Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
Project Director NHAI Vs Babu Ram & Anr.
OMP(M) No. 9 of 2025 02.04.2026 Present: Ms. Ritu Sharma, Advocate, vice Mr. Sumeet Raj Sharma, Advocate, for the applicant/ appellant. Mr. Munish Datwalia, Advocate, for respondent No. 1. Ms. Ayushi Negi, Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No. 2. The applicant has filed the accompanying appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), against the judgment dated 07.06.2024, passed by the Court of learned District Judge, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, H.P., in Arbitration Case No. 146 of 2023, which was filed under Section 34 of the Act.
2. Since, the appeal has been filed after the prescribed period of limitation, as such, the present application has been moved for condonation of delay. The delay, as per the application and the report of the Registry, is 207 days.
3. The delay of 207 days has mainly been sought to be condoned, on the ground, that after passing of the
judgment on 07.06.2024, legal opinion has been sought by the office of the applicant, with respect to assailing
the judgment. After receiving the legal opinion, steps were taken by the learned counsel for filing the appeal. 4. On the basis of above facts, it has been contended that the delay is not intentional and has occurred on account of bonafide reasons beyond the control of the applicant. 5. As such, a prayer has been made to condone the delay in filing the appeal. 6. When put to notice, the application has been contested by the respondents by filing the reply, in which, the preliminary objections have been taken that the application is not maintainable, in view of the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled as “State of Madhya Pradesh Versus Ram Kumar Choudhary”, Civil Appeal No. 995 of 2021, decided on 25.02.2021, in which, Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the delay in filing the appeal under Section 37 of the Act, can only be condoned in exceptional cases and not in a routine manner. 7. In addition to this, another preliminary objection has been taken that the applicant is not entitled for the discretionary relief to condone the delay, as, with the expiry of period of limitation, respondents have acquired rights, which cannot be taken away. In addition to this, preliminary objection has also been
taken that the applicant has failed to establish any sufficient or exceptional cause for condonation of delay. The allegations of negligence have also been levelled against the applicant authority. 8. On the basis of the above facts, the factual position, as mentioned in the application, has been contested and a prayer has been made to dismiss the application. 9. Heard. 10. By way of award dated 07.06.2024, the objections, which were filed by the predecessorin interest of the respondents were allowed and the award passed by the Arbitrator has been set aside and matter has been remanded back for reconsideration. 11. Although, allegations of negligence have been levelled in the reply, but, considering the stand as taken in the application, that before filing the appeal before this Court, matter has been dealt with at various levels, the application is liable to be considered. 12.
Moreover, reply is totally silent about the object, which the applicant would achieve in not preferring the appeal, within the prescribed period of limitation, had he not been prevented to do so, for the reasons, as mentioned, in the application. 13. It is no longer resintegra that the Court should adopt a liberal approach while deciding the application for condonation of delay, as held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & anr. versus Mst. Katiji & others, reported in AIR 1987 Supreme Court 1353. Relevant paragraph3 of the
judgment is reproduced as under:
“3.The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 51 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression
"sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaning ful manner which subserves the ends of justicethat being the lifepurpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:
"Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period."
1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is con doned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6.
It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justiceoriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the 'State' which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a liti gant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is admin istered in an even handed manner. There is no warrant for according a stepmotherly treatment when the 'State' is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experi ence shows that on account of an impersonal machinary (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the notemaking, file pushing, and passingonthebuck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigantnongrata status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even handed justice on mertis in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time barred, is therefore. set aside. Delay is condoned.
And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on
merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides.”
14. Considering the stand taken by the applicant, in light of the aforesaid decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court is of the view that the applicant is able to make out a case for condonation of delay. Consequently, the application is allowed and delay in filing the accompanying appeal is ordered to be condoned. Application is, thus, disposed of. Arb. Appeal No. _______ of 2026
15. Vide order of the even date, passed in OMP(M) No. 9 of 2025, the delay in filing the appeal has been ordered to be condoned. Appeal be registered. 16. Service complete. 17. Call for the record. OMPST No. 48060 of 2024
18. Reply to the same, if any, be filed, on or before next date of hearing. 19. List on 23.04.2026. ( Virender Singh )
Judge 02nd April, 2026 (Pramod Kumar)