HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI **** CRIMINAL PETITON CASE No.3919 of 2025 Between: Neelam Harikrishna ...PETITIONER AND 1. State of AP rep by its PP 2. Golla Tejaswini ...RESPODENT **** DATE OF ORDER PRONOUNCED : 15.09.2025 2 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.3919 of 2025 Dated 15.09.2025 SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL: THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO 1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers may be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes/No 2. Whether the copy of Judgment may be marked to Law Reporters/Journals? Yes/No 3. Whether His Lordship wish to see the fair copy of the Judgment? Yes/No _________________________ Dr. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J 3 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.3919 of 2025 Dated 15.09.2025 * THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO + CRIMINAL PETITION CASE No.3919 of 2025 % 15.09.2025 # Between: Between: Neelam Harikrishna ...PETITIONER AND 1. The State of AP rep by its PP 2. Golla Tejaswini ...RESPODENT ! Counsel for the Petitioner :K.S.Murthy repd Sri Arun Showri. G ^Counsel for the Respondent: Assistant Public Prosecutor < Gist: The Order of the Court was delivered by Dr. Justice Y.LakshmanaRao :— For the convenience of exposition, this order is divided into the following parts :— A. CASE OF THE PROSECUTION B. CONTENTIONS OF THE COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER C. ARGUMENTS OF THE STATE D. ARGUMENTS OF THE RESPONDENT NO.2 D. POINT FOR CONSIDERATION 4 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.3919 of 2025 Dated 15.09.2025 E. ANALYSIS F. CONCLUSION > Head Note: ? Cases referred: 1) Crl.P. No.7606 of 2025 dated 07.08.2025 2) 2014 8 SCC 913 3) 2024 AHC 135775 (Neutral Citation) 4) MANU/AP/1626/2024 5) MANU/SC/8531/2006 6) Crl.P.No.7606 of 2025 dated 07.08.2025 7) Crl.P.No.2166 of 2025 dated 27.03.2025 8) MANU/SC/0787/2025 9) Spl Leave Petition (Crl.) No.7004 of 2025 10) (2023) SCC Online SC 89 11) @ SLP (Crl.) No.3475 of 2025 12) 2025 SCC OnLine SC 696 13) (2019) 9 SCC 608 14) (2020) 10 SCC 108 5 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.3919 of 2025 Dated 15.09.2025 THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL PETITION NO:3919 of 2025 ORDER: The Criminal Petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for brevity ‘the BNSS’) by the Petitioner/Accused No.1seeking for grant of pre-arrest bail in connection with Crime No.51 of 2025 of Hindupur I Town Police Station, Sri Sathya Sai District, registered for the alleged offence punishable under Section 318 (4), 69 and 351 (2) read with 3 (5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (for brevity ‘the BNS’). CASE OF THE PROSECUTION: 2. The prosecution states that on 06.03.2025, a case was registered based on a complaint by a 29 year old woman from the BC-D (Golla) community, working as a Ward Amenities Secretary in Hindupur from 2019. De-facto complainant alleges that she was in a relationship with Petitioner/Accused No.1, Neelam Harikrishna, an Assistant Engineer, who is her superior at work. According to the Complainant, Harikrishna/petitioner professed love and promised marriage, which led her to eventually enter into a relationship despite initial reluctance. She alleges that during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, while working together, he attempted to physically exploit her. In 2022, he allegedly assured mother of de-facto complainant of his intention to marry her, stating he would involve his parents after his elder sister’s marriage. Following 6 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.3919 of 2025 Dated 15.09.2025 his sister’s marriage in August 2024, the Complainant claims that Harikrishna/petitioner promised to bring his parents for marriage talks in January 2025, but failed to do so. On 24.02.2025, the petitioner allegedly told her there was no relationship and that he would be marrying someone else, asking her to move on. Additionally, his brother (Accused No.2) allegedly threatened her with false SC/ST cases if she did not leave Harikrishna/petitioner alone. A Zero FIR was initially filed at Puttaparthi Town Police Station on 04.03.2025 and later transferred on point of territorial jurisdiction to Hindupur Town Police Station, registered as Cr.No.51/2025 under Sections 318(4), 69 and 351(2) read with Section 3(5) of ‘the BNS’. Later, Section 64(2)(j) ‘the BNS.,’ was also added with the permission of the learned Magistrate during investigation. CONTENTIONS OF THE COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER: 3. Sri K.S. Murthy, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri Arun Showri, learned counsel for the Petitioner, submits that the Petitioner has been falsely implicated in the present case and has not committed any offence as alleged. The Petitioner is the sole earning member of his family, and his arrest would cause irreparable hardship to his dependents. The Petitioner is willing to abide by any condition that this Court may deem fit and proper for the grant of anticipatory bail. The Petitioner has got fixed abode. 4. The allegation of a false promise of marriage does not attract Section 318(4) of ‘the BNS.,’ as the De-facto Complainant’s own statements fail to 7 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.3919 of 2025 Dated 15.09.2025 establish the essential ingredients of the offence. Similarly, invoking Section 64(2)(j) of ‘the BNS.,’ relating to sexual intercourse by deceit requires proof of fraudulent intent from the outset, which is absent. The Complainant, who worked under the Petitioner’s supervision, was previously warned for dereliction of duty, and the Petitioner had reported her to higher authorities. This prior professional conflict indicates a possible motive for lodging a false complaint. 