APHC010201342012 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3521] FRIDAY,THE TWENTY EIGHTH DAY OF MARCH TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 764/2012 Between: Sabbavrajpu Srinivasa Vara Prasad ...PETITIONER AND State of APRepbyits PP ...RESPONDENT Counsel for the Petitioner: I. V. N.Raju Counsel for the Respondent: Public Prosecutor (A.P) The Court made the following: ORDER: The revision has been preferred under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity ‘the Cr.P.C’) challenging the judgment dated 11.05.2012 in Crl.A.No.7 of 2011on the file of the learned III Additional Sessions Judge, (Fast Track Court), Bhimavaram, confirming the conviction and sentence imposed against the petitioner,by the learned Principal Junior Civil Judge-Cum-Judicial First Class Magistrate, Bhimavaram in C.C.No.147 of 2009vide judgment dated 23.12.2010 finding the petitioner 2 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.764 of 2012 Dated 28.03.2025 guilty for the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘the I.P.C’) and sentencinghim to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and also fine of Rs.500/- (Rupees Five Hundred Only). 2. I have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the Revisionists and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. 3. Sri I.V.N. Raju, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that even though the prosecution had not proved the guilt of the petitioner beyond all reasonable doubt under Section 498-A of ‘the I.P.C’.,the learned Trial Court erroneously convicted and sentenced the petitioner, and the learned Appellate Court also confirmed it erroneously. There was no evidence that the petitioner demanded and harassed the defacto complainant to bring an additional dowry of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand Only) from her parent’s house. In Ex. P1 there were no specific dates mentioned, when the petitioner demanded additional dowry and bet P.W.1. The dispute in between the petitioner and the defacto complainant arose because of gold-cutting machines. P.W.1 filed a case against the petitioner and four others after he issued notice to P.W.1 for restitution of conjugal rights.The Investigating Officer-P.W.5 deleted names of A2 to A5 from the case and shown the petitioner as sole accused. Alternately, it is submitted that the alleged offence took place in the year 1996 more than 29 years have elapsed. It is not known whether the petitioner and the P.W.1 got divorced lawfully and living separately. Right to speedy trial of the 3 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.764 of 2012 Dated 28.03.2025 petitioner was violated and urged to impose the sentence to which the petitioner had already undergone since the petitioner had already paid the fine amount imposed by the learned Trial Court and confirmed by the learned Appellate Court. 4. Per contra, Ms. P. Akila Naidu, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor vehemently argued that the prosecution had proved the guilt of the petitioner beyond all reasonable doubt. Therefore, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the petitioner by taking a lenient view in regard to imposing a sentence of simple imprisonment and the learned Appellate Court also confirmed the same. There are no material irregularities in finding the petitioner guilty. There is no misreading of the evidence. Therefore, it is requested to dismiss the revision case. 5. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the Petitioner and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. I have perused the record. 6. Now the point for consideration is: “Whether the judgment in Crl.A.No.7 of 2012 dated 11.05.2012 passed by the learnedIII Additional Sessions Judge, (Fast Track Court), Bhimavaram, is correct, legal, and proper with respect to its finding, sentence, or judgment, and there are any material irregularities? And to what relief?” 4 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.764 of 2012 Dated 28.03.2025 7. It is apposite to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court inBindeshwari Prasad Singh v State of Bihar1whereinat Paragraph Nos.12 & 13 it is held as under: “12. … We have carefully considered the material on record and we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in re-appreciating the evidence on record and coming to a different conclusion in a revision preferred by the information under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Sub-section (3) of Section 401 in terms provides that nothing in Section 401 shall be deemed to authorize a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. The aforesaid sub-section, which places a limitation on the powers of the revisional Court, prohibiting it from convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, is itself indicative of the nature and extent of the revisional power conferred by Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the High Court could not convert a finding of acquittal into one of the conviction directly, it could not do so indirectly by the method of ordering a re-trial. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the High Court will ordinarily not interfere in revision with an order of acquittal except in exceptional cases where the interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice.The High Court will not be justified in interfering with an order of acquittal merely because the trial Court has taken a wrong view of the law or has erred in appreciation of evidence. It is neither possible nor advisable to make an exhaustive list of circumstances in which exercise of revisional jurisdiction may be justified, but decisions of this Court have laid down the parameters of exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in an appeal against acquittal by a private party. 13. ... In the absence of any legal infirmity either in the procedure or in the conduct of the trial, there was no justification for the High Court to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It has repeatedly been held that the High Court should not re-appreciate the evidence to reach a finding different from the trial Court. In the absence of manifest illegality resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction in such cases is not warranted.” 1(2002) 6 SCC 650 5 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.764 of 2012 Dated 28.03.2025 8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in D Stephens v Nosibolla2at Paragraph No.10 held as under: “The revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under S. 439, Cr.P.C., is not to be lightly exercised, when it is invoked by a private complainant against an order of acquittal, against which the Govt. has o right of appeal under S. 417. It could be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality, or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. This jurisdiction is not ordinarily invoked or used merely because the lower court has taken a wrong view of the law or mis-appreciated the evidence on record.” 