Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC-LKO:45585 Court No. - 8 Case :- WRIT - A No. - 8232 of 2025 Petitioner :- Dr. Haridutt Nemi Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Deptt. Of Medical Health Family Welfare Lko. And 2 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Lalta Prasad Misra,Prafulla Tiwari Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C. Hon'ble Manish Mathur,J. 1. Heard Dr. L. P. Mishra, assisted by Mr. Prafulla Tiwari, learned counsel for petitioner, Mr. Anuj Kudesia, learned Additional Advocate General, assisted by Mr. Tushar Verma and Mr. Rishi Raj, learned State Counsel for opposite parties. 2. Petition has been filed challenging the charge- sheet dated 09.07.2025 as also another order of the same date whereby inquiry officer has been appointed. 3. Further prayer for a direction to concerned authorities not to hold any disciplinary proceeding against petitioner in furtherance of the impugned order has also been sought. 4. It has been submitted that earlier petitioner had been suspended from service vide order dated 19.06.2025 which was challenged in Writ A No.7173 of 2025 and by means of order dated 07.07.2025, the operation of suspension order was stayed. It has been submitted that despite such interim protection having been granted to petitioner, opposite parties malafidely resisted petitioner's reinstatement on the post on which he was employed prior to passing of the suspension order. Various documents and photographs have been alluded to indicate bias and mala fide on the part of opposite parties in issuing the impugned orders. It is also submitted that due to the recalcitrant attitude of opposite parties regarding compliance of interim order staying the suspension order, petitioner was compelled to initiate contempt proceedings before this Court in which cognizance was taken and relevant orders were passed. It is submitted that the opposite parties have thereafter sought to initiate the disciplinary proceedings malafidely. 5. The second ground taken by learned counsel for petitioner pertains to the aspect of charge-sheet having been issued in derogation of specific provisions indicated in Rule 7 of the Uttar Pradesh Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1999 inasmuch as the inquiry officer was appointed by means of order dated 09.07.2025 (Annexure 2) and indicates the order being digitally signed by the Principal Secretary of the Department at 19.15.43 hours whereas the impugned charge-sheet has been issued on the same day under signatures of the inquiry officer as approved by the Principal Secretary of the Department at 19.01.21 hours. 6. It is therefore submitted that framing of charges by the inquiry officer preceded his appointment as inquiry officer and therefore was without jurisdiction. 7. Learned counsel has also adverted to proviso to Rule 7(ii) of the Rules of 1999 to submit that proceeding for imposing major penalties as indicated therein delegates the authority of approval of charge-sheet upon the Principal Secretary or Secretary of the concerned department where the appointing authority is Governor of the State. It is therefore submitted that in such circumstances, the delegated function conferred upon the Principal Secretary or Secretary of the concerned department is limited to the extent of approving of the charge-sheet as prepared by the inquiry officer only and not to frame charges and issue charge-sheets on his own, which is the primary function of the Disciplinary Authority only. 8. Learned counsel has placed reliance on judgments rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Manohar Lal (Dead) By LRS versus Ugrasen (Dead) By LRS & Ors.,(2010) 11 SCC 557 as well as State of Punjab versus V. K. Khanna and others; (2001) 2 SCC 330 to buttress his submissions. 9. Learned counsel for opposing parties have refuted submissions advanced by learned counsel for petitioner with the submission that the delegation of power indicated in proviso to Rule 7(ii) of the Rules of 1999 clearly indicate powers delegated upon the Principal Secretary or Secretary of the concerned department, in terms of which the charge-sheet has been prepared and served upon the petitioner and even otherwise, petitioner has not indicated any prejudice caused to him on account of the said facts. 10. Learned State counsel has also produced various orders to submit that approval for appointment of inquiry officer has been granted by the Minister of department concerned at 13:30 hours on 09.07.2025 and therefore appointment of inquiry officer clearly precedes framing of charges. It is also submitted that the order dated 09.07.2025 annexed as Annexure No.2 to the writ petition is merely a communication indicated by the Principal Secretary of the department regarding appointment of inquiry officer, which already stands approved by the Minister concerned in terms of Rules of business. 11. He has also placed reliance on judgments rendered in the case of State Bank of Patiala & Ors. versus S. K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364 and by Division Bench of this Court in the case of S.R. Kashyap versus Canara Bank & Ors., 2004 (4) L.L.N. 876. 