2025:HHC:19710 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP (M) No. 1203 of 2025 Reserved on: 18.06.2025 Date of Decision: 25.06.2025 Jeevan Singh @ Jivnu ...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : Mr. Jagmohan Singh Chandel, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr. Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in F.I.R. 73 of 2024, dated 10.11.2024, registered at Police Station Swarghat, District Bilaspur, H.P., for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (in short ‘NDPS Act’) 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:19710 2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution’s case, the police party intercepted a vehicle bearing registration No. PB-01A-2770 at 3:10 a.m. and recovered 5 kg and 787 grams of charas from the blue trolley bag, which was kept in the dickey of the vehicle. The petitioner was travelling in the vehicle. The police arrested the petitioner and seized the charas. The petitioner is innocent, and he was falsely implicated. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the petitioner is not guilty of the commission of the offence. The investigation is complete, and no recovery is to be effected from the petitioner. The driver/owner of the vehicle was not arrayed as an accused. The petitioner would abide by all the terms and conditions which the Court may impose. No purpose would be served by keeping the accused in custody. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police party was on patrolling duty on 10.11.2024. They intercepted a vehicle bearing registration No. PB01A-2770. The driver identified himself as Prince Kumar, and the other person identified himself as Jeevan Singh (the present petitioner). The driver said that he was engaged by the petitioner 3 2025:HHC:19710 to drop him at Chandigarh Airport; however, the petitioner could not give any satisfactory answer for going towards the Airport. The Police checked the vehicle and found a trolley bag and recovered eight packets wrapped with Khakhi tape. These were checked and found to contain 5kg and 787 grams of charas. The police seized the charas and arrested the petitioner. The Charas was sent to SFSL Junga, and as per result of the analysis, it was found to be an extract of cannabis and a sample of Charas. The Charge sheet was filed before the Court on 22.01.2025, and the matter is listed before the learned Special Judge on 30.06.2025 for recording of statements of PWs 1, 5, 8, and 9. The petitioner would indulge in the commission of a similar offence in case of release on bail. Hence, the status report. 4. I have heard Mr. Jagmohan Singh Chandel, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State. 5. Mr Jagmohan Singh Chadel, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. The police arrested the petitioner and made the driver a witness. The driver was driving the vehicle, and he 4 2025:HHC:19710 had the keys; therefore, he was in possession of the trolley bag. There is nothing to connect the petitioner with the commission of a crime. There are various discrepancies in the prosecution’s case. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. He relied upon judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dataram Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2018SC (Criminal) 425 and Anr. and Union of India vs. Shri Shiv Shankar Kesari in Appeal (Crl) 1223 of 2007 decided on 14.09.2007 in support of his submission. 6. Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, submitted that the police had recovered 5 kg and 787 grams of charas, which is a commercial quantity. Rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the present case. The petitioner has not satisfied the twin conditions laid down in Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The petitioner would commit a similar offence in case of his release on bail. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 5 2025:HHC:19710 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 974, wherein it was observed at page 783: - “Relevant parameters for granting bail 26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. [Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman Lal v. State of U.P., (2004) 7 SCC 525: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1974]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977]; Masroor v. State of U.P. [Masroor v. State of U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 286 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368]; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765]; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi)[Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425]; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar [Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 558] .] 9. This position was reiterated in Ramratan v. State of M.