APHC010168272025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH (Special Original Jurisdiction) FRIDAY, TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 3591/2025 Between: Vallabhaneni Vamsi Mohan The State Of Andhra Pradesh and Others Counsel for the Petitioner/accused: 1. V.Devi Satya Sri Counsel for the Respondent/complainant(S): 1. VENKATASUBBAIAH V 2. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR The Court made the following 1) Under Sections 480 and 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, 'BNSS'), this Criminal Petition has been filed by the petitioner herein/A.71 seeking regular bail, in Gannavaram Police Station punishable under sections 143, 147, 148, 435, 506 r/w. 149 Penal Code, 1860 (referred to as the ' Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (POA) Act, 1989 (referred to as Act’). 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) FRIDAY, THE SECOND DAY OF MAY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 3591/2025 Vallabhaneni Vamsi Mohan ...PETITIONER/ACCUSED AND The State Of Andhra Pradesh and ...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT(S) Counsel for the Petitioner/accused: Counsel for the Respondent/complainant(S): VENKATASUBBAIAH V PUBLIC PROSECUTOR The Court made the following ORDER: Under Sections 480 and 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, 'BNSS'), this Criminal Petition has been filed by the 1 seeking regular bail, in Cr.No.137 of 2023 of Gannavaram Police Station, Krishna District, registered for the offences under sections 143, 147, 148, 435, 506 r/w. 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (referred to as the 'I.P.C.') and Section 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) of and Scheduled Tribes (POA) Act, 1989 (referred to as IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH [3369] THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO ...PETITIONER/ACCUSED ...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT(S) Under Sections 480 and 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, 'BNSS'), this Criminal Petition has been filed by the 137 of 2023 of registered for the offences of the Indian and Section 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) of and Scheduled Tribes (POA) Act, 1989 (referred to as ‘the 2 2) The prosecution's case, as outlined in the report dated 22.02.2023, is as follows: (i) One Mudunuri Satya Vardhan, the de facto complainant, works as a computer operator in the Gannavaram Telugu Desam Party office and belongs to the SC Madiga community. On 20.02.2023 in the evening, Pitta Mahesh, driver of Kalyani, was in the office at about 5.00 P.M. The local MLA-Vallabhaneni Vamsi Mohan came in two black Scorpio cars (AP 39 LR 0333, AP 39 LB 0333) and stopped in the front of party office and threatened that today itself the Telugu Desam Party is over and went away by observing the surroundings. (ii) At about 5.30 P.M., the followers of the YCP party belonging to Gannavaram Constituency, including the petitioners herein and other accused, attacked altogether and entered the office and shouted “jai Vallabhaneni Vamsi" and threw stones and illegally entered the party office with deadly weapons and trying to break the furniture, two computers and two televisions and then one Volupalli Mohan Ranga Rao, Yatendra Ramakrishna, Gondi Paramdamaiah, Mulupuri Prabhukanth and Pothumarthi Hemanth of YCP party said to him and Mahesh with touching the caste of the defacto complainant and told that all the furniture in the party office was smashed with sticks, cricket wickets and stones. Another is damage to the three cars which are parked in the compound. Rabbani poured petrol on a car bearing No.AP 16 DA 5555, the said car was burnt, and the entire episode took place before the Police. All the YCP rowdy leaders illegally formed a group; they attacked their Telugu Desam Party office, destroyed the furniture and set cars on fire, threatening to kill all the people, saying that they would kill anyone who came across their Vamsi. The accused attacked their Telugu Desam Party office with the instigation of the local Legislator 3 Vallabhaneni Vamsi as an illegal group. They insulted the defacto complainant in the name of his caste. 3) It is contended in the petition that the petitioner has been falsely implicated as A.71 in Crime No.137 of 2023, despite the absence of any reference to his name in the complainant’s report or any specific acts attributed to him. The offences, based on political rivalry, are baseless. Sections 436, 450 IPC, and the SCs & STs (POA) Act are inapplicable. The investigation under F.I.R.No.136 of 2023 has been completed, with a charge sheet filed. Cr.No.137 of 2023 is merely an additional charge based on the same facts. He has cooperated fully with the investigation. Despite his earlier bail application (Crl.M.P.No.156/2025) being dismissed, several co-accused have been granted bail by this Court (A5 vide Crl.P.No.5202/2024 and 14 others vide Crl.P.No.5375/2024) and 30 others by the Special Court. 4) The learned Public Prosecutor filed a counter, contending that the present bail petition under Section 439 Cr.P.C., is not maintainable, as provisions of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, remain applicable in Crime No.137/2023. Despite adverse observations by the Special Court on 13.02.2025 and 17.02.2025, no alteration memo has been filed to delete the SC/ST charges. Thus, the appropriate remedy lies under Section 14A of the SC/ST Act. (ii) The State has filed Crl.P.No.3682/2025 under Section 528 BNSS seeking expungement of the 13.02.2025 order, scheduled for hearing on 16.04.2025. It also contests the Special Court's 17.02.2025 order refusing to hear the remand application. The petitioner's involvement in the commission of the offence is alleged to be based on call records, witness statements, and CCTV footage. (iii) The investigation was stagnant from Feb–July 2023. Approval for deletion of SC/ST provisions was obtained on 04.07.2023, but no alteration memo was filed before the court. A new I.O., resumed the probe in July 2024. 4 Out of 93 accused, 34 remain absconding. The petitioner has concealed serious criminal antecedents and has violated the law by abducting and threatening the de facto complainant in Cr.No.137 of 2023, resulting in the registration of Cr.No.86 of 2025 at Patamata P.S. (iv) Given the gravity of the offences, ongoing investigation, and risk of tampering or aiding the absconding accused, it is requested to dismiss the present criminal petition. 5) I have heard Ms V. Devi Satya Sri, learned Counsel for the petitioner / A.71 and Sri Sidharth Luthra, learned Senior Counsel representing the Respondent-State and perused the written submissions filed to support the petitioner's contentions. Both sides reiterated their submissions on par with the contentions presented in the petition, counter and written submissions. 