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2025 DAILYLAW 13743 (CHH)

RAJESH KUMAR NARETI v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

WPS/2217/2019 · 2025-06-29

Shri Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi

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Judgment text

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1 2025:CGHC:28827 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 2217 of 2019 Reserved on 17-6-2025 Delivered on 30 - 6-2025 1 - Rajesh Kumar Nareti S/o Late G.R. Nareti Aged About 31 Years R/o Mirchi Para Mulla, Post Bhanupratappur, District Kanker, Chhattisgarh., District : Kanker, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Public Health And Engineering Service Department, Mahanadi Bhawan Naya Mantralaya, Naya Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Superintendent Engineer Public Health And Engineering Department, Jagdalpur, Region, Jagdalpur, District Jagdalpur, Chhattisgarh., District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 3 - Executive Engineer Public Health Engineer, Block Sukhma, District Sukhma, Chhattisgarh., District : Sukuma, Chhattisgarh ... Respondents For Petitioner : Mr. Shikhar Bakhtiyar, Adv. For Respondents No. 1 and 2 : Ms. Mukta Tripathi, Panel Lawyer Hon’ble Mr. Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi, J C A V Order 1. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been preferred by the petitioner against the respondents challenging the order dated 18-9-2015 passed by the respondent No. 2, whereby service of the petitioner has been terminated. Digitally signed by AVANISH KUMAR PATHAK Date: 2025.06.30 17:28:09 +0530 2 2. Facts of the case, in nutshell, are that, G.R. Nareti, who was father of the petitioner, was posted as Hand Pump Technician in the regular establishment of respondent department. He died in harness on 27-8-2012, therefore, petitioner was granted compassionate appointment on the post of Peon in respondent department vide order dated 3-12-2012 (Annexure P-2). While joining, the petitioner had filed verification form mentioning therein that, he has never been arrested or prosecuted in any criminal case, but when character verification report was sought from police department, then vide report (Annexure P-7) dated 6-8-2015, Assistant Inspector General of Police, Intelligence, Chhattisgarh, Raipur, informed that, two criminal cases were registered against the petitioner i.e. Crime No. 170/2008 for the offence under Section 25 of the Arms Act, in which he has been acquitted and another Crime No. 68/2008 for the offence under Sections 294, 323, 325, 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, in which, he has been convicted. On receiving aforesaid information, vide impugned order (Annexure P-1) dated 18-9-2015, service of petitioner has been terminated with immediate effect. Review application filed by the petitioner has also been rejected, therefore, the petitioner has filed instant writ petition seeking quashment of impugned order (Annexure P-1) by directing respondent authorities to reinstate the petitioner on the post of Peon. 3. Respondents/State have filed reply stating inter alia that, while joining on the post of Peon in the respondent department, the petitioner had filed attestation/verification form by concealing the fact and stating 3 that, neither he has been arrested nor prosecuted in any criminal case, whereas, upon receiving character verification report from police department, it was informed vide Annexure P-7 dated 6-8-2015 that, there were two criminal cases registered against him, out of which, he has been acquitted in one criminal case of Arms Act, but he was convicted in second criminal case, therefore his service has been terminated. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that, the petitioner is less educated tribal person. He was appointed on the post of Peon in respondent department on compassionate ground. Though, two criminal cases were registered in Police Station Bhanupratappur against him, but from one case i.e. Crime No. 170/2008 (Criminal Case No. 222/2011), he has been acquitted by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bhanupratappur from the charge under Section 25 of the Arms Act vide judgment dated 29-6-2011 i.e. prior to his joining on the said post. He further submits that in Crime No. 68/2008 (Criminal Case No. 318/2011), he was tried for the offence under Sections 294, 325, 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, in which, he has been acquitted from the offence under Sections 294 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, but he has been convicted under Section 325 read with Section 34 of the IPC. He further submits that in appeal preferred by the petitioner bearing Appeal No. 306/2013, learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bhanupratappur vide order dated 21-4-2016 has acquitted the petitioner from the offence under Section 325 read with Section 34 of the IPC, on the basis of compromise. 4 Thus, the petitioner has been acquitted in both the criminal cases, therefore, terminating petitioner’s service, that too, from the post of Peon, cannot be held to be valid. Learned counsel further submits that, because of ignorance due to less educated person, petitioner inadvertently could not disclose about both the criminal cases registered against him, but since he has been acquitted, hence the petitioner could not be treated as criminal or not having good character to continue his service, that too, on lowest pedestal of hierarchy, hence, he prayed that, the petition may be allowed by setting aside the impugned order and the respondent authorities may be directed to reinstate the petitioner on the post of Peon. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the State would submit that, the petitioner did not join the said post with clean hand as, despite two criminal cases registered against him, he concealed the same in verification form (Annexure R-2), rather he filled the form mentioning therein that, neither he has been arrested nor has been prosecuted nor convicted in any criminal case, thus, giving false information by the petitioner itself shows his malafide intention. He further submits that, if the petitioner would have fairly disclosed about his previous criminal antecedents in verification form, then he may have prayed for liberal approach, but concealing about his two criminal cases dis- entitle him to retain his service, as such, he prays that, the petition may be rejected. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 5 7. Undisputedly, the petitioner was appointed on the post of Peon in respondent department vide order (Annexure P-2) dated 3-12-2012 on compassionate ground, as his father G.R. Nareti died in harness. 8. In appointment order (Annexure P-2) of petitioner, there was specific term/condition No. 1 that, if any adverse comment is received from the police department upon character verification of the employee/candidate, then the service will be terminated without any prior information. The petitioner had filed attestation form (Annexure R-2), in which, he has clearly stated that, neither he has been arrested nor prosecuted nor convicted in any criminal case, whereas undisputedly vide communication (Annexure P-7), the Assistant Inspector General of Police, Intelligence, Chhattisgarh, Raipur has informed that, there are two criminal cases registered against the petitioner, out of which, from one case bearing Crime No. 170/2008 (Criminal case No. 222/2011), he has been acquitted from the offence under Section 25 of the Arms Act vide judgment dated 29-6-2011, but in second Crime No. 68/2008 (Criminal Case No. 318/2011), he has been convicted vide judgment dated 7-9-2013. Annexure P-4 is copy of judgment passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bhanupratappur in Criminal Case No. 318/2011, which shows that, petitioner has been acquitted of the offence under Sections 294 and 506-II of the IPC, but convicted under Section 325/34 of the IPC. Annexure P-5 shows that in appeal preferred by the petitioner/appellant, against aforesaid conviction bearing Appeal No. 306/2013, he has been acquitted of the offence under Section 325/34 6 of the IPC vide order dated 21-4-2016 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Bhanupratappur, disttt. Kanker on the basis of compromise arrived at between the parties. 9. Thus, it is clear that, prior to joining of petitioner on the post of peon on 3-12-2012, there were two criminal cases registered against him, out of which, he had been acquitted from one criminal case prior to his joining, but second criminal case was pending at the time of joining and he was acquitted from that criminal case by the Additional Sessions Judge, Bhanupratappur on 21-4-2016, on the basis of compromise. But, while filling verification form (Annexure R-2), the petitioner concealed aforesaid fact and joined the service. 10. While dealing with such issue, in the case of Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India and others reported in (2016) 8 SCC 471, Hon’ble Supreme Court after considering various judgments has held in para 38 as under : “38. We have noticed various decisions and tried to explain and reconcile them as far as possible. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we summarise our conclusion thus: 38.1. Information given to the employer by a candidate as to conviction, acquittal or arrest, or pendency of a criminal case, whether before or after entering into service must be true and there should be no suppression or false mention of required information. 38.2. While passing order of termination of services or cancellation of candidature for giving false 7 information, the employer may take notice of special circumstances of the case, if any, while giving such information. 38.3. The employer shall take into consideration the government orders/instructions/rules, applicable to the employee, at the time of taking the decision. 38.4. In case there is suppression or false information of involvement in a criminal case where conviction or acquittal had already been recorded before filling of the application/verification form and such fact later comes to knowledge of employer, any of the following recourses appropriate to the case may be adopted: 38.4.1. In a case trivial in nature in which conviction had been recorded, such as shouting slogans at young age or for a petty offence which if disclosed would not have rendered an incumbent unfit for post in question, the employer may, in its discretion, ignore such suppression of fact or false information by condoning the lapse. 38.4.2. Where conviction has been recorded in case which is not trivial in nature, employer may cancel candidature or terminate services of the employee. 38.4.3. If acquittal had already been recorded in a case involving moral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature, on technical ground and it is not a case of clean acquittal, or benefit of reasonable 8 doubt has been given, the employer may consider all relevant facts available as to antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to the continuance of the employee. 38.5. In a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate. 38.6. In case when fact has been truthfully declared in character verification form regarding pendency of a criminal case of trivial nature, employer, in facts and circumstances of the case, in its discretion, may appoint the candidate subject to decision of such case. 38.7. In a case of deliberate suppression of fact with respect to multiple pending cases such false information by itself will assume significance and an employer may pass appropriate order cancelling candidature or terminating services as appointment of a person against whom multiple criminal cases were pending may not be proper. 38.8. If criminal case was pending but not known to the candidate at the time of filling the form, still it may have adverse impact and the appointing authority would take decision after considering the seriousness of the crime. 