IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH **** I. CM-11230-C-2025 in/and RSA-3148-2025 (O&M) Sukhdev Singh @ Sukhwinder Singh . . . . Appellant Vs. Anookh Singh and others . . . . Respondents **** II. CM-11317-C-2025 in/and RSA-3166-2025 (O&M) Sukhdev Singh @ Sukhwinder Singh . . . . Appellant Vs. Anookh Singh and others . . . . Respondents **** Date of decision: 13.01.2026 **** CORAM: HON’BLE MR JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA **** Present: - Mr. Amit Kumar Jain, Advocate, for the appellant. **** DEEPAK GUPTA, J. These two Regular Second Appeals arise out of a common judgment dated 05.11.2024 passed by the learned First Appellate Court, Fatehabad whereby the appeal preferred by the respondent–plaintiff was allowed and the suit for possession was decreed; whereas the appeal filed by the defendant–appellant against dismissal of his counter-claim was dismissed. 2. The respondent–plaintiff Anookh Singh instituted a suit for possession of the property in dispute, pleading that he along with proforma defendants No.3 to 7 was the owner thereof. It was pleaded that the land had been given for cultivation to Bharpur Singh, predecessor-in-interest of contesting defendants No.1 and 2. After the death of Bharpur Singh, defendants No.1 and 2 continued in possession merely as licensees. Their VIVEK PAHWA 2026.01.14 17:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSAs-3166 & 3148-2025 2026:PHHC:002968 licence stood terminated vide notice dated 16.03.2012; however, despite termination, they failed to vacate the land, necessitating filing of the suit. 3. The defendants contested the suit by asserting that they were tenants on the suit land on payment of 1/3rd batai. Along with contesting the suit, they also filed a counter-claim seeking declaration of their status as tenants in possession of the suit land on batai basis. 4. The learned trial Court, vide judgment dated 25.03.2016, dismissed both the suit as well as the counter-claim. Aggrieved, both parties preferred separate appeals. 5. The First Appellate Court, by a common judgment dated 05.11.2024, allowed the appeal filed by the plaintiff and decreed the suit for possession, while dismissing the appeal filed by the defendant against rejection of the counter-claim. 6. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the defendant has filed the present two Regular Second Appeals. Delay in Filing Appeals 7. RSA-3148-2025 is accompanied by CM-11230-C-2025 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation of delay of 215 days, whereas RSA-3166-2025 is accompanied by CM-11317-C-2025 seeking condonation of delay of 217 days. 8. The sole ground pleaded in both applications is that the appeal file was mistakenly kept in “admitted cases” and the mistake came to light only on 06.09.2025 while searching for other files. 9. Though the applications are supported by the affidavit of the appellant, the explanation offered is wholly unsatisfactory and does not inspire confidence. There is no affidavit of the concerned advocate, his clerk, or any responsible person explaining when the appeal was prepared, how it was misplaced, or why such a prolonged delay remained unnoticed. A bald VIVEK PAHWA 2026.01.14 17:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSAs-3166 & 3148-2025 2026:PHHC:002968 and vague plea of inadvertent mixing of files, without any supporting material, cannot constitute “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 10. The delay in the present case is substantial, extending beyond 7 months. In the absence of any cogent, bona fide or plausible explanation, the applications for condonation of delay are liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, CM-11230-C-2025 and CM-11317-C-2025 are dismissed. 11. Consequent to dismissal of the applications for condonation of delay, both the appeals are liable to be dismissed as barred by limitation. 12. Even if the appeals are examined on merits, no case for interference is made out. 13. The sole contention raised by learned counsel for the appellant is that the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit and that only the Revenue Court was competent to order eviction of a tenant under the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953. 14. In support of the said submission, reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shyam Lal v. Deepa Dass Chela Ram Chela Garib Dass, Law Finder Doc ID #653637, wherein it was held that eviction of a tenant from agricultural land must be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act and that Civil Court would have no jurisdiction in such matters. 15. The reliance upon the aforesaid judgment is, however, wholly misconceived. The bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Court would arise only if the defendant is able to establish his status as a tenant. In the present case, the defendant-appellant has miserably failed to do so. 16. As found by the First Appellate Court on appraisal of the revenue record, though possession of defendants No.1 and 2 is reflected in the jamabandis, the ownership is recorded in favour of the plaintiff and proforma VIVEK PAHWA 2026.01.14 17:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSAs-3166 & 3148-2025 2026:PHHC:002968 defendants. Significantly, there is not a single entry in the revenue record reflecting payment of rent or batai. 17. Even before this Court, learned counsel for the appellant was unable to produce any jamabandi or other revenue entry evidencing payment of rent. On the contrary, learned counsel fairly conceded that the entry in the column of possession is “gair maurusi bila lagan bawajah bhatija”, which clearly denotes permissive possession on account of relationship with the owner, i.e. possession as a licensee. The column relating to rent remains conspicuously blank. 18. It is well settled that a mere entry of “gair maurusi”, in the absence of proof of payment of rent, does not confer the status of a tenant. The burden to establish tenancy lies heavily upon the person asserting it, which burden the appellant has failed to discharge. 19. Once the status of the defendant as a tenant is not proved, the bar of jurisdiction under the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act does not operate, and the Civil Court retains full jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit for possession. 20. Accordingly, the First Appellate Court has rightly decreed the suit for possession and dismissed the counter-claim. The findings recorded are based on proper appreciation of evidence and settled principles of law and do not suffer from any perversity or illegality. 21. For the reasons recorded above, both the appeals are dismissed, firstly, as barred by limitation and, secondly, even otherwise on merits. 22. All pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. A photocopy of this judgment be placed on the file of the connected case. (DEEPAK GUPTA) 13.01.2026 JUDGE
 Whether Speaking/reasoned Yes Whether reportable No VIVEK PAHWA 2026.01.14 17:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh