1 2025:CGHC:48370 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 786 of 2017 1. Smt. Yashoda Rajak Wd/o Late Shri Jhaman Lal, Aged About 64 Years R/o Darrighat, Tahsil Masturi, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ...............Defendant No.1 2. Rajesh Rajak S/o Late Shri Jhaman Lal Rajak, Aged About 41 Years R/o Darrighat, Tahsil Masturi, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ...............Defendant No.2 ... Appellants versus 1. Smt. Saraswati Gupta Wd/o Late Shri Shyam Manohar Gupta, Aged About 75 Years R/o Darrighat, Tahsil Masturi, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh, Present Address Kila Ward, Juna Bilaspur, Tahsil And District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh Plaintiff No.1, 2. Prabhat Kumar S/o Late Shri Shyam Manohar Gupta, Aged About 56 Years R/o Darrighat, Tahsil Masturi, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh, Present Address Kila Ward, Juna Bilaspur, Tahsil And District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ...............Plaintiff No.2, 3(A) - Smt. Saroj Gupta W/o Late Shri Praveen Kumar Gupta Aged About 50 Years R/o Kewatpara, Juna Bilaspur Tahsil And District - Bilaspur (C.G.) 3 (B) - Abhijeet Gupta S/o Late Shri Praveen Kumar Gupta Aged About 20 Years R/o Kewatpara Juna Bilaspur, Tahsil And District - Bilaspur (C.G.) SYED ROSHAN ZAMIR ALI Digitally signed by SYED ROSHAN ZAMIR ALI 2 3(C) - Shivam Gupta S/o Late Shri Praveen Kumar Gupta Aged About 18 Years R/o Kewatpara Juna Bilaspur Tahsil And District - Bilaspur (C.G.) ... Respondents/plaintiffs For Appellants : Mr. Vikrant Pillai, Advocate on behalf of Mr. R.R.Soni, Advocate SB:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Parth Prateem Sahu Judgement on Board 19.9.2025 1. Appellants have preferred this second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 28.8.2017 passed in Civil Appeal No.70A/2015 by which learned 8th Additional District Judge, Bilaspur has dismissed appeal filed against the judgment and decree dated 28.4.2015 passed by learned Civil Judge Class II, Bilaspur by which civil suit filed by respondents herein for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent has been decreed. 2. Facts relevant for disposal of this appeal are that plaintiffs filed civil suit for eviction and arrears of rent pleading therein that the plaintiffs are owner of suit property, which is a residential accommodation given to defendant on monthly rent at the rate of Rs.150/-. Tenancy starts from 1st date of month and ends on last date of same month. Suit accommodation is in dilapidated condition, needs urgent repairing which is not possible till persons residing there are evicted. It was further pleaded that suit accommodation is required for plaintiff No.3 for his 3 residence and family members as also for business purpose. Defendants have purchased the land at Darrighat bearing Khasra No.22/42 admeasuring 0.0067 hectare, constructed a house thereon and also shop. Defendants are having suitable accommodation for their residence. 3. Defendants in their written statement have denied the pleadings made in plaint and pleaded that during lifetime of husband of plaintiff No.1 Shyam Manohar Gupta had executed an agreement to sell in favour of Jhamanlal Gupta, husband of defendant No.1 and father of defendant No.2, for agreed consideration of Rs.90,000/-, accepted part of sale consideration in installments, total of which was Rs.75,000/-. Possession of suit accommodation was also handed over to him and therefore, plaintiffs are not owners of suit accommodation. Defendants are residing in suit accommodation in the capacity of owner. Condition of suit accommodation is good because defendants by expending Rs.50,000/- had repaired the suit accommodation. Plaintiffs are having alternate residential and commercial accommodation. 4. Learned trial Court based on pleadings made by respective parties framed as many as six issues and after trial, upon considering the evidence, oral and documentary, brought on record by respective parties, has held that defendants are 4 tenants, suit accommodation is in dilapidated condition which requires renovation or repairs, defendants have not paid the rent since 19.4.1988 till September 2003 and decreed the suit of plaintiffs. 5. Learned first appellate Court in appeal filed by defendants after considering the grounds raised therein affirmed the findings of learned trial Court that defendants are residing in the house as tenant on monthly rent of Rs.150/-. Relying on photographs Ex.D-2 and Ex.D-3 it is held that house is in dilapidated condition and it cannot be repaired without eviction. While affirming the judgment and decree of learned trial Court, learned first appellate Court has held that trial Court has exercised its jurisdiction in accordance with law. 6. Learned counsel for appellants would submit that both the Courts failed to consider that husband of plaintiff No.1 and father of plaintiff No.2 and 3 have executed an agreement to sell in favour of Jhaman Lal Rajak, husband of defendant No.1, for sale of property, subject matter of suit, and in lieu thereof Rs.75,000/- was paid as adavnce on different dates. Learned trial Court has taken into consideration that suit for specific performance bearing C.S. No.8a/2001 filed by defendant No.1 to 3 was dismissed vide judgment dated 25.2.2023 and First Appeal bearing No.133/2023 filed against the same has also been dismissed vide judgment dated 7.2.2017, but failed to 5 consider that suit for specific performance of contract was dismissed on the ground of limitation and not that there was no agreement to sell between the parties. 7. Heard learned counsel for appellants and perused the record of both the Courts. 8. Plaintiffs claiming themselves to be owner/landlord of suit accommodation, filed a civil suit before learned trial Court against the defendants seeking decree of eviction and arrears of rent on the ground that the defendants are tenant in suit accommodation, they had not paid arrears of rent @ Rs.150/- w.e.f. 1.4.1998 in spite of service of notice dated 15.3.2001; the suit accommodation has become dilapidated and requires to be reconstructed; the suit accommodation is also required by plaintiffs to start their own business and for their residence. In support of their case, plaintiffs have produced kishtbandi khatoni B-1 of the year 1999-2000 and 2009-10, khasra panchsala of 1999-2000 and 2009-10. It can be seen from aforementioned documents that the plaintiffs are recorded as joint owners of the suit accommodation. 