5. It is further submitted that there is no recovery attributable to the Petitioner and custodial detention and interrogation are not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner has cooperated with the investigation and there is no likelihood of absconding or tampering with the prosecution evidence. Therefore, it is prayed that this Court may be pleased to grant pre-arrest bail to the Petitioner/Accused No.1 in the interest of justice. ARGUMENTS OF THE ASSISTANT PUBLIC PROSECUTOR: 6. Per contra, Ms.P. Akhila Naidu, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor vehemently opposed granting of pre-arrest bail contending that the investigation is at a nascent stage and the custodial interrogation of the Petitioner is imperative for eliciting material facts. It is submitted that if the Petitioner is granted pre-arrest bail, there is a grave apprehension that he may not cooperate with the investigation and may evade the process of law. 7. The prosecution also apprehends that the Petitioner may influence witnesses or tamper with evidence, thereby obstructing the fair and impartial 8 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.3919 of 2025 Dated 15.09.2025 investigation. In view of the seriousness of the allegations and the potential risk to the progress of the investigation, it is prayed that the instant bail application be dismissed. ARGUMENTS OF THE COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT No.2: 8. Sri N. Aswartha Narayana, the learned counsel for the respondent No.2, had filed elaborated written arguments and argued to dismiss the bail application. While reiterating the arguments advanced by the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor, he submits that the petitioner is not entitled to the discretionary relief of pre-arrest bail, as he made false promise of marriage and sexually exploited for several times over several years and made her pregnant and he got it aborted intentionally. Initially, the petitioner agreed to marry de-facto complainant, but later he postponed doing so for one reason or other saying false pretexts of his father’s ill-health and his sister’s marriage. He threatened the de-facto complainant after filing complaint. He lodged ST/ST a false case against de-facto complainant and her family members. 9. The learned counsel for the 2nd respondent further argued that Section 69 of ‘the BNS.,’ squarely applicable to the acts committed by the petitioner, so he is not entitled for discretionary relief of anticipatory bail. The de-facto complainant gave a statement which was recorded under Section 164 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ wherein she specifically alleged that the petitioner on keeping a false promise of marriage sexually exploited her several times. The petitioner even after filing of the complainant with the police he threatened her with dire 9 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.3919 of 2025 Dated 15.09.2025 consequences including lodging a case under the provisions of the ST/ST Act against the de-facto complainant and her elderly family members. The petitioner from very inception of making a false promise of marriage had an intention not to marry her and sexually enjoyed her demanded Rs.50,00,000/- as dowry for him as his father required it. 10. The learned counsel for the 2nd respondent has relied on the decisions of this Court in Gadapu Ravi Teja v. State of A.P.,1 wherein, a false promise of marriage was made, sexual intercourse occurred, victim got pregnancy and got it aborted, this Court dismissed the request for grant of pre-arrest bail. 11. The petitioner has got filed statement of the de-facto complainant recorded under Section 164 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ contrary to the guidelines given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Karnataka v. Sivanna2 at para Nos.3, 5, 8, and 10.1 it is held as under: “3. We had further observed that there is a pressing need to introduce drastic amendments into CrPC in the nature of fast track procedure for Fast Track Courts when we considered just and appropriate to issue notice and called upon the Union of India to file its response as to why it should not take initiative and sincere steps for introducing necessary amendment into the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 involving trial for the charge of “rape” by directing that all the witnesses who are examined in relation to the offence and incident of rape cases should be straightaway produced preferably before the Lady Judicial Magistrate for recording their statement to be kept in sealed cover and thereafter the same be treated as evidence at the stage of trial by producing the same in record in accordance with law which may be put to test by subjecting it to cross-examination. We were and are further of the view that the statement of victim should as far as possible be recorded preferably before the Lady Judicial Magistrate under Section 164 CrPC skipping over the recording of statement by the police under Section 161 CrPC to be kept in sealed cover and thereafter the same be treated as evidence at the stage of trial which may be put to test by subjecting it to cross-examination. 1 Crl.P. No.7606 of 2025 dated 07.08.2025 2 2014 8 SCC 913 10 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.3919 of 2025 Dated 15.09.2025 5. What we wished to emphasise is that the recording of evidence of the victim and other witnesses multiple times ought to be put to an end which is the primary reason for delay of the trial. We are of the view that if the evidence is recorded for the first time itself before the Judicial Magistrate under Section 164 CrPC and the same be kept in sealed cover to be produced and treated as deposition of the witnesses and hence admissible at the stage of trial with liberty to the defence to cross-examine them with further liberty to the accused to lead his defence witness and other evidence with a right to cross-examination by the prosecution, it can surely cut short and curtail the protracted trial if it is introduced at least for trial of rape cases which is bound to reduce the duration of trial and thus offer a speedy remedy by way of a fast track procedure to the Fast Track Court to resort to. 8. We, thereafter, appointed the learned Senior Counsel Mr Shekhar Naphade and Mr U.U. Lalit, who appeared and addressed this Court. The learned Senior Advocate Mr Shekhar Naphade agreed with the suggestions given by this Court that the statement of the victim of rape and gang rape may be and should be recorded under Section 164 CrPC which should be placed on record, treated as evidence of the victim and may later be relied upon as evidence and then the accused may be given a chance to cross- examine the prosecution version and the evidence recorded at the instance of the victim. The learned Senior Counsel Mr Shekhar Naphade was good enough to give us a brief note in this regard”. 10.1. Upon receipt of information relating to the commission of offence of rape, the investigating officer shall make immediate steps to take the victim to any Metropolitan/preferably Judicial Magistrate for the purpose of recording her statement under Section 164 CrPC. A copy of the statement under Section 164 CrPC should be handed over to the investigating officer immediately with a specific direction that the contents of such statement under Section 164 CrPC should not be disclosed to any person till charge- sheet/report under Section 173 CrPC is filed”. 12. The ICDS people ought not to have furnished the information in between the petitioner and the de-facto complainant to the media. The petitioner and other accused have been purposefully avoiding the process of the investigation for more than four months. The accused No.2 who is the brother of the petitioner/accused No.1 is a practicing advocate at the instance of whom the petitioner adopting dialectic tactics to avoid the process of law. The version of the petitioner has been from forum to forum conveniently suiting to his selfish requirements. A person who has not approached this Court with clean 11 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.3919 of 2025 Dated 15.09.2025 hands is not entitled for grant of discretionary relief and urged to dismiss the petition. 13. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for both sides. I have perused the entire record. POINT FOR CONSIDERATION: 14. In the light of the case of the prosecution and the contentions of the learned Counsel for both the sides, now the point for consideration is: “Whether the Petitioner is entitled for grant of pre-arrest bail?” ANALYSIS: 15. In Jahir v. State of Uttar Pradesh3 a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Allahabad at para Nos.8 to 11 held as under: 8. In Shrikant Upadhyay and others Vs State of Bihar and another, 2024 INSC 202 has observed as under "19. The relief of Anticipatory Bail is aimed at safeguarding individual rights. While it serves as a crucial tool to prevent the misuse of the power of arrest and protects innocent individuals from harassment, it also presents challenges in maintaining a delicate balance between individual rights and the interests of justice. The tight rope we must walk lies in striking a balance between safeguarding individual rights and rotecting public interest. While the right to liberty and presumption of innocence are vital, the court must also consider the gravity of the offence, the impact on society, and the need for a fair and free investigation. The court's discretion in weighing these interests in the facts and circumstances of each individual case becomes crucial to ensure a just outcome." 9. The power of anticipatory bail is somewhat extraordinary in character and it is to be exercised only in exceptional cases where the person is falsely implicated. Though in many cases it was held that bail is said to be a rule, it cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be said that anticipatory bail is the rule. 10. The court owes duty that justice is done to all the parties (i,e accused, prosecution, informant, complainant and victim). The citizens in terms of constitutional mandate are required to abide by law. Where from the material and allegation against an accused, offence is made out, the 32024 AHC 135775 (Neutral Citation) 12 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.3919 of 2025 Dated 15.09.2025 accused is required to show exceptional circumstances warranting the protection of liberty. No circumstances have been shown by applicant(s) to demonstrate that personal liberty of accused in the facts and circumstances of the case is required to be protected. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the grant of anticipatory bail would lead to miscarriage of justice. 