6) Learned Public Prosecutor relied on the decision in Anil Kumar Yadav V. State (NCT of Delhi)1, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: 17. While granting bail, the relevant considerations are : (i) nature of seriousness of the offence; (ii) character of the evidence and circumstances which are peculiar to the accused; and (iii) likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice; (iv) the impact that his release may make on the prosecution witnesses, its impact on the society; and (v) likelihood of his tampering. No doubt, this list is not exhaustive. There are no hard-and-fast rules regarding grant or refusal of bail, each case has to be considered on its own merits. The matter always calls for a judicious exercise of discretion by the court. 19. The test to be applied for a grant of bail was also considered in Jayendra Saraswathi Swamigal v. State of T.N. [Jayendra Saraswathi Swamigal v. State of T.N., (2005) 2 SCC 13: 2005 SCC (Cri) 481], wherein it was held as under : (SCC pp. 21-22, para 16) “16. … The considerations which normally weigh with the court in granting bail in non-bailable offences have been explained by this Court in State v. Jagjit Singh [State v. Jagjit Singh, (1962) 3 SCR 622 : AIR 1962 SC 253 : (1962) 1 Cri LJ 215] and Gurcharan Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Gurcharan Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (1978) 1 SCC 118 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 41] and basically they are — the nature and seriousness of the offence; the character of the evidence; circumstances which are peculiar to the accused; a reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused not being secured at the trial; reasonable 1 (2018) 12 SCC 129 5 apprehension of witnesses being tampered with; the larger interest of the public or the State and other similar factors which may be relevant in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 24. As pointed out earlier, one of the grounds for the grant of bail to the appellant Anil Kumar Yadav by the Sessions Court was that he was in custody for more than one year. In crimes like murder, the mere fact that the accused was in custody for more than one year may not be a relevant consideration. In the Gobarbhai Naranbhai case [Gobarbhai Naranbhai Singala v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 3 SCC 775 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 743], it was observed that the period of incarceration by itself would not entitle the accused to be enlarged on bail. The same was reiterated in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh [Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688]. 7) In P. Chidambaram V. Central Bureau of Investigation2, the Hon'ble Apex Court held thus: "22. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised based on the well-settled principles having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. The following factors are to be taken into consideration while considering an application for bail:(i) the nature of accusation and the severity of the punishment in the case of conviction and the nature of the materials relied upon by the prosecution; (ii) reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witnesses or apprehension of threat to the complainant or the witnesses; (iii) reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the Accused at the time of trial or the likelihood of his abscondence; (iv) character behaviour and standing of the Accused and the circumstances which are peculiar to the Accused; (v) larger interest of the public or the State and similar other considerations (vide Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT, Delhi and Anr. [MANU/SC/0193/2001]." It is also necessary for the court granting bail to consider, among other circumstances, the following factors also before granting bail; they are, (a) The nature of the accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence; (b) Reasonable apprehension of tampering of the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant; (c) Prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge." 8) Learned Public Prosecutor relied on the decision in Ajwar V. Waseem3, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: Relevant parameters for granting bail 2 MANU/SC/1456/2019 3 (2024) 10 SCC 768 6 26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. In light of the parameters mentioned above, the respective contentions raised by both parties are to be considered to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to the grant of bail. 9) Ms V. Devi Satya Sri learned Counsel for the petitioner (A.71), contends that the petitioner did not participate in the commission of the offence at any point. The case, she argues, was fabricated against him months after the crime was registered, allegedly due to political rivalry between groups. Furthermore, no specific overt acts are attributed to the petitioner (A.71) in the report filed by the de facto complainant, and his name was not even mentioned in the report. She further contends that the Police invoked Sections 436 and 452 of the I.P.C., solely to circumvent the safeguards laid down in Arnesh Kumar V. State of Bihar.4 and/or those envisaged under Section 35(3) of the BNSS, thereby depriving the petitioner of legal protection. This, she argues, is a clear instance of political malice tainting the prosecution, amounting to an illegality that strikes at the root of the case, particularly in the absence of the essential ingredients required to sustain the offences alleged. 10) I have thoroughly examined the First Information Report (F.I.R.) to evaluate the aforementioned submissions. No.136 of 2023, which was filed on 22.02.2023. 11) As per the prosecution’s case, on 20.02.2023, the de facto complainant, office boy Pitta Mahesh, and car driver Kalyani were present at the office. 4 (2014) 8 SCC 273 7 Around 5:00 P.M., Sri Vallabaneni Vamsi and Sri Katru Seshu, accompanied by others, arrived at the TDP party office in two black Scorpio cars (registration Nos. AP 39 LR 0333 and AP 39 LB 0333). They threatened the de facto complainant and inquired about TDP leaders, including Pattabi. They left, declaring that the future of the TDP would be finished. At approximately 5:30 P.M., following the instigation of Sri Vamsi Mohan, YSRCP leaders and followers from the Gannavaram Assembly constituency (A.1 to A.70, along with others) conspired to attack the TDP party office. They assembled unlawfully, armed with deadly weapons such as sticks, stones, cricket wickets, and plastic petrol bottles. The group trespassed onto the premises, raising slogans with the intent to harm the TDP leaders present. They threw stones at the office, shattering glasses and mirrors, and caused damage to vehicles parked in the compound, including those bearing registration Nos. AP 39 K 1999, AP 16 DJ 9499, and TS 10 EC 4099, using sticks, stones, and cricket wickets. Subsequently, they entered the party office and damaged the furniture and computers inside. Sri Rabbani (A.44) brought a petrol can and poured petrol on the vehicle with registration No.AP 16 DA 5555, and set it on fire, completely burning the car. Additionally, they poured petrol on the walls of the office room and set them on fire, creating a chaotic and panic-stricken atmosphere. 12) The learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the investigation into this crime is marred by inconsistencies and external pressures, as evident from the belated inclusion of the petitioner through an undated memo after the change of Government in June 2024. The record shows that the F.I.R., was lodged under the previous regime while petitioner / A.71, an MLA from the ruling party, was in power. Even though the petitioner's involvement is clearly outlined in the report, for reasons only the investigating officer knows, the petitioner has conveniently been left out of the list of accused. So, the arguments raised here, as stated above, have no grounds and can't be accepted at the outset. 8 13) The same submissions were made before this court at the time of disposal of the bail application in Crl.P.No.5202 of 2024 and in other related petitions. This court observed that additional provisions were brought on record on 30.01.2024, well before the formation of the new Government; the investigation did not follow a consistent course; it proceeded intermittently, with periods of inaction, during which the Police remained passive observers, failing to register a case upon noticing the commission of cognizable offences; there appears to have been unholy interference in the investigation process, and it is evident that the petitioners therein, including A.5 and several others, participated in the acts of vandalism that resulted in the destruction of property belonging to political opponents. 14) The other contention raised is that the provisions of Sections 436 and 450 of the I.P.C., do not apply to the facts of this case, as the alleged incident occurred at the TDP office, not a human dwelling. 15) Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the general meaning of the term ‘dwelling’ is a house or structure where a person/s lives or which is used for human inhabitation. However, as the term ‘dwelling’ has several meanings and interpretations, the meaning that aligns with the intent behind using the said term in the statute is to be adopted. In support of her contention, she relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.P. Jain V. Krishna Mohan Gupta5, wherein it held that: 20. Stroud, in his Judicial Dictionary, Vol. 2, at p. 858 (4th Edn.), noted that a "dwelling house" is obviously a house with the superadded requirement that it is dwelt in or the dwellers in which are absent only temporarily, having animus revertendi. 21. In this connection, reference may be made to the meaning of "dwelling house" in Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 28, pp. 604-05, where dwelling place is mentioned. See also in this connection "dwelling" or "dwelling house" where it was mentioned that the term was not free from ambiguity, multiple meanings and many definitions have been given. The meaning must suit the purpose and the idea behind the statute in question in a particular case. For the meaning of "dwelling house", it may be instructive to refer to the Words and Phrases Legally 5 (1987) 1 SCC 191 9 Defined, Vol. 2, 2nd Edn., p. 127 wherein it has been mentioned, inter alia, that “dwelling house” meant a building used or constructed or adapted to be used wholly or principally for human habitation and “dwelling house” included any part of a house where that part was occupied separately as a dwelling house. 16) She further placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Election Commission of India v. Manmohan Singh (Dr)6, wherein it observed that: 9. The writ petition was allowed in part by the High Court, holding thus: (i) That the 'ordinarily resident' in a constituency, as mentioned in the Representation of the People Act, 1950, shall mean a habitual resident of that place or a resident as a matter of fact in regular, normal or usual course. It means a usual and normal resident of that place. The residence must be permanent in character and not temporary or casual. It must be as above for a considerable time, he must have the intention to dwell permanently. He must have a settled abode at that place for a considerable length of time for which a reasonable man will accept him as the resident of that State. (ii) A person holding a declared office as provided by the Act of 1950 can file a declaration in Form 6, and such a declaration shall have to be accepted as correct, and the burden does not lie on such a person to produce evidence to the contrary; that burden lies on the authority who disputes it, regarding holding of declared office. (iii) Apart from inquiry regarding holding a declared office, such a declaration made by the holder of declared office cannot be subjected to any inquiry as the statute by creating a deeming provision/fiction has given that privilege/right to the holder of a declared office to make a declaration regarding 'ordinarily residence' of a place and that must be deemed to be final. (iv) The orders dated 1-3-1994 (Annexure J), notice dated 2-2-1994 and 16- 2-1994 (Annexures D and F), and the order dated 3-3-1994 (Annexure I) shall stand quashed being without authority of law and having been issued without jurisdiction, and in violation of laws as indicated above.” 10. The appellant accepts the correctness of the finding of the High Court in regard to the meaning of the words “ordinarily resident”. It questions the correctness of its finding in regard to the effect of a declaration of the place of his ordinary residence by a person holding a declared office and, consequently, the quashing of the orders dated 1-3-1994 and 3-3-1994 and notices dated 2-2-1994 and 16-2-1994. 