APHC010187582009 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH (Special Original Jurisdiction) FRIDAY, THE TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO CRIMINAL REVISION CASE Between: 1. UPPALA SUBBA RAO, S/O. DURGAIAH R/O. GARIVARIPALEM VILLAGE NAGARAM MANDALAM GUNTUR DISTRICT 1. THATHA SRINIVASA RAO R/O. SIVAPURAM NIZAMPATNAM VILLAGE NIZAMPATNAM POST 2. THE STATE OF A.P, REP. BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF A.P., HYDERABAD. Revision filed under Section 397/401 of Cr circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the Criminal Revision Case, the High Court may be pleased to the Judgment in Sessions Case No.75 of 2008 on the file of the Court of the Addl. Assistant Sessions Judge, Tenali, dated 21.07.2008, the petitioner above named begs to present this Memorandum of Criminal Revision Case to this Hon'ble Court. IA NO: 1 OF 2009(CRLRCMP 654 OF 2009 Petition under Section 151 CPC, praying that in the circu in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to condone the delay of 92 days in presentation of Criminal Revision Ca against the Judgment in S.C. Sessions Judge, Tenali, dated 21.07.2008. 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) THE NINETEENTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 1570/2009 UPPALA SUBBA RAO, S/O. DURGAIAH R/O. GARIVARIPALEM VILLAGE NAGARAM MANDALAM GUNTUR DISTRICT ...PETITIONER AND THATHA SRINIVASA RAO ANOTHER, S/O. CHINNA SUNDARAIAH R/O. SIVAPURAM NIZAMPATNAM VILLAGE NIZAMPATNAM POST P, REP. BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF A.P., HYDERABAD. ...RESPONDENT(S): Revision filed under Section 397/401 of Cr.P.C., praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the Criminal Revision Case, the High Court may be pleased to allow the Revision by setting aside the Judgment in Sessions Case No.75 of 2008 on the file of the Court of the . Assistant Sessions Judge, Tenali, dated 21.07.2008, the petitioner above named begs to present this Memorandum of Criminal Revision Case to IA NO: 1 OF 2009(CRLRCMP 654 OF 2009 Petition under Section 151 CPC, praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to condone the delay of 92 days in presentation of Criminal Revision Ca against the Judgment in S.C.No.75 of 2007 on the file of the Addl. Assistant Judge, Tenali, dated 21.07.2008. IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH [3369] THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO UPPALA SUBBA RAO, S/O. DURGAIAH R/O. GARIVARIPALEM ...PETITIONER ANOTHER, S/O. CHINNA SUNDARAIAH R/O. SIVAPURAM NIZAMPATNAM VILLAGE NIZAMPATNAM POST P, REP. BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH ...RESPONDENT(S): praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the Criminal Revision allow the Revision by setting aside the Judgment in Sessions Case No.75 of 2008 on the file of the Court of the . Assistant Sessions Judge, Tenali, dated 21.07.2008, the petitioner above named begs to present this Memorandum of Criminal Revision Case to mstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to condone the delay of 92 days in presentation of Criminal Revision Case No.75 of 2007 on the file of the Addl. Assistant 2 Counsel for the Petitioner: 1. CH RAVINDRA BABU Counsel for the Respondent(S): 1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR The Court made the following ORDER: 1. The Criminal Revision Case, under Sections397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’) is filed by the petitioner/de facto complainant assailing the Judgment dated 21.07.2008 passed in S.C.No.75 of 2008 on the file of the learned Additional Assistant Sessions Judge, Tenali (for short, ‘the Trial Court’), whereby the Trial Court acquitted the 1st respondent/accused for the offences punishable under Sections498A and 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, 'IPC’). 2. The parties to this Criminal Revision Case will hereinafter be referred to as described before the trial Court for the sake of convenience. 3. The Prosecution's case is as follows: (a) PW1 and LW2 are the parents of the deceased; the accused is her husband. PW3 and PW9 are PW1's brothers-in-law. PW4 and PW10 are elders, and PW6 is a neighbour of the scene of the offence. PW8 and LW11 are panchayatdars and mediators, while LW12 is also an elder and panchayatdar. PW5 is the medical officer who conducted the autopsy. PW11, the Sub-Inspector of Police, is the Investigating Officer. (b) PW1 has five daughters; the deceased was his second daughter. She was married to the accused 12 years ago. At the time of marriage, a dowry of ₹15,000, a watch, a ring, and one acre of land (given as pasupu-kunkuma) were presented to the accused. The couple had a son and a daughter. After the birth of their son, the accused began subjecting the deceased to cruelty, pressuring her to sell the 3 land given to her. He became addicted to vices such as alcohol and attempted to harm her on several occasions. PWs 3, 4, 9, and 10 intervened and mediated. Unable to bear the harassment, the deceased died by suicide (hanging) on 02.12.2007 between 9:00 a.m. and 12:00 noon. PW1 lodged a complaint at Nizampatnam Police Station on 03.12.2007 at 6:00 a.m. PW11, the Sub-Inspector of Police, registered the case as Crime No. 66/2007, issued FIR copies to the concerned authorities, and initiated the investigation. (c) During the investigation, PW11 visited the scene of the offence in the presence of mediators PW8 and LW11. He seized rope pieces, a wooden stool, and a plastic Coca-Cola tray used in the hanging. An observation report was prepared and attested by PW8 and LW11. PW7 photographed the scene. PW11 conducted an inquest on the deceased's body in the presence of panchayatdars PW8, LW11, and LW12. He examined and recorded the statements of PWs 1 to 4, 6, 9, and 10. During the inquest, the panchayatdars unanimously opined that the deceased was subjected to cruelty by the accused, which led her to commit suicide. The inquest report was prepared and attested accordingly. The body was then sent for a postmortem. Based on the findings, Section 498-A of the IPC was added, as the investigation revealed relevant elements of cruelty. The accused was arrested at 5:00 p.m. on 05.12.2007 and remanded. PW11 also examined PW7 and recorded his statement. On PW11's requisition, PW5 conducted the postmortem and confirmed that the cause of death was asphyxia due to hanging. After completing the investigation, PW11 filed a charge sheet stating that the accused is liable for punishment under Sections 498-A and 306 IPC. 4. After laying the charge sheet by the Investigating Officer, the committal Court passed an order under Section 209 of Cr.P.C., following the provisions of Sections 207 and 208 Cr.P.C. The case is committed to the Court of 4 Sessions. Subsequently, the case in Sessions Case No.75of 2008 has been numbered. After hearing the Public Prosecutor and the defence counsel, the Trial Court framed charges against the accused, punishable under Section 498A and 306 of the IPC, against the accused. The accused did not plead guilty but claimed to be tried. 5. During the course of the trial, on behalf of the Prosecution, PWs.1 to 11 were examined, and Exs.P1 to P8 were marked. On behalf of the defence, no witnesses were examined; however, Ex.D1 was marked. MOs.1 to 3 were also marked. 6. After the closure of the evidence of the Prosecution, the accused was examined under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., concerning the incriminating circumstances appearing in the evidence let in by the Prosecution, for which he denied the same and stated that he had no defence witnesses and pleaded not guilty. 7. The Trial Court, upon hearing both sides and considering the oral and documentary evidence, found the accused not guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 498A and 306 of IPC, and accordingly acquitted the accused vide its Judgment dated 21.07.2008 in S.C.No.75 of 2008. 8. Felt aggrieved by the aforementioned acquittal of the accused, the de facto complainant filed the present Criminal Revision Case, challenging the Judgment of the Trial Court in S.C.No.75 of 2008. 9. Now, the point that arises for consideration is: Was the trial Court justified in acquitting the accused? POINT: 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the Trial Court erred in failing to recognize that the Prosecution's evidence on material aspects is cogent, consistent, and trustworthy; according to local customs and caste 5 traditions, land gifted as pasupu-kunkuma is deemed the deceased’s property despite the absence of registered transfer; the Prosecution placed sufficient evidence to satisfy the ingredients of Sections 498-A and 306 IPC; there is ample evidence to convict the accused under these sections; the Trial Court's reasons for disbelieving the prosecution witnesses are improper and implausible; further, the Trial court wrongly emphasized minor discrepancies while overlooking crucial evidence; moreover, the citations relied upon by the 1st respondent/accused are irrelevant to the facts of this case and should have been rejected by the Trial Court; the Trial Court's Judgment violates established principles of criminal jurisprudence and warrants a remand for proper reappreciation of the evidence. 11. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner/de facto complainant and learned Assistant Public Prosecutor, appearing for the 2nd Respondent/State. 12. It is settled law as observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra V. Jagmohan Singh Kuldip Sing Anand1, that “in exercise of revisional powers, this Court need not undertaken in-depth and minutest reexamination of entire evidence, when there is no error in the findings arrived by the Trial Court as well as 1st Appellate Court”. 