1 2025:CGHC:48728-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 1039 of 2024 1 - Chhabilal Kachlame S/o Brijlal Kachlame Aged About 36 Years R/o Nedagaon Post Thana Manpur, District Mohla Manpur Chhattisgarh, Halmukam Police Line, District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh 2 - Peela Bai W/o Brijlal Kachlame Aged About 55 Years R/o Ercode, Post Nedagaon, Thana Manpur, District Mohla Manpur, Chhattisgarh, District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh 3 - Banshilal Kachlame S/o (Wrongly Mention As D/o) Brijlal Kachlame Aged About 38 Years R/o Ercode, Post Nedagaon, Thana Manpur, District Mohla Manpur, Chhattisgarh, District : Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through S H O- P S Mahila Thana, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh 2 - Laxmi Kachlame W/o Chabilal Kachlame Aged About 35 Years R/o Sheetla Para, Ward No. 2, Hathkhoj, Bhilai, Purani Bhilai, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Aman Pandey, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Shailendra Sharma, Panel Lawyer MANPREET KAUR Digitally signed by MANPREET KAUR Date: 2025.09.24 11:36:42 +0530 2 Hon’ble Mr. Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon’ble Mr. Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 23.09.2025 1. Heard Mr. Aman Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. Shailendra Sharma, learned Panel Lawyer for the State/respondent No. 1. 2. On 29.04.2024, this Court had issued notices to the respondent No.2. Thereafter, the matter was taken up on 11.09.2025 when it was revealed from the office notes that the respondent No. 2 was served with the notice on 25.05.2024 but still none had appeared. In such circumstances, this Court directed the Superintendent of Police concerned to ensure that the respondent No. 2 shall remain present before this Court on 23.09.2025 but today also, none had appeared on behalf of the respondent No.2. 3. The learned State counsel has produced a copy of communication dated 19.09.2025 of the Station House Officer, Police Station- Mahila Thana, Sector – 6, Bhilai, District- Durg whereby, it has been informed that in pursuance to the Court’s order dated 11.09.2025, notice has already been served to the respondent No.2 / complainant. 3 4. Despite service of notice on respondent No. 2 on two occasions, as the respondent No. 2 has chosen not to appear in the matter either personally or through her counsel, hence notice is deemed sufficient to her, thus this Court proceeds to hear the matter finally as the matter pertains to the year 2024. 5. The petitioners have prayed for the following relief(s): “It is, therefore, prayed that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow the present petition by setting aside the order framing charge dated 28.12.2022 and order taking cognizance dated 28.12.2022 along-with chargesheet bearing No. 112 of 2022 dated 23.12.2022 filed before the Civil Judge and Magistrate Court, Durg in RCC No. 15408/2022 arising out of FIR bearing No. 115 of 2022 (ANNEXURE P/1) registered at PS Mahila Thana, District Durg (CG) for offences punishable under section 498A r/w 34 of IPC and grant any other relief to which the petitioners are entitled to.” 6. Facts of the case in brief is that the marriage between petitioner No.1 and respondent No.2 was solemnized on 29.06.2020 at Bhilai, District Durg (C.G.), according to Hindu rites and rituals. Petitioner No.2 is the mother-in- law and Petitioner No.3 is the brother-in-law of respondent No.2. It is stated that the expenses of the marriage ceremony held at Durg were shared between both families, while the petitioners themselves hosted a reception at Bhilai at their own cost. According to the petitioners, there 4 was no discussion or demand for dowry or gifts at the time of marriage. It is alleged that immediately after the marriage, respondent No.2 expressed her unwillingness to live in a joint family and insisted that she and her husband should shift to a separate flat. On the night of 10.04.2022, respondent No.2 allegedly quarreled without cause, called her parents, and on the following morning, her family members arrived and took her away to her parental home at Durg, carrying along her belongings, gold, cash, and other valuables. Since then, respondent No.2 has been residing at her parental house. It is further the case of the petitioners that despite several efforts made by them to bring respondent No.2 back to the matrimonial home, she did not agree to return and instead, along with her family members, started making monetary demands and insisting that petitioner No.1 should establish a separate residence. It is also alleged that respondent No.2 threatened the petitioners with false criminal cases if her demands were not met. Although the alleged incident of desertion took place on 10.04.2022, respondent No.2 approached the Mahila Thana for the first time only on 26.11.2022. The petitioners contend that respondent No.2 has not only implicated her husband but also his mother and brother 5 with a view to pressurize them into fulfilling her unlawful demands. Hence this petition. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the present prosecution is wholly unsustainable in law as well as on facts. It is urged that as per the FIR itself, it is admitted that petitioner No.1 was already married prior to the marriage solemnized with respondent No.2, and therefore, such marriage was null and void in law, resulting in there being no legal relationship of husband and wife between the parties. Hence, the very substratum of the offence under Section 498A IPC, which presupposes a valid matrimonial relationship, is absent. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Suman Sharma v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 SCC Online Chh 416, as also the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shivcharan Lal Verma v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2007) 15 SCC 369. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners further contended that the FIR itself is vindictive in nature and lodged only to harass the petitioners with the ulterior motive of pressurizing them into meeting unlawful monetary demands. The FIR, according to the petitioners, is a false implication and a classic example of misuse of Section 498A IPC, which amounts to abuse of the process of law. It 6 is argued that even if the allegations in the FIR are accepted in totality, the same are vague, omnibus, and general in nature, without disclosing any specific role attributed to any of the petitioners. No distinct allegation of dowry demand or cruelty has been made against any of them, nor is there even an averment of physical hurt having been caused to respondent No.2. On the contrary, the allegations appear to be the outcome of normal matrimonial discord or personal vendetta. Learned counsel has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kahkashan Kausar and Others v. State of Bihar and Others, (2022) 6 SCC 599, wherein it has been categorically held that relatives of the husband should not be mechanically roped in matrimonial offences on the basis of omnibus allegations without specific instances of their involvement. It is submitted that even in the charge-sheet filed, nothing incriminating has been unearthed against the petitioners, and the statements of respondent No.2 and her relatives are inconsistent and self-contradictory. In such circumstances, it is contended that the present case falls squarely within the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, and therefore, this is a fit case for exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC to 7 quash the FIR and all consequential proceedings against the petitioners. Learned counsel for the petitioners lastly submits that on 11.03.2024, the evidence of respondent No.2 was recorded by the learned trial Court and thereafter, vide order dated 29.04.2024, an interim order was passed in favour of the petitioners and further proceedings of the case were stayed. Since then, the matter is pending and though the notices have been served upon the respondent No.2 twice, but she herself is not appearing to contest this present petition, as such, the present petition may kindly be allowed and the proceedings pending against the petitioners may kindly be quashed. 9. On the other hand, learned State counsel would submit that considering the material available on record, it cannot be held that no prima facie case against the petitioners for offence punishable under Sections 498A of the IPC is made out. He would further submit that jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, ‘BNSS’) is extremely limited as FIR cannot be quashed particularly when there is sufficient material available on record. 10. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and State and considered their rival submissions made hereinabove 8 and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra) has considered the question as to whether the offence under Section 498-A of I.P.C. would attract when the marriage of the appellant therein with the deceased Mohini (second wife) is null and void, as it has been performed by appellant therein during the lifetime of his first wife, which their Lordships answered holding that since the alleged marriage of the appellant therein with Mohini during the subsistence of a valid marriage with Kalindi is null and void and consequently, proceeded to set aside the conviction of appellant therein for offence under Section 498-A of I.P.C. and held as under :- "1. This appeal is by the two appellants who have been convicted under Sections 306 and 498A IPC by the learned Sessions Judge and have been sentenced imprisonment for seven years for conviction under Section 306 and three years for conviction under Section 498A. The prosecution alleged that during the lifetime of the first wife Kalindi, Shiv Charan married for the second time, Mohini, but after marriage both Kalindi and Shiv Charan tortured Mohini as a result of which she ultimately committed suicide by burning herself. The incident occurred inside the house of Shiv Charan while Kalindi and Shiv Charan were in one room and Mohini was in some other room. The 9 learned Sessions Judge on appreciation of evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 3 came to the conclusion that prosecution has been able to prove both the charges against both Kalindi Shiv Charan beyond reasonable doubt and convicted both as already said. On appeal, the High Court re- appreciated the evidence and affirmed the conviction and sentence and hence, the present appeal by way of grant of special leave. 2. This matter had not been taken up for hearing for this length of time as the judgment of this Court holding Section 306 IPC to be unconstitutional was under re- consideration by the Constitution Bench. The Constitution Bench finally disposed of the matter in Criminal Appeal No. 274 of 1984 and batch and set aside the earlier judgment of this Court and held that Section 306 is constitutionally valid. In view of the aforesaid Constitution Bench decision, two questions consideration in this appeal. One, whether the prosecution under Section 498A can at all be attracted since the marriage with Mohini itself was null and void, the same having been performed during the lifetime of Kalindi. Second, whether the conviction under Section 306 could at all be sustained in the absence of any positive material to hold that Mohini committed suicide because of any positive act on the part of either Shiv Charan or Kalindi. There may be considerable force in the argument of Mr. Khanduja, learned counsel for the appellant so far as conviction under Section 498A is concerned, inasmuch as the alleged marriage with Mohini during the subsistence of valid marriage with 10 Kalindi is null and void. We, therefore, set aside the conviction and sentence under Section 498A of the IPC. But so far as the conviction under Section 306 is concerned, the evidence of the three witnesses already referred to, make it absolutely clear that it is on account of torture by both Kalindi and Shiv Charan that Mohini committed suicide inside the house of Shiv Charan in another room. The learned Sessions Judge as well as the High Court have appreciated the evidence of the aforesaid three witnesses and on going through the evidence of these three witnesses, we do not find any error committed by the courts below either in the matter of appreciation or in their approach relating to the evidence in question. We, therefore, do not find any infirmity with the conviction of the appellants under Section 306 of the IPC. So far as the sentence is concerned, they have been sentenced imprisonment for seven years but having to undergo rigorous regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, we reduce the sentence to five years. This appeal is accordingly disposed of. Bail bonds of the appellants would stand cancelled and they must surrender to undergo the remaining period of sentence." 