1 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 1247 of 2025 Mohammed Mateen Ahamed S/o Moh. Ebrahim Qureshi Aged About 37 Years, R/o Village Nurani Chowk Sadar Uttar Word No. 14, Tehsil And District Dhamtari Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through The District Magistrate, Mahasamund, (Police Station, Patewa), District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent For Petitioner : Mr. Virendra Kashyap, Advocate For Respondent : Mr. Pranjal Shukla, P.L. Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal Order on Board 11.07.2025 1. The present petition under Section u/s 528 of BNSS has been filed against the order dated 28.02.2025 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Mahasamund (C.G.) in Criminal Revision No.H-09/2025 affirming the order dated 28.01.2025 passed by the JMFC, Mahasamund in Criminal Digitally signed by BHOLA NATH KHATAI Date: 2025.07.16 16:45:41 +0530 2 Case No.21/2025 whereby the application filed by the petitioner for interim custody of the seized vehicle i.e. Pickup bearing registration No. CG 23 F 4550 was rejected. 2. The petitioner is the registered owner of the said vehicle, which he had given to accused Gulam Hussain on rent for 11 months from 05.11.2024 to 05.10.2025, for which an agreement was also executed between them. On 10.11.2024, the said vehicle was found cruelly transporting 6 cows from Mahasamund (CG) to Orissa. Hence, the vehicle was seized by the police and a case was registered for the offence under Sections 4, 6, 10 of the Chhattisgarh Agricultural Cattle Preservation Act and Section 11 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act in Crime No. 182/2024 at Police Station Patewa, District Mahasamund. 3. An application was moved by the present petitioner before the JMFC, Mahasamund for releasing the seized vehicle on Supurdnama which was rejected vide order dated 28.01.2025 on the ground that the vehicle was seized on 11.11.2024 and as per Section 6 (3) Chhattisgarh Agricultural Cattle Preservation Act, 2004 (for short, “the Act of 2004”), there is no provision for releasing the seized vehicle on Supurdnama before six months from the date of seizure. Against the said order of the trial Court, the petitioner preferred a criminal revision before the Sessions 3 Judge, Mahasamund which was rejected vide impugned order dated 28.02.2025 affirming the order of the trial Court. Hence, this petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that Section 6(3) of the Act of 2004 would attract when cattle are transported for the purpose of slaughter in contravention of the provisions of the Act of 2004 or with the knowledge that it will be likely to be slaughtered. If there is no allegation of slaughter and the cattle are being transported for a valid purpose, then Section 6 (3) of the Act of 2004 would not apply and interim custody can be granted immediately based on the merits of the matter. In this case, there is no allegation of transporting the agricultural cattle for the purpose of slaughter even in the entire prosecution case, the place in the state of Orissa where the cattle were being transported is not reflected, therefore, bar under section 6(3) of the Act of 2004 would not apply. Even otherwise, the vehicle involved in the present case was seized on 11.11.2024 and now the period of six months has already elapsed, therefore, this Court may order for releasing the vehicle on Supurdnama. 5. On the other hand, learned State counsel vehemently opposes the submission made by learned counsel for the appellant and supported the impugned order. 4 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 7. The Act of 2004 has been enacted in the interest of the general public and to maintain communal harmony and peace, for prohibition of slaughter of agricultural cattle. Section 6 of the Act of 2004 provides prohibition on transport of agricultural cattle for slaughter. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice the provisions contained in Section 6 of the Act of 2004 which reads as under: - “6. Prohibition on transport of Agricultural cattle for slaughter:— (1) No person shall sell, or transport or offer to transport or cause to be transported any Agricultural cattle from any place within the state to any place within the state or outside the State, for the purpose of its slaughter in contravention of the provision of this Act or with the knowledge that it will be or is likely to be, so slaughtered. (2) Whenever any person transports or causes to be transported in contravention of provisions of sub- section (1) any agricultural cattle as specified in the Schedule, such vehicle or any conveyance used in transporting such animal along with such agricultural cattle shall be liable to be seized by such authority or officer as the State Government may appoint in this behalf. 5 (3) The vehicle or conveyance so seized under sub- section (2) shall not be released by the order of the court on bond or surety before the expiry of six months from the date of such seizure or till the final judgment of the court, whichever is earlier and such vehicle shall also be liable for confiscation at the end of the trial.” 8. A focused perusal of Section 6(1) of the Act of 2004, would show that the provision bars transport, possession and sale of cattle for the purpose of slaughter or with the knowledge that the same may be slaughtered. Mere transport of cattle from one place to another for the purpose other than slaughter is not barred under the Act and in that case the provision under Section 6(3) of the Act of 2004 would not be applicable. 9. It is well settled law that penal statutes are to be strictly construed. When a specific word has been inserted by the legislature, the provision cannot be given a different meaning. In the matter of W. H. King v. Republic of India and another1, their Lordships of the Supreme Court pertinently observed as under:- “10. As the statute creates an offence and imposes a penalty of fine and imprisonment, the words of the section must be strictly construed in favour of the subject. We are not concerned so much with what might possibly have been intended as with 1 AIR 1952 SC 156 6 what has been actually said in and by the language employed.” 