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3068, wherein it was observed as under:- 6 2025:HHC:19710 “12. The fundamental purpose of bail is to ensure the accused's presence during the investigation and trial. Any conditions imposed must be reasonable and directly related to this objective. This Court in Parvez Noordin Lokhandwalla v. State of Maharastra (2020) 10 SCC 77 observed that though the competent court is empowered to exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for the grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is not misused to impede the investigation, overawe the witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. The relevant observations are extracted herein below: “14. The language of Section 437(3) CrPC, which uses the expression “any condition … otherwise in the interest of justice” has been construed in several decisions of this Court. Though the competent court is empowered to exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for the grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is not misused to impede the investigation, overawe the witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. Several decisions of this Court have dwelt on the nature of the conditions which can legitimately be imposed both in the context of bail and anticipatory bail.” (Emphasis supplied) 13. In Sumit Mehta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 15 SCC 570, this Court discussed the scope of the discretion of the Court to impose “any condition” on the grant of bail and observed in the following terms:— “15. The words “any condition” used in the provision should not be regarded as conferring absolute power on a court of law to impose any condition that it chooses to impose. Any condition has to be interpreted as a reasonable condition acceptable in the facts permissible in 7 2025:HHC:19710 the circumstance, and effective in the pragmatic sense, and should not defeat the order of grant of bail. We are of the view that the present facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant such an extreme condition to be imposed.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. This Court, in Dilip Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2021) 2 SCC 779, laid down the factors to be taken into consideration while deciding the bail application and observed: “4. It is well settled by a plethora of decisions of this Court that criminal proceedings are not for the realisation of disputed dues. It is open to a court to grant or refuse the prayer for anticipatory bail, depending on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The factors to be taken into consideration while considering an application for bail are the nature of the accusation and the severity of the punishment in the case of conviction and the nature of the materials relied upon by the prosecution; reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witnesses or apprehension of threat to the complainant or the witnesses; the reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the time of trial or the likelihood of his abscondence; character, behaviour and standing of the accused; and the circumstances which are peculiar or the accused and larger interest of the public or the State and similar other considerations. A criminal court, exercising jurisdiction to grant bail/anticipatory bail, is not expected to act as a recovery agent to realise the dues of the complainant, and that too, without any trial.” (Emphasis supplied) 10. This position was reiterated in Shabeen Ahmed versus State of U.P., 2025 SCC Online SC 479. 11. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 8 2025:HHC:19710 12. The petitioner was travelling in the vehicle from which the recovery was effected. The vehicle was a taxi, and the driver categorically stated that the petitioner had hired it to go to Chandigarh Airport from Kullu. Prima facie, there is nothing to doubt the testimony of the driver. In Madan Lal versus State of H.P. (2003) 7 SCC 465: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1664: 2003 SCC OnLineSC 874, the contraband was recovered from a vehicle, and it was held that all the occupants of the vehicle would be in conscious possession of the contraband. It was observed: “19. Whether there was conscious possession has to be determined with reference to the factual backdrop. The facts which can be culled out from the evidence on record are that all the accused persons were travelling in a vehicle, and as noted by the trial court, they were known to each other, and it has not been explained or shown as to how they travelled together from the same destination in a vehicle which was not a public vehicle. 20. Section 20(b) makes possession of contraband articles an offence. Section 20 appears in Chapter IV of the Act, which relates to offences for possession of such articles. It is submitted that in order to make the possession illicit, there must be conscious possession. 21. It is highlighted that unless the possession was coupled with the requisite mental element, i.e. conscious possession and not mere custody without awareness of the nature of such possession, Section 20 is not attracted. 22. The expression “possession” is a polymorphous term which assumes different colours in different contexts. It may carry different meanings in contextually different 9 2025:HHC:19710 backgrounds. It is impossible, as was observed in the Supdt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Anil Kumar Bhunja [(1979) 4 SCC 274: 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038: AIR 1980 SC 52] to work out a completely logical and precise definition of “possession” uniformly applicable to all situations in the context of all statutes. 23. The word “conscious” means awareness of a particular fact. It is a state of mind which is deliberate or intended. 24. As noted in Gunwantlal v. State of M.P. [(1972) 2 SCC 194: 1972 SCC (Cri) 678: AIR 1972 SC 1756], possession in a given case need not be physical possession but can be constructive, having power and control over the article in the case in question, while the person to whom physical possession is given holds it subject to that power or control. 