6 (2000) 1 SCC 591 10 17) Learned senior Counsel appearing for the Respondent-State relied on the following precedents: (i) In Mangaraj Barik V. State of Orissa7, the High Court of Orissa held that: 5. Counsel had made submissions on the question of whether a school building would come under the expression—"…………any building, …………used as a human dwelling …………-in section 442 of the Penal Code, 1860. The learned Additional Government Advocate submitted that a school building would satisfy the test of a building used as a human dwelling, and in support of his contention, he relied on The State v. Nihal Singh [(1971) LXXXIII Punj. Law Reporter 440.] . In that case the meaning of the expression “any building used as a human dwelling” in section 380, Penal Code, 1860 was considered in the context of railway waiting-ioom. It was observed:— “There can be no dispute that a railway waiting room is a building. The further point for consideration is whether it is used as a 'human dwelling'. The contention of Mr Gour is that the word 'dwelling' in section 380, Penal Code, 1860, has a restricted meaning, viz., a house or building used as a permanent residence and that it does not include such public places where passengers may only rest for a while awaiting the arrival of their train. It is true that one fact of the dictionary meaning of ‘dwell’ is ‘to remain as in a permanent residence’ to have one's abode to reside. But that is not the only connotation of the term, which is of wide amplitude and is used in several shades and senses. The O.E. i.e., the original appearance of the word in English (vide. Shorter Oxford Dictionary, Third Edition, and Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition), was ‘dwellan’ or dwelian - akin to ‘dull’ which originally meant “tolingot”, delay, tary”. In current use also, it retains the meaning. “abide, remain or linger for a time in a place or condition. Thus construed, the term “dwelling” in section 380, Penal Code, 1860, means a building, tent or vessel in which a person lives, remains or lingers whether permanently or temporarily. A Railway waiting room, therefore, is a 'building used as a human dwelling' and a theft committed therein would be punishable under section 380, Penal Code, 1860.” 6. As pointed out in the aforesaid decision, a building need not be used as a place of permanent residence in order to be considered as a human dwelling. In the present case, there can be no dispute that the school is a building, and on the strength of the reasoning adopted in the aforesaid decision, I would further hold that a school is a building used as a human dwelling within the contemplation of section 442, of the Penal Code, 1860. 7 1982 SCC OnLine Ori 134 11 (ii) In Balram Thakur and others V. The State of Madhya Pradesh and others8, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh held that: 15. As per definition of 'house-trespass', apart from the building, tent or vessel used as a human dwelling, a place for custody of property is also covered within the definition of 'house-trespass' as postulated in Section 442 of I.P.C. This aspect was taken note of by the High Court of Karnataka in the case of State of Karnataka by Cantonment vs Richard @ Aruldas and the State of Karnataka by Cantonment vs. Richard @ Aruldas and Chakravarthi, 2008 CrLJ 2200Chakravarthi, 2008 CrLJ 2200 where in paragraph No.28 it is held as under: "28. Therefore from a combined reading of these two Sections and in. particular, having regard to use of the expression in building used as a place for "custody of property" I am of the view that A4 having entered the police station and having assaulted PW2, Section 452 gets attracted. A police station is necessarily house in a building and it is also a place for custody of properly. Therefore, I am unable to agree with the contention put forward by the learned Counsel for the respondents that Section 452 of the I.P.C. is applicable only in respect of any building used as a human dwelling. In this regard, it is also pertinent to refer to a decision reported in 1991(2) Orissa LR 295, which decision has been referred to in AIR Manual 5th Edition Volume 38 at page 868 where it is commented thus: "Where the evidence on record proved that accused went inside office room of the Sub-Divisional Veterinary Assistant Surgeon with a stone in hand and threatened to assault him, offence under Section 448 is made out against thus accused." 16. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, a Police Station is also a place for custody of property, and accordingly, an offence of house-trespass attracts when the same is committed while unauthorizedly entering into the Police Station, as the same is considered to be a place which is used for custody of the property as well. (iii) In State of Karnataka V. Richard9, the High Court of Karnataka held that: 25. Therefore, the important question to be answered at this juncture is, whether the prosecution has also made out a case against A4 in respect of the offence punishable under Section 452 of the I.P.C.? 26. Section 452 of the I.P.C. reads as follows: 8 Misc. Criminal Case No.28119 of 2024 9 2008 SCC OnLine Kar 45 12 “452. House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint.- Whoever commits house-trespass, having made preparation for causing hurt to any person or for assaulting any person, or for wrongfully restraining any person, or for putting any person in fear of hurt, or of assault, or of wrongful restraint, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 27. The expression house-trespass has been explained in Section 442 of the I.P.C. as follows: “442. House-trespass.- Whoever commits criminal trespass by entering into or remaining in any building, tent or vessel used as a human dwelling or any building used as a place for worship or as a place for the custody of property is said to commit "house-trespass". 29. In the instant case, not only A4 committed criminal trespass by entering the police station, but he further assaulted PW2 by ditching his head against the face of PW2 and, thereby caused injuries to PW2 which also included loss of one tooth. Under the above circumstances, I am of the view that the prosecution has made out a case by conviction of A4 even in respect of the offence punishable under Section 452 of the I.P.C. (iv) In Pradeep R.S and others V. State of Kerala10, the High Court of Kerala held that: 12. To attract an offence of lurking house-trespass or housebreaking punishable under Section 454 of the I.P.C, the prosecution will have to prove that there was housebreaking or house trespass as defined under Sections 442 and 445 of the I.P.C. The argument of the learned Counsel appearing for the accused persons herein is that the film set is not a house or a place of worship. "House-trespass" is defined under Section 442 I.P.C. 13. A reading of the aforesaid provision and, in particular, the expression "in building used as a place for custody of property", I am of the view that a film set, though a temporary structure, was being used as a place for the custody of property like generator, etc.; which was allegedly stolen. Since the definition also includes a tent and does not state that it should be a permanent structure, even a temporary film set would fall within the definition of a house, which, in this case, can be said to be a structure used for the custody of property. Hence, I have no doubts about Section 454 getting attracted in this case. (v) In State V. Nihal Singh11, the High Court of Rajasthan held that: (6) There can be no dispute that a railway waiting room is a building'. The further point for consideration is whether it is used as a 'human dwelling'. The contention of Mr. Gaur, is, that the word ‘dwelling’ in section 380, Penal Code, 10 2020 SCC