13. I have carefully examined the witness depositions and considered the submissions made by both parties. 14. A perusal of the Trial Court's Judgment indicates that considerable emphasis was placed on the alleged suppression of the original FIR. 15. In Ramesh kumar V. State by Inspector of Police2, the High Court of Madras held that: 11. The materials available on record also disclose that the report given by PW2 was suppressed. PW2 has categorically admitted in his cross- examination that he has given an earlier report to the police. But the said 1 (2004) 7 SCC 659 2 2010 Supreme(Mad) 2279 6 report was suppressed. The version of PW2 in his chief examination is that he was present with PW1 at the time PW1 gave his report at the police station. But the fact remains, Ex.P1 was not attested by PW2. Therefore, it is quite clear that the Prosecution has deliberately suppressed the earlier report given by PW2. In view of this infirmity, the delay in reporting to the police assumes importance, and as such, the inordinate delay in reporting to the police, as well as the suppression of the earliest report given by PW2, are fatal to the Prosecution's case. 16. The Trial Court relied upon the testimony of PW.1, Subba Rao, the father of the deceased, who deposed that PW.3, P. Venkateswarlu, initially drafted a report at the police station around 8:00 or 9:00 a.m. on 03.12.2007, during which PW.1's thumb impression was obtained. Subsequently, at around 3:00 p.m. on the same day, a second report was drafted by PW.3, purportedly at the behest of the Circle Inspector of Police. PW.1 stated that he was unaware whether the earlier report remained on record. Based on this testimony, the Trial Court inferred that the initial report had been suppressed. However, the depositions of PWs.1 and 3 do not shed light on the reasons for such suppression, or the circumstances under which the second report was given. Nonetheless, the Trial Court concluded that the investigation was initiated based on the second report. 17. The Trial Court also considered another circumstance favouring the accused, arising from the testimony of PW.5, Dr. K. Narasimha Murthy, who conducted the postmortem and issued the postmortem certificate. PW.5 testified that the deceased was menstruating at the time of her death. The defence relied on this fact to support its version that, in the earlier report allegedly submitted by PW.1, it was stated that the deceased had died by suicide due to an inability to endure stomach pain during her menstrual period. However, in the absence of the original report, this contention remains speculative and cannot be meaningfully assessed. Furthermore, the Investigating Officer's evidence does not shed light on the reasons or circumstances that led to the procurement of a second report from PW.1, thereby leaving a gap in the Prosecution's version. 7 18. The Trial Court also relied upon the delay in forwarding the FIR to the concerned Magistrate as one of the grounds for acquitting the accused. 19. In Apren Joseph @ Current Kunjukunju and others V. State of Kerala3, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: "It is always better that the FIR is rendered before there in time and opportunity to embellish or before the informant's memory fades. Undue or unreasonable delay in lodging the FIR, therefore, inevitably gives rise to suspicion which puts the Court on guard to look for the possible motive and the explanation for the delay and consider its effect on the trustworthiness or otherwise of the prosecution version. Effect of delay in lodging the FIR, would always depend on the facts and circumstances of a given case." 20. In State of M.P. vs. Kriparan4, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: "Inordinate and unexplained delay in lodging the F.I.R. is fatal to the case of the prosecution particularly when the facts and circumstances of the case demonstrate such an inference". 21. In State of Rajasthan V. Daud Kahn5, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: “The interpretation of Section-157 of the CrPC is no longer res integra. A detailed discussion on the subject is to be found in Brahm Swaroop V. State of U.P., which considered a large number of cases on the subject. The purpose of the forthwith communication of a copy of the FIR to the Magistrate is to check the possibility of its manipulation. Therefore, a delay in transmitting the special report to the Magistrate is linked to the lodging of the FIR. If there is no delay in lodging an FIR, then any delay in communicating the special report to the Magistrate would really be of little consequence, since manipulation of the FIR would then get ruled out. Nevertheless, the Prosecution should explain the delay in transmitting the special report to the Magistrate. However, if no question is put to the investigating officer concerning the delay, the Prosecution is under no obligation to give an explanation. There is no universal rule that whenever there is some delay in sending the FIR to the Magistrate, the prosecution version becomes unreliable. In other words, the facts and circumstances of a case are important for a decision in this regard." 3 AIR 1973 SC 1 4 (2003) 12 SCC 675 5 (2016) 2 SCC 607 8 22. In Soorya and Others Versus State Represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Madurai6, the High Court of Madras held that: 25. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of M.P. vs. Ratan Singh7, held that: "9. Thus, not only was there a delay in filing the FIR (which remained unexplained), which was taken as the basis of the investigation in this case, but also there was a wilful suppression of the actual first information received by the police. These factors together cast grave doubts on the credibility of the prosecution version and lead us to the conclusion that there has been an attempt to build up a different case for the Prosecution and bring in as many Considering those principles, the unexplained delay in registering the FIR and dispatching the same to the concerned Court, and suppressing two earliest statements given by PWs. 2 and 3 cast a serious doubt on the prosecution case, and there was a possibility of improvement in the prosecution case and introduction of new version of deliberation and consultation. 26. Considering all those circumstances, we are of the considered view that the Prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the Court below without considering those aspects has convicted the accused on believing the eyewitness. Hence, the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial Court is liable to be set aside and the appellants are entitled for acquittal. 23. The Investigating Officer, examined as PW.11, admitted in his testimony that there was hourly conveyance available from Repalle to Nizampatnam and that the travel time between the two places was approximately one hour. According to Ex.P1, the report was given on 03.12.2007 at 3:00 p.m., yet the FIR appears to have been registered at 6:00 a.m. on the same day, which creates a temporal inconsistency. Furthermore, even as per the testimony of PW.1, the second report was submitted only at 3:00 p.m. on 03.12.2007. The Trial Court noted that there was an unexplained delay of approximately 33 to 36 hours in lodging the report with the police, a lapse which the Prosecution failed to clarify satisfactorily. 24. During cross-examination, PW.1 stated that approximately five years prior, the father of the accused executed a settlement deed, gifting his share 6 2021 Supreme(Mad) 1502 7 (2020) 12 SCC 630 9 of the terraced house to the accused's son and daughter. The Trial Court observed this circumstance, noting that the accused had influenced his father to execute the settlement deed in favour of his children, and that 0.08 acres of land was accordingly transferred to the accused's daughter by his father. The Court further took into account that the accused demonstrated affection towards his children and made considerable efforts to ensure that the property was conveyed to them through his father. 25. Based on the evidence on record, the Trial Court noted that the accused provided all necessary comforts to his wife and children. PW.1 testified that after marriage, the accused and his daughter lived together happily for about six years, during which she gave birth to a daughter, followed by a son. However, it was after the birth of the male child that the accused allegedly began ill-treating his daughter. 26. The Trial Court has taken into account the fact that the neighbours were not examined, considering this omission to be favourable to the accused. 27. In Ponnazhagu V. The State8, the High Court of Madras held that: 38. As per the evidence of PW.11, Investigating Officer, Ex.P1, First Information Report was said to have been registered on 08.10.2003 and PW.11 had arrested two accused on 07.10.2003, which is prior to registration of Ex.P1. Though it is stated by PW.11 in her deposition that the neighbours of the Revision Petitioner/A1 knew about the cruelty caused to PW.1, PW.11 did not examine any of such neighbours or Villagers, but only the relatives and interested witnesses of PW.1. Hence, this Court is of the view that the investigation had not been done in a fair manner and that non- examination of the neighbours of the Revision Petitioner/A1, who are the proper persons to speak about the alleged acts, would be fatal to the case of the Prosecution. 