KAILASH KUMAR v. STATE OF U.P. THRU. PRIN. SECY. HOME LKO. AND ANOTHER
CRLP/7255/2025 · 2025-08-14
Rajesh Singh Chauhan, S Q H Rizvi
body2025
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[ 2025 DAILYLAW 156774 (ALL) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 156774 (ALL) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
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Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC-LKO:47900-DB Court No. - 9 Case :- CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 7255 of 2025 Petitioner :- Kailash Kumar Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Lko. And Another Counsel for Petitioner :- Krishna Lal Yadav,Aparna Sinha Counsel for Respondent :- G.A. Hon'ble Rajesh Singh Chauhan,J. Hon'ble Syed Qamar Hasan Rizvi,J.
1. Heard Sri Krishna Lal Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri S. N. Tilhari, learned A.G.A. for the State- respondents.
2. By means of this petition, the petitioner has prayed for a writ,
order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the opposite parties to conduct proper, fair and unbiased investigation in pursuance to the FIR dated 07.04.2025 bearing Case Crime No. 0059 of 2025, under Sections 318(4), 318(2) BNS, 2023 and Section 66D of I.T. Act, 2008, Police Station- Cyber Crime, District- Lucknow.
3. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that after registration of the aforesaid FIR, the said incident was investigated by the cyber crime police, after which the petitioner presented all the records before the Investigating Officer of the said police station. It has also been stated by the
learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was informed by the Investigating Officer of the said police station that some amount of the fraud committed from the applicant's account has been recovered. 4. Learned Additional Government Advocate submits that only three and half months have passed since registration of the F.I.R., and the petitioner has prematurely approached this Court seeking an expeditious investigation of the case, although he himself has stated that the Investigating Officer is promptly investigating the matter and is co-operating with the petitioner. He submits that the writ petition is premature and is liable to be dismissed. 5. We have taken into consideration the fact that the Investigating Officer is promptly investigating the matter. Moreover, the law on the subject is well settled in the case of Sakiri Vasu vs. State of Uttar Pradesh And Others reported in (2008) 2 SCC 409 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to pass the following order. For ready reference, the relevant part of the aforesaid order is extracted here-in-below:-
"13. ............................... We would further clarify that even if an FIR has been registered and even if the police has made the investigation, or is actually making the investigation, which the aggrieved person feels is not proper, such a person can approach the Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., and if the Magistrate is satisfied he can order a proper investigation and take other suitable steps and pass such order orders as he thinks necessary for ensuring a proper investigation. All these powers a Magistrate enjoys under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
14. Section 156 (3) states:
"Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation as abovementioned." The words `as abovementioned obviously refer to Section 156 (1), which contemplates investigation by the officer in charge of the Police Station. 15. Section 156(3) provides for a check by the Magistrate on the police performing its duties under Chapter XII Cr.P.C. In cases where the Magistrate finds that the police has not done its duty of investigating the case at all, or has not done it satisfactorily, he can issue a direction to the police to do the investigation properly, and can monitor the same. 16.
The power in the Magistrate to order further investigation under Section 156(3) is an independent power, and does not affect the power of the investigating officer to further investigate the case even after submission of his report vide Section 173(8). Hence the Magistrate can
order re-opening of the investigation even after the police submits the final report, vide State of Bihar vs. A.C. Saldanha AIR 1980 SC 326 (para 19). 17. In our opinion Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include all such powers in a Magistrate which are necessary for ensuring a proper investigation, and it includes the power to order registration of an F.I.R. and of ordering a proper investigation if the Magistrate is satisfied that a proper investigation has not been done, or is not being done by the police. Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., though briefly worded, in our opinion, is very wide and it will include all such incidental powers as are necessary for ensuring a proper investigation. 18. It is well-settled that when a power is given to an authority to do something it includes such incidental or implied powers which would ensure the proper doing of that thing. In other words, when any power is expressly granted by the statute, there is impliedly included in the grant, even without special mention, every power and every control the denial of which would render the grant itself ineffective. Thus where an Act confers jurisdiction it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts or employ such means as are essentially necessary to its execution. 19. The reason for the rule (doctrine of implied power) is quite apparent. Many matters of minor details are omitted from legislation. As Crawford observes in his Statutory Construction (3rd edn. page 267):-
"...If these details could not be inserted by implication, the drafting of legislation would be an indeterminable process and the legislative intent would likely be defeated by a most insignificant omission."
20. In ascertaining a necessary implication, the Court simply determines the legislative will and makes it effective. What is necessarily implied is as much part of the statute as if it were specifically written therein. 21. An express grant of statutory powers carries with it by necessary implication the authority to use all reasonable means to make such grant effective. Thus in ITO, Cannanore vs. M.K. Mohammad Kunhi, AIR 1969 SC 430, this Court held that the income tax appellate tribunal has implied powers to grant stay, although no such power has been expressly granted to it by the Income Tax Act. 22.
