2025:HHC:23790 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 442 of 2025 Reserved on: 15.7.2025 Date of Decision: 23.07.2025. Bharat Pathania ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. and others ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : M/s Jiwan Lal Sharma & Tek Chand Sharma, Advocate. For Respondent No.1/State : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present petition has been filed for quashing of FIR No. 93/24, dated 14.6.2024, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 307, 452, 323, 324, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), at Police Station, Dharampur, District Mandi, H.P. and the consequential proceedings pending before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P. in case No. 1/2025 as per 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:23790 the compromise effected between the parties. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the informant’s husband used to quarrel with her on trivial matters. She left her matrimonial home on 17.5.2024. The petitioner and his parents visited her on 14.6.2024. The informant went to her room after taking the meals. The petitioner followed her and inflicted serious injuries upon the informant and her minor child. He threw the minor child from the first floor. The police registered the FIR and conducted the investigation. The police submitted the final report after the completion of the investigation. The parties have settled the matter with the intervention of the respectable persons of the society. The informant has withdrawn the divorce petition filed by her. The parties want to maintain a cordial relationship with each other. The informant does not want to proceed further with the matter after the compromise. Hence the petition. 2. I have heard M/s Jiwan Lal Sharma and Tek Chand Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent-State. 3 2025:HHC:23790 3. Mr. Jiwan Lal Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that a minor quarrel had taken place between the parties. The parties have settled the matter amongst themselves. No case for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC is made out against the petitioner. The continuation of the proceedings would amount to hardship for the parties. The parties want to reside happily with each other, as the informant does not want to proceed with the present matter after the compromise. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed based on the compromise effected between the parties. 4. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent-State, submitted that the allegations in the FIR show that the petitioner had inflicted injuries using a knife on the neck, which is a vital part of the body. An offence of an attempt to commit murder cannot be quashed based on the compromise effected between the parties. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 5. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 4 2025:HHC:23790 6. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Naushey Ali v. State of U.P., (2025) 4 SCC 78 that an offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC is a heinous offence and cannot be quashed based on the compromise; however, mere mention of Section 307 of IPC is not sufficient to prevent the Court from exercising its inherent jurisdiction. It was observed at page 85: 20. Will the mere mention of Section 307IPC in the criminal proceedings force the court to adopt a hands-off approach when parties come forward with a settlement? In that event, what should be the duty of the court, and what are the tests to be applied to decide in which cases settlements would be accepted and in which cases they would not be? 21. In State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan [State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 706], after discussing the ratio in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] and other judgments, this Court held : (Laxmi Narayan case [State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 706], SCC pp. 704-705, para 15) “15. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under: 15.1. That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and 5 2025:HHC:23790 when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves; 15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. 15.3. Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act, or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of a compromise between the victim and the offender; 15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act, etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307IPC and/or the Arms Act, etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine whether the incorporation of Section 307IPC is for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which, if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, the nature of weapons used, etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge-sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paras 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466: (2014) 3 SCC 6 2025:HHC:23790 (Cri) 54] should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove; 15.5 [Ed. Para 15.5 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./22/2019 dated 3-4-2019. While exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non- compoundable offences, which are private and do not have a serious impact on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise, etc.” (emphasis supplied) 22. Before we apply this judgment to the facts, it will be worthwhile to recall the observations of Sikri, J. in Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466: (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54]: (SCC p. 481, para 26) “26. Having said so, we would hasten to add that though it is a serious offence as the accused person(s) attempted to take the life of another person/victim, at the same time the court cannot be oblivious to hard realities that many times whenever there is a quarrel between the parties leading to physical commotion and sustaining of injury by either or both the parties, there is a tendency to give it a slant of an offence under Section 307IPC as well.” (emphasis supplied) 23. Coming back to Laxmi Narayan [State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 706], this Court has held that mere mention of Section 307IPC in the FIR or the charge-sheet should not be the basis for adopting a hands-off approach. It has further held that it would be open for the court to examine as to whether the incorporation of Section 307IPC is there for the sake of it or whether there is evidence to back it. It has been held that the courts may go by the nature of injuries sustained, as to whether the injuries are inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body and the nature of the 7 2025:HHC:23790 weapon used. It has also been clarified that such an exercise would be permissible after investigation and filing of a charge-sheet/framing of charges or during the trial. (See para 15.4 of Laxmi Narayan [State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 706].) 7. In the present case, a perusal of the FIR shows that the petitioner followed the informant to her room. He bolted the room and asked the informant to accompany him. She refused. The petitioner abused her. He took out a knife and inflicted injuries on the victim’s neck and left arm. She shouted for help, but the petitioner continued to inflict injuries with a knife. He also threatened to kill the informant and her son. Informant’s mother, Kalawati, came to the spot. The petitioner inflicted injuries on her face with a knife. The petitioner caught hold of the informant’s son, Tejas, inflicted injuries with a knife on his neck, and threw him from the roof into the courtyard. He became unconscious. The Medical Officer stated that the injuries sustained by the informant and her son were dangerous to life. 8. A perusal of the contents of the FIR shows that the petitioner had caused injuries to the neck and other parts of the body of the informant and her son by using a knife. The nature of the injury was stated to be dangerous to life by the Medical Officer. The weapon of offence used by the petitioner and the 8 2025:HHC:23790 part of the body where the injuries were caused show that if the death had taken place, the petitioner would have been guilty of the commission of murder. Therefore, prima facie, there is sufficient material to conclude that the petitioner is guilty of an offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC. Such an offence cannot be quashed by taking recourse to Section 482 of Cr.P.C. as per the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Naushey Ali (supra). Hence, the petition for quashing the FIR cannot be allowed. 9. In view of the above, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed. 10. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 23rd July, 2025 (Chander)