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2025 DAILYLAW 14017 (HP)

SUSHMA DEVI AND ORS v. STATE OF HP AND ANR

CRMMO/443/2021 · 2025-08-04

Rakesh Kainthla

body2025

Judgment text

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2025:HHC:25802 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 443 of 2021 Reserved on: 28.7.2025 Date of Decision: 04.8.2025. Sushma Devi and others ...Petitioners Versus State of H.P. and another ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For Petitioners No.1 to 5 : Mr. Hemant Thakur, Advocate. Petitioner No.6 reported to have died. For Respondent No.1 : Mr. Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General. For Respondent No.2 : Mr. Sanjeev Kumar Suri, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 163 of 2018, dated 14.6.2018, registered at Police Station Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 451, 323, 427, 147 and 149 of 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:25802 the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the consequential proceedings arising out of the said FIR. 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that informant Pawna Devi was discharging her duties on 14.6.2018. Her daughter, Shabnam, came to her at about 12.45 PM and told her that Sushma Devi was cultivating her land located adjacent to the informant’s house. The informant accompanied her daughter and found that the petitioners, Sushma and Sushil, were present in their field located near the informant’s house. Puran Chand was ploughing the field with the tractor. The informant told the petitioners not to plant paddy as it leads to water seepage to her (informant’s) house. Petitioners, Sushil Kumar and Sushma Devi, started abusing the informant. They damaged the barbed wire and angle iron. Pratap Chand, Urmila Devi, Sanjay Kumar and Nisha Devi also came to the spot. They started pelting stones at the informant and her family members. The informant sustained injuries on her left arm and right leg. Shabnam sustained injuries on her arms, and Pankaj suffered injuries on his chest. The informant and her children rushed inside the house. However, the petitioners entered the house and pelted stones upon the informant party. The water 3 2025:HHC:25802 tank and the plates were damaged in the pelting of the stones. The police registered the FIR and conducted the investigation. 3. Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR, the petitioners have filed the present petition, asserting that the police added graver sections for some extraneous reasons. It was a case of simple injury, and the trial should have been sent to the Gram Panchayat. The petitioners had also reported the matter to the police; however, no action was taken on the petitioners’ complaint. The police recorded an entry no.9 in the Daily Diary and stated that a cognizable offence was committed. The investigation is not fair. The matter is listed for prosecution evidence after framing the charges. The cross cases are to be tried together. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed. 4. The petition is opposed by filing a reply by respondent No.1 /State reproducing the contents of the FIR. It was asserted that Sushma Devi made a complaint to the police regarding the pelting of stones. She was asked to get herself medically examined; however, she refused to do so. Petitioners got themselves medically examined on 17.6.2018, and the injuries 4 2025:HHC:25802 were found to be simple. The allegations made by the petitioners could not be substantiated during the inquiry. The police conducted the investigation into the FIR lodged by the informant and found sufficient reasons to file a charge sheet before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 451, 323, 427, 147 and 149 of the IPC. The matter is pending before the learned Trial Court. It was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 5. No reply was filed on behalf of respondent No.2. 6. I have heard Mr. Hemant Thakur, learned counsel for petitioners No.1 to 5, Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No.1-State and Mr. Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel for respondent No.2/informant. 7. Mr. Hemant Thakur, learned counsel for petitioners No.1 to 5, submitted that a false FIR was lodged by the informant. The petitioners had also reported the matter to the police, but the police failed to take any action. The cross cases are to be tried together, which is not possible in the present case, as no FIR was registered by the police based on the complaint made by the petitioners. The allegations in the FIR are false, and continuation 5 2025:HHC:25802 of the proceedings amounts to abuse of the process of the Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and subsequent proceedings arising out of the FIR be quashed. 8. Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent No.1-State, submitted that the allegations in the FIR constitute the commission of a cognizable offence. The police have filed the charge sheet before the Court, and this Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction in the present matter. He prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 9. Mr. Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel for respondent No.2-informant, submitted that the allegations in the FIR are to be taken as correct during these proceedings. These allegations disclose the commission of cognizable offences. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter, and this Court should not exercise the inherent jurisdiction in the present case. The petitioners filed an application under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., which was treated as a private complaint. The matter is pending before the learned Trial Court, and the cross-cases can be tried 6 2025:HHC:25802 together. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 10. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 11. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. 7 2025:HHC:25802 (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code, except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable based on which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the 8 2025:HHC:25802 proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 12. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process 9 2025:HHC:25802 or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre- empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) 13. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14. The allegations in the FIR show that the petitioners pelted stones upon the informant party, which caused injuries to the informant and her children and damage to her property. They entered the courtyard of the informant and continued to pelt the stones. These allegations prima facie show the commission of cognizable offences, and the FIR cannot be quashed in the present case. 15. It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR are false. This submission will not help the petitioners. The Court exercising inherent jurisdiction has to take the allegations in the 10 2025:HHC:25802 FIR as correct. This position was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, wherein it was observed: - “29. It is settled law that the power of quashing a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non- interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used in a routine manner according to its whims or caprice.” 16. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was observed: - “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the 11 2025:HHC:25802 categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060: “14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge- sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 17. It was submitted that the police have not registered the FIR, and the complaint filed by the petitioners cannot be tried together with the complaint made by the informant. This 12 2025:HHC:25802 submission will not help the petitioners. It is undisputed that the petitioners had filed Cr.MMO No. 413 of 2018, which was decided on 29.10.2024 and this Court held that the learned Trial Court was justified in taking cognisance and not referring the matter to the police for investigation. Therefore, the matter is pending before the learned Trial Court, and both complaints can be tried together. 18. It was admitted in the petition that the charges have been framed and the matter is listed for prosecution evidence. It was laid down in Minakshi Bala v. Sudhir Kumar, (1994) 4 SCC 142: 1994 SCC (Cri) 1181 that once the Competent Court has framed the charges, the person aggrieved may invoke the revisional jurisdiction and the High Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., except in rare cases. It was observed at page 145: - “7. If charges are framed in accordance with Section 240 CrPC on a finding that a prima facie case has been made out — as has been done in the instant case — the person arraigned may, if he feels aggrieved, invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court or the Sessions Judge to contend that the charge-sheet submitted under Section 173 CrPC and documents sent with it did not disclose any ground to presume that he had committed any offence for which he is charged and the revisional court if so satisfied 13 2025:HHC:25802 can quash the charges framed against him. To put it differently, once charges are framed under Section 240 CrPC the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction would not be justified in relying upon documents other than those referred to in Sections 239 and 240 CrPC; nor would it be justified in invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the same except in those rare cases where forensic exigencies and formidable compulsions justify such a course. We hasten to add even in such exceptional cases, the High Court can look into only those documents which are unimpeachable and can be legally translated into relevant evidence.” (Emphasis supplied) 19. In the present case, no exceptional circumstances were shown to justify the quashing of the FIR. 20. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected, forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge 14 2025:HHC:25802 application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.” 21. No other point was urged. 22. In view of the above, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed. 23. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 4th August 2025 (Chander)