Page No.# 1/3 GAHC010141512024 2025:GAU-AS:13831 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : Crl.L.P./38/2024 MANJU MEDHI W/O. SHRI. KUMUD CHANDRA DAS, R/O. VILL.- HAJO(SANTIPUR), P/O. AND P/S. HAJP, DIST.- KAMRUP(M), ASSAM, PIN-781102. VERSUS DR. NUR ISLAM S/O. LATE AMIRUDDIN AHMED, R/O. GARIGAON, GUWAHATI, P/O. GAUHATI UNIVERSITY H.P.O, P/S. JALUKBARI, DIST.- KAMRUP(METRO), ASSAM, PIN-781014 Advocate for the Petitioner : MS. P C BARNALI NAIR, MR. B K JAIN Advocate for the Respondent : , Linked Case : MANJU MEDHI VERSUS DR NUR ISLAM G ------------ Advocate for : MS. P C BARNALI NAIR Advocate for : appearing for DR NUR ISLAM G Page No.# 2/3 BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANJAN MONI KALITA ORDER 15.10.2025 Heard Mr. B K Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner/ complainant. 2. This is an application seeking special leave to appeal under Section 419(5) of BNSS, 2023 against the impugned judgment and order dated 13.05.2024 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kamrup (Metro), Guwahati in C.R. No. 1348C/2012, whereby the accused person has been acquitted from the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in view of the judicial pronouncement of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Celestium Financial -Vs- A. Gnanasekaran Etc. reported in (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1320 in the matter of offences punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, 1881 to prefer an appeal against acquittal passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, a special leave to appeal under Section 419(5) of BNSS, 2023 shall not be required. 4. To substantiate his submission, learned counsel for the petitioner has taken this Court to Paragraph-9 of the aforesaid judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court, which is reproduced herein below – “9. In the circumstances, we find that Section 138 of the Act being in the nature of a penal provision by a deeming fiction against an accused who is said to have committed an offence under the said provision, if acquitted, can be proceeded against by a victim of the said offence, namely, the person who is entitled to the proceeds of a cheque which has been dishonoured, in terms of the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC, as a victim. As already noted, a victim of an offence could also be a complainant. In such a case, an appeal can be preferred either under the Page No.# 3/3 proviso to Section 372 or under Section 378 by such a victim. In the absence of the proviso to Section 372, a victim of an offence could not have filed an appeal as such, unless he was also a complainant, in which event he could maintain an appeal if special leave to appeal had been granted by the High Court and if no such special leave was granted then his appeal would not be maintainable at all. On the other hand, if the victim of an offence who may or may not be the complainant, proceeds under the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC, then in our view, such a victim need not seek special leave to appeal from the High Court. In other words the victim of an offence would have the right to prefer an appeal, inter alia, against an order of acquittal in terms of the proviso to Section 372 without seeking any special leave to appeal from the High Court only on the grounds mentioned therein. A Person who is a complainant under Section 200 of the CrPC who complains about the offence committed by a person who is charged as an accused under Section 138 of the Act, thus has the right to prefer an appeal as a victim under the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC.” 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court has also relied on the aforesaid case of Celestium Financial (Supra) vide order dated 14.07.2025 passed in Crl.L.P. No. 33/2025 and accordingly passed an order observing that no leave is required to be made. 6. In view of the aforesaid submissions, the present special leave to appeal is disposed of, directing the Registry to register the accompanying criminal appeal and list it for Admission within a period of 4 (four) weeks. JUDGE Comparing Assistant