OnLine Ker 12772 11 1970 SCC OnLine P&H 234 13 1860, has a restricted meaning, viz., “a house or building used as a permanent residence” and that it does not include such public places where passengers may only rest for a while, awaiting the arrival of their train. (vi) In State V. Hari Ballabh12, the High Court of Rajasthan held that: Applying these observations to the case before us, we may well point out that although a member of the public may and does have a right of access to a Government Officer in connection with such official business as he may have therein, such a right is not enough to preclude the officer in charge of that office from having actual physical possession of his office building or deprive him of a right to exclude all interference with it if necessary. If all that is so, we feel strongly disposed to think that there can be no valid justification for the view that a Government Officer cannot possibly be held to be in possession of his office premises. So far as we consider, his possession is not capable of being interfered with so long as he is in charge of it, and further, his possession has all the qualities of a peaceful, lawful user, which an outsider can only invade at his own peril, and particularly when forbidden to do so. It only remains for us to point out that if the act of a wrongdoer may happen to fall within the four walls of offences more than one as defined in the Indian Penal Code, then it can be no real answer to say that the offence is only the one which has been provided under a particular section and not the other. So far as we think, in such a case the wrongdoer may well be convicted of both offences, and if for some technical reason a conviction is not possible under one of the offences, then that by itself can hardly be a reason for not convicting or punishing the offender for the other offence. We may, in this connection, also point out that essentially an offence under Section 186, Penal Code, is aimed to reach an entirely different state of circumstances; it is designed to protect public servants in the discharge of their official duties; while section 441, Penal Code, is conceived and designed on a far more comprehensive pattern and is aimed to protect possession which may vest in anybody whatever, whether he is a public servant or not, provided of course such possession is invaded with the criminal intent provided in that section. Lastly, we may also point out that if the view propounded by the learned Judge, in the case which we are considering, were to be accepted, then the employees or agents of all juristic bodies--and it admits of no doubt that the Government is such a body--will stand deprived of the benefit of the protection afforded to them under Section 441, Penal Code, against criminal trespassers in relation to the buildings which are placed in their charge, and we see no cogent reason for adopting such a narrow view having regard to the wide language of section 441, Penal Code. 18) The material on record prima facie suggests that the accused persons entered the TDP office and caused extensive damage, including the destruction of furniture, before the change in political leadership. In light of the 12 1962 SCC OnLine Raj 36 14 observations made in the aforementioned decisions and concerning the concept of house trespass, it is pertinent to note that under Section 442 of the I.P.C., a place used for the custody of property, beyond a building, tent, or vessel used as a human dwelling, is also covered within the definition of house trespass. The record further establishes that the said party office housed computers and other furniture essential to its functioning. In light of the above, the contention raised by the Counsel for the petitioner regarding the inapplicability of Section 452 of the I.P.C., cannot be sustained. 19) As evident from the witness statements, recorded well before the change in political leadership, including those from fire department personnel, the police investigation indicates that not only was a vehicle set on fire, but one Rabbani also poured fuel on the walls of the TDP office and set them ablaze. The scene observation report prepared by the investigating agency confirms that the walls were charred, thereby corroborating the sequence of events. Taken together, these facts prima facie attract the provisions of Section 436 of the Indian Penal Code. This court has already recorded a finding while disposing of the bail application of A.5 in Crl.P.No.5202 of 2024 that the cumulative facts of the case prima facie attract the provisions of Section 436 of the I.P.C. 20) The Counsel for the petitioner argues that F.I.R.No.136 of 2023, related to the alleged incident, has been thoroughly investigated. Furthermore, F.I.R.No.137 of 2023, registered two days later for the same offences, has no grounds for custodial interrogation, as the investigation in F.I.R.No.136 of 2023 is complete. 21) The learned senior Counsel appearing for the Respondent–State submits that Crime No.137 of 2023 was registered based on another incident. At this stage, it cannot be said that two FIRs have been registered for the same offence. Although both incidents occurred at the TDP office, the subject matter of the second crime is identical to that of the first. At this stage, it is not 15 necessary to determine whether the second incident is a continuation of the earlier one, or whether the intentions of the accused in both incidents are similar or distinct. However, it is open to either the petitioner or the State to approach the appropriate superior court to seek a joint trial of the cases. Accordingly, this court finds that the petitioner's contention on this issue cannot be considered when deciding the present bail application. 22) Initially, the investigating officer, the SDPO appointed by the Superintendent of Police, Krishna District, concluded that no offence had been committed under the SC/ST (POA) Act. Based on the statement of the de facto complainant, the investigating officer deleted the provisions under Section 3(1)(r)(s) of the SCs & STs (POA) Act. Subsequently, the Inspector of Police filed a memo on 07.08.2024, adding Sections 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(va) of the SCs & STs (POA) Act. 23) The learned Sessions Judge while passing the common orders dated 13.02.2025 in Crl.M.P.Nos.124, 125 and 157 of 2025 and 1781 of 2024, framed the point for consideration in the anticipatory bail applications, whether the allegations in the F.I.R./complaint filed by the de facto complainant disclose the commission of offences under sections 506 and 450 of the I.P.C., along with the corresponding offences under sections 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(va) of the SC & ST (POA) Act. 24) It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the rough sketch and scene observation report, dated 23.02.2023, prepared by the SDPO in the presence of mediators, did not reveal any damage from fire or signs of fire inside the TDP office. Photographs of the crime scene, taken from various angles by a photographer, corroborated this finding. The learned Sessions Judge concluded that there was no prima facie material for the application of sections 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(va) of the SC & ST (POA) Act. However, the Sessions Judge noted that all allegations against the accused under sections 436, 450, 452, and 353 of the I.P.C., pertained to non-bailable 16 offences, where, except for the accusation under section 353 of the I.P.C., all other offences are punishable with imprisonment up to ten years or life. Additionally, the order revealed that it was brought to the attention of the learned Sessions Judge that a case in Cr.No.86 of 2025 had been registered against A.2, A.7, and A.9 for threatening and extorting the complainant in this case. In light of the deletion of these sections, the petitioner's present application cannot be dismissed solely because no appeal was filed against the Sessions Judge's order, as per Section 14A of the SC/ST Act. However, the State has filed a revision petition challenging the deletion of the provisions stated above. 25) Learned Public Prosecutor relied on the decision in Anzar Azeez V. State of Kerala13, wherein the High Court of Kerala held that: 11. Not only in NDPS cases but in any bail application, if the Counsel for the accused raises a legal point or a point on merit, the bail Court cannot reject the same, saying that it will amount to a finding of prima facie case at the bail application stage. A finding of a prima facie case at the bail application stage is not binding to the trial court at the time of final disposal of that case. It is not binding to the Investigating Officer for further investigation to collect materials in addition to the materials collected already. Therefore, simply because a prima facie opinion is arrived at by the bail court while deciding a bail application, it is not binding on the trial court at the time of the final hearing, nor is it binding on the Investigating Officer, debarring the collection of further evidence. 12. As I mentioned earlier when a question of law or a point on merit is raised by the accused in a bail application, it is the duty of the bail court to decide that point. But that decision will be a prima facie finding at the bail application stage. The bail court court can not neglect such points raised in a bail application by merely stating that if those questions are decided prima facie, it will affect the investigation and the trial. As I mentioned, the prima facie finding in a bail application is not binding to the trial court or the Investigating Agency for collecting further evidence. But when a point is raised by an accused in a bail matter, the court is bound to consider it. Bail court cannot escape from dealing with that contention by observing that it amounts to a "prima facie finding" in a bail application, which will be used by the accused or the prosecution, as the case may be. I make it clear that, no court shall rely on a "prima facie finding" by the bail court, while deciding the main case finally. Similarly, the investigating agency shall not stop the investigation because there is a prima 13 2025 SCC OnLine Ker 1260 17 facie finding that no offence is made out. Investigating officer can proceed with the case, untrammeled by the observation of the bail court. 26) Upon examination of the available records, it is premature to conclude, at this juncture, that the offences alleged against the petitioners are wholly inapplicable. Should the petitioners wish to challenge the inclusion of the provisions as mentioned above, it is open for them to present detailed arguments in support of their stand at the appropriate stage of the proceedings before the Special Court. 27) In such an event, the Sessions Judge shall provide both parties with a fair opportunity to present their arguments regarding the applicability of the relevant provisions at the appropriate stage of the proceedings. This court clarifies that the observations made by the learned Sessions Judge, particularly those regarding the potential deletion or non-applicability of provisions under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (SC/ST Act), should not be considered definitive or conclusive. Bail proceedings, which primarily focus on whether the accused should be granted temporary release pending trial, do not typically involve a comprehensive review of the case merits or a detailed examination of statutory provisions. Considering all relevant legal principles, precedents, and facts, a thorough review should be deferred to later in the judicial process, allowing both parties to advance their cases fully. Therefore, while the observations made during the bail hearing are essential within that specific context, they should not be considered final or binding. The Sessions Judge must ensure that both parties have the opportunity to fully argue their stand on the applicability of the offences alleged. However, at this stage, this court is not inclined to make any definitive findings concerning the Sessions Judge’s observations regarding the non-application of the SC/ST Act provisions. 28) Therefore, it is needless to mention that it is open to both parties to submit their respective contentions at the appropriate stage of the proceedings, and the Sessions Judge shall duly consider these submissions. 18 29) Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the investigation must be conducted by a police officer, not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police and completed within 60 days; however, in the present case, a Sub- Inspector carried out the investigation after an inordinate delay of 27 months and it is an inherent defect in making the investigation and that would it vitiate the trial. She placed reliance on the decision in Viswanadhula Chittibabu V. State of AP.14, wherein the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that: 24. We have already observed in the foregoing paragraphs of the judgment that the said Act was enacted in the year 1989, whereas the Rules were framed in the year 1995 under Section 23 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. There was a delay of about six years in framing the rules. We have to consider why the Government framed this Rule. According to our logic, the Government experienced that the Act was being misused and therefore felt that under such Acts, the investigation has to be done by a responsible Senior Officer, and therefore, they chose Dy. S.P. to make an" investigation. This Rule does not provide that all Dy. S.Ps. can investigate the matter but provides that the Dy. S.P., named by the State Government or Director General of Police or Superintendent of Police, has to nominate and select a