11. The Court is required to exercise jurisdiction of anticipatory bail on sound judicial principles. The court should be slow to grant anticipatory bail to an accused who does not abide by law and commits an offence. In the present case, it is not shown by the applicant(s) that the prosecution or complainant has falsely implicated the applicant(s). One cannot lose sight of the fact that unwarranted protection to an accused has adverse effect on the peace and tranquillity of society at large and effects maintenance of law and order in the society. The jurisdiction of anticipatory bail permits the accused to be not produced before the ordinary jurisdictional court although ordinary jurisdictional court at grass root level have greater experience and exposure with regard to situation of maintenance of law and order at the local place. The process of anticipatory bail permits consideration of anticipatory bail by Session Court or High Court and not by Magistrate courts. Facts and circumstance of each case is to be examined at the time of consideration of anticipatory bail”. 16. In Pamarthi Chaitanyeswar Ganesh v. State of Andhra Pradesh4 a learned Single Judge of this Court, in the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent, at para Nos.28 and 29 held as under. “28...The specific overt acts alleged in the first information report as well as in the statement of victim recorded by police during investigation are the petitioner was after the victim saying that he loves and intending to marry her and made a promise marry: It happened in the year 2020; The petitioner used to visit the house of victim and developed acquaintance also with the parents of the victim; Therefore, the victim believed the promise of the petitioner that he would marry her; Hence, continued the friendship with the petitioner, While so, in the month of July 2021, one day, the victim visited the flat of the petitioner, He was alone in the flat: The petitioner sexually assaulted her saying that he will marry her; The victim believed him. The petitioner continued the friendship with the victim promising that he will marry her, after completing the education; Later, after completion of education, the petitioner went to Vijayawada, promising that he will speak with his parents about marriage. “...29...Therefore, when the above allegations are considered on their face value, prima facie they show that victim consented for the relationship with the petitioner as she sincerely believed his promises to marry, from inception till he left for Vijayawada, as truthful and he marry her. It must be remembered that at relevant point both were co-students in the college and became good friends. Therefore, no reason for the girl to suspect his bona- fides at that time. In fact, it is the contention of the petitioner that he could 4MANU/AP/1626/2024 13 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.3919 of 2025 Dated 15.09.2025 not marry her due to subsequent unforeseen events which are not under his control. Truth of these allegations cannot be gone into in a quash petition”. 17. In Yedla Srinivasa Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh5 a decision relied on by the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent, at para No.11 and 12 held as under: “11...In this connection reference may be made to the amendment made in the Indian Evidence Act. Section 114A was introduced and the presumption has been raised as to the absence of consent in certain prosecutions for rape. Section 114A reads as under: Section 114A-Presumption as to the absence of consent in certain prosecutions for rape.- in a prosecution for rape under Clause (a) or Clause(b) or Clause(c) or Clause (d) or Clause (e) or Clause (g) of Sub-section (2) of Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), where sexual intercourse by the accused is proved and the question is whether it was without the consent of the woman alleged to have been raped and she states in her evidence before the court that she did not consent, the Court shall presume that she did not consent. If sexual intercourse has been committed by the accused and if it is proved that it was without the consent of the prosecutor and she states in her evidence before the court that she did not consent, the court shall presume that she did not consent. Presumption has been introduced by the legislature in the Evidence Act looking to atrocities committed against women and in the instant case as per the statement of PW, she resisted and she did not give consent to the accused at the first instance and he committed the rape on her. The accused gave her assurance that he would marry her and continued to satisfy his lust till she became pregnant and it became clear that the accused did not wish to marry her. 12. In the present case in view of the facts as mentioned above we are satisfied that the consent which had been obtained by the accused was not a voluntary one which was given by her under misconception of fact that the accused would marry her but this is not a consent in law”. 18. In Gadapu Ravi Teja v. State of Andhra Pradesh6 a learned Single Judge of this Court, a decision relied on by the respondent No.2, at para No.7 held as under: 5MANU/SC/8531/2006 6Crl.P.No.7606 of 2025 dated 07.08.2025 14 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.3919 of 2025 Dated 15.09.2025 “7...As seen from the record, the petitioner is aged about 31 years and the de facto complainant/respondent No.2 is aged about 26 years. Both are fully grown, both are working and they are educated. Because of love and affection in between them, they met physically on several occasions. Later, respondent No.2 got pregnancy. When she informed the same to the petitioner, the petitioner suggested her to get it aborted and gave some tablets. As the respondent No.2 consumed those tablets, the pregnancy got aborted. Even though, the respondent No.2 requested the petitioner to marry her, the petitioner did not oblige her request on the pretext that his mother and sister do not agree formarriage. As mentioned supra in Manthri Rahul Patnaik's case, relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner, there was no instance of the victim therein got pregnancy and it was aborted at the instance of the petitioner therein. As rightly pointed out by the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor, the facts and circumstances of Manthri Rahul Patnaik's case and the instant case are distinguishable on facts and the ratio laid down by Co-ordinate Bench of this Court cannot be followed, as there are no merits in this criminal petition for grant of pre- arrest bail to the petitioner”. 