2025:HHC:21850-DB IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CWPOA No. 88 of 2019 Decided on : 08.07.2025 Bansi Lal Chauhan & others ...Petitioners. Versus State of H.P. & others ...Respondents Coram: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Satyen Vaidya, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the petitioners : Mr. Naveen K. Bhardwaj, Advocate. For the respondents : Mr. Amandeep Sharma, Addl. A.G., for the respondent-State. Mr. Neel Kamal Sharma, Advocate, for respondents No. 3, 5, 6, 9, 17, 19, 23, 24, 40, 43, 47, 48, 50, 54 and 56. Ms. Kanta Thakur, Advocate, for respondents No. 10, 36 and 55. Ms. Shikha Chauhan, Advocate, for respondent No.15. Mr. Tek Chand Sharma, Advocate, for respondents No. 7, 26, 35, 38, 58, 72 and 75. Mr. Jaidev Thakur, Advocate, for respondents No. 11, 20, 21, 25, 27, 29, 30 to 34, 44, 49, 51, 52, 60, 63, 64, 66, 70, 76 and 77. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? -2- Satyen Vaidya, Judge (oral): The instant petition has been filed for the following reliefs:- “i) That the respondents may very kindly be directed to redraw the entire seniority list with respect to the Patwaris in District Mandi by further directions to the respondents to review and redraw the seniority list strictly in accordance with the Rules (Annexure A-3) by further drawing the seniority on the basis of marks obtained in the written test and viva-voce test as conducted as per Rule 15 (A) (1) of the Recruitment and Promotion Rules for the post of Patwari Mohal in Revenue Department, Government of Himachal Pradesh in the interest of law and justice. ii) That after redrawing the seniority list as per the Recruitment and promotion Rules, the respondents may very kindly be further directed to review the promotions as made in the year 2017 from the post of Patwari to the post of Kanungo, by further holding the review DPCs strictly in accordance with redraw seniority as per Recruitment and Promotion Rules.” 2. The respondents have raised specific objection that the petition is hopelessly time barred or in alternative is hit by the principle of delay and laches. The respondents have also raised a specific plea that the seniority of Patwaris in District Mandi was finalized in the -3- year 2007 and before that tentative seniority list was circulated inviting objections. The petitioners had not raised any objection at that stage. 3. The above plea of the respondents that the seniority list was finalized in the year 2007 has not been specifically refuted by the petitioners. In the entire petition, nothing has been stated as to against which seniority list was the grievance of petitioners. 4. The petition was filed by the petitioners in the year 2017. The only explanation rendered by the petitioners is that the maintenance of wrong seniority list had started effecting the petitioners only in the year 2017 and thus, the petitioners had got the cause of action to file the petition in the said year. 5. Since the petitioners had not raised any objection to the tentative seniority list, circulated by the official respondents and further they had also remained silent even after issuing of final seniority list in the year 2007, their petition is clearly barred by delay and laches. -4- 6. In Shiba Shankar Mahapatra & others vs. State of Orissa & others, 2010 (12) SCC 471, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “16. The question of entertaining the petition disputing the long standing seniority filed at a belated stage is no more res integra. A Constitution Bench of this Court, in Ramchandra Shanker Deodhar & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. AIR 1974 SC 259, considered the effect of delay in challenging the promotion and seniority list and held that any claim for seniority at a belated stage should be rejected inasmuch as it seeks to disturb the vested rights of other persons regarding seniority, rank and promotion which have accrued to them during the intervening period. A party should approach the Court just after accrual of the cause of complaint. While deciding the said case, this Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgments, particularly in Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, AIR 1970 SC 898, wherein it has been observed that the principle, on which the Court proceeds in refusing relief to the petitioner on the ground of laches or delay, is that the rights, which have accrued to others by reason of delay in filing the writ petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is a reasonable explanation for delay. The Court further observed as under:- "A party claiming fundamental rights must move the Court before others' rights come out into existence. The action of the Courts cannot harm innocent parties if their rights emerge by reason of delay on the part of person moving the court." -5- 7. Further a Division bench of this Court in CWPOA No. 6358 of 2020 decided on 17.12.2021 has dealt with similar proposition by holding as under:- “12. Having said so, it still cannot be ignored that this petition was initially filed before the erstwhile Tribunal only on 25.2.2019, whereas respondent No.5 was appointed to the post of Assistant Registrar on secondment basis in the respondent University vide office order dated 21.1.2013. The Tribunal established under the Administrative Tribunals Act could have entertained the original application; provided the same was filed within limitation as prescribed under Section 21 of the Act. 13. This issue has been elaborately considered and dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in D.C.S. Negi vs. Union of India & ors., 2018 (16) SCC 721, wherein it was observed as under: 12. Before parting with the case, we consider it necessary to note that for quite some time, the Administrative Tribunals established under the Act have been entertaining and deciding the applications filed under section 19 of the Act in complete disregard of the mandate of Section 21, which reads as under: “21. Limitation.-(1) A Tribunal shall not admit an application,- (a) in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made in connection with the grievance unless the application is made, -6- within one year from the date on which such final order has been made; (b) in a case where an appeal or representation such as is mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made and a period of six months had expired thereafter without such final order having been made, within one year from the date of expiry of the said period of six months. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), where- (a) the grievance in respect of which an application is made had arisen by reason of any order made at any time during the period of three years immediately preceding the date on which the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal becomes exercisable under this Act in respect of the matter to which such order relates; and (b) no proceedings for the redressal of such grievance had been commenced before the said date before any High Court, the application shall be entertained by the Tribunal if it is made within the period referred to in clause (a), or, as the case may be, clause (b), of sub-section (1) or within a period of six months from the said date, whichever period expires later. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1) or sub-section (2), an application may be admitted after the period of one year specified in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, -7- the period of six months specified in sub- section (2), if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period." 13. A reading of the plain language of the above reproduced section makes it clear that the Tribunal cannot admit an application unless the same is made within the time specified in clauses (a) and (b) of Section 21(1) or Section 21(2) or an order is passed in terms of sub-section (3) for entertaining the application after the prescribed period. Since Section 21(1) is couched in negative form, it is the duty of the Tribunal to first consider whether the application is within limitation. An application can be admitted only if the same is found to have been made within the prescribed period or sufficient cause is shown for not doing so within the prescribed period and an order is passed under Section 21(3). 14. In the present case, the Tribunal entertained and decided the application without even adverting to the issue of limitation. Learned counsel for the petitioner tried to explain this omission by pointing out that in the reply filed on behalf of the respondents, no such objection was raised but we have not felt impressed. In our view, the Tribunal cannot abdicate its duty to act in accordance with the statute under which it is established and the fact that an objection of limitation is not raised by the respondent/non applicant is not at all relevant. 14. It is not in dispute that the petitioner while preferring the original application did not file any application seeking condonation of delay. The only -8- explanation offered by the petitioner for filing the original application after a period of 6 years is that the original application has been filed against the recurring cause of action as illegality is continuing till date and respondent No.5 is usurper to the post of Assistant Registrar as basis of his appointment is illegal. 15. Even if it is assumed that there is no period of limitation prescribed, even then in the matters relating to promotion and appointments, the courts need to draw a line. After all, every person ought to be entitled to sit back and consider that his appointment and promotion effected a long time ago would not be set aside after the lapse of a number of years. 16. In coming to such conclusion, we are duly supported by the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rabindra Nath Bose & ors. vs. Union of India & ors., 1970 AIR 470, wherein it was held as under:- “In so far as the attack was based on the 1952 rules, it must fail on the ground that this petition under article 32 of the Constitution had been brought about 15 years after the 1952 Rules were promulgated and effect given to them in the Seniority List prepared on August 1, 1953. Even though article 32 is a guaranteed right it does not follow that it was the intention of the Constitution makers that this Court should discard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. It would be unjust to deprive the respondents of the -9- rights which had accrued to them. Every person ought to be entitled to sit back and consider that his appointment and promotion effected a long time ago would not be set aside after the lapse of a number of years.” 8. In the instant case also the Original Application was filed by the petitioners before the erstwhile State Administrative Tribunal. 9. The explanation that the petitioners did not feel aggrieved till 2017 will not infuse life to their stale claim. 10. In result, I am of the considered view that the petition is hit by huge delay and laches and for such reason, the petition is dismissed. 11. The petition is accordingly disposed of. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. (Satyen Vaidya) 8th July, 2025 Judge (kck)