12. Upon consideration of submissions advanced by learned counsel for parties and perusal of material available on record, it is evident that petitioner has pleaded twin grounds to raise challenge to the impugned orders with the first ground being malice in law and the second pertaining to lack of jurisdiction of the inquiry officer to frame charges. 13. With regard to the first submission of learned counsel for petitioner, it is evident that earlier petitioner had been suspended from service vide order dated 19.06.2025, which was challenged as indicated herein above. A perusal of the interim order dated 07.07.2025 passed in Writ A No.7173 of 2025 reveals that the suspension of petitioner had been stayed primarily on the ground that it had been resorted to without initiation of inquiry proceedings or even contemplation thereof, inter alia other grounds as well. 14. Learned counsel for petitioner has also averted to various documents and photographs to bring on record the aspect to corroborate his submissions of malice in law to the extent that despite passing of interim orders by this Court, compliance of same was not effected voluntarily or happily by opposite parties leading to filing of contempt petition before this Court and orders were passed. 15. In the considered opinion of this Court, the fact that suspension order was passed without indicating initiation or contemplation of inquiry proceedings does not detract the disciplinary authority for exercising its power to hold an inquiry against alleged misconduct of petitioner since such powers are statutorily provided in terms of the Rules of 1999 and the mere fact of omission of such initiation or contemplation cannot be held to take away the rights of the disciplinary authority for holding a departmental inquiry. 16. The aspect of malice in law has submitted by learned counsel for petitioner, in the considered opinion of this Court are already engaging attention of Coordinate Bench of this Court in contempt jurisdiction. The aspect of whether opposite parties complied with the interim directions happily, voluntarily or under threat of contempt is a matter to be adjudicated upon by the Contempt Court and again would not have any effect on the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against petitioner. 17. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab vs. V. K. Khanna (supra) has clearly enunciated the aspect of bias by holding that bias admittedly negates, fairness and reasonableness by reason of which arbitrariness and mala fide creep in. However it has also been held that the expression mala fide has a definite significance in legal phraseology and the same cannot possibly emanate out of fanciful imagination or even apprehensions but there must be existing definite evidence of bias and actions. The relevant portion is as follows: "25. Bias admittedly negates fairness and reasonableness by reason of which arbitrariness and mala fide move creep in — issuance of the two notifications, assuming in hot haste, but no particulars of any mala fides move or action has been brought out on record on the part of Shri V.K. Khanna — while it is true that the notings prepared for Advocate General's opinion contain a definite remark about the mala fide move on the part of Shri V.K. Khanna yet there is singular absence of any particulars without which the case of mala fides cannot be sustained. The expression "mala fide" has a definite significance in the legal phraseology and the same cannot possibly emanate out of fanciful imagination or even apprehensions but there must be existing definite evidence of bias and actions which cannot be attributed to be otherwise bona fide — actions not otherwise bona fide, however, by themselves would not amount to be mala fide unless the same is in accompaniment with some other factors which would depict a bad motive or intent on the part of the doer of the act." 18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.K. Sharma (supra) has also held as follows: "33. ………(3) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, the position is this: procedural provisions are generally meant for affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the delinquent officer/employee. They are, generally speaking, conceived in his interest. Violation of any and every procedural provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate the enquiry held or order passed. Except cases falling under — "no notice", "no opportunity" and "no hearing" categories, the complaint of violation of procedural provision should be examined from the point of view of prejudice, viz., whether such violation has prejudiced the delinquent officer/employee in defending himself properly and effectively. If it is found that he has been so prejudiced, appropriate orders have to be made to repair and remedy the prejudice including setting aside the enquiry and/or the order of punishment. If no prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose violation is by itself proof of prejudice. The Court may not insist on proof of prejudice in such cases. As explained in the body of the judgment, take a case where there is a provision expressly providing that after the evidence of the employer/government is over, the employee shall be given an opportunity to lead defence in his evidence, and in a given case, the enquiry officer does not give that opportunity in spite of the delinquent officer/employee asking for it. The prejudice is self-evident. No proof of prejudice as such need be called for in such a case. To repeat, the test is one of prejudice, i.e., whether the person has received a fair hearing considering all things. Now, this very aspect can also be looked at from the point of view of directory and mandatory provisions, if one is so inclined. The principle stated under (4) hereinbelow is only another way of looking at the same aspect as is dealt with herein and not a different or distinct principle." 