19. In Gudibanda Karteek v. State of Andhra Pradesh7 a learned Single Judge of this Court, at para No.5 held as under: 5. A perusal of the material on record goes to show that this is a case of stalking, criminalized sexual intercourse committed by deceitful means on the pretext of love and marriage, causing simple hurt and miscarriage without her consent, criminal intimidation and insulting her by naming her caste. As seen from the contents of the FIR, A1, by promising to marry the de facto complainant, had physical contact with her several times. When she became pregnant, A1 introduced his brother A2, who gave tablets to her. Trusting the words of A1 that he would marry her, she took the tablets. Later, her pregnancy was removed. When she asked A1 to marry her, A1 abused her in filthy language by touching her caste and beat her. The offences alleged against A1 are very grave in nature. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor submitted that the investigation is under progress and some more witnesses are to be examined”. 20. While citing the above reasons a learned Single Judge of this Court in Karteek supra declined to grant pre-arrest bail to the petitioner therein. 21. Sri K.S. Murthy, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri Arun Showri, learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision of the 7Crl.P.No.2166 of 2025 dated 27.03.2025 15 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.3919 of 2025 Dated 15.09.2025 Hon’ble Apex Court in Amol Bhagwan Nehul v. State of Maharashtra 8 wherein at para No.9 it is held as under: “9...In our considered view, this is also not a case where there was a false promise to marry to begin with. A consensual relationship turning sour or partners becoming distant cannot be a ground for invoking criminal machinery of the State. Such conduct not only burdens the Courts, but blots the identity of an individual accused of such a heinous offence. This Court has time and again warned against the misuse of the provisions, and has termed it a folly³ to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and prosecute a person for an offence under section 376 IPC”. 22. In Kunal Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal9 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. Learned counsel appearing for the State has relied upon the definition of 'Rape' and would argue that the consent given by the minor is no consent and it would still be a rape. In our considered opinion, as regarding the rape being committed by the appellant when the prosecutrix was a minor, there is absolutely no evidence, and definitely no forensic evidence with the prosecution. It is only an allegation in the FIR after more than 03 years, in order to make out a case under the POCSO Act, that such an act of rape was committed three years back when she was a minor. She also categorically states that she consented to the act as there was a promise of marriage by the appellant”. 23. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Naim Ahmed v. State of (NCT) of Delhi10 at para No.21 and 22 it is held as under: “”21... The bone of contention raised on behalf of the respondents is that the prosecutrix had given her consent for sexual relationship under the misconception of fact, as the accused had given a false promise to marry her and subsequently he did not marry, and therefore such consent was no consent in the eye of the law and the case fell under Clause Secondly of Section 375IPC. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that there is a difference between giving a false promise and committing breach of promise by the accused. In case of false promise, the accused right from the beginning would not have any intention to marry the prosecutrix and would have cheated or deceited the prosecutrix by giving a false promise to marry her only with a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in case of breach of promise, one cannot deny a possibility that the accused might have given a promise with all seriousness to marry her, and subsequently might have 8 MANU/SC/0787/2025 9 Spl Leave Petition (Crl.) No.7004 of 2025 10(2023) SCC Online SC 89 16 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.3919 of 2025 Dated 15.09.2025 encountered certain circumstances unforeseen by him or the circumstances beyond his control, which prevented him to fulfil his promise. So, it would be a folly to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and to prosecute a person for the offence under Section 376. As stated earlier, each case would depend upon its proved facts before the court. In the instant case, the prosecutrix who herself was a married woman having three children, could not be said to have acted under the alleged false promise given by the appellant or under the misconception of fact while giving the consent to have sexual relationship with the appellant. Undisputedly, she continued to have such relationship with him at least for about five years till she gave complaint in the year 2015. Even if the allegations made by her in her deposition before the court, are taken on their face value, then also to construe such allegations as “rape” by the appellant, would be stretching the case too far. The prosecutrix being a married woman and the mother of three children was matured and intelligent enough to understand the significance and the consequences of the moral or immoral quality of act she was consenting to. Even otherwise, if her entire conduct during the course of such relationship with the accused, is closely seen, it appears that she had betrayed her husband and three children by having relationship with the accused, for whom she had developed liking for him. She had gone to stay with him during the subsistence of her marriage with her husband, to live a better life with the accused. Till the time she was impregnated by the accused in the year 2011, and she gave birth to a male child through the loin of the accused, she did not have any complaint against the accused of he having given false promise to marry her or having cheated her. She also visited the native place of the accused in the year 2012 and came to know that he was a married man having children also, still she continued to live with the accused at another premises without any grievance. She even obtained divorce from her husband by mutual consent in 2014, leaving her three children with her husband. It was only in the year 2015 when some disputes must have taken place between them, that she filed the present complaint. The accused in his further statement recorded under Section 313CrPC had stated that she had filed the complaint as he refused to fulfil her demand to pay her huge amount. Thus, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it could not be said by any stretch of imagination that the prosecutrix had given her consent for the sexual relationship with the appellant under the misconception of fact, so as to hold the appellant guilty of having committed rape within the meaning of Section 375IPC”. 24. In Bhawar Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh11 the Hon’ble Apex Court set aside the order of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh rejecting the request for grant of pre-arrest bail to the petitioner therein, and granted pre- 11@SLP (Crl.)No.3475 of 2025 17 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.3919 of 2025 Dated 15.09.2025 arrest bail to the petitioner for the offence punishable under Section 69 of ‘the BNS’. 25. Similarly, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Kunal Chatterjee case supra also in the similar facts and circumstances of the case, granted the relief of quashing the proceedings. 26. The Hon’ble Apex Court in catena of decisions held that promise to marriage and subsequent physical relationship between the two with consent would not amount to rape. 27. In Prithivirajan v. State12 at para Nos.6 and 7 it is held as under: “6. This Court has time and again reiterated that only because physical relations were established based on a promise to marry, it will not amount to rape. For the offence of rape to be attracted, the following conditions need to be satisfied : first, the accused promised to marry the prosecutrix solely to secure consent for sexual relations without having any intention of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning; second, that the prosecutrix gave her consent for sexual relations by being directly influenced by such false promise of marriage. 7. The instant case is one of consensual relationship between the appellant and prosecutrix. Even otherwise, it does not appear from the record that the initial promise to marry allegedly made by the appellant was false to begin with. Perusal of FIR itself suggests that the alleged promise to marry could not be fulfilled by the appellant due to intervening circumstances. Consequently, the relationship ended because of which the present FIR came to be registered. Under these circumstances, letting the appellant face trial would be nothing short of an abuse of the process of the Court. This cannot be permitted”. 28. In Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra 13 at para Nos.12, 18, and 21 it is held under: “12... This Court has repeatedly held that consent with respect to Section 375 IPC involves an active understanding of the circumstances, actions and consequences of the proposed act. An individual who makes a reasoned choice to act after evaluating various alternative actions (or inaction) as well 122025 SCC OnLine SC 696 13(2019) 9 SCC 608 18 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.3919 of 2025 Dated 15.09.2025 as the various possible consequences flowing from such action or inaction, consents to such action. 18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act. 21. The allegations in the FIR do not on their face indicate that the promise by the appellant was false, or that the complainant engaged in sexual relations on the basis of this promise. There is no allegation in the FIR that when the appellant promised to marry the complainant, it was done in bad faith or with the intention to deceive her. The appellant's failure in 2016 to fulfil his promise made in 2008 cannot be construed to mean the promise itself was false. The allegations in the FIR indicate that the complainant was aware that there existed obstacles to marrying the appellant since 2008, and that she and the appellant continued to engage in sexual relations long after their getting married had become a disputed matter. Even thereafter, the complainant travelled to visit and reside with the appellant at his postings and allowed him to spend his weekends at her residence. The allegations in the FIR belie the case that she was deceived by the appellant's promise of marriage. Therefore, even if the facts set out in the complainant's statements are accepted in totality, no offence under Section 375 IPC has occurred”. 