Similar examples where this Court has affirmed the doctrine of implied powers are Union of India vs. Paras Laminates AIR 1991 SC 696, Reserve Bank of India vs. Peerless General Finance and Investment Company Ltd AIR 1996 SC 646 (at p. 656), Chief Executive Officer & Vice Chairman Gujarat Maritime Board vs. Haji Daud Haji Harun Abu 1996 (11) SCC 23, J.K. Synthetics Ltd. vs. Collector of Central Excise, AIR 1996 SC 3527, State of Karnataka vs. Vishwabharati House Building Co-op Society 2003 (2) SCC 412 (at p. 432) etc. 23. In Savitri vs. Govind Singh Rawat AIR 1986 SC 984 this Court held that the power conferred on the Magistrate under Section 125Cr.P.C. to grant maintenance to the wife implies the power to grant interim maintenance during the pendency of the proceeding, otherwise she may starve during this period. 24. In view of the abovementioned legal position, we are of the view that although Section 156(3) is very briefly worded, there is an implied power in the Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. to order registration of a criminal offence and /or to direct the officer in charge of the concerned police station to hold a proper investigation and take all such necessary steps that may be necessary for ensuring a proper investigation including monitoring the same. Even though these powers have not been expressly mentioned in Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., we are of the opinion that they are implied in the above provision. 25.
We have elaborated on the above matter because we often find that when someone has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered at the police station and/or a proper investigation is not being done by the police, he rushes to the High Court to file a writ petition or a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. We are of the opinion that the High Court should not encourage this practice and should ordinarily refuse to interfere in such matters, and relegate the petitioner to his alternating remedy, firstly under Section 154(3) and Section 36 Cr.P.C. before the concerned police officers, and if that is of no avail, by approaching the concerned Magistrate under Section 156(3). 26. If a person has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered by the police station his first remedy is to approach the Superintendent of Police
under Section 154 (3) CrPC or other police officer referred to in Section 36 CrPC. If despite approaching the Superintendent of Police or the officer referred to in Section 36 his grievance still persists, then he can approach a Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC instead of rushing to the High Court by way of a writ petition or a petition under Section 482 CrPC. Moreover, he has a further remedy of filing a criminal complaint under Section 200 CrPC . Why then should writ petitions or Section 482 petitions be entertained when there are so many alternative remedies? 27. As we have already observed above, the Magistrate has very wide powers to direct registration of an FIR and to ensure a proper investigation, and for this purpose he can monitor the investigation to ensure that the investigation is done properly (though he cannot investigate himself). The High Court should discourage the practice of filing a writ petition or petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. simply because a person has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered by the police, or after being registered, proper investigation has not been done by the police.
For this grievance, the remedy lies under Sections 36 and 154(3) before the concerned police officers, and if that is of no avail, under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate or by filing a criminal complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and not by filing a writ petition or a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
28. It is true that alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to a writ petition, but it is equally well settled that if there is an alternative remedy the High Court should not ordinarily interfere. 29. In Union of India vs. Prakash P. Hinduja (SCC vide para 13) it has been observed by this Court that a Magistrate cannot interfere with the investigation by the police. However, in our opinion, the ratio of this decision would only apply when a proper investigation is being done by the police. If the Magistrate on an application under Section 156(3) CrPC is satisfied that proper investigation has not been done, or is not being done by the officer in charge of the police station concerned, he can certainly direct the officer in charge of the police station to make a proper investigation and can further monitor the same (though he should not himself investigate). 30. It may be further mentioned that in view of Section 36 Cr.P.C. if a person is aggrieved that a proper investigation has not been made by the officer-in-charge of the concerned police station, such aggrieved person can approach the Superintendent of Police or other police officer superior in rank to the officer-in-charge of the police station and such superior officer can, if he so wishes, do the investigation vide CBI vs. State of Rajasthan and another 2001 (3) SCC 333 (vide para 11), R.P. Kapur vs. S.P. Singh AIR 1961 SC 1117 etc. Also, the State Government is competent to direct the Inspector General, Vigilance to take over the investigation of a cognizable offence registered at a police station vide State of Bihar vs. A.C. Saldanha (supra)."
6. In view of the above, no relief can be granted to the petitioner.
He may avail the remedy available to him as per the observations and directions issued by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment quoted here-in-above. 7. The writ petition stands disposed of keeping in view the above direction passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sakiri Vasu (supra).
Order Date :- 14.8.2025 (Manoj K.) (Syed Qamar Hasan Rizvi, J.) (Rajesh Singh Chauhan, J.) Digitally signed by :- MANOJ KUMAR High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench