Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:28743-DB ) 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 444 of 2014 Reserved on: 30.07.2025 Decided on: 26.08.2025 ____________________________________________________ State of Himachal Pradesh …..Appellant. Versus Inder Singh ……Respondent. __________________________________________________ Coram The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vivek Singh Thakur, Judge. The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sushil Kukreja, Judge. 1 Whether approved for reporting? Yes. _____________________________________________________ For the appellant: Mr. I.N. Mehta, Senior Additional Advocate General. For the respondent: Ms. Aishwarya Chauhan, Advocate, vice Mr. Naresh Sharma, Advocate. Sushil Kukreja, Judge. The instant appeal has been preferred by the appellant/State under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against judgment, dated 28.06.2014, passed by learned Special Judge-I, Sirmaur District at Nahan, H.P., in Sessions Trial No. 68-ST/7 of 2013, whereby, the accused (respondent herein) was acquitted for the offence punishable under Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act (for short ‘NDPS Act’). 2. The facts giving rise to the present appeal, as per the prosecution story, can be summarized as under: 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:28743-DB ) 2 2(a). The accused (respondent herein) was convicted by learned Special Judge, Shimla, on 20.12.2010, in some other NDPS case, wherein he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay fine of Rs.1,00,000/- and he was undergoing sentence in the jail. The accused was granted parole of 21 days, i.e., w.e.f. 29.04.2011 to 19.05.2011, but he jumped the period of parole, therefore, appropriate information was sent to the police to nab the accused. 2(b). On 01.03.2013, acting upon the specific information, police constituted a team and reached the house of the accused and around 05:00 a.m., police officials were deputed on the exit points of the house of the accused. Thereafter, the police, alongwith the independent witnesses, entered the house of the accused. The accused, who was sleeping in the kitchen of the house, woke up and he was apprised about his arrest. The police officials felt smell of the charas, where the accused was sleeping. Police found four bags near the chullah (hearth) and due to suspicion, the said bags were searched and found stuffed with charas in the shape of sticks and balls. The recovered charas, on weighment was found to be 22.680 kgs. Thereafter, the police completed all the codal formalities, i.e., all four bags of recovered charas were sealed with ten seals, having impressions ‘T’ and Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:28743-DB ) 3 taken in possession, NCB form in triplicate was filled in, facsimile seal was drawn, the seal, after its use, was handed over to a witness, Shri Som Dutt, rukka was prepared, which was sent to the police station, through HC Raj Kumar, whereupon FIR was registered against the accused, site plan was prepared, police recorded the statements of the witnesses and the accused was arrested. After completion of the investigation, police presented the charge-sheet before the learned Trial Court against the accused for commission of the offence punishable under Section 20 of the NDPS Act. 3. The prosecution, in order to prove its case, examined ten witnesses. Statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was also recorded, wherein he claimed innocence and denied the prosecution case. In defence, the accused examined three witnesses. 4. The learned Trial Court, vide impugned judgment dated 28.06.2014 acquitted the accused for commission of the offence punishable under Section 20 of the NDPS Act, hence, the instant appeal has been preferred by the appellant/State. 5. The learned Senior Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State contended that the impugned judgment is against the law and facts, based upon mis-appreciation of evidence, which Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:28743-DB ) 4 ultimately resulted into miscarriage of justice, as such the same is liable to be set-aside. He further contended that the learned Trial Court has appreciated the evidence in a slip-shod and perfunctory manner and the impugned judgment is based on hypothetical reasoning, surmises and conjectures. Lastly, he submitted that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be quashed and set-aside by allowing the instant appeal and the accused be convicted. 6. Conversely, the learned vice counsel for the respondent/accused contended that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court is the result of proper appreciation of the material on record and the same was passed after appreciating the evidence and law in its right and true perspective. He further contended that there was nothing against the accused and the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court is a well-reasoned judgment, which does not require any interference, thus the instant appeal, which sans merits, be dismissed. 7. We have heard the learned Senior Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State, learned vice counsel for the respondent/accused, and carefully examined the entire records. 8. It is well settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a catena Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:28743-DB ) 5 of decisions that an Appellate Court has full power to review, re- appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proven guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the learned trial Court. Further, if two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Court. 9. The scope of power of Appellate Court in case of appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Muralidhar alias Gidda & another vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2014) 5 SCC 730, which reads as under: "10. Lord Russell in Sheo Swarup[1], highlighted the approach of the High Court as an appellate court hearing the appeal against acquittal. Lord Russell said, "... the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:28743-DB ) 6 and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses." The opinion of the Lord Russell has been followed over the years. 11. As early as in 1952, this Court in Surajpal Singh[2] while dealing with the powers of the High Court in an appeal against acquittal under Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code observed: "7...........the High Court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, but it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons.” 12. The approach of the appellate court in the appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by this Court in Tulsiram Kanu [3], Madan Mohan Singh [4], Atley [5] , Aher Raja Khima [6], Balbir Singh [7], M.G. Agarwal [8], Noor Khan [9], Khedu Mohton [10], Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade [11], Lekha Yadav [12], Khem Karan [13], Bishan Singh [14], Umedbhai Jadavbhai [15], K. Gopal Reddy [16], Tota Singh [17], Ram Kumar [18], Madan Lal [19], Sambasivan [20], Bhagwan Singh [21], Harijana Thirupala [22], C. Antony [23], K. Gopalakrishna [24], Sanjay Thakran [25] and Chandrappa [26]. It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually. Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the appellate court must bear in mind the following: (i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court, (ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal, (iii) Though, the power of the appellate court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:28743-DB ) 7 the trial court. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanor of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified, and (iv) Merely because the appellate court on re- appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate court in the judgment of the trial court.” 10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Prasad vs. State of Bihar & another, (2022) 3 SCC 471, observed as under: “31. The circumstances under which an appeal would be entertained by this Court from an order of acquittal passed by a High Court may be summarized as follows: 31.1. Ordinarily, this Court is cautious in interfering with an order of acquittal, especially when the order of acquittal has been confirmed up to the High Court. It is only in rarest of rare cases, where the High Court, on an absolutely wrong process of reasoning and a legally erroneous and perverse approach to the facts of the case, ignoring some of the most vital facts, has acquitted the accused, that the same may be reversed by this Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. [State of U.P. v. Sahai (1982) 1 SCC 352] Such fetters on the right to entertain an appeal are prompted by the reluctance to expose a person, who has been acquitted by a competent court of a criminal charge, to the anxiety and tension of a further examination of the case, even though it is held by a superior court. [Arunchalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297] An appeal cannot be entertained against an order of acquittal which has, after recording valid and weighty Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:28743-DB ) 8 reasons, has arrived at an unassailable, logical conclusion which justifies acquittal. [State of Haryana vs. Lakhbir] 31.2. However, this Court has on certain occasions, set aside the order of acquittal passed by a High Court. The circumstances under which this Court may entertain an appeal against an order of acquittal and pass an order of conviction, may be summarized as follows: 31.2.1. Where the approach or reasoning of the High Court is perverse; (a) Where incontrovertible evidence has been rejected by the High Court based on suspicion and surmises, which are rather unrealistic. [State of Rajasthan v. Sukhpal Singh (1983) 1 SCC 393] For example, where direct, unanimous accounts of the eyewitnesses, were discounted without cogent reasoning. [State of U.P. vs. Shanker 1980 Supp SCC 489] (b) Where the intrinsic merits of the testimony of relatives, living in the same house as the victim, were discounted on the ground that they were “interested” witnesses. [State of U.P. v. Hakim Singh (1980) (c) Where testimony of witnesses had been disbelieved by the High Court, on an unrealistic conjecture of personal motive on the part of witnesses to implicate the accused, when in fact, the witnesses had no axe to grind in the said matter. [State of Rajasthan v. Sukhpal Singh (1983) 1 SCC 393] (d) Where dying declaration of the deceased victim was rejected by the High Court on an irrelevant ground that they did not explain the injury found on one of the persons present at the site of occurrence of the crime. [Arunachalam vs. P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297] (e) Where the High Court applied an unrealistic standard of “implicit proof” rather than that of “proof beyond reasonable doubt” and therefore evaluated the evidence in a flawed manner. [State of U.P. v. Ranjha Ram (1986) 4 SCC 99] (f) Where the High Court rejected circumstantial evidence, based on an exaggerated and capricious theory, which were beyond the plea of the accused; [State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah (1981) 3 SCC 610] (g) Where the High Court acquitted the accused on the ground that he had no adequate motive to commit the offence, although, in the said case, there was strong direct evidence establishing the guilt of the Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:28743-DB ) 9 accused, thereby making it necessary on the part of the prosecution to establish “motive”. [State of A.P. v. Bogam Chandraiah (1990) 1 SCC 445] 31.2.2.Where acquittal would result is gross miscarriage of justice; (a) Where the findings of the High Court, disconnecting the accused persons with the crime, were based on a perfunctory consideration of evidence, [State of U.P. v. Pheru Singh 1989 Supp (1) SCC] or based on extenuating circumstances which were purely based in imagination and fantasy [State of U.P. v. Pussu (1983) 3 SCC 502] (b) Where the accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial, which delay was attributable not to the tardiness or indifference of the prosecuting agencies, but to the conduct of the accused himself; or where accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial relating to an offence which is not of a trivial nature. [State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah (1981) 3 SCC 610].” 11. In H.D. Sundara & others vs. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the appellate court cannot overturn acquittal only on the ground that after re-appreciating evidence, it is of the view that the guilt of the accused was established beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant portion of the above judgment is as under: “8. In this appeal, were are called upon to consider the legality and validity of the impugned judgment rendered by the High Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”). The principles which govern the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC can be summarized as follows: 8.1.The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2.The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:28743-DB ) 10 documentary evidence; 8.3.The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4.If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5.The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible. 9. Normally, when an appellate court exercises appellate jurisdiction, the duty of the appellate court is to find out whether the verdict which is under challenge is correct or incorrect in law and on facts. The appellate court normally ascertains whether the decision under challenge is legal or illegal. But while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court cannot examine the impugned judgment only to find out whether the view taken was correct or incorrect. After re-appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, the appellate court must first decide whether the trial court’s view was a possible view. The appellate court cannot overturn acquittal only on the ground that after re- appreciating evidence, it is of the view that the guilt of the accused was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Only recording such a conclusion an order of acquittal cannot be reversed unless the appellate court also concludes that it was the only possible conclusion. Thus, the appellate court must see whether the view taken by the trial court while acquitting an accused can be reasonably taken on the basis of the evidence on record. If the view taken by the trial court is a possible view, the appellate court cannot interfere with the order of acquittal on the ground that another view could have been taken.” 12. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:28743-DB ) 11 perverse, the Appellate Court can interfere with the order of acquittal. Further, if two views were possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned Trial Court, merely, because the Appellate Court could have arrived at a different conclusion than that of the learned Trial Court. 13. The prosecution, examined as many as ten witnesses, however, its case mainly rests upon the statements of PW 1, HC Raj Kumar, PW-2, HC Islam Mohammad and PW-10 SI Ankush Dogra in order to prove search, seizure and recovery of the alleged contraband, 14. PW-1 HC Raj Kumar, PW-2 Islam Mohd. and PW-10 SI Ankush Dogra deposed that on 28.02.2013 and 01.03.2013 they alongwith Constable Vicky Kumar and Constable Suresh Kumar, left the police station in search of the accused-Inder Singh, who had jumped the parole, in private vehicle, bearing registration No. HP-16-2885 and en route Shri Som Dutt (PW-9) met and he also joined them. They have further deposed that the house of accused was located at Ghotari and it was raided at 05:00 a.m. in the morning and he was found sleeping alone in the kitchen of the house. The accused was awaked and he was informed that he did not return to jail after the expiry of his parole Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:28743-DB ) 12 period. They also deposed that there was smell of charas in the kitchen of the accused and four bags were kept by the side of the wall. On suspicion, the bags were opened and on checking the bags, those were found to be stuffed with charas in the shape of small sticks and balls. Subsequently, a weighing machine was brought and all four bags of the recovered contraband were weighed and the same were found to be containing 9 kgs 980 grams, 3 kgs 700 grams, 4 kgs and 5 kgs charas. 15. It is well settled that the conviction can be based upon the testimony of the police officials, provided that such testimony is reliable, trustworthy and confidence inspiring. The evidence of police witnesses cannot be distrusted and disbelieved, merely on account of their official status. The testimony of official witnesses, including police officials, carries the same evidentiary value as the testimony of any other person. The only difference is that Courts have to be more circumspect while appreciating the evidence of official witnesses to rule out the possibility of false implication of the accused, especially when such a plea is specifically raised by the defence. In Pramod Kumar Versus State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2013) 6 Supreme Court Cases 588, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that if the testimony of the police officer is found to be reliable and trustworthy, the Court can definitely act Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:28743-DB ) 13 upon the same. If, in the course of scrutinizing the evidence, the Court finds the evidence of the police officer as unreliable and untrustworthy, the Court may disbelieve him but it should not do so solely on the presumption that a witness from the Department of Police should be viewed with distrust. Para-13 of the judgment reads as under:- “13. This Court, after referring to State of U.P. v. Anil Singh, State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil and Ramjee Rai v. State of Bihar has laid down recently in Kashmiri Lal v. State of Haryana that there is no absolute command of law that the police officers cannot be cited as witnesses and their testimony should always be treated with suspicion. Ordinarily, the public at large show their disinclination to come forward to become witnesses. If the testimony of the police officer is found to be reliable and trustworthy, the court can definitely act upon the same. If, in the course of scrutinising the evidence, the court finds the evidence of the police officer as unreliable and untrustworthy, the court may disbelieve him but it should not do so solely on the presumption that a witness from the Department of Police should be viewed with distrust. This is also based on the principle that quality of the evidence weighs over the quantity of evidence.” 16. Similarly, in Baldev Singh Versus State of Haryana, (2015) 17 Supreme Court Cases 554, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that evidence of police witnesses cannot be discarded merely on the ground that they belong to police force and interested in the investigation and their desire to see the success of the case. However, prudence requires that the evidence of police officials who are interested in the outcome of the result of the case needs to be carefully scrutinized and independently Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:28743-DB ) 14 appreciated. Relevant para of the judgment reads as under:- “10. There is no legal proposition that evidence of police officials unless supported by independent evidence is unworthy of acceptance. Evidence of police witnesses cannot be discarded merely on the ground that they belong to police force and interested in the investigation and their desire to see the success of the case. Prudence however requires that the evidence of police officials who are interested in the outcome of the result of the case needs to be carefully scrutinised and independently appreciated. Mere fact that they are police officials does not by itself give rise to any doubt about their creditworthiness.” 17. In Surinder Kumar Versus State of Punjab, (2020) 2 Supreme Court Cases 563, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the Court cannot start with the presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a presumption of law, the presumption should be the other way round. Para-16 of judgment reads as under:- “16. In State (NCT of Delhi) Vs. Sunil it was held as under (SCC p.655): “It is an archaic notion that actions of the police officer should be approached with initial distrust. It is time now to start placing at least initial trust on the actions and the documents made by the police. At any rate, the court cannot start with the presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a presumption of law, the presumption should be the other way round. The official acts of the police have been regularly performed is a wise principle of presumption and recognized even by the legislature”. 18. In Raveen Kumar v. State of H.P., (2021) 12 SCC 557, it was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that non- Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:28743-DB ) 15 association of the independent witnesses will not be fatal to the prosecution case. However, the Court will have to scrutinize the statements of prosecution witnesses carefully. It was observed as under:- "19. It would be gainsaid that the lack of independent witnesses is not fatal to the prosecution case. [Kalpnath Rai vs. State, (1998) AIR SC 201] However, such omissions cast an added duty on Courts to adopt a greater degree of care while scrutinizing the testimonies of the police officers, which if found reliable can form the basis of a successful conviction." 19. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid settled legal position, the testimony of police witnesses cannot be rejected on the ground of non-corroboration by independent witnesses, however such testimony needs to be carefully scrutinized. The same must inspire confidence and should be consistent with the case set up by the prosecution. In case there are material contradictions, which goes to the root of the case and make the prosecution case highly doubtful, then this Court would obviously be circumspect while placing reliance on such testimony. 20. Now, applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the case on hand. The case of the prosecution is that 22.680 kgs of charas was recovered by the Police from the kitchen of the accused in presence of independent witness, i.e. Shri Som Dutt Sharma (PW-9). However, the aforesaid independent witness Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:28743-DB ) 16 did not support the prosecution case and he had turned hostile. He was subjected to cross-examination by the learned Public Prosecutor, however, nothing favourable could be elicited from his exhaustive cross-examination. In cross-examination by the learned Public Prosecutor, he specifically denied that at 05:00 a.m. the police party met him at Neripul and thereafter he accompanied the police party to the house of the accused. He further denied that in the kitchen of the house of the accused, four bags were lying and on checking, charas was found contained in all four bags in the shape of small sticks and the total weight of charas in all four bags was found to be 22 kgs and 680 grams. He denied the recovery of any contraband from the house of the accused. He deposed that he, alongwith the police, visited the house of the accused and on knocking the door, it was opened by an old man. The accused was found present in the house alongwith other family members. As per this witness, in his presence, nothing was recovered by the police from the house of the accused. 21. The defence of the accused in his statement recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C. is that he had been falsely implicated in the case. As per the accused the police had arrested him, as he had jumped parole and the alleged charas was recovered by the police at Nohra Khud from a Maruti Car, registration whereof was Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:28743-DB ) 17 of Una and it was occupied by four persons. The police had left all the four persons and planted charas case on him, as he was already convicted in a charas case. 22. In support of his defence, the accused also examined DW-2 Shri Dharam Pal before the learned Trial Court, who happened to be the owner of the vehicle, bearing registration No. HP16-2885, in which the police party left Police Station, Rajgarh, in search of the accused. DW-2 in his deposition before the Court deposed that he was the owner of vehicle, bearing registration No. HP16-2885 and on 28.02.2013, around 07:00 p.m., he was called by the police to the police station. On his inquiry, the police official disclosed qua the destination and distance and also disclosed that they might have to travel 200 kms. As per this witness, ahead of Neripul a person requested for lift and on the direction of SHO he gave him lift. Subsequently, they stopped near village Pab and police directed him to stay back in the vehicle and left the vehicle alongwith the person, who had taken lift. He further deposed that after about one or two hours, police officials came with another person. When they were returning, police stopped a car, which was coming from Pulwahal side. He also deposed that the four occupants of the car were searched and charas was recovered from the boot of the car. Two occupants were shifted to his vehicle Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:28743-DB ) 18 and police officials from his vehicle shifted to the car. Thereafter, all four persons were brought to Rajgarh by the police and at about 07:00 a.m., they reached the police station and he left the police station. 23. DW-2 was cross-examined at length by the learned Public Prosecutor, however, nothing favourable could be elicited from his lengthy cross-examination. In his cross-examination, he specifically stated that the police had recovered three or four parcels containing charas weighing approximately 3, 4, 5 or 6 kgs from the car and the said car was brought to the police station alongwith the occupants. 24. Admittedly, the police party left the police station in the car of DW-2, bearing registration No. HP16-2885, in search of the accused but he was neither cited as a prosecution witness, nor he was examined before the court by the prosecution. He would have been the best person to depose about the recovery of the alleged contraband in question. However, for the reasons best known to the prosecution he was neither cited as a witness nor examined by the prosecution, rather he was examined by the accused and in his deposition he never deposed that the alleged charas was recovered from the house of the accused. 25. The testimonies of official witnesses, i.e., PWs 1, 2 and Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:28743-DB ) 19 10 are contradictory to each other. PW-1 HC Raj Kumar admitted that four persons from Una were also brought to the police station alongwith their vehicle by the SHO. On the other hand, PW2 HC Islam Mohd. and PW-10 SI Ankush Dogra denied this fact that four persons from Una were brought by them to the police station. As observed earlier, DW-2 Dharam Pal specifically deposed that when they were returning, after arrest of the accused, a vehicle with registration No. HP-20 (Una District) was intercepted by the police. As per this witness, there were four occupants in the car and during search, charas was recovered from the boot of the car. Subsequently, all those persons, alongwith the contraband, were brought to Police Station, Rajgarh. The testimony of DW-2 is corroborated by the testimony of PW-1, who also admitted that four persons from Una were brought to the police station. Thus, the defence of the accused that he had been falsely implicated in the case appears to be probable. Hence, in view of the material discrepancies, contradictions and inconsistencies in the case of the prosecution, the statements of the police/official witnesses cannot be believed. 26. In addition to the above contradictions and inconsistencies, there are other inconsistencies as well in the prosecution case. Admittedly, the accused was residing in the Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:28743-DB ) 20 house in question with 22-23 family members, therefore, it cannot be said that the accused only was in conscious possession of alleged recovered contraband. The prosecution has failed to examine any independent and respectable person from the village of the accused that the accused was in exclusive possession of the house from where the alleged charas was recovered. No revenue record has been produced to prove the exclusive possession of the accused over the house or kitchen from where the alleged contraband was recovered. DW-3 Shri Durga Singh, the then Pradhan of Gram Panchayat Tali Bhujjal, deposed that father of the accused-Het Ram had 22 to 23 family members and he had two wives, five sons and three daughters. He further deposed that his four sons were married and they used to live in joint family and share one kitchen. This witness, in his cross-examination, specifically denied that the accused was having his separate house and land. He also denied that the accused was living separately from his father in a separate house and was having separate kitchen. In these circumstances, it is not possible to hold that the prosecution succeeded in proving that the accused was even in physical custody of the alleged contraband. Even assuming that those bags were in the kitchen, unless the accused had the knowledge as to the contents of the bags, it cannot be held that he Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:28743-DB ) 21 was in possession of the contraband, much less in conscious possession of the alleged contraband. From the mere fact of physical presence of the accused at the relevant time, the possession of the contraband allegedly recovered from the kitchen cannot be tagged on to the accused. Hence, the prosecution, in the absence of any cogent and satisfactory evidence on record, has failed to prove that the accused was in conscious possession of alleged recovered contraband. Thus, in the entirety of circumstances, the prosecution could not establish its case against the accused beyond the scope of all reasonable doubt 27. No other point was urged. 28. In view of what has been discussed hereinabove, no interference in the judgment of acquittal dated 28.06.2014, passed by the learned Special Judge-I, Sirmaur District at Nahan, H.P., in Sessions Trial No. 68-ST/7 of 2013, is required, as the same is result of proper appreciation of evidence and law. The appeal, which is devoid of merits, deserves dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. Bail bonds are discharged. 29. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. 30. In view of the provisions of Section 481 BNSS, the respondent is directed to furnish personal bond in the sum of Rs. Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:28743-DB ) 22 50,000/- and a surety in the like amount each, before the Registrar (Judicial) of this Court, which shall be effective for a period of six months, with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of leave, the respondent, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. ( Vivek Singh Thakur ) Judge ( Sushil Kukreja ) Judge 26th August, 2025 (virender)