9. The Hon’ble Apex Court in K Chinnaswamy Reddy v State of AP3, at Paragraph No.7 held as under: “7. It is true that it is open to a High Court in revision to set aside an order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal; but this jurisdiction should in our opinion be exercised by the High Court only in exceptional cases, when there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. Sub-section (4) of S. 439 forbids a High Court from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction and that makes it all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not, convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering retrial when it cannot itself directly convert a finding of acquittal into a finding of conviction. This places limitations on the power of the High Court to set aside a finding of acquittal in revision and it is only in exceptional cases that this power should be exercised. It is not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies. We may, however, indicate some cases of this kind which would in our opinion justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision. These cases may be: where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted the accused, or where the trial court 2AIR 1951 SC 196 3AIR 1962 SC 1788 6 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.764 of 2012 Dated 28.03.2025 has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce. or where the appeal court has wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible, or where material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial court or by the appeal court, or where the acquittal is based on a compounding of the offence, which is invalid under the law. These and other cases of similar nature can properly be held to be cases of exceptional nature, where the High Court can justifiably interfere with an order of acquittal; an in such a case it is obvious that it cannot be said that the High Court was doing indirectly what it could not do directly in view of the provisions of S. 439 (4). We have, therefore, to see whether the order of the High Court setting aside the order of acquittal in this case can be upheld on these principles.” 10. This Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 397 read with Section 401 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ cannot invoke its revisional power as a Second Appellate Court and re-appreciation of evidence is not possible in the revision case as laid down in the decisions in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh, D. Stephens and K. Chinnaswamy Reddy. 11. The learned Trial Court in order to bring home the guilt of the petitioner had examined P.Ws.1 to 5 and marked Exs.P1 to P3. P.W.1 stuck to her version of 161 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ statement and her complaint to policewas marked as Ex.P1. The evidence of P.W.1 is corroborated with Ex. P1. P.W.2 did not support the case of the prosecution and his statement under Section 161 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ was marked as Ex. P2. In this case, P.W.3 and P.W.4 have supported the version of P.W.1. P.W.5 also deposed that he had conducted investigation and came to conclusion that the petitioner had committed an offence under Section 498-A of ‘the I.P.C’. The learned Trial Court having examined the entire gamut of the case convicted and 7 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.764 of 2012 Dated 28.03.2025 sentencedthe petitioner. The learned Appellate Court also confirmed the same. As rightly pointed out by the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor there are no material irregularities committed by the learned Trial Court. It may be true that there are no vivid details given by P.W.1 in her deposition or in Ex.P1 reportthe exact dates on which the petitioner had demanded her to bring additional dowry and bet her and causedharassment, nonetheless in a continuous marital life,P.W.1, being a wife who had been subjected to continuous cruelty or harassment, cannot be practically expected to remember and reveal the exact dates and time of harassment. Cruelty or harassment as defined under Section 498-A of ‘the I.P.C.,’ is a continuous offence. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is unsustainable in the facts and circumstances of the case. It may also be true that pursuant to petitioner issuinga legal notice requiring the P.W.1 to come for leading conjugal life,P.W.1 had gotregistered a case against the petitioner, neverthelessthat cannotbe a sole ground to deny the version of the prosecution. At any rate, the concurrent conviction for the offence under Section 498-A ‘the I.P.C.,’shall be maintained. 12. With regard to the imposition of a sentence of six months simple imprisonment by the learned Trial Court and confirmed by the learned Appellate Court, it is submitted that the offence took place in the year 1996. In fact, more than 29 years have passed by. It is not known whether the petitioner and the P.W.1 are living separately by lawfully obtainingdivorce. The 8 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.764 of 2012 Dated 28.03.2025 record discloses that the petitioner had undergone 26 days of incarceration.The right to speedy trial is a fundamental right as per the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon (IV) v. Home Secretary State of Bihar4.This right includes speedy disposal of appeals. In addition to the appeals, the right to a speedy trial also includes criminal revisions as per the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajdeo Sharma v. State of Bihar5. 13. In view of the gravity of the allegationsof P.W.1 against the petitioner, it is a fit case where the petitioner can be sentenced to undergoingthe imprisonment which he has already undergone. The petitioner had already paid the fine amount ordered by the learned Trial Court and confirmed by the learned Appellate Court. 14. Therefore, the criminal revision case is disposed of, confirming the conviction under Section 498-A of ‘the I.P.C.,’ while sentencing the petitioner to undergo imprisonment which he had already undergone.There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand closed. _________________________ Dr. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J Dt: 28.03.2025 KMS 4 Air 1979 SC 1360 5 2000 (1) BLJR 37 9 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.764 of 2012 Dated 28.03.2025 101 THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 764/2012 28.03.2025 W KMS