heinous offence. He would intimidate the witnesses in case of his release on bail; hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. It is undisputed that the petitioner had earlier filed a bail petition, which was registered as Cr.MP(M) No.206 of 2025 and was dismissed on 22.03.2025. It was held in the State of Maharashtra. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605, that once a bail application has been dismissed, a subsequent bail application can only be considered if there is a change of circumstances. It was observed:
“Once that application was rejected, there was no question of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the earlier decision without there being a change in the fact situation. And when we speak of change, we mean a substantial one, which has a direct impact on the earlier decision and not merely cosmetic changes, which are of
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little or no consequence. 'Between the two orders, there was a gap of only two days, and it is nobody's case that during these two days, drastic changes had taken place, necessitating the release of the respondent on bail.
Judicial discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the impugned order should not have been passed, reversing all earlier orders, including the one rendered by Puranik, J., only a couple of days before, in the absence of any substantial change in the fact situation. In such cases, it is necessary to act with restraint and circumspection so that the process of the Court is not abused by a litigant and an impression does not gain ground that the litigant has either successfully avoided one judge or selected another to secure an order which had hitherto eluded him. 10. Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528 that where an earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court has to consider the rejection of the earlier bail application and then consider why the subsequent bail application should be allowed. It was held:
“11. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications have been rejected and after such consideration, if the court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then the said court will have to give specific reasons why in spite of such earlier rejection the subsequent bail application should be granted.”
11. A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja, (2005) 8 SCC 380, wherein it was observed:
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9. When a learned Single Judge of the same court had denied bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that
order was unsuccessfully challenged before the appellate forum, without there being any major change of circumstances, another fresh application should not have been dealt with within a short span of time unless there were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of course, the principles of res judicata are not applicable to bail applications, but the repeated filing of bail applications without there being any change of circumstances would lead to bad precedents.”
12. This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant Purohit v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458, wherein it was observed:
“30. Before concluding, we must note that though an accused has a right to make successive applications for the grant of bail, the court entertaining such subsequent bail applications has a duty to consider the reasons and grounds on which the earlier bail applications were rejected. In such cases, the court also has a duty to record the fresh grounds, which persuade it to take a view different from the one taken in the earlier applications.”
13. It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1551, that a successive bail application can be filed if there is a material change in the circumstances, which means a change in the facts or the law. It was observed:
“7. It needs to be noted that the right to file successive bail applications accrues to the applicant only on the existence of a material change in circumstances. The sine
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qua non for filing subsequent bail applications is a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstances settled by law is a change in the fact situation or law that requires the earlier view to be interfered with or where the earlier finding has become obsolete. However, a change in circumstance has no bearing on the salutary principle of judicial propriety that successive bail application needs to be decided by the same Judge on the merits, if available at the place of sitting. There needs to be clarity between the power of a judge to consider the application and a person's right based on a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstance creates in a person accused of an offence the right to file a fresh bail application.
But the power to decide such a subsequent application operates in a completely different sphere, unconnected with the facts of a case. Such power is based on the well-settled and judicially recognized principle that if successive bail applications on the same subject are permitted to be
disposed of by different Judges, there would be conflicting orders, and the litigant would be pestering every Judge till he gets an order to his liking resulting in the credibility of the Court and the confidence of the other side being put in issue and there would be wastage of Court's time and that judicial discipline requires that such matter must be placed before the same Judge, if he is available, for orders. The satisfaction of material change in circumstances needs to be adjudicated by the same Judge who had earlier decided the application. Therefore, the same Judge needs to adjudicate whether there is a change in circumstance as claimed by the applicant, which entitles him to file a subsequent bail application.”
14.
Therefore, the present bail petition can only be considered on the basis of the change in the circumstances, and it is not permissible to review the order passed by the Court.
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15.
It was submitted that a charge sheet has been filed, and this is a change in circumstance. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Virupakshappa Gouda v. State of Karnataka, (2017) 5 SCC 406: (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 542: 2017 SCC OnLine SC 295 that the filing of a charge sheet does not amount to a change in circumstances. It was observed:
“12. On a perusal of the order passed by the learned trial Judge, we find that he has been swayed by the fact that when a charge sheet is filed, it amounts to a change of circumstance. Needless to say, the filing of the charge sheet does not in any manner lessen the allegations made by the prosecution. On the contrary, filing of the charge sheet establishes that after due investigation, the investigating agency, having found materials, has placed the charge sheet for the trial of the accused persons.”
16.
Thus, the petitioner cannot claim bail on the ground that the charge sheet has been filed.
17.
It was submitted that there is a delay in the progress of the trial, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on this
consideration. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Maja Ram Vs. Narcotics Control Bureau, SLP(Crl.) No.16863/2025, decided on 16.01.2026 in support of his submission. However, this submission will not help the
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petitioner. Certified copies of the order sheets show that the accused sought time for consideration of the charge on
27.02.2025. The accused submitted on 01.07.2025 that they intended to apply to the High Court for quashing of the FIR, and the matter was adjourned on their request. They informed the Court on 28.06.2025 that they had filed a petition before the High Court for the quashing of the FIR; hence, the matter was adjourned. Ultimately, charges were framed on 02.08.2025. Thus, it is apparent that the petitioner has contributed to the delay by seeking the adjournments for the consideration of the charge and thereafter on the ground that he had approached the High Court for the quashing of the FIR. A person cannot take advantage of his own wrong; therefore, the petitioner cannot seek bail because of the delay in the progress of the trial.
18.
The offence alleged against the petitioner is heinous. Statements of witnesses are yet to be recorded; therefore, releasing the petitioner on bail at this stage would be detrimental to the fair trial.
19. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed.
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20.
The observation made hereinbefore shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.
(Rakesh Kainthla) Vacation Judge 23rd January, 2026 (Gaurav Rawat)