2025:HHC:6729 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 747 of 2023 Reserved on: 11.03.2025 Date of Decision: 19.03.2025 Jahir Abbaskhan & another ….. Petitioners Versus State of H.P. & o another ....Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the petitioners : Ms. Sangeeta Vasudeva, Advocate. For the respondents : Mr Tarun Pathak, Deputy Advocate General for respondent No.1. Mr Gurmeet Bhardwaj, Advocate, for respondent No. 2 ___________________________________________ Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of F.I.R. No. 130 of 2020 dated 24.08.2020 along with the consequential proceedings. 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the Informant-respondent No. 2 made a complaint to the police that petitioner No.1 Jahir Abbas Khan had threatened him on 14.08.2020, while petitioner No. 2 Amir Khan stood outside. Petitioner No.1 Jahir Abbas Khan asked the informant to issue character certificates in his, his brother’s and his father's favour. He forced the informant to put his 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:6729 signature on the character certificates. The informant told petitioner No.1 that various criminal cases were registered against him in Police Post Kotla. The matters were also pending before Gram Panchyat Kuther, Tehsil Jawali, District Kangra, H.P. Petitioner no. 1 asked the informant to settle the cases. The informant declined to do so. The petitioner threatened to kill the informant. The police conducted the investigation and filed a charge sheet against the petitioners for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 451, 506, and 504 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). 3. Being aggrieved from the registration of the F.I.R. and filing of the charge sheet, the petitioners have filed the present petition asserting that their father had filed an application under the Right to Informant Act in the office of Secretary, Gram Panchayat Kuthehar on 11.06.2020. Respondent No2/informant became inimical with the petitioners’ family to get them involved in some false case. The petitioners’ father had also filed an application against the informant, in Police Post Kotla on 22.08.2020, however, no action was taken by the police. The F.I.R. has been registered by the informant due to enmity. The informant had committed various irregularities while holding the Post of Pradhan. He is an influential person. Petitioner No.1 is student and Petitioner No.2 is doing a private job. The Investigating Officer stated that the CCTV footage was not clear, which shows the false implication of the petitioners. The Investigating Officer examined only 3 2025:HHC:6729 interested witnesses. No offence is made out against the petitioners. Petitioner No.1 had filed a complaint against eight persons of Kuthehar Panchayat before the District Panchayat Officer, Kangra, Lokpal (DRDA) Ombudsman (MGNREGA). One Ishwar Singh had also filed a Civil Writ Petition bearing CWP No. 4148 of 2022 against respondent No.2/informant. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R. be quashed. 4. The petition is opposed by filing a reply by respondent No.1 making preliminary submissions regarding lack of maintainability, the petitioners having not approached the Court with clean hands and the offences being serious and having far-reaching effects upon the society. It was asserted that police conducted the investigation into the allegations made by the informant and found sufficient reasons to file a charge sheet before the Court. The complaint filed by the petitioners’ father was also investigated. No cognizable offence was found to have been committed. The matter is pending before the competent Court. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 5. A separate reply was filed by respondent No.2 making preliminary submissions regarding lack of maintainability, and the petitioners having concealed material facts from the Court. The contents of the petition were denied on merits. However, it was admitted that respondent No.2/informant made a complaint to the police and F.I.R. was 4 2025:HHC:6729 registered in the Police Station. It was also admitted that various complaints were made against respondent No.2/informant. It was asserted that the complaints were found to be false. It was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 6. Separate rejoinders denying the contents of the respective replies and affirming those of the petition were filed. 7. I have heard Ms Sangeeta Vasudeva, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr Tarun Pathak, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent No.1 and Mr Gurmeet Bhardwaj, Advocate, for respondent No.2. 8. Mr Sangeeta Vasudeva, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners are innocent and they were falsely implicated. The allegations in the F.I.R. do not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. The present F.I.R. was lodged by informant/respondent No.2 as a counterblast to various complaints made against him by the petitioners and their family members. Therefore, she prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R. be ordered to be quashed. 9. Mr. Tarun Pathak, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent No.1-State submitted that the learned Trial Court has framed the charges against the petitioners and their remedy is to file a revision against the order framing the charges. The competent Court has applied 5 2025:HHC:6729 its mind and found sufficient reasons to frame the charges and this Court should not exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 10. Mr. Gurmeet Bhardwaj, learned counsel for respondent No.2 adopted the submission advanced by learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent No.1/State and submitted that the complaints made against respondent No.2/informant were found to be false. The police duly investigated the allegations made by informant/respondent No.2 against the petitioners and they were found to be true. This Court will not go into the correctness or otherwise of the allegations while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the record carefully. 12. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarized some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: 6 2025:HHC:6729 “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. 7 2025:HHC:6729 (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceeding can be quashed.” 8 2025:HHC:6729 13. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185 wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) 14. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. It is undisputed that the learned Trial Court has framed the charges against the petitioners. It was laid down in Minakshi Bala v. Sudhir Kumar, (1994) 4 SCC 142: 1994 SCC (Cri) 1181 that once the 9 2025:HHC:6729 competent Court has framed the charges, the person aggrieved may invoke the revisional jurisdiction and the High Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., except in the rare cases. It was observed on page 145: - “7. If charges are framed in accordance with Section 240 CrPC on a finding that a prima facie case has been made out — as has been done in the instant case — the person arraigned may, if he feels aggrieved, invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court or the Sessions Judge to contend that the charge-sheet submitted under Section 173 CrPC and documents sent with it did not disclose any ground to presume that he had committed any offence for which he is charged and the revisional court if so satisfied can quash the charges framed against him. To put it differently, once charges are framed under Section 240 CrPC the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction would not be justified in relying upon documents other than those referred to in Sections 239 and 240 CrPC; nor would it be justified in invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the same except in those rare cases where forensic exigencies and formidable compulsions justify such a course. We hasten to add even in such exceptional cases the High Court can look into only those documents which are unimpeachable and can be legally translated into relevant evidence.” (Emphasis supplied) 16. A perusal of the copy of the charge sheet annexed to the