2025:JHHC:24773 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P. (S) No. 7425 of 2017 --------- Ugani Devi, W/o Late Karu Bhuian, resident of village Hisri, P.O Dalho, P.S Samaria, District – Hazaribagh. ......Petitioner Versus 1. Bharat Coking Coal Limited through its Chairman cum Managing Director, Koyla Bhawan P.O Koyla a Director Koyla Bhawan P.O Koyla Nagar P.S Saraidhella, District - Dhanbad. 2. Director (Personnel), Bharat Coking Coal Limited, Koyla Bhawan, P.O Koyla Nagar, P.S Saraidhella, District Dhanbad. 3. General Manager, P.B Area, Bharat Coking Coal Limited, P.O and P.S Kerkend, District - Dhanbad. 4. Project Officer, Pootkee Colliery, P.B. Area, Bharat Coking Coal Limited, P.O and P.S Kerkend, District Dhanbad. .....Respondents --------- CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN --------- For the Petitioner : Mrs. Saumya S. Pandey, Advocate For the Resp.-BCCL : Mr. Anoop Kumar Mehta, Advocate --------- 08/Dated:-11.08.2025 1. Heard learned counsels for the parties. 2. The instant writ application has been preferred by the petitioner praying therein for the following reliefs: (A) For issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the Reasoned Order dated 15/18.11.2016(Annexure-8), passed by the Project Officer, Pootkee Colliery whereby her claim for payment of monetary compensation has been declined. (B) For issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding upon the respondents to make payment of monetary compensation along with arrears from the date of death of her husband in terms of clause 9.5.0 of the NCWA. 3. The brief facts of the case are that the husband of the petitioner Late Karu Bhuian was a permanent employee of the respondent company and he was working as a General Mazdoor in Pootkee Colliery of M/s BCCL and on 26.05.1994 he died in harness. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an application dated 18.12.1994 (Annexure-1) before the Project Officer Pootkee 2025:JHHC:24773 2 Colliery for her appointment on compassionate ground. Thereafter, the petitioner was directed to resubmit her application after proper rectification after which the petitioner again submitted the requisite documents on 10.09.1996/04.10.1996 (Annexure-3). Thereafter, the Rastriya Colliery Mazdoor Sangh requested the Director (Personnel), BCCL to look into the matter and appoint the petitioner on compassionate ground on 23.02.2008 vide Annexure-4. An Advocate Notice dated 09.12.2011 (Annexure-5) was also sent to the General Manager, P.B. Area, BCCL. On 27.08.2012 vide Annexure-6, the claim of the petitioner for her appointment has been rejected on the ground that till date, no application for appointment has been submitted and more than 18 years have elapsed since the date of death of her husband. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred W.P. (S) No. 5226 of 2014 which was disposed of on 20.05.2016 granting liberty to the petitioner to file a fresh representation. Thereafter, on 08.07.2016, the petitioner filed her representation. Finally, vide Annexure-8 dated 15/18.11.2016, the claim of the petitioner has been declined on the ground that application for payment of monetary compensation has to be made within 18 months from the date of death of the employee and she made an application for her appointment through her petition dated 10.08.2012 which was hopelessly time barred. 2025:JHHC:24773 3 4. At the outset, Mrs. Saumya S. Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioner confines her argument only on the question of monetary compensation and referred to the judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No.657 of 2018 titled Gangia Devi Vs. M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Ors., wherein the Division Bench of this Court has held that in absence of any stipulation made in NCWA-V, under clause 9.5.0, the writ petitioner-Gangia Devi was entitled to get monetary compensation from the date of death of her husband. 5. Relying upon the aforesaid judgment learned counsel submits that the respondents may be directed to pay the monetary compensation. 6. A counter affidavit has been filed in this case. Mr. Anoop Kumar Mehta, learned counsel for the respondent-BCCL relying upon the counter affidavit opposes the prayer for compassionate appointment and also monetary benefit. Mr. Mehta further submits that the claim of the petitioner for monetary compensation is hit by the principle of delay and laches; however, he could not dispute the fact that in the case of Gangia Devi (supra), there was a specific direction given by the Division Bench with regard to the payment of compensation. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after going through the prayer made in the instant writ application and also the subsequent argument with regard to monetary compensation only, it appears that the Division Bench of this Court after considering several judgments has allowed the case of 2025:JHHC:24773 4 the petitioner-Gangia Devi for payment on monetary compensation. For brevity para 5 to 10 of the aforesaid judgment is quoted hereinbelow: “5.This Court after having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on appreciation of rival submissions advanced on their behalf as also the materials available on record vis-à-vis the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge, deem it fit and proper first to refer the provision of National Coal Wage Agreement which was applicable during the time of death of deceased employee, for ready reference, relevant provisions as contained under Clause-9.3.1, 9.3.3 and 9.5.0 are being referred herein, which reads as hereunder:- “9.3.1 Employment would be provided to one dependent of the workers who are disabled permanently and also those who die while in service. 9.3.3 The dependant for this purpose means the wife/husband as the case may be unmarried daughter, son and legally adopted son. If no such direct dependant is available for employment, brother, widowed daughter/widowed daughter-in-law or son-in-law of the employee may be considered. In so far as female dependants are concerned, their employment would be governed by the provisions of Clause 9.5.0. Clause 9.5.0 of N.C.W.A.