19. Similarly, in the case of S. R. Kasyap (supra), Division Bench of this court has held as follows: "36. Hence even assuming that there was some technical violation of the rules relating to the procedure of the enquiry we are not inclined to exercise our discretion under Art.226 of the Constitution as we are of the opinion that no serious prejudice has been caused to the petitioner. It may be mentioned that to obtain a writ the petitioner has not only to show violation of law but he must also show that some prejudice was caused to him. If there is mere violation of law but there is no serious prejudice against the petitioner this Court under Art. 226 shall not interfere merely because of that violation, as writ is a discretionary remedy vide State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma [1996 (1) L.L.N.819] (vide supra)." 20. Upon applicability of aforesaid judgment in the present facts and circumstances of the case, it is evident that mala fide or malice in law are required to be proven on evidence of specific bias and not on apprehension. In the facts and circumstances of this case, therefore the only aspect being of non-compliance of interim orders passed by this Court and posting some other person in place of petitioner alongwith suspending and posting him elsewhere, would not come within the realm of malice in law. Even otherwise, despite mala fide having been alleged, no person against whom mala fide has been alleged has been arrayed as opposite party in the writ proceedings. 21. In view thereof, the first ground of challenge to the impugned charge-sheet fails. 22. So far as the second challenge to the impugned order is concerned, it is evident from the order dated 09.07.2025 (Annexure No.2) that the inquiry officer appears to have been appointed under signatures of the Principal Secretary of the Department at 19:15:43 hours whereas the impugned charge-sheet has been issued by the said inquiry officer and approved by the Principal Secretary of the Department preceding appointment of the inquiry officer. 23. In such circumstances, the aspect of prejudice caused to the petitioner would have special relevance. 24. The relevant portion of Rule 7 of the Rules of 1999 which prescribes procedure for imposing major penalties which is as follows:- "7. Procedure for imposing major penalties. - Before imposing any major penalty on a Government servant, an inquiry shall be held in the following manner : (i) The disciplinary authority may himself inquire into the charges or appoint an authority subordinate to him as Inquiry Officer to inquire into the charges. (ii)The facts constituting the misconduct on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced in the form of definite charge or charges to be called charge-sheet. The charge-sheet shall be approved by the disciplinary authority :Provided that where the appointing authority is Governor, the charge-sheet may be approved by the Principal Secretary or the Secretary; as the case may be, of the concerned department. (iii)The charges framed shall be so precise and clear as to give sufficient indication to the charged Government servant of the facts and circumstances against him. The proposed documentary evidence and the name of the witnesses proposed to prove the same alongwith oral evidence, if any, shall be mentioned in the charge-sheet. (iv)The charged Government servant shall be required to put in a written statement of his defence in person on a specified date which shall not be less than 15 days from the date of issue of charge-sheet and to state whether he desires to cross-examine any witness mentioned in the charge-sheet and whether desires to give or produce evidence in his defence. He shall also be informed that in case he does not appear or file the written statement on the specified date, it will be presumed that he has none to furnish and Inquiry Officer shall proceed to complete the inquiry ex parte. (v)The charge-sheet, alongwith the copy of the documentary evidences mentioned therein and list of witnesses and their statements, if any shall be served on the charged Government servant personally or by registered post at the address mentioned in the official records. In case the charge-sheet could not be served in aforesaid manner, the charge-sheet shall be served by publication in a daily newspaper having wide circulation : Provided that where the documentary evidence is voluminous, instead of furnishing its copy with charge- sheet, the charged Government servant shall be permitted to inspect the same before the Inquiry Officer. (vi) Where the charged Government servant appears and admits the charges, the Inquiry Officer shall submit his report to the disciplinary authority on the basis of such admission. (vii) Where the charged Government servant denies the charges, the Inquiry Officer shall proceed to call the witnesses proposed in the charge-sheet and record their oral evidence in presence of the charged Government servant who shall be given opportunity to cross-examine such witnesses. After recording the aforesaid evidence, the Inquiry Officer shall call and record the oral evidence which the charged Government servant desired in his written statement to be produced in his defence : Provided that the Inquiry Officer may for reasons to be recorded in writing refuse to call a witness. (viii)The Inquiry Officer may summon any witness to give evidence or require any person to produce documents before him in accordance with the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Departmental Inquiries (Enforcement of Attendance of Witnesses and Production of Documents) Act, 1976. (ix) The Inquiry Officer may ask any question he pleases, at any time of any witness or from person charged with a view to discover the truth or to obtain proper proof of facts relevant to charges. (x) Where the charged Government servant does not appear on the date fixed in the inquiry or at any stage of the proceeding inspite of the service of the notice on him or having knowledge of the date, the Inquiry Officer shall proceed with the inquiry ex parte. In such a case the Inquiry Officer shall record the statement of witnesses mentioned in the charge-sheet in absence of the charged Government servant. (xi) The disciplinary authority, if it considers it necessary to do so, may, by an order appoint a Government servant or a legal practitioner, to be known as "Presenting Officer" to present on its behalf the case in support of the charge. (xii) The Government servant may take the assistance of any other Government servant to present the case on his behalf but not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose unless the Presenting Officer appointed by the disciplinary authority is a legal practitioner of the disciplinary authority having regard to the circumstances of the case so permits : Provided that this rule shall not apply in following cases : (i) Where any major penalty is imposed on a person on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or (ii) Where the disciplinary authority is satisfied that for reason to be recorded by it in writing, that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry in the manner provided in these rules; or (iii) Where the Governor is satisfied that, in the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to hold an inquiry in the manner provided in these rules." 25. The aforesaid procedure clearly indicates the aspect that the disciplinary authority either himself may inquire into the charges or appoint an authority subordinate to him as inquiry officer to inquire into the charge. 26. The facts constituting misconduct on which action is proposed, is required to be reduced in form of definite charge or charges to be called charge-sheet which shall be approved by the disciplinary authority. The proviso thereto indicates that where the appointing authority is Governor, the charge-sheet may be approved by Principal Secretary or Secretary, as the case may be, of the concerned department. 27. The aforesaid provision evidently indicates the aspect that the original power to hold an inquiry into alleged misconduct of a delinquent employee is to be exercised by the disciplinary authority. The aspect of appointing an inquiry officer and consequent action are delegated functions of the original power to be exercised by the disciplinary authority itself. 28. Even in case the disciplinary authority does not wish due to constraint of time, or otherwise to hold an inquiry on its own, power has been conferred upon such disciplinary authority to delegate these functions to the inquiry officer. 29. In the present case, admittedly, Governor of the State is the appointing and disciplinary authority of petitioner. However due to the exalted post of Governor being held by the disciplinary authority as in the present case, power has been conferred upon Governor of the State to delegate the function of conduct of inquiry. The proviso to Rule 7(ii) of the Rules of 1999, therefore, clearly envisages delegation of power of disciplinary authority with regard to approval of charge-sheet upon the Principal secretary or the Secretary, as the case may be, of the concerned department. 30. Upon perusal of the charge-sheet, it is evident that the same has been prepared under signatures of the inquiry officer and has thereafter been approved by the Principal Secretary of the department in terms of proviso to Rule 7(ii) of the Rules of 1999. 