38.9. In case the employee is confirmed in service, holding departmental enquiry would be necessary before passing order of termination/removal or 9 dismissal on the ground of suppression or submitting false information in verification form. 38.10. For determining suppression or false information attestation/verification form has to be specific, not vague. Only such information which was required to be specifically mentioned has to be disclosed. If information not asked for but is relevant comes to knowledge of the employer the same can be considered in an objective manner while addressing the question of fitness. However, in such cases action cannot be taken on basis of suppression or submitting false information as to a fact which was not even asked for. 38.11. Before a person is held guilty of suppressio veri or suggestio falsi, knowledge of the fact must be attributable to him.” 11. The similar proposition was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh and Others vs Abhijit Singh Pawar reported in (2018) 18 SCC 733 wherein it is observed as under :- ''13. In Avtar Singh (supra), though this Court was principally concerned with the question as to non- disclosure or wrong disclosure of information, it was observed in paragraph 38.5 that even in cases where a truthful disclosure about a concluded case was made, the employer would still have a right to consider antecedents of the candidate and could not be compelled to appoint such candidate. 14. In the present case, as on the date when the 10 respondent had applied, a criminal case was pending against him. Compromise was entered into only after an affidavit disclosing such pendency was filed. On the issue of compounding of offences and the effect of acquittal under Section 320(8) of Cr.P.C., the law declared by this Court in Mehar Singh (supra) (Commissioner of Police, New Delhi and anr. Vs. Mehar Singh [(2013) 7 SCC 685], specially in paragraphs 34 and 35 completely concludes the issue. Even after the disclosure is made by a candidate, the employer would be well within his rights to consider the antecedents and the suitability of the candidate. While so considering, the employer can certainly take into account the job profile for which the selection is undertaken, the severity of the charges levelled against the candidate and whether the acquittal in question was an honourable acquittal or was merely on the ground of benefit of doubt or as a result of compromise. 16. We must observe at this stage that there is nothing on record to suggest that the decision taken by the concerned authorities in rejecting the candidature of the respondent was in any way actuated by mala fides or suffered on any other count. The decision on the question of suitability of the respondent, in our considered view, was absolutely correct and did not call for any interference. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the decisions rendered by the Single Judge as well as by the Division Bench and dismiss Writ Petition No. 9412 of 2013 preferred by the respondent. No costs.'' 12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Imran vs State of Maharashtra reported in (2019) 17 SCC 696 has held as follows : ''5. Employment opportunities is a scarce commodity in our 11 country. Every advertisement invites a large number of aspirants for limited number of vacancies. But that may not suffice to invoke sympathy for grant of relief where the credentials of the candidate may raise serious questions regarding suitability, irrespective of eligibility. Undoubtedly, judicial service is very different from other services and the yardstick of suitability that my apply to other services, may not be the same for a judicial service. But there cannot be any mechanical or rhetorical incantation of moral turpitude, to deny appointment in judicial service simplicitor. Much will depend on the facts of a case. Every individual deserves an opportunity to improve, learn from the past and move ahead in life by self- improvement. To make past conduct, irrespective of all considerations, albatross around the neck of the candidate, may not always constitute justice. Much will, however, depend on the fact situation of a case. 6. That the expression "moral turpitude" is not capable of precise definition was considered in Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana, (1996) 4 SCC 17 opining : "12. "Moral turpitude" is an expression which is used in legal as also societal parlance to describe conduct which is inherently base, vile, depraved or having any connection showing depravity." 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State (UT of Chandigarh) vs Pradeep Kumar reported in (2018) 1 SCC 797 has held as under:- ''11. Entering into the police service required a candidate to be of good character, integrity and clean antecedents. In 12 Commissioner of Police, New Delhi and Another v. Mehar Singh (2013) 7 SCC 685, the respondent was acquitted based on the compromise. This Court held that even though acquittal was based on compromise, it is still open to the Screening Committee to examine the suitability of the candidate and take a decision… 12. While considering the question of suppression of relevant information or false information in regard to criminal prosecution, arrest or pendency of criminal case(s) against the candidate, in Avtar Singh vs Union of India and Others reported in (2016) 8 SCC 471, three- Judges Bench of this Court summarized the conclusion in para (38). As per the said decision in para (38.5), - ''38.5. In a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate." 13. It is thus well settled that acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle him for appointment to the post. Still it is open to the employer to consider the antecedents and examine whether he is suitable for appointment to the post. From the observations of this Court in Mehar Singh (supra) and Parvez Khan (supra) cases, it is clear that a candidate to be recruited to the police service must be of impeccable character and integrity. A person having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged, it cannot be presumed that he was honourably acquitted/completely exonerated. The decision of the Screening Committee must be taken as final unless it is shown to be mala fide. The Screening Committee also 13 must be alive to the importance of the