1 2025:CGHC:18783-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 275 of 2025 Anand Kumar Bhardwaj S/o K. R. Bhardwaj Aged About 46 Years R/o Tarbahar, Behind Guru Ghasidas Mandir, Bilaspur, P/s And Post Bilaspur, Civil And Revenue District Bilaspur C.G. (Wrongly Mentioned As Anand Bhardwaj In Impugned Order Annexure P1 And P8, P12) ... Appellant(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Thorugh Secretary, Health And Family Welfare Department Mantralay, Capital Complex Mahanadi Bhavan New Raipur P/s Raipur District Raipur C.G. 2 - Director Health Services Chhattisgarh Raipur P/s Civil Line Raipur, District Raipur C.G. 3 - Chief Medical And Health Officer Bilaspur District Bilaspur C.G. 4 - Divissional Joint Director Health Service Bilaspur District Bilaspur C.G. ... Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Vivek Kumar Tripathi, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. S.S. Baghel, Dy. G.A. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Arvind Kumar Verma , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 25.04.2025 MANPREET KAUR Digitally signed by MANPREET KAUR Date: 2025.04.26 11:12:10 +0530 2 1. Heard Mr. Vivek Kumar Tripathi, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. S.S. Baghel, learned Deputy Government Advocate for respondent / State. 2. The appellant has filed this writ appeal against the order dated 16.06.2014 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No. 2569 of 2014, by which the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner / appellant herein by observing as under:- “3. There is no dispute that under Rule 6 of the Rules, 1961 any person who has more than two living children, who is born after 26-1-2001, is not qualified for seeking appointment on any post under the State Government. It is also not denied that, as a matter of fact, the petitioners incur such disqualification. 4. The argument that no such condition was mentioned either in the advertisement or in the order of appointment would not come to the rescue of the petitioners because such condition is a part of general service conditions under the Rules, 1961, which is applicable to all the Government servants whether or not such conditions are mentioned in the advertisement or in the order of appointment. Protection under Article 311 of the Constitution of India is available to an employee whose appointment is valid in law. Any person who incurs a disqualification under any of the service rules and is thus incompetent to hold any civil post, is not entitled for constitutional protection under Article 311 of the Constitution of India. 5. As an upshot, both the writ petitions, being bereft of 3 merit, are liable to be and are hereby dismissed at the motion stage itself.” 3. On a pointed query being made to the learned for the appellants as to why they have approached this Court against the impugned order dated 16.06.2014, after an inordinate delay of 10 years, he has not offered any plausible explanation for delay in filing the writ appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the respondents submit that the writ appeal is barred by delay and laches and is not liable to be entertained. 5. The Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and others v. Tarsem Singh reported in (2008) 8 SCC 652 summarized the settled principles in the following manner:- “7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or re fixation of pay or pension, relief 4 may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion,etc.., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.” 6. The Supreme Court in the matter of C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining and others reported in (2008) 10 SCC 115, having found that the employee suddenly brought up a challenge to the order of termination of his services after 20 years and claimed all consequential benefits, held that the relief sought for was inadmissible. The legal position in this regard was laid out in the following terms:- “10. Every representation of the Government for relief, may not be applied on merits. Representations relating to matters which have become stale or barred by limitation, can be rejected on that ground alone, without examining the merits of the claim. In regard to representations unrelated to the Department, the reply may be only to inform that the matter did not concern the Department or to inform the appropriate Department. Representations with incomplete particulars may be replied by seeking relevant particulars. The replies to such representations, cannot furnish a fresh cause of action or revive a stale or dead claim. 5 11. When a decision is issued by a court/tribunal to consider or deal with the representation, usually the directee (person directed) examines the matter on merits,being under the impression that failure to do so may amount to disobedience. When an order is passed considering and rejecting the claim or representation, in compliance with direction of the court or tribunal, such an order does not revive the stale claim, nor amount to some kind of “acknowledgement of a jural relationship” to give rise to a fresh cause of action. 12. When a government abandons service to take alternative employment or to attend to personal affairs, and does not bother to send any letter seeking leave or letter of resignation or letter of voluntary retirement, and the records do not show that he is treated as being in service, he cannot after two decades, represent that he should be taken back to duty. Nor can such employee be treated as having continued in service, thereby deeming the entire period as qualifying service for the purpose of pension. That will be a travesty of justice. 13. Where an employee unauthorisedly absents himself and suddenly appears after 20 years and demands that he should be taken back and approaches the court, the department naturally will not or may not have any record relating to the employee at that distance of time. In such cases, when the employer fails to produce the records of the enquiry and the order of dismissal/removal, court cannot draw an adverse inference against the employer for not producing records, nor direct reinstatement with back wages for 20 years, ignoring the cessation of service or 6 the lucrative alternative employment of the employee. Misplaced sympathy in such matters will encourage discipline, lead to unjust enrichment of the employee at fault and result in drain of public exchequer. Many a time there is also no application of mind as to the extent of financial burden, as a result of a routine order for back wages.” 7. The Supreme Court in the matter of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and others v. T.T.Murali Babu reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108 has held as under:- “16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant – a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like 7 a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. 17. In the case at hand, though there has been four years’ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons - who compete with “Kumbhakarna” or for that matter “Rip Van Winkle”. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.” 8. In the light of principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above-stated judgments (supra) and considering the grounds raised in I.A. No. 01 of 2025, we do not find any good ground to condone the delay of 3887 days in preferring the writ appeal. 8 9. Accordingly, I.A. No.01 of 2025 is rejected and consequently thereto, the writ appeal is dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Arvind Kumar Verma) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Manpreet