IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP (M) No. 1075 of 2025 Reserved on: 03.06.2025 Date of Decision: 17.06.2025 Sahib Singh ...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1. No For the Petitioner : Ms. Anjali Soni Verma, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, Additional Advocate General Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail. It has been asserted that the petitioner was arrested in F.I.R. No. 13 of 2023, dated 22.01.2023, registered at Police Station Kangra, District Kangra, H.P. for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 302, 504, and 201 read with Section 34 of IPC The petitioner was falsely implicated. The investigation is complete and material witnesses have been 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 examined. Other accused have been released on bail and the petitioner is entitled to bail on the principle of parity. The custody of the petitioner is not required and his detention is not justified. The petitioner would abide by all the terms and conditions, which the Court may impose. Hence, the petition. 2. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the informant, Roop Lal, made a complaint to the police stating that he, his brothers Ripon Kumar and Saroop Chand were taking meals on 21.01.2023 at 8:00 pm when Sahib Singh @ Kaku (present petitioner) came and started abusing them. Rippon Kumar went outside and asked the petitioner as to why he was abusing them on which the petitioner started walking towards his home. Rippon Kumar also followed him. The petitioner inflicted an injury on the head of Rippon Kumar with an iron rod with a gear-like contraption welded to it. Rippon Kumar fell. The petitioner, Rishu Kumar, Chaman and Krishan Devi dragged Rippon Kumar inside the house where they gave him beatings. The informant, his brother Saroop Chand and Meena Devi reached the spot. All the assailants ran away. Rippon Kumar suffered injuries on his head. He was taken to the hospital and was declared brought dead. The police 3 registered the F.I.R. and conducted the investigation. The clothes worn by the accused were preserved. Accused Sahib Singh made a disclosure statement, which led to the recovery of an iron rod with a gear-like contraption welded to it. Krishna Devi, co-accused, made a disclosure statement which led to the discovery of a foot mat. As per the report of RFSL Dharamshala, H.P. human blood of group-B was found on the blood picked upon from the spot, slippers lying on the spot, muffler, bed, foot mat, clothes of Rippon Kumar, clothes of the petitioner and Salwar of co-accused Krishna Devi. The blood was also found on the door handle, iron grill, bathroom drainage exit, weapon of offence, underwear of Rippon Kumar, and clothes of Rishu Kumar and Krishna Devi. As per the report of the DNA, the blood lifted from the spot, blood present on the slippers, muffler, bed, foot mat, iron grill, iron pipe, petitioner’s sweatshirt and Krishna Devi’s Salwar contained the DNA of Rippon Kumar. Mixed DNA was found in the bathroom drainage exit and one component matched the sweatshirt of Sahib Singh. As per the medical opinion, the injury could have been caused by the metallic pipe with a metallic wheel/Grari welded at one end. Ethyl alcohol was detected in the blood of Rippon Kumar to the 4 extent of 351.83 mg %. The Court has framed the charges and the matter was listed for prosecution evidence. 15 witnesses are yet to be examined. The matter was listed on 06.06.2025 for prosecution evidence. Hence, the status report. 3. I have heard Ms Anjali Soni Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent-State. 4. Ms Anjali Soni Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. There is no evidence against the petitioner. The present case is based on the circumstantial evidence. The co-accused have been granted bail and the petitioner is entitled to bail on the principle of parity. He is to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. The prosecution has failed to complete the evidence despite the lapse of more than two years. He should not be kept behind the bars indefinitely. Therefore, she prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 5. Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General submitted that the petitioner had committed a heinous 5 crime. The DNA of the deceased was found on the petitioner’s clothes, which prima facie connects him to the commission of an offence. The bail should not be granted to the petitioner considering the nature of the offence and severity of the punishment. He prayed that the present bail application be dismissed. 6. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 7. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 974, wherein it was observed at page 783: - “Relevant parameters for granting bail 26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. [Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman Lal v. State of U.P., (2004) 7 SCC 525: 2004 6 SCC (Cri) 1974]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977]; Masroor v. State of U.P. [Masroor v. State of U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 286 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368]; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765]; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi)[Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425]; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar [Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 558] .] 8. This position was reiterated in Ramratan v. State of M.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3068, wherein it was observed as under:- “12. The fundamental purpose of bail is to ensure the accused's presence during the investigation and trial. Any conditions imposed must be reasonable and directly related to this objective. This Court in Parvez Noordin Lokhandwalla v. State of Maharastra (2020) 10 SCC 77 observed that though the competent court is empowered to exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for the grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is not misused to impede the investigation, overawe the witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. The relevant observations are extracted herein below: “14. The language of Section 437(3) CrPC, which uses the expression “any condition … otherwise in the interest of justice” has been construed in several decisions of this Court. Though the competent court is empowered to exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for the grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of 7 the court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is not misused to impede the investigation, overawe the witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. Several decisions of this Court have dwelt on the nature of the conditions which can legitimately be imposed both in the context of bail and anticipatory bail.” (Emphasis supplied) 13. In Sumit Mehta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 15 SCC 570, this Court discussed the scope of the discretion of the Court to impose “any condition” on the grant of bail and observed in the following terms:— “15. The words “any condition” used in the provision should not be regarded as conferring absolute power on a court of law to impose any condition that it chooses to impose. Any condition has to be interpreted as a reasonable condition acceptable in the facts permissible in the circumstance, and effective in the pragmatic sense, and should not defeat the order of grant of bail. We are of the view that the present facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant such an extreme condition to be imposed.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. This Court, in Dilip Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2021) 2 SCC 779, laid down the factors to be taken into consideration while deciding the bail application and observed: “4. It is well settled by a plethora of decisions of this Court that criminal proceedings are not for the realisation of disputed dues. It is open to a court to grant or refuse the prayer for anticipatory bail, depending on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The factors to be taken into consideration while considering an application for bail are the nature of the accusation and the severity of the punishment in the case of conviction and the nature of the materials relied upon by the prosecution; reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witnesses or apprehension of threat to the complainant or the witnesses; the reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the time of trial or the likelihood of his 8 abscondence; character, behaviour and standing of the accused; and the circumstances which are peculiar or the accused and larger interest of the public or the State and similar other considerations. A criminal court, exercising jurisdiction to grant bail/anticipatory bail, is not expected to act as a recovery agent to realise the dues of the complainant, and that too, without any trial.” (Emphasis supplied) 9. This position was reiterated in Shabeen Ahmed versus State of U.P., 2025 SCC Online SC 479. 10. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11. It was specifically mentioned in the F.I.R. that the petitioner started abusing the informant party when they were having a meal. Rippon Kumar went to the petitioner and requested him not to hurl abuses. He also followed the petitioner to his home where the petitioner gave him beatings by an iron rod with gear-like contraption welded to the top. Postmortem report shows that the cause of death was injuries sustained on the head which could have been caused by a metallic pipe with a gear-like contraption welded to it. This pipe was recovered at the instance of the petitioner and it was found to contain DNA of the deceased. The informant had seen the petitioner and the co-accused who ran away from the spot. 9 The presence of the DNA of the deceased in the clothes of the petitioner, prima facie, shows his involvement in the commission of crime. Hence, the submission that there is insufficient material to connect the petitioner with the commission of crime is not acceptable. 12. It was submitted that the informant might have been mistaken about the voice of the petitioner. This submission is not to be appreciated at this stage. It is a matter of evidence. The Court has to accept the contents of the F.I.R. as correct while deciding the present petition. It was specifically mentioned in the FIR that the petitioner came to the gate of the informant’s house and started abusing him. Therefore, this aspect of the prosecution’s case cannot be doubted. 13. It was further submitted that the petitioner is to be presumed innocent till he is proved to be guilty. There is no dispute with this proposition of law. The detention of the person during trial is never punitive but preventive and has nothing to do with the innocence or the guilt of the accused. Therefore, this submission will not help the petitioner in any manner. 10 14. It was submitted that co-accused have been released on bail and the petitioner is entitled to bail on the principle of parity. Copies of the orders granting the bail were not placed on record to show the reasoning adopted by the Courts while granting bail to the co-accused. Further, the status report shows that the petitioner had inflicted the injury on the head of the deceased by an iron road with a gear-like contraption welded to it, whereas, the other accused had only given beatings with kick and fist blows. Hence, the role of each of the accused is different and the petitioner cannot claim party with the co- accused. 15. It was submitted that there is a delay in the progress of the trial. The petitioner was arrested on 22.01.2023 and the prosecution has not completed the evidence within a period of two years. Copies of the order sheets were not filed to show that the delay is not attributable to the petitioner. Further, the status report shows that charges were framed on 22.07.2023 and 15 witnesses have been examined so far. The matter was listed on 06.06.2023 for prosecution evidence. Examination of 15 witnesses within 1 ½ years does not show any delay and the petitioner is not entitled to bail on the ground of delay. 11 16. In view of the above, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed. 17. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 17th June, 2025 (ravinder)