10. Similarly, in the matter of State of West Bengal and others v. Swapan Kumar Guha and others2, the Supreme Court held as under: - “15. … when it is said that penal statutes must be construed strictly, what is meant is that the court must see that the thing charged is an offence within the plain meaning of the words used and it must not strain the words : “To put it in other words, the rule of strict construction requires that the language of a statute should be so construed that no case shall be held to fall within it which does not come within the reasonable interpretation of the statute”, and that in case of doubt, the construction favourable to the subject should be preferred. But I do not think that this rule of strict interpretation of penal statutes in any way affects the fundamental principle of interpretation, that the primary test which can safely be applied is the language used in the Act and, therefore, when the words are clear and plain, the court must accept the expressed intention of the legislature. ...” 11. The pari materia provision contained in clause (4) of Section 6(A) of the Bombay Animal Preservation Act, 1954 came up for consideration before the Gujarat High Court in Ravidasbhai Segjibhai Vasava v. State of Gujarat, 2024 SCC OnLine Guj 14545 in which the Gujarat High Court 2 (1982) 1 SCC 561 7 considering the issue identical as involved in the present case held that clause (4) of Section 6(A) would apply only in a case where the animals are being transported for the purpose of slaughter. It has been observed in paragraphs 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the report as under: - “10. The plain reading of section 6(A) clause (1) would indicate that the same is applicable in a case where it is found that the animals were being transported from any place within the State to any other place within the State for the purpose of slaughter in contravention of the provisions of the Act or with the knowledge that they were likely to be slaughtered. There is a proviso to section 6(A) clause (1) which provides that a person shall be deemed to be transporting such animal for the purpose of slaughter unless contrary is proved thereto to the satisfaction of the concerned authority or officer by such person or he has obtained a permission under sub- section (2) for transporting the animal for bona fide agricultural or animal husbandry purpose. 11. Clause (4) to section 6(A) puts a restriction so far as the release of the vehicle is concerned for a period of six months. 12. It is, therefore, manifest that section 6(A) clause (4) would apply only in a case where the animals are being transported for the purpose of slaughter. 13. It is not in dispute so far as the present case is concerned that no permit was obtained by the petitioner herein as the registered owner of the vehicle for the purpose of transport. However, at the same time, the prosecution has to, prima facie, show something that the transport of the cattle was for the purpose of slaughter. For such purpose, I inquired with Mr. Dabhi, the learned APP, regarding the materials collected by the police in the course of investigation. Mr. Dabhi has fairly submitted that there is 8 nothing to show that the cattle were being transported for the purpose of slaughter. It appears that there is no investigation in that direction. If it is the case of the prosecution that the cattle were being transported for the purpose of slaughter, then at least, it is expected from the investigating officer to investigate at which place they were being taken and were to be handed over to whom for the purpose of slaughter. There is nothing in that regard. In the absence of such material, in my view, the prosecution cannot straight way take recourse to the deeming fiction as provided under section 6(A)(1). In such circumstances, I am of the view that there should not be any legal impediment in releasing the vehicle before the expiry of the statutory time period i.e six months.” 12. Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of the aforesaid legal position and the principle of law flowing from the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Ravidasbhai Segjibhai Vasava (supra), it is established legal position that if the agricultural cattle is being transported for the purpose of slaughter in contravention of the Act of 2004, bar under Section 6(3) would apply and vehicle cannot be released on interim custody for a period of six months or till the judgment is pronounced whichever is earlier, but mere transportation of agricultural cattle from one place to another for the purpose other than slaughter is not an offence under the said Act and in case Section 6(1) of the Act of 2004 is not attracted, bar contained in Section 6(3) of the Act would not attract and interim custody can be 9 granted without waiting for the period of six months as provided. 13. A careful perusal of the order impugned and other documents annexed with the petition would show that the prosecution or the investigating agency at no place has alleged that the petitioner’s vehicle was being used to transport the cattle for the purpose of slaughter in contravention of the provisions of the Act, specifically Section 6(1) of the Act of 2004. Case of the prosecution in sum and substance is that the petitioner’s vehicle was being used to carry the cattle from Mahasamund (CG) to Orissa i.e. from one place to another and it was not in contravention of Section 6(1) of the Act of 2004. In the entire prosecution case, no specific place in Orissa has been mentioned where the cattle were being transported. 14. In the Animal Health Certificate dated 10-11-2024, the Senior Veterinary Officer, Veterinary Hospital, Mahasamund, has certified that all the six cattle are in healthy condition. Therefore, it cannot be said that the agricultural cattle were in bad / injured condition to attract the definition of “slaughter” so as to apply the bar contained in Section 6(3) of the Act of 2004. 15. In that view of the matter, the impugned orders passed by the trial Court and affirmed by learned revisional Court are 10 hereby set aside. It is held that bar under Section 6(3) of the Act of 2004 is not at all attracted. Even otherwise, now the period of six months has already elapsed. Hence, in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai v. State of Gujarat, (2002) 10 SCC 283, the petitioner would be entitled for the custody of the vehicle till the conclusion of trial. Accordingly, the trial Court is directed to give the interim custody of the vehicle to the petitioner by imposing reasonable conditions. The vehicle shall be released within seven days from the date of complying with the conditions imposed by the trial Court. 16. The petition is allowed to the extent indicated herein- above. Sd/- (Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal) Judge Khatai