29. In Maheshwar Tigga v. State of Jharkhand14 at para Nos.10, 12, 13, 14, and 18 it is held as under: “10...The appellant belonged to the Scheduled Tribe while the prosecutrix belonged to the Christian community. They professed different religious beliefs in a traditional society. They both resided in the same Village Basjadi and were known to each other. The nature and manner of allegations, coupled with the letters exchanged between them, marked as exhibits during the trial, make it apparent that their love for each other grew and matured over a sufficient period of time. They were both smitten by each other and passions of youth ruled over their minds and emotions. The physical relations that followed was not isolated or sporadic in nature, but regular over the years. The prosecutrix had even gone and resided in the house of the appellant. In our opinion, the delay of four years in lodgement of the FIR, at an opportune time of seven days prior to the appellant solemnising his marriage with another girl, on the pretext of a promise to the prosecutrix raises serious doubts about the truth and veracity of the allegations levelled by the prosecutrix. The entire genesis of the case is in serious doubt in view of the admission of the prosecutrix in cross- examination that no incident had occurred on 9-4-1999. 14(2020) 10 SCC 108 19 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.3919 of 2025 Dated 15.09.2025 12. The prosecutrix acknowledged that an engagement ceremony had also been performed. She further deposed that the marriage between them could not be solemnised because they belonged to different religions. She was therefore conscious of this obstacle all along, even while she continued to establish physical relations with the appellant. If the appellant had married her, she would not have lodged the case. She denied having written any letters to the appellant, contrary to the evidence placed on record by the defence. The amorous language used by both in the letters exchanged reflect that the appellant was serious about the relationship desiring to culminate the same into marriage. But unfortunately for societal reasons, the marriage could not materialise as they belonged to different communities. 13. The question for our consideration is whether the prosecutrix consented to the physical relationship under any misconception of fact with regard to the promise of marriage by the appellant or was her consent based on a fraudulent misrepresentation of marriage which the appellant never intended to keep since the very inception of the relationship. If we reach the conclusion that he intentionally made a fraudulent misrepresentation from the very inception and the prosecutrix gave her consent on a misconception of fact, the offence of rape under Section 375 IPC is clearly made out. It is not possible to hold in the nature of evidence on record that the appellant obtained her consent at the inception by putting her under any fear. Under Section 90 IPC a consent given under fear of injury is not a consent in the eye of the law. In the facts of the present case, we are not persuaded to accept the solitary statement of the prosecutrix that at the time of the first alleged offence her consent was obtained under fear of injury. 14. Under Section 90 IPC, a consent given under a misconception of fact is no consent in the eye of the law. But the misconception of fact has to be in proximity of time to the occurrence and cannot be spread over a period of four years. It hardly needs any elaboration that the consent by the appellant was a conscious and informed choice made by her after due deliberation, it being spread over a long period of time coupled with a conscious positive action not to protest. The prosecutrix in her letters to the appellant also mentions that there would often be quarrels at her home with her family members with regard to the relationship, and beatings given to her. 18. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the facts and circumstances of the present case and are of the considered opinion that the appellant did not make any false promise or intentional misrepresentation of marriage leading to establishment of physical relationship between the parties. The prosecutrix was herself aware of the obstacles in their relationship because of different religious beliefs. An engagement ceremony was also held in the solemn belief that the societal obstacles would be overcome, but unfortunately differences also arose whether the marriage was to solemnised in the church or in a temple and ultimately failed. It is not possible to hold on the evidence available that the appellant right from the inception did not intend to marry the prosecutrix ever and had fraudulently misrepresented only in order to establish physical relation with her. The prosecutrix in her letters acknowledged that the appellant's family was always very nice to her”. 20 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.3919 of 2025 Dated 15.09.2025 30. Following are the relevant dates and events concerning the petitioner and the 2nd respondent: The petitioner, aged about 33 years, belongs to the Scheduled Caste (Mala) community and is employed as an Assistant Engineer, Gunthakal Municipal Office. The 2nd respondent, aged about 29 years, belongs to the Backward Class (Golla) community and is working as Secretary, Ward Amenities, Mukkidipeta, Hindupur Municipal Office. As per the averments in the FIR and other documents, it appears that in December 2019, the petitioner proposed to the 2nd respondent, but she rejected it. In February 2020, he again made a similar proposal. In May 2020, during the lockdown period, while on inspection at Ajijia Urdu Primary School, the first sexual intercourse took place between the petitioner and the 2nd respondent. This physical relationship continued on several occasions until June 2024. 