9. Defendants filed written statement denying relationship of landlord-tenant and took a stand that they have not taken the suit accommodation on tenancy from plaintiffs nor they are in possession of the same in the capacity of tenant. An agreement was entered between husband of plaintiff No.1 and 6 husband of defendant No.1 for the sale of suit accommodation and on payment of sale consideration, possession of suit accommodation was handed over to them. To substantiate their claim, defendants have exhibited the agreement as Ex.D-1 and a glance of Ex.D-1 would show that this agreement was executed on 18.9.1996 under which the parties agreed that the sale deed shall be executed within four months from the date of execution of agreement. It was further pleaded by defendants that they have filed a civil suit for specific performance of contract but the same was dismissed being barred by limitation. 10. Thus, from the pleadings and documents brought on record by defendants it is appearing that case of defendants is that they are in possession of the suit property by virtue of an agreement to sell entered into between husband of plaintiff No.1 and husband of defendant No.1. Therefore, the question for consideration is whether the defendants are entitled to protect their possession by virtue of the agreement to sell or they can be dispossessed by due process of law by a person having a title better than what the defendants have. 11. It is well settled that ownership/title in immovable property passes only when a registered sale deed is executed and duly registered under the Registration Act, 1908. An agreement to sell, by itself, does not create ownership rights or confer title of 7 property, as envisaged in Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. At best, the agreement to sell gives a right to buyer to seek specific performance under the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Ownership remains with the seller until the registered sale deed is executed. A person who is in possession of the property by virtue of an agreement to sell is liable to be dispossessed by due process of law by a person having a title better than what the defendant has. 12. In case at hand admittedly there is no sale deed in favour of the defendants whereas the plaintiffs are recorded owners of the suit accommodation as is discernible from revenue documents produced by them as Ex.P-1 and Ex.P-2. Defendants have not denied the fact that husband of plaintiff No.1 and father of plaintiffs No.2 and 3 was the exclusive owner of the suit accommodation. In fact, defendant No.2 in his cross-examination before the trial Court has admitted that his father Shyam Manohar Gupta residing in suit accommodation by taking it on rent and till death of his father in the year 1998, they were residing as tenant in suit accommodation. Most importantly, the right accrued to defendants under the said agreement i.e. right to seek specific performance, has also been unsuccessfully availed by defendants. 8 13. In light of above discussed proved facts, perusal of impugned judgments shows that after due appreciation of evidence, oral and documentary, adduced by the parties the trial Court has recorded the findings in favour of the plaintiff which have subsequently been affirmed by the lower appellate Court as well. Concurrent findings recorded by both the Courts being based on proper appreciation of evidence available on record does not suffer from any perversity or material irregularity warranting interference by this Court. Hence, in the considered opinion of this Court, no substantial question of law, nonetheless those proposed by appellants in memo of appeal, arises in present appeal and therefore, appeal is liable to be dismissed. 14. In second appeal the High Court can interfere with the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below only on a question of law much less substantial question of law. The findings of fact recorded by the Courts below are not liable to be interfered with unless the same are perverse. In the case of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, reported in (1999) 3 SCC 722, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “5. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court. It is true that the lower appellate court 9 should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the first appellate court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence. 15. In the matter of Vishwanath Agrawal S/o Sitaram Agrawal v. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal reported in (2012) 7 SCC 288 Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the concurrent findings recorded by Courts below cannot be disturbed until and unless they are perverse or contrary to law. Relevant portion of the said judicial pronouncement reads as under:- “37.... High Court in a second appeal should not disturb the concurrent findings of fact unless it is shown that the findings recorded by the Courts below are perverse being based on no evidence or that on the evidence on record no reasonable person could 10 have come to that conclusion. We may note here that solely because another view is possible on the basis of the evidence, the High Court would not be entitled to exercise the jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” 16. In case of Adiveppa & ors vs. Bhimappa & ors, reported (2017) 9 SCC 586 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed and held as under: "17. Here is a case where two Courts below, on appreciating the entire evidence, have come to a conclusion that the Plaintiffs failed to prove their case in relation to both the suit properties. The concurrent findings of facts recorded by the two Courts, which do not involve any question of law much less substantial question of law, are binding on this Court. 18. It is more so when these findings are neither against the pleadings nor against the evidence and nor contrary to any provision of law. They are also not perverse to the extent that no such findings could ever be recorded by any judicial person. In other words, unless the findings of facts, though concurrent, are found to be extremely perverse so as to affect the judicial conscious of a judge, they would be binding on the Appellate Court." 17.In the result, this second appeal being devoid of any substance is liable to be and is hereby dismissed as such at the admission stage itself. No order as to costs. 18.Decree be drawn accordingly. Sd/- (Parth Prateem Sahu) Judge roshan/-