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Suman Sharma (Supra) has held that the complaint filed by the second wife against her husband and in laws under the provisions of Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) is not maintainable. Relevant paras of the judgment are quoted hereinbelow: 11 11. In Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra), three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court has clearly held that marriage of the appellant therein with Mohini, second wife, during the subsistence of a valid marriage with Kalindi, first wife, is null and void and consequently quashed the conviction of the appellant therein for Section 498-A of I.P.C. Whereas in Reema Aggarwal (supra) which is two Judges Bench of the Supreme Court, the principles of law laid down in Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra) was not noticed and it has been held that absence of a definition of "husband" to specifically include such persons who contract marriages ostensibly and cohabit with such woman, in the purported exercise of their role and status as "husband" is no ground to exclude them from the purview of Section 304-B or 498-A I.P.C. Since Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra) is the three judge bench judgment, the principles of law laid down by the three judges Bench of the Supreme Court in the matter of Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra) would prevail over the two judges Bench of the Supreme Court in Reema Agrawal (supra). 12. The issue which fell for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajinder Singh (supra) was with regard to applicability of Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The said case did not deal with the issue as to whether prosecution under Section 498A of I.P.C. is maintainable at the instance of the second wife. The said issue was emphatically answered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra), 12 wherein it was held that the second marriage being null and void, the second wife cannot seek protection and initiate prosecution for commission of offence under Section 498A of I.P.C. The judgment delivered by Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra) was by a bench of three judges which answered the said issue. However, in Rajinder Singh (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to the judgment of Reema Aggarwal (supra) where certain observations were made with regard to the provisions contained under the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 with regard to the meaning of 'marriage'. The term 'marriage' under the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 was given a wider interpretation so as to include even a proposed marriage that may not have taken place in reality. It was therefore that certain observations were made by the their Lordships of Supreme Court, but then the said observations cannot be applied as principle applicable when examining the issue as to whether prosecution under Section 498A of I.P.C. is maintainable at the instance of the second wife. As such, in our considered opinion there is absolutely no apparent conflict between two-three judges bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra) and Rajinder Singh (supra). 13. Furthermore, the Supreme Court recently in the matter of Union Territory of Ladakh v. Jammu & Kashmir National Conference has made the legal position clear relying upon Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in National 13 Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi by holding that when there is conflicting judgments by Benches of equal strength of the Court, it is the earlier one which is to be followed by the High Courts, and held in para 35 as under: "35. We are seeing before us judgments and orders by High Courts not deciding cases on the ground that the leading judgment of this Court on this subject is either referred to a larger Bench or a review petition relating thereto is pending. We have also come across examples of High Courts refusing deference to judgments of this Court on the score that a later Coordinate Bench has doubted its correctness. In this regard, we lay down the position in law. We make it absolutely clear that the High Courts will proceed to decide matters on the basis of the law as it stands. It is not open, unless specifically directed by this Court, to await an outcome of a reference or a review petition, as the case may be. It is also not open to a High Court to refuse to follow a judgment by stating that it has been doubted by a later Coordinate Bench. In any case, when faced with conflicting judgments by Benches of equal strength of this Court, it is the earlier one which is to be followed by the High Courts, as held by a 5-Judge Bench in National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680. The High Courts, of course, will do so with careful 14 regard to the facts and circumstances of the case before it.” 14. In view of the aforesaid discussion and legal position, we are of the considered view that there is no apparent conflict with the decision rendered by the three judges bench of Supreme Court in Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra) and Rajinder Singh (supra), however, even if, there is conflict, as it has been held by the Supreme Court in Union Territory of Ladakh (supra), it is vividly clear that when there is conflicting judgments of the Supreme Court of Benches of equal strength, it is the earlier one which is to be followed by this Court, and accordingly in the instant case Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra) has to be followed and consequently the question is answered as under:- The complaint or FIR lodged by second wife for commission of offence punishable under Section 498A of the IPC would not be tenable in light of principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Shivcharan Lal Verma v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [(2007) 15 SCC 369]. 