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2025 DAILYLAW 15273 (HP)

RANBIR SINGH v. STATE OF HP

CRMPM/1186/2025 · 2025-06-05

Rakesh Kainthla

body2025

Judgment text

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( 2025:HHC:17893 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP(M) Nos. 1186 & 1188 of 2025. Reserved on: 26.05.2025 Date of Decision: 05.06.2025 1. Cr.MP(M) No. 1186 of 2025 Ranbir Singh …Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh ....Respondent 2. Cr.MP(M) No. 1188 of 2025 Jasvinder Kaur …Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh ....Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? No. For the Petitioners : Mr. Jeevan Kumar, Advocate, in both the petitions. For the Respondents- State : Mr. Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General with HC-Sandeep Singh No.572, I/O PS Paonta Sahib (H.P), in both the petitions. , I/O Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioners have filed the present petitions for seeking pre-arrest bail. It has been asserted that the police had registered an FIR No. 104 of 2025, dated 02.05.2025 for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 318(4) & 316(2) of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita 2( 2025:HHC:17893 ) (for short BNS), at Police Station Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H.P. The allegations made against the petitioners are false. The petitioner- Ranbir Singh, was in urgent need of money for acquiring a visa for his son, Aditya Bir Singh, therefore, he borrowed ₹14,00,000/- from the informant, Abdul Rehman. The informant obtained security cheques from the petitioner. The petitioner paid ₹10,00,000/- on 27.03.2025, and thereafter, he paid more than ₹2,00,000/- partly in cash and partly online. The informant agreed to give time to the petitioner to make the payment to him, but he registered a false FIR by levelling false allegations. The petitioner, Jasvinder Kaur, needed money for acquiring a visa for her son, and she borrowed ₹3,00,000/- from the informant. She handed over a cheque to the informant as security. She repaid more than ₹1,50,000/- to the informant. The informant registered a false FIR against her. The petitioners would abide by all the terms and conditions which the Court may impose. Hence, the petition. 2. The petitions are opposed by filing a status report asserting that the informant knew the petitioners. The petitioner – Ranbir Singh, borrowed ₹6,00,000/- from the informant on 17.12.2024. He handed over a cheque of ₹6,00,000/-. He also executed an agreement. The petitioners visited the informant’s home and told 3( 2025:HHC:17893 ) her that they had a job offer for the informant’s son in the USA. They revealed that their relative was a Manager in a Company in the USA. The Company required the staff. The informant's son would get a package of ₹80,00,000/- per annum. They demanded ₹10,00,000/- from the informant. The informant transferred ₹2,00,000/-; however, the petitioners failed to provide the sponsorship letter as promised by them. The police registered the FIR and conducted an investigation. The victim produced an agreement executed between her and the petitioners. The police also seized the copies of the cheque. The police sent the notices to the petitioners; however, the petitioners did not join the investigation. The police searched for them in their home, but they were not found present at the home. The petitioners are to be interrogated. Hence, the status report. 3. I have heard Mr. Jeevan Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners, in both the petitions and Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State, in both the petitions. 4. Mr. Jeevan Kumar, learned Counsel for the petitioners, in both the petitions, submitted that the petitioners are innocent and were falsely implicated. The petitioners had borrowed money from the informant, and they had issued the cheques. The dispute between 4( 2025:HHC:17893 ) the parties is purely civil, and the informant has given a colour of criminality to the dispute. The petitioners would abide by all the terms and conditions which the Court may impose. Therefore, he prayed that the present petitions be allowed and the petitioners be released on bail. 5. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State, in both the petitions, submitted that the petitioners had cheated the informant by promising to get a job for her son. They failed to provide the sponsorship letter. Police are to interrogate the petitioners. They failed to join the investigation despite the service of the notice upon them. Therefore, he prayed that the present petitions be dismissed. 6. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records of the case carefully. 7. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2019) 9 SCC 24: (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 509: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1143 that the power of pre-arrest bail is extraordinary and should be exercised sparingly. It was observed: “69. Ordinarily, arrest is a part of the procedure of the investigation to secure not only the presence of the accused but also several other purposes. Power under Section 438 Cr.P.C. is 5( 2025:HHC:17893 ) an extraordinary power, and the same has to be exercised sparingly. The privilege of pre-arrest bail should be granted only in exceptional cases. The judicial discretion conferred upon the court has to be properly exercised after application of mind as to the nature and gravity of the accusation; the possibility of the applicant fleeing justice and other factors to decide whether it is a fit case for the grant of anticipatory bail. Grant of anticipatory bail to some extent interferes in the sphere of investigation of an offence, and hence, the court must be circumspect while exercising such power for the grant of anticipatory bail. Anticipatory bail is not to be granted as a matter of rule, and it has to be granted only when the court is convinced that exceptional circumstances exist to resort to that extraordinary remedy.” 8. This position was reiterated in Srikant Upadhyay v. State of Bihar, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 282, wherein it was held: “25. We have already held that the power to grant anticipatory bail is extraordinary. Though in many cases it was held that bail is said to be a rule, it cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be said that anticipatory bail is the rule. It cannot be the rule, and the question of its grant should be left to the cautious and judicious discretion of the Court, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. While called upon to exercise the said power, the Court concerned has to be very cautious as the grant of interim protection or protection to the accused in serious cases may lead to a miscarriage of justice and may hamper the investigation to a great extent as it may sometimes lead to tampering or distraction of the evidence. We shall not be understood to have held that the Court shall not pass interim protection pending consideration of such application as the Section is destined to safeguard the freedom of an individual against unwarranted arrest, and we say that such orders shall be passed in eminently fit cases.” 