APHC010777422016 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3367] FRIDAY ,THE TWENTY EIGHTH DAY OF FEBRUARY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE V SRINIVAS CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NOS: 245 & 246 OF 2016 Between in Crl.R.C.No.245 of 2016: Chilukuri Tri Venkatanarayana Murthy, W.g.dt., ...PETITIONER AND The State Of Ap Rep Pp Anr and Others ...RESPONDENT(S) Between in Crl.R.C.No.246 of 2016: Cheemalamudi Venkateswar Rao, W.g.dist. ...PETITIONER AND The State Of Ap Rep Pp Anr and Others ...RESPONDENT(S) Counsel for the Petitioner: DASARI S V V S V PRASAD Counsel for the Respondent(S): 1. C SHARAN REDDY 2. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (AP) The Court made the following: COMMON JUDGMENT: Assailing the orders dated 21.12.2015 in Crl.M.P.No.9069 of 2015 in C.C.No.367 of 2014 and Crl.M.P.No.9068 of 2015 in C.C.No.177 of 2014 on the file of the Special Mobile Court of learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class at Eluru, the 2 petitioner/accused filed the Criminal Revision Case Nos.245 and 246 of 2016 under Section 397 r/w.401 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “Cr.P.C.”) respectively. 2. Since common question of law involved in both the criminal revisions, the parties in both the revision cases are one and the same, the same are being disposed of by way of this common judgment. 3. It is required to be noted that during the pendency of these revision cases, an interim stay of all further proceedings in the main calendar cases before the Trial Court until further orders was granted, vide order dated 01.05.2019. 4. The shorn of necessary facts leading to prefer the present criminal revision cases are that: i). The petitioner in both the revision cases is the accused in the complaints filed against him by the complainant/respondent No.2 herein for the offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. ii). During the pendency of the said matters, the revision petitioner/accused has filed petitions in both the matters under Section 45 of the Evidence Act requesting the Trial Court to send the documents in question to the Forensic 3 Laboratory for obtaining the opinion of the expert by stating that the handwriting of the date mentioned in the respective cheques is not that of petitioner and the ink used for execution of promissory note and the remaining the portion of the cheques is different and the difference can be proved through handwriting expert. 5. 5. The said petitions were dismissed by the Trial Court by giving reasons and following the pronouncement of this Court and held that when the application for seeking opinion of the expert is filed at a belated stage without availing the earliest opportunity, the application is not maintainable under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act. 6. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner/accused preferred the present criminal revision cases. 7. Heard Smt.K.Srilakshmi, learned counsel representing by Sri Dasari S.V.V.S.V.Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused and Sri Md.Ismail, learned counsel representing Sri C.Sharan Reddy, learned counsel for the respondent No.2/complainant. 8. Now the point that arises for determination in this revision is “whether there is any manifest error of law or flagrant 4 miscarriage of justice in the findings recorded by the Trial Court?” 9. It is the only contention of the revision petitioner/accused that the handwriting of the date mentioned in the respective cheques is not that of petitioner/accused and the ink used for execution of promissory note and the remaining portion of the cheque is different, thereby, required to send the same for expert report. 10. Now, it is relevant to refer the categorical observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Oriental Bank of Commerce v. Prabodh Kumar Tewari1, that “…..the fact that the details in the cheque have been filled up not by the drawer, but by some other person would be immaterial. The presumption which arises on the signing of the cheque cannot be rebutted merely by the report of a hand-writing expert. Even if the details in the cheque have not been filled up by drawer but by another person, this is not relevant to the defense whether cheque was issued towards payment of a debt or in discharge of a liability.” 11. In view of the above precedent, it is categorical that the presumption which arises on the signing of the cheque cannot be rebutted merely by the report of a handwriting expert. Even if 12022 LiveLaw (SC) 714 5 the details in the cheque have not been filled up by drawer but by another person, this is not relevant to the defence whether cheque was issued towards payment of a debt or in discharge of a liability. In the present case on hand, the dispute is the handwriting of the date mentioned in the respective cheques is not that of petitioner and the ink used for execution of promissory note and the remaining the portion of the cheques is different and the difference can be proved through handwriting expert. Thereby, the contentions raised by the petitioner/accused that the Trial Court erred in dismissing the petitions filed under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, thereby, he deprived the opportunity to substantiate his pleadings, has no legs to stand. 12. Furthermore, when these criminal revision cases came upon for hearing before this Court, this Court entertained a doubt regarding the maintainability of these revision cases under Section 397(1) Cr.P.C. in view of the express bar engrafted under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. to entertain a revision under Section 397(1) Cr.P.C. against the interlocutory order passed during the pendency of the trial of the case. 13. Now, it is significant to note that Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. mandates that the power of revision conferred by sub-section (1) 6 of Section 397 Cr.P.C. shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order in any appeal, enquiry, trial, or other proceeding. Therefore, express bar is created by the legislation under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. to entertain a revision against an interlocutory order. To curb the practice of stalling or protracting the proceedings of the case in the trial Court by way of preferring revisions against interlocutory orders, this provision under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. was introduced, whereunder an express bar is imposed on the revisional Courts to entertain any revision under sub-section (1) of Section 397 Cr.P.C. against interlocutory orders. 14. In the present case on hand, admittedly, the impugned orders under Section 45 of the Evidence Act were passed by the Trial Court during the pendency of the trial of the main cases. Irrespective of the fact that whether the said petitions filed under Section 45 of the Evidence Act is allowed or dismissed, the proceedings of the main criminal cases still subsist and continue. So, it does not decide anything finally relating to the main case. The said order will not have the effect to terminating the proceedings of the main case. So, in the usual course, therefore, they are to be pure and simple interlocutory orders 7 clearly attracting the bar under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. for the purpose of maintaining a revision under Section 397(1) Cr.P.C. 15. The said proposition of law was elaborately discussed by this Court in Goli Satyanarayana Reddy v. G.Mahesh2, wherein referred the plethora of pronouncements of Hon’ble Supreme Court and in particularly relied upon three-Judge Bench decision of the Apex Court in Girish Kumar Suneja v. C.B.I.3 and categorically held that “….since the order passed under Section 45 of the Evidence Act do not decide anything finally and results into culminating the main proceeding of the case, in any way, it cannot be construed as an order which is matter of moment or as an intermediate or quasi final order so as to maintain revision against the said order. It is held that on par with the law laid down in Sethuraman v. Rajamanickam4 that an order summoning a witness or calling for a document is an interlocutory order against which revision is barred, the order passed under Section 45 of the Evidence Act is also a pure and simple interlocutory order against which revision is barred under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C.” (emphasis supplied) 22019 SC Online AP 327; (2020) 1 ALT (Crl.) 323 3(2017) 14 SCC 809 4 2009 Crl.L.J. 2247 8 16. In view of the above precedents, it is categorical that the order passed under Section 45 of the Evidence is also a pure and simple interlocutory order and the revision against the said order is not maintainable under Section 397(1) Cr.P.C. 17. Having regard to the above discussion and in view of the above pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that the present criminal revision cases are not maintainable either on merits or under Section 397(2) of Cr.P.C. against the interlocutory order passed during the pendency of the trial of the main cases, thereby, the same are liable for dismissal. 18. In the result, both the Criminal Revision Cases are dismissed. In view of the long pendency of the Calendar Cases of the year 2014, this Court is directed the both parties to cooperate with the Trial Court for early and effective disposal of the matter as well the Trial Court concerned shall dispose of the main cases as expeditiously as possible. Interim orders granted earlier if any, stand vacated. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed. _______________________ JUSTICE V.SRINIVAS Date: 28.02.2025 Krs 9 3 THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE V.SRINIVAS CRIMINAL REVISION CASE Nos.245 & 246 of 2016 ( COMMON JUDGMENT ) DATE: 28.02.2025 Krs