Dy. S.P., with integrity and experience to investigate such offences, which will prevent the misuse of the Act, and therefore, in our considered view, the provision contained in Rule 7 of the said Rules has to be interpreted as mandatory. In some of the rulings cited earlier, their Lordships held if there were procedural defects, the trial would not vitiate. The procedure means a procedure which is adopted by the court. For example in the case triable by a Court of Session, the charge-sheet has to be filed in the Court of the Magistrate at the first instance having territorial jurisdiction. The learned Magistrate has to commit the case to the Court of Session. Then only the Sessions Judge gets jurisdiction to try the offences. Unless the procedure prescribed under Section 193 Cr. P.C. is followed, the Sessions Court cannot take cognisance, which is triable by him and for some reason, this procedure is not adopted, and the case is tried directly by the Sessions Judge having jurisdiction will not vitiate the trial. Under the Criminal Procedure Code, the Magistrate has to simply commit the case to the Sessions, who has to act as post office. This procedure in case inadvertently not complied with and the judgment is rendered by the Sessions Court on receiving the charge- sheet directly in his court will not vitiate the trial. But when we see the investigation has to be done by a Police Officer, not below the rank of Dy. S.P. under Rule 7 of the said Rules framed under Section 23 of the said Act, it has some meaning. It is not the procedural defect, it is inherent defect in making the investigation and that would vitiate the entire trial. 14 MANU/AP/1569/2002 19 25. The learned single Judge of this Court held that prejudice has to be shown. We are not able to imagine in the present type of case as to how the accused can show the prejudice caused to him if the investigation is made by the Police Officer below the rank of Dy. S.P. and therefore, the investigation by itself done by any person not authorised under Rule 7 has to be treated as prejudice being caused to the accused, and consequently we have come to the conclusion that Rule 7 framed under Section 23 of the said Act is mandatory and it has to be strictly complied with, which is not the procedural defect but it is inherent defect in conducting the investigation under the said Act and we further hold that if the investigation is done by any other Officer below the rank of Dy. S.P. will vitiate the trial. S.P. will vitiate the trial. Therefore, we answer the point accordingly 30) It is not the petitioner’s case that the provisions of Sections 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act apply to the facts of this case. The petitioner has relied on the observations made by the learned Sessions Judge, who found no prima facie material to invoke these provisions. Based on these observations, the petitioner did not file an appeal against the Sessions Judge's order refusing to grant bail. However, the petitioner now seeks to take advantage of the fact that an officer of the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police did not conduct the investigation. The petitioner is at liberty to raise such a contention at an appropriate stage before the competent court. 31) The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that call data records and other technical evidence related to the petitioner have already been collected. Statements from witnesses (LWs.1 to 55) have been recorded, and some statements have been made under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C; the petitioner has been in judicial custody since 13.02.2025. It is brought to the notice of this court that bail was granted to A.5 by this Court in Crl.P.No.5202 of 2024 on 23.08.2024 and to 14 other accused in Crl.P.No.5375 of 2024 on the same date. Subsequently, the Special Court granted bail to 30 other accused in the same crime. The present bail application of the petitioner was heard along with the applications of other accused, namely A.27, A.28, A.47, A.54, A.55, and A.68. Upon consideration, this court is inclined to grant bail to them for reasons recorded separately. This court, while disposing of the bail 20 applications of A.27, A.28, A.47, A.54, A.55, and A.68, observed that no prima facie material on record to suggest that, if the benefit of bail is extended to the petitioners, they are likely to misuse their liberty or create circumstances detrimental to a fair investigation or trial. In the absence of specific overt acts attributed to those accused and the period of detention, this court views that it is just and reasonable to release those accused on bail by imposing certain conditions and as no material granting bail would hinder justice. Therefore, this court finds no risk of the accused’s tampering with witnesses or hampering the investigation. 32) It has been brought to the court's attention that interim protection was granted during the pendency of the petitioner's anticipatory bail application. However, the prosecution alleges that the petitioner misused this liberty by threatening the de facto complainant and coercing him into withdrawing the accusations made in the present case. 33) The orders passed by the Special Court in Crl.M.P.Nos.124, 125, 127 of 2025 and 1781 of 2024, bail applications filed under Section 438 of the Cr.P.C., indicate that notice was issued to the defacto complainant in accordance with Section 15A of the Act. The defacto complainant, M. Satyavardhan, stated his intention to withdraw the report he had filed, citing difficulties in performing his job due to the ongoing case. He reiterated in his statement that he was not present at the time of the incident, did not know the individuals who came to the TDP office, and that those individuals were also unaware of his identity. He claimed that he signed the report at the request of one Batchula Subrahmanyam, who told him he was signing only as a witness and that he was unaware of the report's contents or the names mentioned therein. He also expressed concern that his family members were distressed about becoming entangled in police and court proceedings and submitted written submissions to that effect. When the de facto complainant did not hesitate to lodge a report against the MLA and YSRCP workers during the previous regime, when that party was in power, it raises concern as to why he 21 chose to withdraw his allegations under the current regime, despite his association with the TDP office. The prosecution contends that the complainant was threatened, coerced, and kidnapped, and was thereby compelled to make such a statement. 