28. As rightly contended by the defence, the Prosecution failed to examine the neighbours of the accused, with the sole exception of PW.6, Pathan Meer Bee, who did not support the Prosecution's case. In fact, PW.6, during cross- examination by the defence, stated that the accused and his wife maintained a 8 MANU/TN/1639/2025 10 cordial relationship, and that the deceased used to suffer from stomach pain during her menstrual period. PW.11, the Investigating Officer, confirmed that no neighbours, other than PW.6, were examined during the investigation. Moreover, the police did not examine the mother of the deceased, LW.2, thereby leaving a significant gap in the Prosecution's evidence. 29. Another ground considered by the Trial Court was the testimony of PW.1, who stated during cross-examination that he had given 1.00 acre of land to the deceased as ‘pasupukumkuma' (a customary gift), but no deed was executed to that effect. Contrarily, the Prosecution's case alleged that the accused demanded money from the deceased by pressuring her to sell the said 1.00 acre of land gifted by her father. The Trial Court expressed doubt as to how the deceased could have sold the property when it was not legally registered in her name. 30. The Trial Court also took note that following the death of the deceased, her father (PW.1) demanded that the accused convey all the properties in favour of his children, to which the accused agreed. PWs.3, 9 and others subsequently removed all the household articles, furniture, and paddy using a tractor. The Trial Court, after considering the record, observed that the accused was very fond of his children and willingly consented to transfer the properties to them. It is thus reasonable to infer that he likely treated his wife with similar affection and care. 31. The Trial Court did not consider the evidence of PW.2, a child witness, on the ground that she appeared to be tutored and was therefore not deemed a trustworthy witness. Upon careful evaluation of the testimonies of PWs.4, 9, and 10, the Trial Court observed that there was no direct evidence from witnesses possessing personal knowledge of any harassment. Furthermore, no independent witnesses were examined by the Prosecution. Consequently, there was insufficient material to conclude that the accused subjected the deceased to cruelty or that he drove her to commit suicide. Additionally, the 11 evidence on record did not indicate that the accused aided or instigated the commission of the offence. 32. From a reading of Section 107 IPC, what is deducible is that a person would be abetting the doing of a thing if he instigates any person to do that thing or if he encourages with one or more person or persons in any conspiracy for doing that thing or if he intentionally aids by any act or illegal omission in doing of that thing. Explanation 1 clarifies that even if a person, by way of wilful misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact which he is otherwise bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures or attempts to cause or procure a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing. Similarly, it is clarified by way of Explanation-2 that whoever does anything in order to facilitate the commission of an act, either prior to or at the time of commission of the act, is said to aid the doing of that act. 33. In Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu V. State of West Bengal9, the Hon’ble Supreme Court after referring to some of the previous decisions held that: 15. Thus, this Court has consistently taken the view that before holding an accused guilty of an offence under Section 306 IPC, the Court must scrupulously examine the facts and circumstances of the case and also assess the evidence adduced before it in order to find out whether the cruelty and harassment meted out to the victim had left the victim with no other alternative but to put an end to her life. It is also to be borne in mind that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without their being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable. 16. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 306 of IPC there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. 9 (2010) 1 SCC 707 12 Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC. 34. In Rajesh V. State of Haryana10, the Hon’ble Supreme Court after referring to Sections 306 and 107 of the IPC held as follows: 9. Conviction under Section 306 IPC is not sustainable on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused, which led or compelled the person to commit suicide. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 306 IPC, there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the Prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC. 35. Applying the test laid down hereinabove, this Court is of the view that the legislative intent and the ratio decidendi of the precedents established by this Court are unequivocal: to secure a conviction under Section 306 of the IPC, there must be a clear mens rea on the part of the accused. Moreover, there must be an active or direct act which compelled the deceased to commit suicide, leaving her no reasonable alternative, and such act must have been intended to drive the deceased into that position. 36. Upon careful evaluation of the evidence on record, this Court concurs with the Trial Court’s finding that there is no material to suggest that the accused instigated or abetted the deceased to end her life, either by direct or indirect acts. 37. Now, it is relevant to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ganesha V. Sharanappa11, wherein it was held that: "In a case where the finding of acquittal is recorded on account of misreading of evidence or non-consideration of evidence or perverse appreciation of evidence, nothing prevents the High Court from setting aside 10 (2020) 15 SCC 359 11 (2014) 1 SCC 87 13 the order of acquittal at the instance of the informant in Revision and directing fresh disposal on merit by the trial court. In the event of such direction, the trial court shall be obliged to reappraise the evidence in light of the observation of the Revisional Court and take an independent view uninfluenced by any of the observations of the Revisional Court on the merit of the case. By way of abundant caution, we may herein observe that interference with the order of acquittal in Revision is called for only in cases where there is manifest error of law or procedure and in those exceptional cases in which it is found that the order of acquittal suffers from glaring illegality, resulting into miscarriage of justice. The High Court may also interfere in those cases of acquittal caused by shutting out the evidence which otherwise ought to have been considered or where the material evidence which clinches the issue has been overlooked. In such an exceptional case, the High Court in Revision can set aside an order of acquittal but it cannot convert an order of acquittal into that of an order of conviction. The only course left to the High Court in such exceptional cases is to order." 38. Further, in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh V. State of Bihar12, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held at paragraph No.12 as follows: "12. … Sub-section (3) of Section 401 in terms provides that nothing in Section 401 shall be deemed to authorize a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. The aforesaid subsection, which places a limitation on the powers of the Revisional Court, prohibiting it from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, is itself indicative of the nature and extent of the revisional power conferred by Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the High Court could not convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction directly, it could not do so indirectly by the method of ordering a retrial. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the High Court will ordinarily not interfere in Revision with an order of acquittal except in exceptional cases where the interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice. The High Court will not be justified in interfering with an order of acquittal merely because the trial court has taken a wrong view of the law or has erred in appreciation of evidence. It is neither possible nor advisable to make an exhaustive list of circumstances in which exercise of revisional jurisdiction may be justified, but decisions of this Court have laid down the parameters of exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in an appeal against acquittal by a private party." 12 2002 SCC (Cri) 1448 14 39. After evaluation of the evidence, this Court finds no evidence upon which it can hold the accused guilty of abetting the suicide of the deceased. Accordingly, after a careful and conjoint reading of the entire materials on record, this Court is of the view that the Prosecution has failed to prove the charge of abetment to commit suicide under Sections 498A and 306 of the IPC against the accused. 40. Given the discussions above and findings and considering the entire facts and circumstances of this case, this Court is of the considered view that the learned Judge has rendered a judicious and well-reasoned order, duly considering the material on record and the arguments advanced on behalf of both parties. The impugned order is not perverse or illegal, and no interference is warranted. The Criminal Revision Case, therefore, deserves dismissal. 41. In the result, the Criminal Revision Case is dismissed, confirming the Judgment dated 21.07.2008 passed in S.C.No.75 of 2008 on the file of the learned Additional Assistant Sessions Judge, Tenali. Interim orders granted earlier, if any, shall stand vacated, and the miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed. _____________________________ JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO Date: 19.09.2025. SAK 15 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 1570 of 2009 Date: 19.09.2025 SAK