2025:HHC:20302 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP (M) No. 1216 of 2025 Reserved on: 20.06.2025 Date of Decision: 28.06.2025 Sonu Kumar ...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : M/s Sandeep Kumar Pandey and Adhiraj Thakur, Advocates. For the Respondent/State : Mr. Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General with Jaiwant No.81, I.O. P.S. Sadar, District Solan, H.P., with police record. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in F.I.R. No. 126 of 2023 dated 19.07.2022, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 21 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:20302 Substances Act (in short ‘NDPS Act’) at Police Station Sadar, District Solan, H.P. 2. It has been asserted that the petitioner was arrested on 19.07.2022 and since then he is behind the bars. He filed bail petitions before the learned Special Judge-II, Solan, which were dismissed. Another co-accused, Rattan Kumar @ Raju, has already been granted bail by the learned Special Judge-II on 29.08.2022. No recovery was effected from the petitioner, and he was only arrested based on suspicion. As per prosecution, 35.33 grams of heroin was recovered from the room of the accused, which is an intermediate quantity. The challan has been filed, and the custody of the petitioner is not required. The petitioner would abide by all the terms and conditions which the Court may impose. Hence, the petition. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police party was on patrolling duty on 19.07.2022. They received a secret information at 3:30 p.m. that Raju and Sonu were selling heroin in a room located at Kailar road in the building of Mohan Lal. A huge quantity of heroin could be recovered in case of search of the premises. The police 3 2025:HHC:20302 reduced the information to writing and sent it to the Supervisory Officer. Independent witnesses Madan Lal Thakur and Usha Thakur were associated, and the police went to the room. Sonu, the petitioner, was found in the room. The police searched the room and recovered a pouch containing 35.33 grams of heroin. The police arrested the petitioner and seized the heroin. The heroin was sent to SFSL Junga for chemical examination, and as per the report of analysis, it was confirmed to be a sample of Diacetylmorphine. F.I.R. No. 157 of 2018, dated 05.12.2019, F.I.R. No.119 of 2019, dated 28.11.2019 and F.I.R. No. 118 of 2022, dated 15.06.2022, were registered against the petitioner under the NDPS Act. F.I.R. No.17 of 2020, dated 26.01.2020, was registered against co-accused Rattan Kumar @ Raju for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 504 and 506, read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The police filed the charge sheet before the Court on 09.09.2022, and the matter is now listed for consideration of the charge on 11.07.2025. Hence, the status report. 4. I have heard M/s Sandeep Kumar Pandey and Adhiraj Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Ajit 4 2025:HHC:20302 Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent- State. 5. Mr. Sandeep Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner was arrested on 19.07.2022. He has been in judicial custody since then. The charges have not yet been framed, and the right to a speedy trial of the petitioner is being violated. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. He relied upon the judgment of this Court in Saurabh Bhatnagar vs State of H.P. 2025:HHC:13899 in support of his submission. 6. Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner is a habitual offender. He has no criminal antecedents. He is likely to indulge in the commission of a similar offence in case of his release on bail. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768: 5 2025:HHC:20302 2024 SCC OnLine SC 974, wherein it was observed as under at page 783: - “Relevant parameters for granting bail 26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. [Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman Lal v. State of U.P., (2004) 7 SCC 525: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1974]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977]; Masroor v. State of U.P. [Masroor v. State of U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 286 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368]; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765]; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi)[Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425]; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar [Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 558] .] 9. This position was reiterated in Ramratan v. State of M.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3068, wherein it was observed as under:- “12. The fundamental purpose of bail is to ensure the accused's presence during the investigation and trial. Any 6 2025:HHC:20302 conditions imposed must be reasonable and directly related to this objective. This Court in Parvez Noordin Lokhandwalla v. State of Maharastra (2020) 10 SCC 77 observed that though the competent court is empowered to exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for the grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is not misused to impede the investigation, overawe the witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. The relevant observations are extracted herein below: “14. The language of Section 437(3) CrPC, which uses the expression “any condition … otherwise in the interest of justice” has been construed in several decisions of this Court. Though the competent court is empowered to exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for the grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is not misused to impede the investigation, overawe the witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. Several decisions of this Court have dwelt on the nature of the conditions which can legitimately be imposed both in the context of bail and anticipatory bail.” (Emphasis supplied) 13. In Sumit Mehta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 15 SCC 570, this Court discussed the scope of the discretion of the Court to impose “any condition” on the grant of bail and observed in the following terms: — “15. The words “any condition” used in the provision should not be regarded as conferring absolute power on a court of law to impose any condition that it chooses to impose. Any condition has to be interpreted as a reasonable condition acceptable in the facts permissible in the circumstance, and effective in the pragmatic sense, and 7 2025:HHC:20302 should not defeat the order of grant of bail. We are of the view that the present facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant such an extreme condition to be imposed.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. This Court, in Dilip Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2021) 2 SCC 779, laid down the factors to be taken into consideration while deciding the bail application and observed: “4. It is well settled by a plethora of decisions of this Court that criminal proceedings are not for the realisation of disputed dues. It is open to a court to grant or refuse the prayer for anticipatory bail, depending on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The factors to be taken into consideration while considering an application for bail are the nature of the accusation and the severity of the punishment in the case of conviction and the nature of the materials relied upon by the prosecution; reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witnesses or apprehension of threat to the complainant or the witnesses; the reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the time of trial or the likelihood of his abscondence; character, behaviour and standing of the accused; and the circumstances which are peculiar or the accused and larger interest of the public or the State and similar other considerations. A criminal court, exercising jurisdiction to grant bail/anticipatory bail, is not expected to act as a recovery agent to realise the dues of the complainant, and that too, without any trial.” (Emphasis supplied) 10. This position was reiterated in Shabeen Ahmed versus State of U.P., 2025 SCC Online SC 479. 11. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 8 2025:HHC:20302 12. Perusal of the status report shows that police went to the room where the petitioner was present. The search of the room was conducted in the presence of independent witnesses, and police recovered 35.33 grams of heroin from the room. Hence, prima facie, the petitioner was in possession of heroin. 13. The copies of order sheets show that the charge sheet has been filed before the Court. Co-accused Rattan Kumar @ Raju did not appear, and efforts were made to secure his presence. Thereafter, the petitioner was not produced before the Court despite the directions issued by the Court. These order sheets show that charges could not be framed due to the absence of the co-accused or non-production of the petitioner. The petitioner is lodged in jail, and the Jail Authorities are duty- bound to produce the petitioner before the Court. Since the petitioner is inside the jai, therefore, he cannot be held responsible for the delay caused by his non-production. 14. It was laid down in Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2023 SCC OnLine SC 352, that the right to a speedy trial is a constitutional right of an accused. The right of bail is curtailed 9 2025:HHC:20302 on the premise that the trial would be concluded expeditiously. It was observed: - “13. When provisions of law curtail the right of an accused to secure bail, and correspondingly fetter judicial discretion (like Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in the present case), this court has upheld them for conflating two competing values, i.e., the right of the accused to enjoy freedom, based on the presumption of innocence, and societal interest - as observed in Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan, [2008] 17 SCR 369: (2009) 2 SCC 281 ('the concept of bail emerges from the conflict between the police power to restrict liberty of a man who is alleged to have committed a crime, and presumption of innocence in favour of the alleged criminal....'). They are, at the same time, upheld on the condition that the trial is concluded expeditiously. The Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, [1994] 2 SCR 375: (1994) 3 SCC 569 made observations to this effect. In Shaheen Welfare Association v. Union of India, [1996] 2 SCR 1123: (1996) 2 SCC 616 again, this court expressed the same sentiment, namely that when stringent provisions are enacted, curtailing the provisions of bail, and restricting judicial discretion, it is on the basis that investigation and trials would be concluded swiftly. The court said that Parliamentary intervention is based on: A conscious decision has been taken by the legislature to sacrifice to some extent, the personal liberty of an under-trial accused for the sake of protecting the community and the nation against terrorist and disruptive activities or other activities harmful to society, it is all the more necessary that investigation of such crimes is done efficiently and an adequate number of Designated Courts are set up to bring to book persons accused of such serious crimes. This is the only way in which society can be protected against harmful activities. This would also 10 2025:HHC:20302 ensure that persons ultimately found innocent are not unnecessarily kept in jail for long periods.” 15. The Court highlighted the effects of pre-trial detention and the importance of a speedy trial as under: “22. Before parting, it would be important to reflect that laws which impose stringent conditions for the grant of bail may be necessary in the public interest; yet, if trials are not concluded in time, the injustice wreaked on the individual is immeasurable. Jails are overcrowded, and their living conditions, more often than not, are appalling. According to the Union Home Ministry's response to Parliament, the National Crime Records Bureau had recorded that as of 31st December 2021, over 5,54,034 prisoners were lodged in jails against a total capacity of 4,25,069 lakhs in the country[National Crime Records Bureau, Prison Statistics in India https://ncrb.gov. in/sites/default/files/P SI-202 1/Executive ncrb Summary- 2021.pdf]. Of these 122,852 were convicts; the rest, 4,27,165, were undertrials. 23. The danger of unjust imprisonment is that inmates are at risk of 'prisonisation', a term described by the Kerala High Court in A Convict Prisoner v. State, 1993 Cri LJ 3242 as a radical transformation ' whereby the prisoner: 'loses his identity. He is known by a number. He loses personal possessions. He has no personal relationships. Psychological problems result from loss of freedom, status, possessions, dignity, and autonomy of personal life. The inmate culture of prison turns out to be dreadful. The prisoner becomes hostile by ordinary standards. Self- perception changes. ' 24. There is a further danger of the prisoner turning to crime, 'as crime not only turns admirable but the more professional the crime, more honour is paid to the criminal'[Working Papers - Group on Prisons & Borstals - 11 2025:HHC:20302 1966 U.K.] (also see Donald Clemmer's 'The Prison Community' published in 1940[Donald Clemmer, The Prison Community (1968) Holt, Rinehart & Winston, which is referred to in Tomasz Sobecki, 'Donald Clemmer's Concept of Prisonisation', available at: https://www.tkp.edu.pl/ wpcontent/uploads/2020/12/Sobecki_sklad.pdf (accessed on 23rd March 2023).]). Incarceration has further deleterious effects, where the accused belongs to the weakest economic strata: immediate loss of livelihood, and in several cases, scattering of families as well as loss of family bonds and alienation from society. The courts, therefore, have to be sensitive to these aspects (because in the event of an acquittal, the loss to the accused is irreparable), and ensure that trials - especially in cases where special laws enact stringent provisions- are taken up and concluded speedily.” 16. It was held in Shaheen Welfare Association. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366 that a person cannot be kept behind the bars when there is no prospect of trial being concluded expeditiously. It was observed at page 621: “8. It is in this context that it has become necessary to grant some relief to those persons who have been deprived of their personal liberty for a considerable length of time without any prospect of the trial being concluded in the near future. Undoubtedly, the safety of the community and the nation needs to be safeguarded looking to the nature of the offences these undertrials have been charged with. But the ultimate justification for such deprivation of liberty pending trial can only be their being found guilty of the offences for which they have been charged. If such a finding is not likely to be arrived at within a reasonable time, some relief becomes necessary.” 12 2025:HHC:20302 17. Similarly, it was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, (2022) 9 SCC 321: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 560: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 453 that no accused can be subjected to unending detention pending trial. It was observed at page 335: “40. Having held so, we cannot be oblivious to what has been urged on behalf of the respondent-accused that cancellation of bail by this Court is likely to be construed as an indefinite foreclosure of his right to seek bail. It is not necessary to dwell upon the wealth of case law which, regardless of the stringent provisions in a penal law or the gravity of the offence, has time and again recognised the legitimacy of seeking liberty from incarceration. To put it differently, no accused can be subjected to unending detention pending trial, especially when the law presumes him to be innocent until proven guilty. Even where statutory provisions expressly bar the grant of bail, such as in cases under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, this Court has expressly ruled that after a reasonably long period of incarceration, or for any other valid reason, such stringent provisions will melt down, and cannot be measured over and above the right of liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution (see Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb [Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713, paras 15 and 17] ).” 18. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court recently in Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra (2024) 9 SCC 813: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1693 that the right to speedy trial of the offenders facing criminal charges is an important facet of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and inordinate delay in the 13 2025:HHC:20302 conclusion of the trial entitles the accused to grant of bail, it was observed at page 817: - “10. Long back, in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar [Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81: 1980 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court had declared that the right to speedy trial of offenders facing criminal charges is “implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by this Court”. Remarking that a valid procedure under Article 21 is one which contains a procedure that is “reasonable, fair and just”, it was held that : (SCC p. 89, para 5) “5. … Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of liberty cannot be “reasonable, fair or just” unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as “reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that a speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question which would, however, arise is as to what would be the consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied a speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long-delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right under Article 21.” 11. The aforesaid observations have resonated, time and again, in several judgments, such as Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar [Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar, (1981) 3 SCC 671: 1981 SCC (Cri) 791] and Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93]. In the latter, the court re-emphasised the right to a speedy trial and further held that an accused, facing a prolonged trial, has no option: (Abdul Rehman Antulay case [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. 14 2025:HHC:20302 Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93], SCC p. 269, para 84) “84. … The State or complainant prosecutes him. It is, thus, the obligation of the State or the complainant, as the case may be, to proceed with the case with reasonable promptitude. Particularly, in this country, where the large majority of accused come from poorer and weaker sections of the society, not versed in the ways of law, where they do not often get competent legal advice, the application of the said rule is wholly inadvisable. Of course, in a given case, if an accused demands a speedy trial and yet he is not given one, it may be a relevant factor in his favour. But we cannot disentitle an accused from complaining of infringement of his right to a speedy trial on the ground that he did not ask for or insist upon a speedy trial.” 19. It was further held that if the State or any prosecuting agency, including the Court concerned, has no wherewithal to provide the right of speedy trial to the accused, then the bail should not be opposed on the ground that the crime is serious. It was observed at page 820: 17. If the State or any prosecuting agency including the court concerned has no wherewithal to provide or protect the fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution then the State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of the crime. 18. We may hasten to add that the petitioner is still an accused, not a convict. The over-arching postulate of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be 15 2025:HHC:20302 innocent until proven guilty cannot be brushed aside lightly, howsoever stringent the penal law may be. 19. We are convinced that the manner in which the prosecuting agency as well as the Court have proceeded, the right of the accused to have a speedy trial could be said to have been infringed, thereby violating Article 21 of the Constitution. 20. In the present case, the fact that the State has failed to produce the petitioner before the Court shows that the right to a speedy trial of the petitioner is being violated due to a reason not attributable to him, and he is entitled to be released on bail on this ground alone. 21. It was submitted that many FIRs are pending against the petitioner, and he should not be released on bail. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ayub Khan v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3763: 2024: INSC:994 that the criminal antecedents may not be a reason to deny bail to the accused in case of his long incarceration. It was observed: “10. The presence of the antecedents of the accused is only one of the several considerations for deciding the prayer for bail made by him. In a given case, if the accused makes out a strong prima facie case, depending upon the fact situation and period of incarceration, the presence of antecedents may not be a ground to deny bail. There may be a case where a Court can grant bail only on the grounds of long incarceration. The presence of antecedents may 16 2025:HHC:20302 not be relevant in such a case. In a given case, the Court may grant default bail. Again, the antecedents of the accused are irrelevant in such a case. Thus, depending upon the peculiar facts, the Court can grant bail notwithstanding the existence of the antecedents.” 22. Since, in the present case, the petitioner has undergone long incarceration, therefore, his criminal antecedents are not sufficient to deny him bail. 23. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed, and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail, in the present case, subject to his furnishing of bail bonds in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court. While on bail, the petitioner will abide by the following conditions: (i) The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor will he influence any evidence in any manner whatsoever. (ii) The petitioner shall attend the trial and will not seek unnecessary adjournments. (iii) The petitioner will not leave the present address for a continuous period of seven days without furnishing the address of the intended visit to the concerned Police Station and the Court. (iv) The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to the Court; and 17 2025:HHC:20302 (v) The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and social media contact to the Police and the Court and will abide by the summons/notices received from the Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media Account. In case of any change in the mobile number or social media accounts, the same will be intimated to the Police/Court within five days from the date of the change. 24. It is clarified that if the petitioner misuses the liberty or violates any of the conditions imposed upon him, the investigating agency shall be free to move the Court for cancellation of the bail. 25. The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy of this order be sent to the Superintendent, Central Jail, Ambala District Ambala, Haryana and the learned Trial Court by FASTER. 26. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever on the case's merits. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 28th June, 2025 (ravinder)