-V stipulates the following:- (i) In case of death due to mine accident, the female dependant would have the option to either accept the monetary compensation of Rs.3,000/- per month or employment irrespective of age. (ii) In case of death/total permanent disablement due to cause other than mine accident and medical unfitness under clause 9.4.0., if the female dependant is below the age of 45 years she will have the option to accept the monetary compensation of Rs.2,000/- per month or employment. In case the female dependant is above 45 years of age she will be entitled to monetary compensation and not for employment. 6. We after appreciating the provisions of National Coal Wage agreement have found therefrom that it is a bipartite agreement entered in between the authorities of Coal India Limited, to which, the respondentB.C.C.L. is one of the subsidiary and the trade unions other than in course of conciliation which means that bipartite agreement will be treated to be an agreement within the meaning of Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and as such, the nature of agreement is having its statutory fervor, as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mohan Mahto Vs. Central Coalfield Ltd. & Ors., reported in (2007) 8 SCC 549. This Court, therefore, is of the view that since bipartite agreement by way of National Coal Wage Agreement is having statutory fervor, therefore, the same is to be followed in its strict sense by the respective parties i.e., its signatories. It is evident from the condition as contained under Clause 9.5.0. of N.C.W.A.-V, wherein it has been agreed to provide immediate relief to the dependent of the bereaved family in case of death of deceased employee in harness, two modes have been provided to provide the said relief by way of providing employment on compassionate ground if the dependent is found to be eligible and less than 45 years of age or by way of monetary compensation. The issue as to whether the monetary compensation would be paid from the date of death or from the date of making an application is involved herein. 2025:JHHC:24773 5 It is evident from the conditions stipulated in N.C.W.A. as under Clause-9.5.0, wherein a condition of entitlement to receive monetary compensation has been made, meaning thereby, there is no stipulation made therein that the wife of the deceased employee will only be entitled to get the monetary compensation if she files an application for getting such monetary compensation, and if entitlement has been made in the agreement which has got statutory force irrespective of the fact that the application has been submitted or not, the wife of the deceased employee would be entitled to get the monetary compensation. 7. It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that when a statute provides that a particular thing should be done, it should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any other way. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Singhara Singh and Ors., reported in AIR (1964) SC 358, wherein it has been held at paragraph 8 as under: “....its result is that if a statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid down the method in which that power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than that which has been prescribed. The principle behind the rule is that if this were not so, the statutory provision might as well not have been enacted....” Reference has also made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Babu Verghese and Ors. vs. Bar Council of Kerala and Ors., reported in (1999) 3 SCC 422, wherein it has been at paragraphs 31 & 32 as under: “31. It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. The origin of this rule is traceable to the decision in Taylor v. Taylor which was followed by Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor who stated as under: “[W]here a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all.” 32. This rule has since been approved by this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of V.P. and again in Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan. These cases were considered by a three-judge bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh and the rule laid down in Nazir Ahmad case was again upheld. This rule has since been applied to the exercise of jurisdiction by courts and has also been recognized as a statutory principle of administrative law.” Reference to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court also needs to be made in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai vs. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala & Ors., reported in (2002) 1 SCC 633, wherein it has been held at paragraph 27 as under: “..... it is a normal rule of consideration that when a statute vests certain power in an authority to be exercised in a particular manner then the said authority has to exercise it only in the manner provided in the statute itself....” Reference has also made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ambay Cements & Anr., reported in (2005) 1 SCC 368, wherein it has been held at paragraph 26 as under: “....it is the cardinal rule of interpretation that where a statute provides that a particular thing should be done, it should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any other way. It is also settled rule of interpretation that where a statute is penal in character, it must be strictly construed and followed.....” Reference has also made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Zuari Cement Ltd. vs. Regional Director ESIC Hyderabad & Ors. (in Civil Appeal No.5138-40/2007), reported in (2015) 7 SCC 690, wherein it has been held at paragraph 14 as 2025:JHHC:24773 6 under: “14. As per the scheme of the Act, the appropriate Government alone could grant or refuse exemption. When the statute prescribed the procedure for grant or refusal of exemption from the operation of the Act, it is to be done in that manner and not in any other manner. In State of Jharkhand v. Ambay Cements, it was held that: (SCC p. 378, para 26) 26.... it is the cardinal rule of interpretation that where a statute provides that a particular thing should be done, it should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any other way.” It is the settled position of law that a thing is required to be done strictly in pursuance to the provisions of law, if any deviation, then ultimately the provision as contained under the statute will have no effect. Herein also the National Coal Wage Agreement as under Clause9.5.0, there is no stipulation made about the date of making payment of monetary compensation and as such, the respondents cannot be allowed to interpret the aforesaid conditions about making payment of monetary compensation from the date of application and not from the date of death. It is further evident that payment of monetary compensation is to be made on account of death of deceased employee, therefore, the cause of action for disbursement of monetary compensation, according to our considered view, will be the death of employee and hence, the cause of action will be said to accrue from the date of death. In view thereof, the contention which has been agitated by the learned counsel for the respondent-B.C.C.L. defending the impugned order, whereby and whereunder, the monetary compensation has been directed to be paid from the date of application is having no force, for the reason that the authorities of the B.C.C.L. cannot be allowed to insert anything which is not available under the statute as the agreement by way of N.C.W.A. has got statutory force under the provision of Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, therefore, the paramount consideration is to be looked into, will be the cause of action to get the amount of compensation. Since the monetary compensation is to be paid in consequence of death of deceased employee and therefore, the cause of action would be on the date when the death of deceased employee will occur and in that view of the matter, the wife of the deceased employee or the husband as the case may be, will be entitled to get the monetary compensation from the date of death and not from the date of application. The appellant-writ petitioner has relied upon the judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Putul Devi Vrs. M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and Ors., reported in (2012) (1) JCR 436(Jharkhand), wherein also the monetary of compensation has been decided to be paid from the date of death. So far as the fact of the case is concerned, admittedly the husband of the appellant-writ petitioner has died on 11.04.1996 and immediately thereafter the application was filed by the son of deceased employee for consideration of his case for appointment on compassionate ground but the same has been rejected on 06/07.06.2000. The writ petitioner has approached to the authority by filing an application on 06.11.2002 for disbursement of monetary compensation but having not been disbursed, writ petition has been filed, wherein direction for payment of monetary compensation has been passed payable with effect from the date of application. 8. This Court on the basis of the discussion made hereinabove and considering the fact that there is no stipulation made in the National Coal Wage Agreement-V that monetary compensation will be paid from the date of application, as has been discussed above, it can safely be construed that the monetary compensation would be paid from the date of cause of action i.e., on the date of death of deceased employee. Further, there cannot be any addition in the National Coal Wage 2025:JHHC:24773 7 Agreement-V at the end of the respondents-authorities making the monetary compensation payable from the date of application. 9. In absence of any such stipulation made in the National Coal Wage Agreement-V as under Clause-9.5.0, we are of the view that the appellantwrit petitioner is entitled to get the monetary compensation from the date of death of her husband i.e., the deceased employee with effect from 11.04.1996 and as such, the order passed by the learned Single Judge to the effect holding therein the appellant-writ petitioner entitle for monetary compensation with effect from the date of application, is not sustainable in the eye of law. 10. Accordingly, that part of the order is, hereby quashed and set aside.” Emphasis Supplied 8. After going through the aforesaid judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court, there is no hesitation in holding that the Petitioner is entitled for the monetary compensation from the date of death of her husband. 9. Now coming to the argument of Mr. Mehta with regard to delay and laches, it is pertinent to mention here that this is a Social Security Scheme and further it arises out of the terms and conditions of the agreement where there is no negative covenant that a person will have to apply within a specified period. Moreover, this stand of the Respondents has been dealt with in details in the above referred judgment. For brevity, the same is reproduced herein below:- “6. .....It is evident from the conditions stipulated in N.C.W.A. as under Clause-9.5.0, wherein a condition of entitlement to receive monetary compensation has been made, meaning thereby, there is no stipulation made therein that the wife of the deceased employee will only be entitled to get the monetary compensation if she files an application for getting such monetary compensation, and if entitlement has been made in the agreement which has got statutory force irrespective of the fact that the application has been submitted or not, the wife of the deceased employee would be entitled to get the monetary compensation…..” 10. Having regard to the aforesaid discussions, the impugned order dated 15/18.11.2016 (Annexure-8), is quashed and set aside. The Respondents are directed to calculate the 2025:JHHC:24773 8 monetary compensation calculating it from the date of death of the erstwhile employee till date and pay the same to the petitioner within a period of 16 weeks from the date of receipt/production of copy of this order. 11. Accordingly, the instant writ application stands allowed. Pending I.A., if any, also stands closed. (Deepak Roshan, J.) vikas/- A . F . R .