petition shows that the police conducted the investigation and recorded the statement of witnesses. The police also checked the CCTV footage but it was not clear. It was found after the investigation that the petitioners had committed the offences punishable under Sections 451, 506, and 504 read with Section 34 of IPC. Thus, the Investigating 10 2025:HHC:6729 Officer found that the allegations made by the informant were sufficient to file a charge sheet against the petitioners before the Court. A perusal of the contents of the F.I.R. also clearly shows that petitioner No.1. Jahir Abbas Khan had entered the room where informant/respondent No.2 was sleeping. He threatened the informant and compelled him to put his signature on the character certificates. His brother was standing outside. These allegations prima facie make out a case of the commission of offences punishable under Section 451, 506 read with Section 34 of IPC. 17. It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR are false. This Court cannot determine the truthfulness or falsity of the allegations because it is a matter of trial to be adjudicated by the learned Trial Court where the matter is pending. This position was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643 wherein it was held: - “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at its face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint even if taken at its face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out 11 2025:HHC:6729 a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060: “14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed : (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 18. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392: 2024 12 2025:HHC:6729 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC cannot conduct a mini-trial. It was observed at page 397: “17. This Court in a series of judgments has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) “6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. … 7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.” 19. Hence, it is not permissible for the Court to go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR. 20. It was submitted that F.I.R. is actuated by mala fide because many complaints have been filed against the informant. This submission will not help the petitioners. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Chhattisgarh vs Amar Kumar Singh 2023(6) 559 that when an investigation was conducted and a charge 13 2025:HHC:6729 sheet was filed, the question of mala fide would become meaningless. It was observed: “78. Thirdly, it must be remembered that when information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered in respect of a disproportionate assets case, it is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in court that is decisive for determining the fate of the accused. To our mind, whether the first information report is the outcome of mala fides would be of secondary importance. In such a case, should the allegations of mala fides be of some prima facie worth, would pale into insignificance if sufficient materials are gathered for sending the accused up for a trial; hence, the plea of mala fide may not per se form the basis for quashing the first information report/complaint. 79. Finally, following the above, what is of substantial importance is that if criminal prosecution is based upon adequate evidence and the same is otherwise justifiable, it does not become vitiated on account of significant political overtones and mala fide motives. We can say without fear of contradiction, that it is not in all cases in our country that an individual, who is accused of acts of omission/commission punishable under the PC Act but has the blessings of the ruling dispensation, is booked by the police and made to face prosecution. If, indeed, in such a case (where a prosecution should have been but has not been launched) the succeeding political dispensation initiates steps for launching prosecution against such an accused but he/she is allowed to go scot- free, despite there being materials against him/her, merely on the ground that the action initiated by the current regime is mala fide in the sense that it is either to settle scores with the earlier regime or to wreak vengeance against the individual, in such an eventuality we are constrained to observe that it is criminal justice that would be the casualty. This is because it is difficult to form an opinion conclusively at the stage of reading a 14 2025:HHC:6729 first information report that the public servant is either in or not in possession of property disproportionate to the known sources of his/her income. It would all depend on what is ultimately unearthed after the investigation is complete. Needless to observe, the first information report in a disproportionate assets case must, as of necessity, prima facie, contain ingredients for the perception that there is fair enough reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence relating to “criminal misconduct” punishable under the PC Act and to embark upon an investigation.” 21 It was submitted that various F.I.R.s have been filed by the parties against each other and the present F.I.R. is a counterblast to the F.I.R. lodged by the petitioners. This submission will not help the petitioners. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramveer Upadhyay v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 484, that a complaint cannot be quashed because it was initiated due to enmity. It was observed: “30. The fact that the complaint may have been initiated by reason of political vendetta is not in itself grounds for quashing the criminal proceedings, as observed by Bhagwati, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar (1987) 1 SCC 2884. It is a well-established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution if otherwise justified and based upon adequate evidence, does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or complainant. Though the view of Bhagwati, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan (supra) was the minority view, there was no difference of opinion with regard to this finding. To quote Krishna Iyer, J., in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471, “If the use of power is of 15 2025:HHC:6729 the fulfilment of a legitimate object the actuation or catalysation by malice is not legicidal.” Xxxx 39. In our considered opinion criminal proceedings cannot be nipped in the bud by exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. only because the complaint has been lodged by a political rival. It is possible that a false complaint may have been lodged at the behest of a political opponent. However, such a possibility would not justify interference under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings. As observed above, the possibility of retaliation on the part of the petitioners by the acts alleged, after closure of the earlier criminal case cannot be ruled out. The allegations in the complaint constitute an offence under the Atrocities Act. Whether the allegations are true or untrue, would have to be decided in the trial. In the exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the correctness of the allegations in a complaint except in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear that the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence. The Complaint Case No. 19/2018 is not such a case which should be quashed at the inception itself without further Trial. The High Court rightly dismissed the application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.” 22. Thus, it is impermissible to quash the FIR on the ground of enmity. Moreover, enmity is a double-edged weapon - while it furnishes the motive for false implication, it also furnishes a motive for the commission of the crime; therefore, the submission that F.I.R. has to be quashed due to the enmity cannot be accepted. 23. No other point was urged. 16 2025:HHC:6729 24. Therefore, no exceptional case is made out for quashing the F.I.R., consequently, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed, so also the pending applications, if any. 25. The observation made hereinabove shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 19th March, 2025 (ravinder)