trust repose in it and must examine the candidate with utmost character. … 17. In a catena of judgments, the importance of integrity and high standard of conduct in police force has been emphasized. As held in Mehar Singh (supra) case, the decision of the Screening Committee must be taken as final unless it is mala fide. In the case in hand, there is nothing to suggest that the decision of the Screening Committee is mala fide. The decision of the Screening Committee that the respondents are not suitable for being appointed to the post of Constable does not call for interference. The Tribunal and the High Court, in our view, erred in setting aside the decision of the Screening Committee and the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside." 14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. vs Bunty reported in (2020) 17 SCC 654 has held thus : “13. The law laid down in the aforesaid decisions makes it clear that in case of acquittal in a criminal case is based on the benefit of the doubt or any other technical reason. The employer can take into consideration all relevant facts to take an appropriate decision as to the fitness of an incumbent for appointment/continuance in service. The decision taken by the Screening Committee in the instant case could not have been faulted by the Division Bench." 15. The Full Bench of High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the case of Ashutosh Pawar Vs. High Court of MP and ors. (2018 (2) MPLJ 419) has held as under:- "32. Therefore, in respect of the Questions No. 1, 4 and 5 14 we hold that decision of criminal Court on the basis of compromise or an acquittal cannot be treated that the candidate possesses good character, which may make him eligible, as the criminal proceedings are with the view to find culpability of commission of offence whereas the appointment to the civil post is in view of his suitability to the post. The test for each of them is based upon different parameters and therefore, acquittal in a criminal case is not a certificate of good conduct to a candidate. The competent Authority has to take a decision in respect of the suitability of candidate to discharge the functions of a civil post and that mere acquittal in a criminal case would not be sufficient to infer that the candidate possesses good character. In this view of the matter, we find that the judgment in Arvind Gurjar's case (Arvind Gurjar Vs. State of MP) (2016 MPLJ Online 35) holding that it cannot be held that candidate does not have a good character, is not the correct enunciation of law. Consequently, the judgment in Arvind Gurjar's case (supra) is overruled..” 16. If the situation is analysed in the light of aforesaid proposition of law, it is seen that mere acquittal based upon compromise, does not give any right to the petitioner to continue his service. Rather, if the petitioner has been clear cut acquitted or acquitted on the basis of compromise, even then, it is the domain of the employer to consider and examine the case and while considering so, he can take into consideration the job profile, severity of charge levelled against employee and whether acquittal was honourable acquittal or merely on the ground of benefit of doubt or result of compromise. After examining, the employer is having a right to reject appointment of employee. 15 17. In instant case, there is no dispute about the fact that, while joining in service, there were two criminal antecedents against the petitioner, which he did not disclose while filling verification form (Annexure R- 2). It is also not in dispute that, the petitioner has been ultimately acquitted from those two criminal cases by the Courts. It seems that, circumstances of both the cases were not grave in nature in respect of petitioner. Petitioner is said to be tribal person, resident of Bhanupratappur of tribal District, Kanker (CG) and he was provided employment on the post of Peon on compassionate ground. After his termination, he filed review application, which was not allowed and vide Annexure P-8 dated 5-8-2016, respondent No. 2 communicated him that, if Inspector General of Police (Intelligence), Raipur, certifies that, he is competent for service, then his service may be restored. Meaning thereby, because of only said two criminal antecedents, the petitioner has been refused to be restored in his service and not on the ground of heinousness or gravity or circumstances of said two criminal antecedents. But, since the petitioner was appointed on the post of Peon and for said post, credentials, integrity, strict discipline, sincerity etc. are not expected upto the level, which is expected from officers / employees holding executive post, judicial post, security forces, etc. In aforecited cases, Hon’ble Supreme Court has taken strict view, particularly looking to the candidates/employees of higher post, or police force, but in instant case, situation is not like that. Because the petitioner was appointed on the lower post of peon, that too, on compassionate ground and he is said to be less educated tribal person, despite that, he cannot claim his re-instatement on the 16 said post as a matter of right, but if employer/respondent No. 2 considers it appropriate, in the circumstances and law laid down by the Supreme Court, as has been discussed in preceding paragraphs, then despite two criminal antecedents, he may consider the case of re-instatement of petitioner by taking liberal view, in fact situation of the case. 18. 18. Accordingly, this petition is disposed of granting liberty to the petitioner to file fresh application within a period of 30 days from today before the respondent No. 2 for his re-instatement and after filing such application, respondent No. 2 is directed to decide the same in view of above observations made by this Court, ignoring criminal antecedents of the petitioner if found appropriate, within further period of 60 days from the date of submission of application by the petitioner. 19. This petition is accordingly disposed of. 20. Interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. Sd/- (Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi) Judge Pathak