Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:18362 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP(M) No. 1871 of 2024 in CrAST No. 5218 of 2024 Reserved on: 30.05.2025 Date of Decision: 17.06.2025 Meena Devi ...Applicant Versus Anchal Ranaut ...Non-applicant. Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Applicant : Mr. Virender Singh Rathour, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The applicant/appellant (complainant before the learned Trial Court) has filed the present application for seeking leave to appeal against the judgment dated 23.03.2024 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.1, Dharamshala (learned Trial Court), vide which, the complaint filed by the applicant/appellant was dismissed and the accused was acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304A of Indian Penal Code (in short ‘IPC’). (Parties shall 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. P a g e | 2 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:18362 ) hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present application are that the complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304A of the IPC. It was asserted that Gurcharan (since deceased), husband of the complainant, was going towards PNB Yol on 02.11.2011 at about 1:45 pm. Accused Aanchal Ranaut was riding the motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-35-1635 at a high speed towards Chamunda. He overtook a bus and hit Gurcharan. Gurcharan fell and sustained injuries. The motorcycle hit the boundary wall, and the motorcyclist and the pillion rider fell. Accused-Anchal Ranaut sustained grievous injuries. The incident was witnessed by Pradeep Chand and HC Rajinder. Gurcharan, Aanchal Ranaut, and his friends were taken to the hospital, where Gurcharan succumbed to his injuries, and the accused, Anchal Ranaut, was referred to the PGI. The accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused-Anchal Ranaut. The police filed a false FIR, mentioning that the accident occurred with a jeep. A false story was propounded to save accused-Anchal Ranaut, P a g e | 3 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:18362 ) therefore, a complaint was filed before the learned Trial Court to take action against the accused. 3. Learned Trial Court summoned the accused and put the notice of accusation to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304A of IPC, to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The complainant examined 08 witnesses to prove her case. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that he was driving the motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-35-1635 and Vikas Kumar was sitting as a pillion rider. He admitted that the motorcycle had hit the boundary wall, but claimed that it happened after hitting the jeep. He admitted that he, his pillion rider, and Gurcharan were taken to the hospital. He admitted that the FIR was registered by the police. The statement of Constable Sachin Kumar was recorded in defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the version of the complainant that accused Anchal was driving the motorcycle at a high speed was made doubtful by the statement of Sanjay Guleria (CW2), who had admitted in his earlier statement (Ext. DX1) that the P a g e | 4 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:18362 ) accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the jeep driver. Pratap Chand (CW3) supported the complainant’s case. He was known to the deceased person. Vinod Kumar (CW5), Suresh Kumar (CW6) and Amit Kumar (CW7) stated that they had not seen the accident. In these circumstances, the complainant’s version that the accident occurred with the motorcycle was not established by the eyewitnesses' testimonies. The motorcycle was subjected to chemical examination, and no blood was detected on it. The Medical Officer also admitted that injuries were possible if a light motor vehicle hit a person. Therefore, the complainant’s case was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The accused was entitled to the benefit of doubt, which was granted to him. 7. Being aggrieved from the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the complainant filed the present appeal, asserting that the learned Trial Court appreciated the evidence in a slipshod manner. The findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are contrary to the evidence led by the complainant. No sound reasoning was given for acquittal. The chemical examination report by RFSL proves the involvement of the motorcycle. This report was misread by the learned Trial Court. Therefore, it was prayed that the present application be allowed and the leave to appeal be granted. P a g e | 5 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:18362 ) 8. I have heard Mr. Virender Singh Rathore, learned counsel for the applicant/appellant, who has submitted that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the evidence properly. The statements of the eye-witnesses duly proved that the accident occurred with the motorcycle, and the learned Trial Court wrongly held that the accident occurred with the jeep. The police registered a false FIR to save the motorcycle rider; therefore, he prayed that the present application be allowed and the leave to appeal be granted. 9. I have given considerable thought to his submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 10. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of evidence or omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed: “11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with P a g e | 6 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:18362 ) regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below : (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail the extensive P a g e | 7 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:18362 ) powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748] this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8) “8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence. 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial P a g e | 8 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:18362 ) court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 11. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. P a g e | 9 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:18362 ) 12. Sanjay Guleria (CW2) stated in his examination-in-chief that a motorcycle was going at a high speed towards Dharamshala, which overtook the bus. The accident occurred immediately thereafter. Gurcharan Singh was lying on the spot, and he was carried to the hospital. He has nowhere stated that the motorcycle had hit the deceased. He specifically stated in his cross- examination that the accident occurred due to the negligence and high speed of the driver of the jeep; therefore, his examination-in- chief does not support the complainant’s case. 13. Sanjay Guleria (CW2) admitted in his cross-examination that he had made a statement (Ext. DX1), which bears his signature. This witness had specifically stated in his previous statement (Ex. DX1) that a jeep came at high speed from Dharamshala and hit a person who was going towards the left side of the road. The person fell. The driver of the jeep turned the jeep towards the right side and hit a bike. The bike fell. The rider of the bike and the pillion rider sustained injuries. He took the injured to the roadside. It is apparent from his statement recorded at the earliest point of time that he had attributed the accident to a jeep that had hit the deceased as well as the motorcycle, therefore, his statement does not prove that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the motorcycle rider. P a g e | 10 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:18362 ) 14. Pratap Chand (CW3) supported the prosecution's case. He admitted in his cross-examination that the FIR was lodged by Sanjay Guleria. He had not made any application when the police filed an untraced report before the Court. His name was not mentioned by Sanjay Guleria, the eyewitness to the incident, and the learned Trial Court had rightly doubted his testimony. 15. Sanjay Kumar (CW4), Vinod Kumar (CW5), Suresh Kumar (CW6) and Amit Kumar (CW7) reached the spot after the accident, therefore, their testimonies do not establish that the accident had occurred due to the negligence of the motorcycle rider. 16. Dr. Surinder Kumar (CW8) issued a report (Ext. CW8/B). He stated that the possibility of the first hit to the deceased by the motorcycle and then being run over by some other light motor vehicle could not be ruled out. His report (Ext. CW8/B) is based upon the testimonies of the witnesses present on the spot, which shows that the same is hearsay and cannot be admitted in evidence. Further, he has only given his opinion, which cannot override the statement of Sanjay Guleria, who had witnessed the incident. P a g e | 11 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:18362 ) 17. Statement of Sanjay Guleria (CW-2) made the complainant’s case doubtful, and when two versions appear on the record, the version in favour of the accused is to be preferred. 18. Therefore, the evidence on the record was insufficient to prove that the accident occurred when the motorcycle hit the deceased. This was a reasonable view, which could have been taken based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court, and this Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court while deciding an appeal against the acquittal. 19. Therefore, no case for the grant of leave to appeal is made out; hence, the present application fails and the same is dismissed. Cr.AST No. 5218 of 2024 20. In view of the dismissal of application seeking leave to appeal, the proposed appeal also stands disposed of. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 17th June, 2025 (Saurav pathania)