25. The word “possession” means the legal right to possession (see Heath v. Drown [(1972) 2 All ER 561: 1973 AC 498: (1972) 2 WLR 1306 (HL)] ). In an interesting case, it was observed that where a person keeps his firearm in his mother's flat, which is safer than his own home, he must be considered to be in possession of the same. (See Sullivan v. Earl of Caithness [(1976) 1 All ER 844: 1976 QB 966 : (1976) 2 WLR 361 (QBD)] .) 26. Once possession is established, the person who claims that it was not a conscious possession has to establish it because how he came to be in possession is within his special knowledge. Section 35 of the Act gives a statutory recognition of this position because of the presumption available in law. Similar is the position in terms of Section 54, where also presumption is also available to be drawn from possession of illicit articles. 27. In the factual scenario of the present case, not only possession but conscious possession has been established. It has not been shown by the accused-appellants that the possession was not conscious in the logical background of Sections 35 and 54 of the Act.” 10 2025:HHC:19710 13. Therefore, the petitioner has to be considered, prima facie, in possession of Charas. 14. It was submitted that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the petitioner is not involved in the commission of a crime. There are various contradictions in the prosecution’s case, and the number of persons present in the vehicle is doubtful. All these facts show a reasonable ground for believing the petitioner is not guilty of the offence. The term of reasonable ground to believe was explained in Union of India v. Shiv Shanker Kesari, (2007) 7 SCC 798: (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 505: 2007 SCC OnLine SC 1125 as under at page 801: “7. The expression used in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is “reasonable grounds”. The expression means something more than prima facie grounds. It connotes substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged, and this reasonable belief contemplated in turn points to the existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify recording of satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged. 8. The word “reasonable” has in law the prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the actor, called on to act reasonably, knows or ought to know. It is difficult to give an exact definition of the word “reasonable”. “7. … In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edn., p. 2258 states that it would be unreasonable to expect an exact definition of the word ‘reasonable’. Reason varies in its 11 2025:HHC:19710 conclusions according to the idiosyncrasy of the individual, and the times and circumstances in which he thinks. The reasoning which built up the old scholastic logic sounds now like the jingling of a child's toy.” (See Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar [(1987) 4 SCC 497] (SCC p. 504, para 7) and Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. [(1989) 1 SCC 532] 9. “9. … It is often said that ‘an attempt to give a specific meaning to the word “reasonable” is trying to count what is not number and measure what is not space’. The author of Words and Phrases (Permanent Edn.) has quoted from Nice & Schreiber, In re [123 F 987 at p. 988] to give a plausible meaning for the said word. He says ‘the expression “reasonable” is a relative term, and the facts of the particular controversy must be considered before the question as to what constitutes reasonable can be determined. ’ It is not meant to be expedient or convenient, but certainly something more than that.” [Ed. As observed in Rena Drego v. Lalchand Soni, (1998) 3 SCC 341, p. 346, para 9.] 10. The word “reasonable” signifies “in accordance with reason”. In the ultimate analysis, it is a question of fact whether a particular act is reasonable or not, depends on the circumstances in a given situation. (See Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla Mills Ltd. [(2003) 6 SCC 315] ) 11. The court, while considering the application for bail with reference to Section 37 of the Act, is not called upon to record a finding of not guilty. It is for the limited purpose, essentially confined to the question of releasing the accused on bail, that the court is called upon to see if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and records its satisfaction about the existence of such grounds. But the court has not to consider the matter 12 2025:HHC:19710 as if it is pronouncing a judgment of acquittal and recording a finding of not guilty.” 15. In the present case, the police officials and the driver of the vehicle have categorically stated that the recovery was effected from the Blue trolley bag. The driver claimed that the trolley bag belonged to the petitioner, and there is nothing on record to doubt his testimony. 16. F.I.R. and the statement of the driver show that the only two persons were present in the vehicle, and there is nothing on record to show the presence of any other person. Once the possession of the petitioner is proved, the presumption would arise under Sections 35 and 54 of the NDPS Act that it was conscious and with the requisite intent; therefore, the plea that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the petitioner is not guilty of the commission of the offence is not acceptable. 