9. It was held in Pratibha Manchanda v. State of Haryana, (2023) 8 SCC 181: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 785 that the Courts should 6( 2025:HHC:17893 ) balance individual rights, public interest and fair investigation while considering an application for pre-arrest bail. It was observed: “21. The relief of anticipatory bail is aimed at safeguarding individual rights. While it serves as a crucial tool to prevent the misuse of the power of arrest and protects innocent individuals from harassment, it also presents challenges in maintaining a delicate balance between individual rights and the interests of justice. The tightrope we must walk lies in striking a balance between safeguarding individual rights and protecting public interest. While the right to liberty and presumption of innocence are vital, the court must also consider the gravity of the offence, the impact on society, and the need for a fair and free investigation. The court's discretion in weighing these interests in the facts and circumstances of each case becomes crucial to ensure a just outcome.” 10. It was specifically mentioned in the FIR that the petitioners visited the informant’s house and promised to get a job for her son in their relative’s Company in the USA. They offered a yearly package of ₹80,00,000/- to him and asked the informant to pay ₹10,00,000/-. She paid ₹2,00,000/- by transferring the amount from her bank. The petitioners failed to provide the sponsorship letter, and when the informant called the petitioners, they failed to respond to her calls. The informant found that the petitioners had cheated many people by making similar promises to them. 11. These allegations, prima facie, show that the petitioners had made a promise to the informant, which promise was not 7( 2025:HHC:17893 ) fulfilled. There is nothing to show that the promise made by the petitioners was correct, and their relative’s company had a job offer with a yearly package of ₹ 80,00,000/-, and they were capable of fulfilling the promise so made. Hence, prima facie, the promise was made by the petitioners without any intent to fulfil it, which attracts Section 318(4) of BNS. 12. The police specifically stated in the status report that they had issued a notice to the petitioners, but the petitioners failed to join the investigation. The police further stated that a search was made for the petitioners in their residence, but they were not found. Therefore, there are reasonable grounds to believe, at this stage, that the petitioners cannot be associated with the investigation without their arrest. 13. The police asserted that the custodial interrogation of the petitioners is required. Keeping in view the fact that the petitioners had obtained ₹2,00,000/- from the informant by making a false statement, and they had also made similar promises to other persons, the custodial interrogation of the petitioners is necessary. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State Versus Anil Sharma (1997) 8( 2025:HHC:17893 ) 7 SCC 187 that where custodial interrogation is required, pre-arrest bail should not be granted. It was observed: - “6. We find force in the submission of the CBI that custodial interrogation is qualitatively more elicitation-oriented than questioning a suspect who is well-ensconced with a favourable order under Section 438 of the Code. In a case like this, effective interrogation of a suspected person is of tremendous advantage in disinterring many useful information and also materials which would have been concealed. Success in such interrogation would elude if the suspected person knows that he is well protected and insulated by a pre-arrest bail order during the time he is interrogated. Very often, interrogation in such a condition would reduce to a mere ritual. The argument that the custodial interrogation is fraught with the danger of the person being subjected to third-degree methods need not be countenanced, for such an argument can be advanced by all accused in all criminal cases. The Court has to presume that responsible Police Officers would conduct themselves in a responsible manner and that those entrusted with the task of disinterring offences would not conduct themselves as offender” 14. A similar view was taken by the Delhi High Court in Mukesh Khurana v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1032, wherein it was observed: - “13. One of the significant factors in determining this question would be the need for custodial interrogation. Without a doubt, custodial interrogation is more effective to question a suspect. The cocoon of protection afforded by a bail order insulates the suspect, and he could thwart interrogation, reducing it to futile rituals. But it must be also kept in mind that while interrogation of a suspect is one of the basic and effective methods of crime solving, the liberty of an individual also needs to be balanced out.” 9( 2025:HHC:17893 ) 15. It was held in P Chidambaram (supra) that the grant of pre- arrest bail may hamper the investigations. It was observed: “83. Grant of anticipatory bail at the stage of investigation may frustrate the investigating agency in interrogating the accused and in collecting useful information, and also the materials which might have been concealed. Success in such interrogation would elude if the accused knows that he is protected by the order of the court. Grant of anticipatory bail, particularly in economic offences, would definitely hamper the effective investigation. Having regard to the materials said to have been collected by the respondent Enforcement Directorate and considering the stage of the investigation, we are of the view that it is not a fit case to grant anticipatory bail.” 16. Keeping in view the nature of the allegations made against the petitioners and the fact that the investigation is at the initial stage, the petitioners are not entitled to the concession of pre-arrest bail. Hence, the present petitions fail, and the same are dismissed. 17. The observations made here-in-before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 05th June, 2025 (Shamsh Tabrez)