34) The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that most of the accused are released on regular and anticipatory bail, and such benefit may also be extended to the petitioner. In support of her contention, she placed reliance on the following decisions: (i) In Adapa Shyam Kumar Shyam and Ors. V. The State of Andhra Pradesh15, this court held that: 25. A perusal of the complaints lodged by respective complainants shows that the names of petitioners are not reflected. Even as per the prosecution case, basing on confession made by other accused regarding the role of petitioners, petitioners were arrayed as accused in the above crimes. 27. Considering the facts of this case, since the name of the petitioners doesn't find place in compliant, no specific overt act was attributed against the petitioners, and extra judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence, and as this court granted bail to other accused, who stands on same footing, this court deems it appropriate to grant bail to the petitioners by duly taking the apprehensions made by the learned Special Assistant Public Prosecutor into consideration with the following conditions…… (ii) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Devineni Avinash and others V. State of AP (petitions for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) Nos.12659-12662/2024 held that: The reason why we would refrain from accepting the prayer made by the respondent(s) is primarily that the F.I.R.No.650/2021 dated 19.10.2021 registered at P.S. Mangalagiri, District Guntur Urban is of the year 2021, and the apprehension of arrest has come after a period of more than three years, and according to the petitioners, the reason for the same is the change in the Government in Andhra Pradesh. It has been argued before us that it is not simply a case of slow investigation but it is a case of no investigation at all. It is a clear violation of the provisions of CrPC and all applicable relevant laws. All the same, it would also be relevant to mention here that admittedly no efforts were made at the hands of the complainant to move before the High Court in a Writ Petition seeking proper investigation in the case. Considering 15 MANU/AP/1775/2022 22 these facts, we allow the petitioners' prayer for anticipatory bail, as custodial interrogation at this stage may not be necessary. (iii) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Prabhakar Tewari V. State of U.P.16, held that: 4. …………. He has also submitted that even as per the F.I.R. or the witness statements recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, his client was not named as having participated in the act of assault or being present at the place of occurrence while the assault took place. 7. ……………. The offence alleged no doubt is grave and serious, and there are several criminal cases pending against the accused. These factors by themselves cannot be the basis for refusal of prayer for bail. ……….. 8…………….. It is further submitted that there is no possibility of the applicant of fleeing away from judicial custody or tampering with the witnesses. In case the applicant is enlarged on bail, he shall not misuse the liberty of bail. 9. ……………... The learned Counsel for Respondent 2-accused has, however, pointed out the delay in recording the witness statements. The accused has been in custody for about seven months. ………………. 35) As per the record, M. Kiran, the brother of the defacto complainant, lodged a report on 21.02.2025 alleging that on 10.02.2025, around 12:00 P.M., his brother left their residence and, while searching for him, one Kiran noticed that around 12:15 P.M., the defacto complainant had been forcibly taken away in a car by followers of Vallabhaneni Vamsi. Upon further inquiry, Kiran learned that his brother had been taken to court on the same day by Vamsi’s associates, namely, Komma Kotlu, Bhimavarapu Ramakrishna @ Ramu, Ganta Veerraju @ Raju, and others, where they allegedly threatened and tortured him, and his statement was recorded in court under coercion. While it is argued on behalf of the petitioner that the co-accused cannot claim innocence in Crime No.86 of 2025 while simultaneously being implicated alongside each other in Crime No.84 of 2025, a holistic examination of the 16 (2020) 11 SCC 648 23 facts in Crime Nos.137 of 2023, 84 of 2025, and 86 of 2025 indicate that the petitioner is a victim of circumstantial malice rather than culpability. 36) The investigating agency has gathered prima facie material supporting the allegations against the petitioner, who is currently in judicial custody in connection with that case. Nothing on record suggests that the case against the petitioner is fabricated. 37) This Court is of the view that, had the petitioner not been allegedly involved in the offences relating to coercing the de facto complainant to withdraw the case, his bail application could have been considered favorably, on par with the other accused. The learned Sessions Judge, while disposing of the petitioner's bail application in Crl.M.P.No.156 of 2025, along with other connected applications, observed that the petitioner's involvement was prima facie established based on the statement of LW.1, who was re-examined on 08.07.2024, as well as the statements of LWs.8, 11, 20, 21 to 28, 30 to 36, and 50 to 55. Additionally, the confession statements of A.72 to A.74, A.76 to A.80, A.82, A.84, A.88, and A.93 recorded before mediators on 06.12.2024 further support the prosecution's case. The prosecution has submitted copies of these statements, and upon perusal of the record, this court finds prima facie involvement of the petitioner (A.71) in the alleged offence. As emphasized in the preceding paragraphs, while considering bail during the pending investigation, the court must examine reasonable apprehension of tampering of the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant. It is submitted that the investigation is at a crucial stage, and the charge sheet is about to be filed. Releasing the petitioner at this juncture may adversely impact the ongoing investigation, and there is a likelihood that he may engage in similar conduct if granted bail. The apprehension expressed by the learned Senior Counsel for the State that releasing the petitioner on bail may result in influencing witnesses or tampering with evidence, is justified given the circumstances of the case. 24 38) This court finds no merit in the present bail application for the foregoing reasons. The Criminal Petition is, therefore, dismissed. The petitioner may approach the Sessions Court concerned in case of a material change in circumstances. 39) Any observations made herein-above shall not be construed as an expression of opinion on the case's merits [for or against either of the parties herein], and these observations are made only for the disposal of the instant bail application. Miscellaneous applications, pending if any, in this petition, shall stand closed. _____________________________ JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO Date: 02.05.2025 SAK 25 THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO CRIMINAL PETITION No.3591 OF 2025 Date: 02.05.2025 SAK