17. It was submitted that the bag was not sealed on the spot, and this makes the prosecution's case suspect. This submission is only stated to be rejected. The police seized the charas on the spot, and there was no requirement to seize the bag, and the prosecution's case cannot be doubted because the bag was not seized on the spot. 13 2025:HHC:19710 18. As per the status report, police have recovered 5 kilograms and 787 grams of charas, which is a commercial quantity. Therefore, the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the present case. 19. Section 37 of the NDPS Act provides that in an offence involving commercial quantity, the Court should be satisfied that the accused is not guilty of the commission of an offence and is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Section 37 of the NDPS Act reads as under: “37. Offences are to be cognizable and non-bailable. – (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)— (a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable; (b) no person accused of an offence punishable for offences under section 19, section 24, or section 27A, and also for offences involving commercial quantity, shall be released on bail or his own bond unless– (i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and (ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. 14 2025:HHC:19710 (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force, on granting of bail.” 20. This Section was interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India Versus Niyazuddin & Another (2018) 13 SCC 738 and it was held that in the absence of the satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of an offence and he is not likely to commit an offence while on bail, he cannot be released on bail. It was observed: “7. Section 37 of the NDPS Act contains special provisions with regard to the grant of bail in respect of certain offences enumerated under the said Section. They are : (1) In the case of a person accused of an offence punishable under Section 19, (2) Under Section 24, (3) Under Section 27A and (4) Of offences involving commercial quantity. 8. The accusation in the present case is with regard to the fourth factor, namely, commercial quantity. Be that as it may, once the Public Prosecutor opposes the application for bail to a person accused of the enumerated offences under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in case, the court proposes to grant bail to such a person, two conditions are to be mandatorily satisfied in addition to the normal requirements under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. or any other enactment. (1) The court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person is not guilty of such an offence; 15 2025:HHC:19710 (2) that person is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.” 21. This position was reiterated in State of Kerala Versus Rajesh, AIR 2020 SC 721, wherein it was held: “19. This Court has laid down broad parameters to be followed while considering the application for bail moved by the accused involved in offences under the NDPS Act. In Union of India vs. Ram Samujh and Ors., (1999) 9 SCC 429, it has been elaborated as under:- "7. It is to be borne in mind that the aforesaid legislative mandate is required to be adhered to and followed. It should be borne in mind that in a murder case, the accused commits the murder of one or two persons, while those persons who are dealing in narcotic drugs are instrumental in causing death or in inflicting death-blow to a number of innocent young victims, who are vulnerable; it causes deleterious effects and a deadly impact on the society; they are a hazard to the society; even if they are released temporarily, in all probability, they would continue their nefarious activities of trafficking and/or dealing in intoxicants clandestinely. The reason may be the large stake and illegal profit involved. This Court, dealing with the contention with regard to punishment under the NDPS Act, has succinctly observed about the adverse effect of such activities in Durand Didier vs. Chief Secy., Union Territory of Goa, (1990) 1 SCC 95) as under: 24. With deep concern, we may point out that the organised activities of the underworld and the clandestine smuggling of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances into this country and illegal trafficking in such drugs and substances have led to drug addiction among a sizeable section of the public, particularly the 16 2025:HHC:19710 adolescents and students of both sexes and the menace has assumed serious and alarming proportions in the recent years. Therefore, in order to effectively control and eradicate this proliferating and booming devastating menace, causing deleterious effects and deadly impact on society as a whole, Parliament, in its wisdom, has made effective provisions by introducing Act 81 of 1985 specifying mandatory minimum imprisonment and fine. 8. To check the menace of dangerous drugs flooding the market, Parliament has provided that the person accused of offences under the NDPS Act should not be released on bail during trial unless the mandatory conditions provided in Section 37, namely, (i) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence; and (ii) that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail are satisfied. The High Court has not given any justifiable reason for not abiding by the aforesaid mandate while ordering the release of the respondent accused on bail. Instead of attempting to take a holistic view of the harmful socio-economic consequences and health hazards which would accompany trafficking illegally in dangerous drugs, the court should implement the law in the spirit with which Parliament, after due deliberation, has amended." 