15. Let the matter be placed before the learned Single Judge for deciding the petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. in light of stated question answered herein above. 13. Recently Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of P. Sivakumar & Ors. vs. State Rep. By the Deputy 15 Superintendent of Police Etc., reported in 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 116 has held that when marriage has been found to be null and void, the conviction under Section 498A IPC would not be sustainable. Relevant para of the judgment reads as under:- “7. Undisputedly, the marriage between the appellant No.1 and PW-1 has been found to be null and void. As such the conviction under Section 498- A IPC would not be sustainable in view of the judgment of this Court in the case Shivcharan Lal Verma's case supra. So far as the conviction under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is concerned, the learned trial Judge by an elaborate reasoning, arrived at after appreciation of evidence, has found that the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. In an appeal/revision, the High court could have set aside the order of acquittal only if the findings as recorded by the trial Court were perverse or impossible.” 14. Reverting to the facts of the present case, a close scrutiny of the FIR and the charge-sheet placed before this Court, it is manifest that the prosecution is founded on the allegation that petitioner No.1 contracted a marriage with respondent No.2 during the subsistence of his earlier valid marriage. This fact, being admitted in the FIR itself, goes to the very root of the matter. In terms of settled law, once it is established that the earlier marriage of petitioner No.1 16 was subsisting on the date of his subsequent marriage with respondent No.2, the subsequent marriage is void-ab-initio and not recognized under law. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shivcharan Lal Verma (supra), has categorically held that Section 498A IPC presupposes the existence of a valid marital relationship, and when the marriage is void, conviction under Section 498A cannot be sustained. This principle has been followed in the matter of Suman Sharma (supra), as also recently reiterated in P. Sivakumar (supra). Applying the said settled proposition, it is clear that the very substratum of the prosecution case against petitioner No.1 stands vitiated. 15. Coming to the allegations against petitioner Nos.2 and 3, who are mother-in-law and brother-in-law of Respondent No.2, it is evident from the FIR as well as the statements recorded during investigation that the allegations are omnibus, vague, and bereft of particulars. There is no mention of any specific instance of cruelty or any distinct overt act attributed to them. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kahkashan Kausar and Others v. State of Bihar and Others, (2022) 6 SCC 599, has held in clear terms that relatives of the husband should not be mechanically prosecuted in matrimonial disputes on the basis of sweeping allegations and that Courts must ensure that 17 specific instances of involvement are shown before compelling them to face the rigors of criminal trial. In the present case, the sweeping allegations, without any supporting material, cannot form the basis of prosecution against petitioner Nos.2 and 3. 16. Even the charge-sheet filed by the prosecution does not disclose any incriminating material. The statements of respondent No.2 and her relatives are inconsistent and contradictory in material particulars. No medical record, independent witness, or contemporaneous document has been produced to substantiate the allegation of cruelty or dowry demand. Thus, even if the entire prosecution case is taken at face value, it does not disclose the essential ingredients of Section 498A IPC. 17. The parameters for exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC are well settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335. One such category is where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint, even if taken at their face value and accepted in entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence. Tested on the touchstone of the said principle, the present case falls squarely within the Bhajan Lal (supra) guidelines. Continuation of the proceedings against the Petitioners, in the absence of foundational material, would 18 result in manifest injustice and sheer abuse of the process of law. 18. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the firm and considered view that the very foundation for prosecuting the petitioners under Section 498A IPC is absent. The marriage between petitioner No.1 and respondent No.2 being void, there exists no legally recognized relationship of husband and wife, and hence the provision itself is inapplicable. Against petitioner Nos.2 and 3, the allegations being omnibus and unsupported by material, no case under Section 498A IPC is made out. Allowing the prosecution to continue would amount to sheer abuse of the process of law and result in miscarriage of justice. 19. This Court is, therefore, of the considered view that the continuation of criminal proceedings against the petitioners would serve no useful purpose, and instead, would amount to unnecessary harassment and abuse of judicial process. 20. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. The order framing charge dated 28.12.2022 and the order taking cognizance dated 28.12.2022, along with charge-sheet bearing No.112 of 2022 dated 23.12.2022, filed before the Court of Civil Judge and Magistrate, Durg in RCC No.15408/2022, arising out of FIR No.115/2022 registered at Police Station 19 Mahila Thana, District Durg (C.G.) for offences punishable under Section 498A read with Section 34 IPC, are hereby set aside. 21. Consequently, all further criminal proceedings arising therefrom stand quashed. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Manpreet