31. The petitioner was also preparing for the UPSC examinations. In August 2022, he approached the parents of the 2nd respondent regarding marriage, but her mother asked him to bring his parents to discuss the alliance. Initially, on 06.03.2025, an FIR was registered against the petitioner and others for offences under Sections 318(4), 69, and 351 of ‘the BNS’. Later, on 07.03.2025, Section 64(2)(j) of ‘the BNS.,’ was also added. While their relationship was subsisting, the petitioner gifted jewellery to the 2nd respondent. They also had intercourse on several occasions at different locations, including private residences of their known persons. 21 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.3919 of 2025 Dated 15.09.2025 32. On 04.03.2025, a counselling session between the petitioner and the 2nd respondent was conducted, but it failed. No proof or specific averments were made by the 2nd respondent regarding the exact month or year of pregnancy, the date of abortion, or the pills allegedly used. 33. As observed above, both the petitioner and the 2nd respondent are educated and sufficiently matured individuals who have been working in government establishments for a quite long time. Their physical relationship continued over a period of more than three years at various places. 34. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Prithivirajan supra observed that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that merely because physical relations were established on a promise to marry, it would not, by itself, amount to rape. In the present case also, the relationship between the petitioner and respondent No.2 appears to have been consensual. It does not emerge from the record that the initial promise allegedly made by the petitioner to marry respondent No.2 was false from the very beginning. The petitioner and respondent No.2 belong to two different communities. Respondent No.2 herself stated in her complaint that the petitioner postponed the marriage once due to his father’s ill health and on another occasion due to his sister’s marriage. There is no allegation in the FIR lodged by respondent No.2 specifying the date on which the petitioner promised to marry her, nor is there any assertion that the promise was made in bad faith or with an intention to deceive her. 22 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.3919 of 2025 Dated 15.09.2025 35. Furthermore, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Amol Bhagawan Nehul supra observed that a consensual relationship that later turns sour, or partners subsequently becoming distant, cannot by itself justify invoking the criminal machinery of the State. The alleged misconception of fact of the petitioner has spread over a period of three years. 36. Considering the ratio lay down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Kunal Chatterjee, Prithivirajan, Pramod Suryabhan Pawar, Naim Ahmed, and Maheshwar Tigga supra, the gravity and nature of the allegations levelled against the petitioner/Accused No.1 is entitled for grant of pre-arrest bail, but with the following stringent conditions. 37. Further in view of the facts and circumstances, the investigating officer is required expedite the process of investigation as early as possible. CONCLUSION: 38. In the result, the Criminal Petition is allowed with the following conditions: i. In the event of his arrest, the Petitioner/Accused No.1 shall be enlarged on bail subject to the executing a personal bond for a sum of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand Only), with two sureties for the like sum each to the satisfaction of the arresting police officials; ii. The Petitioner/Accused No.1 shall make himself available for investigation as and when required; 23 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.3919 of 2025 Dated 15.09.2025 iii. The Petitioner/Accused No.1 shall not cause any threat, inducement or promise to the prosecution witnesses; iv. The Petitioner/Accused No.1 shall appear before the Station House Officer concerned once in a week i.e., on every Saturday between 10.00 a.m. and 5.00 p.m., till filing of the charge sheet. v. The Petitioner/Accused No.1 shall not leave the limits of the state without the express permission from the Station House Officer concerned. vi. The petitioner and the 2nd respondent shall not express their views about the merits or demerits of this case either before the print media or electronic media until the conclusion of the trial. vii. The Petitioner/Accused No.1 shall surrender his passport, if any, to the investigating officer. If he claims that he does not have passport, he shall submit an affidavit to that effect to the Investigating Officer. 39. However, it is made clear that the observations made above were only confined to the disposal of the Criminal Petition and in no way be construed to have an expression on the merits of the case before the learned Trial Court _________________________ DR. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J Date: 15.09.2025. Note: LR copy to be marked. B/o KMS 24 Dr.YLR, J Crl.P.No.3919 of 2025 Dated 15.09.2025 THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL PETITION No.3919 of 2025 Date: 15.09.2025. Note: LR copy to be marked. B/o KMS