20. The scheme of Section 37 reveals that the exercise of power to grant bail is not only subject to the limitations contained under Section 439 of the CrPC but is also subject to the limitation placed by Section 37, which commences with the non-obstante clause. The operative part of the said section is in the negative form prescribing the enlargement of bail to any person accused of the 17 2025:HHC:19710 commission of an offence under the Act unless twin conditions are satisfied. The first condition is that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to oppose the application, and the second is that the Court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence. If either of these two conditions is not satisfied, the ban for granting bail operates. 21. The expression "reasonable grounds" means something more than prima facie grounds. It contemplates substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The reasonable belief contemplated in the provision requires the existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. In the case on hand, the High Court seems to have completely overlooked the underlying object of Section 37 that in addition to the limitations provided under the CrPC, or any other law for the time being in force, regulating the grant of bail, its liberal approach in the matter of bail under the NDPS Act is indeed uncalled for.” 22. A similar view was taken in Union of India v. Mohd. Nawaz Khan, (2021) 10 SCC 100: (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 721: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1237 wherein it was observed at page 110: “21. Under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), the limitations on the grant of bail for offences punishable under Sections 19, 24 or 27- A and also for offences involving a commercial quantity are: (i) The Prosecutor must be given an opportunity to oppose the application for bail; and (ii) There must exist “reasonable grounds to believe” that : (a) the person is not guilty of such an offence; and (b) he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. 18 2025:HHC:19710 22. The standard prescribed for the grant of bail is “reasonable ground to believe” that the person is not guilty of the offence. Interpreting the standard of “reasonable grounds to believe”, a two-judge Bench of this Court in Shiv Shanker Kesari [Union of India v. Shiv Shanker Kesari, (2007) 7 SCC 798 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 505], held that : (SCC pp. 801-02, paras 7-8 & 10-11) “7. The expression used in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is “reasonable grounds”. The expression means something more than prima facie grounds. It connotes substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged, and this reasonable belief contemplated in turn points to the existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify the recording of satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged. 8. The word “reasonable” has in law the prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the actor, called on to act reasonably, knows or ought to know. It is difficult to give an exact definition of the word “reasonable”. ‘7. … Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edn., p. 2258 states that it would be unreasonable to expect an exact definition of the word “reasonable”. Reason varies in its conclusions according to the idiosyncrasy of the individual, and the times and circumstances in which he thinks. The reasoning which built up the old scholastic logic sounds now like the jingling of a child's toy.’ [See MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar [MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar, (1987) 4 SCC 497], SCC p. 504, para 7 and Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. [Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd., (1989) 1 SCC 532] ] *** 19 2025:HHC:19710 10. The word “reasonable” signifies “in accordance with reason”. In the ultimate analysis, it is a question of fact whether a particular act is reasonable or not, depends on the circumstances in a given situation. (See Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla Mills Ltd. [Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla Mills Ltd. (2003) 6 SCC 315] 11. The court, while considering the application for bail with reference to Section 37 of the Act, is not called upon to record a finding of not guilty. It is for the limited purpose, essentially confined to the question of releasing the accused on bail, that the court is called upon to see if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and records its satisfaction about the existence of such grounds. But the court has not to consider the matter as if it is pronouncing a judgment of acquittal and recording a finding of not guilty.”(emphasis supplied) 23. Based on the above precedent, the test which the High Court and this Court are required to apply while granting bail is whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has not committed an offence and whether he is likely to commit any offence while on bail. Given the seriousness of offences punishable under the NDPS Act and in order to curb the menace of drug trafficking in the country, stringent parameters for the grant of bail under the NDPS Act have been prescribed. 23. In the present case, there is nothing to show that the petitioner is not reasonably guilty of committing the offence. Further, there is nothing to show that the petitioner would indulge in the commission of a similar offence in case of his release on bail. Therefore, the petitioner has failed to satisfy the 20 2025:HHC:19710 twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, and he is not entitled to bail. 24. No other point was urged. 25. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and the same is dismissed. 26. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 25th June, 2025 (ravinder)