31. Even if it is assumed, though not admitted by opposite parties, that the inquiry officer was appointed subsequent to preparation of charge- sheet, in the considered opinion of this Court, once the said charge-sheet has been approved by the authority indicated in proviso to Rule 7(ii) of the Rules of 1999, it can be safely considered that the charge-sheet has been prepared exercising original powers by the disciplinary authority itself. 32. The aforesaid aspect is more so in view of settled proposition of law that even after delegation of power by the original authority, the original authority is not divested of its power to exercise the original jurisdiction conferred upon it. In view of proviso to Rule 7(ii) of the Rules of 1999, it is evident that power of the disciplinary authority has been conferred upon the Principal Secretary or the Secretary of the department, as the case may be. 33. With regard to interpretation of statutes and subordinate legislation as in the present case, Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax versus Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2003)3 SCC 57 Supreme Court has enunciated as follows: "14. A construction which reduces the statute to a futility has to be avoided. A statute or any enacting provision therein must be so construed as to make it effective and operative on the principle expressed in the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat i.e. a liberal construction should be put upon written instruments, so as to uphold them, if possible, and carry into effect the intention of the parties. [See Broom's Legal Maxims (10th Edn.), p. 361, Craies on Statutes (7th Edn.), p. 95 and Maxwell on Statutes (11th Edn.), p. 221.] 15. A statute is designed to be workable and the interpretation thereof by a court should be to secure that object unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable. (See Whitney v. IRC [1926 AC 37 : 10 Tax Cas 88 : 95 LJKB 165 : 134 LT 98 (HL)] , AC at p. 52 referred to in CIT v. S. Teja Singh [AIR 1959 SC 352 : (1959) 35 ITR 408] and Gursahai Saigal v. CIT [AIR 1963 SC 1062 : (1963) 48 ITR 1] .) 16. The courts will have to reject that construction which will defeat the plain intention of the legislature even though there may be some inexactitude in the language used. (See Salmon v. Duncombe [(1886) 11 AC 627 : 55 LJPC 69 : 55 LT 446 (PC)] AC at p. 634, Curtis v. Stovin [(1889) 22 QBD 513 : 58 LJQB 174 : 60 LT 772 (CA)] referred to in S. Teja Singh case [AIR 1959 SC 352 : (1959) 35 ITR 408] .) 17. If the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility, and should rather accept the bolder construction, based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. (See Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries [(1940) 3 All ER 549 : 1940 AC 1014 : 109 LJKB 865 : 163 LT 343 (HL)] referred to in Pye v. Minister for Lands for NSW [(1954) 3 All ER 514 : (1954) 1 WLR 1410 (PC)] .) The principles indicated in the said cases were reiterated by this Court in Mohan Kumar Singhania v. Union of India [1992 Supp (1) SCC 594 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 455 : (1992) 19 ATC 881 : AIR 1992 SC 1] . 18. The statute must be read as a whole and one provision of the Act should be construed with reference to other provisions in the same Act so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. 19. The court must ascertain the intention of the legislature by directing its attention not merely to the clauses to be construed but to the entire statute; it must compare the clause with other parts of the law and the setting in which the clause to be interpreted occurs. (See R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka [(1992) 1 SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 286 : (1992) 19 ATC 507 : AIR 1992 SC 81] .) Such a construction has the merit of avoiding any inconsistency or repugnancy either within a section or between two different sections or provisions of the same statute. It is the duty of the court to avoid a head-on clash between two sections of the same Act. (See Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain [(1997) 1 SCC 373 : AIR 1997 SC 1006] .)" 34. Upon applicability of aforesaid judgment in the present facts and circumstances of the case, it is thus evident that interpretation of a statute is required to be made in such a manner that it does not frustrate the very purpose of the enactment or reduce it to an absurdity. 35. In case submission of learned counsel for petitioner is acceded to that in terms of proviso to Rule 7(ii) of the Rules of 1999, only the power of approval to charge-sheet framed by inquiry officer has been delegated, it will reduce the said proviso as well as the entirety of Rule 7 into absurdity. This cannot be the interpretation which can be acceded to. 36. In view of aforesaid facts and discussion, the second ground raised by learned counsel for petitioner also fails. 37. No other point was pressed or argued by learned counsel for petitioner. 38. In view of aforesaid discussion, this Court does not find any good ground to grant indulgence. The writ petition therefore fails and is dismissed at the admission stage itself. Parties are to bear their own costs. Order Date :- 5.8.2025 Subodh/- Digitally signed by :- SUBODH KUMAR SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench