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2025 DAILYLAW 142526 (ALL)

RSCPL-RCC RAJ SHYAMA CONSTRUCTION PVT.LTD.THRU.AUTH.SIGNATOR v. THE COMMERCIAL COURT LUCKNOW and ORS.

A227/25149/2021 · 2025-04-15

Pankaj Bhatia

body2025

Judgment text

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Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC-LKO:21110 Court No. - 6 Case :- MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 25149 of 2021 Petitioner :- Rscpl-Rcc Raj Shyama Construction Pvt.Ltd.Thru.Auth.Signator Respondent :- The Commercial Court Lucknow And Ors. Counsel for Petitioner :- Vikas Vikram Singh,Arjun Krishna,Ashish Aggarwal,Mahima Dixit Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Mahendra Kumar Mishra and Case :- MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 25161 of 2021 Petitioner :- Rscpl-Rcc Raj Shyama Construction Pvt.Ltd.Thru.Auth.Signator Respondent :- The Commercial Court Lucknow And Ors. Counsel for Petitioner :- Vikas Vikram Singh,Arjun Krishna,Ashish Aggarwal,Mahima Dixit Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C. Hon'ble Pankaj Bhatia,J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the State. 2. The Matter Under Article 227 No.25149 of 2021 has been filed challenging an order dated 20.10.2021 passed in Arbitration Petition No.116 of 2020 as well as the Matter Under Article 227 No.25161 of 2021 challenging the order dated 20.10.2021 passed in Arbitration Petition No.115 of 2020 whereby, the applications filed by the petitioner in both the arbitration petitions under Order VII Rule 11 of C.P.C. read with Section 151 read with Sections 42 and 20(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 have been rejected. 3. The facts, in brief, are that on account of an agreement in between the petitioner and the respondent, there existed an arbitration clause on the disputes occurring in between the parties. The said arbitration clause is on record. The paragraph 26.3.1 of the said clause is as under: "26.3.1- Any Dispute which is not resolved amicably by conciliation, as provided in Clause 26.2, shall be finally decided by reference to arbitration by a Board of Arbitrator appointed in accordance with Clause 26.3.2. Such arbitration shall beheld in accordance with the Rules of Arbitration of the International Centre for Alternative Dispute Resolution, New Delhi ("the Rules") or such other rules as may be mutually agreed by the Parties, and shall be subject to the provisions of the Arbitration Act. The venue of such arbitration shall be (New Delhi), and the language of arbitration proceedings shall be English." 4. It contained a further stipulation, which is as under: "27.1 Governing law and jurisdiction This Agreement shall be construed and interpreted in accordance with and governed by the laws of India, and the courts at (Lucknow) shall have exclusive jurisdiction over matters arising out or relating to this Agreement." 5. In the light of the said stipulation, it is stated that as the respondents wanted to invoke bank guarantee, the petitioner approached the Delhi High Court by filing an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, on which, an interim order was passed on 02.08.2018 in DMP (COMM) No.311 of 2018 in favour of the petitioner. The said proceedings were concluded vide order dated 04.12.2018. Subsequent thereto in terms of the arbitration agreement, a panel of arbitrator was appointed, who passed the two awards at Delhi, by which the disputes in between the parties were adjudicated and the amounts as detailed in the award were passed in favour of the petitioner. 6. It is further argued that subsequent to the passing of the award, once again the respondents wanted to invoke the bank guarantee, as such, another application being OMP (I) (COMM) No.309 of 2020 was filed at Delhi High Court, in which an order came to be passed on 25.09.2020. It is stated that subsequent to the passing of the orders and the award, the respondents moved an application under Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act challenging the award before the Commercial Court, Lucknow. As the Commercial Court at Lucknow did not have the jurisdiction, the petitioner moved an application for dismissal of the said objections under Section 34 of the Act on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The said application has been rejected by means of the impugned order. 7. Assailing the said order, Shri J.N. Mathur, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Ashish Aggarwal along with Ms. Aishwarya Mathur, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the issue with regard to the jurisdiction of the court, where in an agreement, the seat of the arbitration is prescribed is no more res integra and has been settled conclusively by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Case of BGS SGS SOMA JV Vs. NHPC Ltd.: (2020) 4 SCC 234 as well as the judgement in the case of State of West Bengal`and others Vs. Associated Contractors: (2015) 1 SCC 32. 8. Learned counsel for the respondents-State, on the other hand, places reliance on paragraph 27.1 to argue that the court at Lucknow would have exclusive jurisdiction in terms of the agreement. Reliance is placed upon the judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Emkay Global Financial Services Ltd. Vs. Gindhar Sondhi AIR 2018 SC 3894. He thus, argues that the petition is liable to be dismissed and should be dismissed, accordingly. 9. The issue as raised in the present petitions is squarely covered by the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of BGS SGS SOMA JV vs NHPC Ltd. (Supra), wherein, Hon'ble Supreme Court after analyzing the provisions of the Act concluded as under: "97. Given the fact that if there were a dispute between NHPC Ltd. and a foreign contractor, clause 67.3(vi) would have to be read as a clause designating the "seat" of arbitration, the same must follow even when sub- clause (vi) is to be read with sub-clause (i) of Clause 67.3, where the dispute between NHPC Ltd. would be with an Indian Contractor. The arbitration clause in the present case states that "Arbitration Proceedings shall be held at New Delhi/Faridabad, India…", thereby signifying that all the hearings, including the making of the award, are to take place at one of the stated places. Negatively speaking, the clause does not state that the venue is so that some, or all, of the hearings take place at the venue; neither does it use language such as "the Tribunal may meet", or "may hear witnesses, experts or par- ties". The expression "shall be held" also indicates that the so-called "venue" is really the "seat" of the arbitral proceedings. The dispute is to be settled in accordance with the Arbitration Act, 1996 which, therefore, applies a national body of rules to the arbitration that is to be held either at New Delhi or Faridabad, given the fact that the present arbitration would be Indian and not international. It is clear, therefore, that even in such a scenario, New Delhi/Faridabad, India has been designated as the "seat" of the arbitration proceedings. 98. However, the fact that in all the three appeals before us the proceedings were finally held at New Delhi, and the awards were signed in New Delhi, and not at Faridabad, would lead to the conclusion that both parties have chosen New Delhi as the "seat" of arbitration under Section 20(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1996. This being the case, both parties have, therefore, chosen that the Courts at New Delhi alone would have exclusive jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings. There- fore, the fact that a part of the cause of action may have arisen at Faridabad would not be relevant once the "seat" has been chosen, which would then amount to an exclusive jurisdiction clause so far as Courts of the "seat" are concerned." 10. In the present case also, the initial proceedings under Section 9 took place at Delhi. The award was passed by the Arbitral Tribunal at Delhi and thereafter another application was also filed at Delhi. 11. In view of the said proceedings being held at Delhi and in view of the law as explained in the case of BGS SGS SOMA JV vs NHPC Ltd. (Supra), it has to be concluded by the court at Delhi which had the jurisdiction to decide the objection under Section 34 of the Act and the same could not have been filed at Lucknow, as such, the order impugned dated 20.10.2021 passed in Arbitration Petition No.116 of 2020 as well as the order dated 20.10.2021 passed in Arbitration Petition No.115 of 2020 cannot be justified and are quashed. 12. 12. The Commercial Court is directed to return the objections filed by the respondents for the same being presented before the appropriate court at Delhi. 13. Both the writ petition stand allowed in the above terms and the directions. Order Date :- 15.4.2025 Ashutosh Digitally signed by :- ASHUTOSH PANDEY High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench